[554]*554DEITS, C. J.
Appellant, an allegedly mentally ill person, appeals an order in which the trial court found that she is mentally ill, as defined in ORS 426.005(l)(d), and committed her to the Mental Health Division for a period not to exceed 180 days. ORS 426.130(l)(b)(C). We affirm.
ORS 426.100(1) requires a trial court to advise an allegedly mentally ill person, at the time that the person is brought before the court, of the following things:
“(a) The reason for being brought before the court;
“(b) The nature of the proceedings;
“(c) The possible results of the proceedings;
“(d) The right to subpoena witness; and
“(e) The person’s rights regarding representation by or appointment of counsel.”
Appellant argues, in her first assignment of error, that the advice that the court gave her at the beginning of the hearing was insufficient to satisfy that statute. The court stated, inter alia:
“Ms. Buffum, this is the time that * * * has been set for a hearing that will be held to determine whether or not that you’re mentally ill. The Court is required by law — I’m required by law to give you that information, although I’m sure you’re aware of it.
“At these proceedings the witnesses will be called. It will be the State’s burden of showing that you are mentally ill, as that expression is defined in the statutes, and they’ll do that by calling witnesses in and perhaps presenting other evidence.”1 (Emphasis added.)
Appellant contends that, although the court’s statement informed her that the hearing would be directed at determining whether she was mentally ill, within the meaning of the applicable statutes, the court was required and failed to further “inform appellant that to be found mentally [555]*555ill under the statute she must be found to be either ‘a danger to herself or others’ or ‘unable to provide for her basic personal needs.’ ” See ORS 426.005(1)(d)(A), (B).2 Appellant asserts that the court’s failure to provide that additional information violated its obligation to advise about both the “reason for [her] being brought before the court” and the “nature of the proceedings.”
The first aspect of appellant’s argument requires little comment. The court explained to her that the reason for her being before the court was to determine whether she was mentally ill and, if so, whether she should be involuntarily committed for up to 180 days. Appellant’s contention that that information was insufficient under ORS 426.100(l)(a) is not tenable. However, whether the advice was adequate to apprise appellant of the nature of the proceedings, as required by ORS 426.100(l)(b), presents a more colorable question.
Beginning with the statutory language, the meaning of “proceedings” is clear in this context; it refers to the hearing that the trial court will conduct after giving the required statutory advice. The applicable dictionary definitions of “nature” are “the essential character or constitution of something,” especially “the essence or ultimate form of something” and “the distinguishing qualities or properties of something[.]” Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary, 1507 (unabridged ed 1993). Thus, the statute required the trial court to advise appellant of the essence or the essential character of the hearing that it was about to conduct.
Appellant offers little explanation of why she perceives the term “nature of the proceedings” in the context of ORS 426.100(1) as encompassing a requirement that an allegedly mentally ill person be informed by the court of the various specific and substantive bases on which a finding of “mental illness” may be based. The dissent, however, offers more of an explanation. It equates the essential character of a proceeding with the specific issues that the court will be [556]*556called upon to decide in it. We disagree with that understanding. In our view, the “essence” of a thing refers to its basic character, not to its refinements and certainly not to the specific variations of it that may or may not be presented in particular instances. Hence, as we read the language of the statute, the term “nature of the proceedings” in ORS 426.100(l)(b) does not encompass particularized advice about the legal and evidentiary standards that are applicable in the proceedings. Rather, the statutory language supports the view that what is required is a description of the nature of the proceedings in the most basic and general of terms, such as those that the trial court used here.
The context points to the same interpretation. ORS 426.100(1) requires the court to advise the allegedly mentally ill person of five separate items of information. Each of those items relates to a matter that could consume a full semester of a law school course. However, each could also contemplate a quantum of general and comprehensible information that could be communicated in a single sentence or two and that, taken together, could provide an allegedly mentally ill layperson with sufficient productively usable information to enable the person to take the actions necessary to protect his or her interests. We think that the legislature intended the statute to fulfill the latter purpose.
Further, ORS 426.100(1) must be viewed as part of a complex statutory scheme that serves to protect the rights of allegedly mentally ill persons and not as the sole source of protection. Most importantly, ORS 426.100(3) provides for the right to representation by and appointment of qualified counsel — a right that is virtually more difficult to waive than is the corresponding right of defendants in criminal cases. It belabors the obvious to say that an attorney who, in the words of ORS 426.100(3)(a), must possess “skills and experience commensurate with the nature of the allegations and complexity of the case,” will be fully aware of the legal and evidentiary particulars that the majority holds the court must include in its preliminary advice to the allegedly mentally ill layperson.
[557]
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
[554]*554DEITS, C. J.
Appellant, an allegedly mentally ill person, appeals an order in which the trial court found that she is mentally ill, as defined in ORS 426.005(l)(d), and committed her to the Mental Health Division for a period not to exceed 180 days. ORS 426.130(l)(b)(C). We affirm.
ORS 426.100(1) requires a trial court to advise an allegedly mentally ill person, at the time that the person is brought before the court, of the following things:
“(a) The reason for being brought before the court;
“(b) The nature of the proceedings;
“(c) The possible results of the proceedings;
“(d) The right to subpoena witness; and
“(e) The person’s rights regarding representation by or appointment of counsel.”
Appellant argues, in her first assignment of error, that the advice that the court gave her at the beginning of the hearing was insufficient to satisfy that statute. The court stated, inter alia:
“Ms. Buffum, this is the time that * * * has been set for a hearing that will be held to determine whether or not that you’re mentally ill. The Court is required by law — I’m required by law to give you that information, although I’m sure you’re aware of it.
