State v. Burgess

590 S.E.2d 42, 356 S.C. 572, 2003 S.C. App. LEXIS 204

Opinions

GOOLSBY, J.

Following an almost daylong drinking episode, Virginia Burgess killed her intoxicated husband sometime during the evening of August 7, 1998. She stabbed him forty-seven times. At trial, Burgess claimed not to remember anything about the evening after the two had argued. A jury convicted her of murder and possession of a weapon during a violent crime. The trial court sentenced her to thirty years imprisonment for murder and five years for the weapons charge, the sentences to run concurrently. On appeal, Burgess argues the trial court abused its discretion by not ordering a psychiatric examination pursuant to section 44-23-410 of the South Carolina Code¹ to determine her competency to stand trial. We disagree and affirm.

At a pretrial motions hearing held on the eve of trial in May 2000, nearly two years following the decedent’s death, defense counsel, who had undertaken the defense of Burgess three months before in February 2000, moved to have the trial court order an evaluation of Burgess’s competency to stand trial. Counsel asserted an inability to talk intelligently with her, stated his conversations with her led him to believe she could not assist in her own defense, and pointed to prior I.Q. tests that reflected that Burgess’s I.Q. registered between 56 and 66. He offered no medical or mental health records in support of the motion and referred only to records that related to her alcoholism and mental retardation.²

The trial judge examined Burgess under oath to determine if she understood the pending charges, the purpose of the proceedings, and the roles of the individuals involved. Burgess said that she understood what she was charged with, that the State claimed she had killed her husband in August of that year; that her lawyer’s role was “to represent” her and the prosecutor’s role was to “talk against me”; and that a jury would determine her guilt or innocence. Burgess acknowledged that when she talked to her lawyer, she thought she would be able to tell him her side of the story; and that the State would offer witnesses to testify against her and her lawyer would have an opportunity to question them.

Noting that Burgess’s demeanor in the courtroom “has been very appropriate” and pointing to the lack of any medical opinion regarding her competence to stand trial, the trial judge denied the request for a psychiatric examination. He found Burgess “seemed ... able to understand everything” he had asked her, appeared to understand the proceedings and the role of trial participants, was able to identify the person whom she was alleged to have killed and to state when the killing was alleged to have occurred, and understood the charges made against her.

Defense counsel renewed at trial the motion for a psychiatric examination of Burgess; however, the trial judge denied the motion.

The question of whether to order a competency examination falls within the discretion of the trial judge whose decision will not be overturned on appeal absent a clear showing of an abuse of that discretion.³ Burgess made no clear showing of an abuse of discretion here.

By statute, the question of whether a defendant is fit to stand trial depends upon whether the defendant, because of a lack of mental capacity, cannot “understand the proceedings” or “assist in his [or her] own defense.”⁴ Factors to be considered in determining whether further inquiry into a defendant’s fitness to stand trial is warranted include evidence of his or her irrational behavior, his or her demeanor at Mai, and any prior medical opinion on his or her competence to stand trial.⁵ In some circumstances, the presence of just one of these factors may justify a trial court’s ordering a further inquiry into a defendant’s competency to undergo trial.⁶

Here, Burgess had not previously been adjudicated incompetent to stand trial; the record does not belie the trial judge’s observation that her demeanor during the pretrial motion appeared to be “very appropriate”;⁷ and the record of the pretrial motion hearing manifests she understood the proceedings, the roles of the various participants, and the charges leveled against her. Beyond defense counsel’s statements regarding his inability to talk intelligently with Burgess and his opinion that she could not assist in her own defense, counsel offered nothing to demonstrate that Burgess’s mental retardation was such as to render her unfit to stand trial.⁸ Under these circumstances we are not inclined to second guess the trial judge and hold he did not clearly abuse his discretion in denying Burgess’s motion for a mental examination regarding her fitness to stand trial.⁹

AFFIRMED.

ANDERSON, J., concurs. CONNOR, J., dissents in a separate opinion.

1 . S.C.Code Ann. § 44-23-410 (2002) provides in relevant part:

Whenever a judge of the Circuit Court ... has reason to believe that a person on trial before him, charged with the commission of a criminal offense ..., is not fit to stand trial because the person lacks the capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense as a result of a lack of mental capacity, the judge shall:

(1) order examination of the person by two examiners designated by the Department of Mental Health if the person is suspected of having a mental illness or designated by the Department of Disabilities and Special Needs if the person is suspected of being mentally retarded or having a related disability or by both sets of examiners if the person is suspected of having both mental illness and mental retardation or a related disability ...; or

(2) order the person committed for examination and observation to an appropriate facility of the Department of Mental Health or the Department of Disabilities and Special Needs for a period not to exceed fifteen days....

2 . The trial judge asked defense counsel, "As I understand, there have been no prior medical or psychiatric opinions issued as to the issue of competence; is that right?” Counsel responded, "That’s correct, Your Honor.”

3 . State v. Locklair, 341 S.C. 352, 535 S.E.2d 420 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1093, 121 S.Ct. 817, 148 L.Ed.2d 701 (2001).

4 . S.C.Code Ann. § 44-23-410 (2002).

5 . State v. Blair, 275 S.C. 529, 273 S.E.2d 536 (1981).

6 . Id. at 533, 273 S.E.2d at 538.

7 . Nothing in the record indicates the trial judge experienced any difficulty in conversing with Burgess. Thus, we should defer to the trial judge’s finding in this regard. See, e.g., State v. Wright, 354 S.C. 48, 55, 579 S.E.2d 538, 542 (Ct.App.2003) (stating the "evaluation of demeanor and credibility [are] matters within the peculiar province of the circuit court”).

8 . Indeed, during her testimony both during a Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964) hearing and before the jury, Burgess appeared able to advise the court of the medication she had taken both in August 1998, when the killing occurred, and in May 2000, when the trial took place. Although some initial confusion developed regarding whether she was taking Prozac at the time of the offense, she explained that she was not taking it. Burgess admitted that she understood what her Miranda rights meant, but claimed she did not understand them when first questioned by the police. Further, she admitted she had refused to talk to the police at some point during the questioning because "I needed a lawyer and they read me my rights," and that she had invoked her right to counsel twice on the day the offense occurred. Her testimony before the jury provided a detailed account of her activities that led up to the crime and her activities on the morning she reportedly discovered her husband had been killed. Burgess testified she did not recall what had occurred when her husband returned home because she had either passed out or fallen asleep. Burgess's testimony, therefore, seems to undercut any question of her lack of competency to stand trial.

9 . See Richardson v. State, 663 S.W.2d 111, 113 (Tex.Ct.App.1983) (holding the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by refusing the defendant's motion for a psychiatric examination even though counsel's testimony revealed possible problems with the defendant’s communication, memory, and veracity where there was no psychiatric testimony and the defendant's testimony refuted counsel’s representations); see also State v. Chapin, 67 Ohio St.2d 437, 424 N.E.2d 317, 319-20 (1981) (finding "good cause" was not shown to grant a motion made during trial for a competency hearing where the defendant had previously been found competent to stand trial after a pretrial hearing and no objective indication of the defendant’s unfitness for trial was demonstrated by the defendant’s conduct, the defendant’s medical records, or defense counsel’s mere assertions that the defendant's fitness was now questionable).