“At these proceedings the witnesses will be called. It will be the State’s burden of showing that you are mentally ill, as that expression is defined in the statutes, and they’ll do that by calling witnesses in and perhaps presenting other evidence.”1 (Emphasis added.)
Appellant contends that, although the court’s statement informed her that the hearing would be directed at determining whether she was mentally ill, within the meaning of the applicable statutes, the court was required and failed to further “inform appellant that to be found mentally [555]*555ill under the statute she must be found to be either ‘a danger to herself or others’ or ‘unable to provide for her basic personal needs.’ ” See ORS 426.005(1)(d)(A), (B).2 Appellant asserts that the court’s failure to provide that additional information violated its obligation to advise about both the “reason for [her] being brought before the court” and the “nature of the proceedings.”
The first aspect of appellant’s argument requires little comment. The court explained to her that the reason for her being before the court was to determine whether she was mentally ill and, if so, whether she should be involuntarily committed for up to 180 days. Appellant’s contention that that information was insufficient under ORS 426.100(l)(a) is not tenable. However, whether the advice was adequate to apprise appellant of the nature of the proceedings, as required by ORS 426.100(l)(b), presents a more colorable question.
Beginning with the statutory language, the meaning of “proceedings” is clear in this context; it refers to the hearing that the trial court will conduct after giving the required statutory advice. The applicable dictionary definitions of “nature” are “the essential character or constitution of something,” especially “the essence or ultimate form of something” and “the distinguishing qualities or properties of something[.]” Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary, 1507 (unabridged ed 1993). Thus, the statute required the trial court to advise appellant of the essence or the essential character of the hearing that it was about to conduct.
Appellant offers little explanation of why she perceives the term “nature of the proceedings” in the context of ORS 426.100(1) as encompassing a requirement that an allegedly mentally ill person be informed by the court of the various specific and substantive bases on which a finding of “mental illness” may be based. The dissent, however, offers more of an explanation. It equates the essential character of a proceeding with the specific issues that the court will be [556]*556called upon to decide in it. We disagree with that understanding. In our view, the “essence” of a thing refers to its basic character, not to its refinements and certainly not to the specific variations of it that may or may not be presented in particular instances. Hence, as we read the language of the statute, the term “nature of the proceedings” in ORS 426.100(l)(b) does not encompass particularized advice about the legal and evidentiary standards that are applicable in the proceedings. Rather, the statutory language supports the view that what is required is a description of the nature of the proceedings in the most basic and general of terms, such as those that the trial court used here.
The context points to the same interpretation. ORS 426.100(1) requires the court to advise the allegedly mentally ill person of five separate items of information. Each of those items relates to a matter that could consume a full semester of a law school course. However, each could also contemplate a quantum of general and comprehensible information that could be communicated in a single sentence or two and that, taken together, could provide an allegedly mentally ill layperson with sufficient productively usable information to enable the person to take the actions necessary to protect his or her interests. We think that the legislature intended the statute to fulfill the latter purpose.
Further, ORS 426.100(1) must be viewed as part of a complex statutory scheme that serves to protect the rights of allegedly mentally ill persons and not as the sole source of protection. Most importantly, ORS 426.100(3) provides for the right to representation by and appointment of qualified counsel — a right that is virtually more difficult to waive than is the corresponding right of defendants in criminal cases. It belabors the obvious to say that an attorney who, in the words of ORS 426.100(3)(a), must possess “skills and experience commensurate with the nature of the allegations and complexity of the case,” will be fully aware of the legal and evidentiary particulars that the majority holds the court must include in its preliminary advice to the allegedly mentally ill layperson.
[557]*557Ultimately, neither appellant nor the dissent bring anything except policy considerations and postulations to bear in support of their view that the “nature of the proceedings” under ORS 426.100(l)(b) must include a description of the legal criteria for a finding of mental illness under ORS 426.005(l)(d). The dissent cites a number of Oregon appellate decisions where phrases such as “nature of the proceedings” and analogous phrases appear, and the dissent attempts to piece language from those opinions together in a way that supports its view that “nature of the proceedings” is all but synonymous with the specific issues and evidence in the proceedings. However, far and away the most frequent use that the appellate courts have made of the phrase “nature of the proceedings” and its analogs has been to describe classifications and distinctions of the most basic and substantively unadorned kinds. See, e.g., Hartford v. Aetna/Mt. Hood Radio, 270 Or 226, 229, 527 P2d 406 (1974) (legal versus equitable); In re J. Kelly Farris, 229 Or 209, 218, 367 P2d 387 (1961) (civil versus criminal nature of bar disciplinary proceeding); Harney Valley Irr. Dist. v. Bolton, 109 Or 486, 492, 221 P 171 (1923) {in rem proceeding); Stewart v. City of Corvallis, 48 Or App 709, 617 P2d 921 (1980), rev den 290 Or 491 (1981) (quasi-judicial proceeding).
Appellant and the dissent also seek support in State v. Allison, 129 Or App 47, 877 P2d 660 (1994). We held in that case that, notwithstanding the fact that the allegedly mentally ill person was represented by counsel and had “stipulated to the facts and to his commitment,” id. at 50, the trial court committed reversible error by failing to provide advice pursuant to ORS 426.100(1). Allison is simply inapposite. It says and suggests nothing about the substance of the information that a court must provide when it does advise an allegedly mentally ill person pursuant to ORS 426.100(1). We hold that the trial court satisfied the requirements of ORS 426.100(l)(b) by advising appellant that the hearing will be held “to determine whether or not * * * you’re mentally ill” (along with apprising her that testimony and other evidence would be presented).
[558]*558In her second assignment of error, appellant challenges the correctness of the trial court’s findings and its resulting conclusion that she is mentally ill. On de novo review, we agree with the trial court.3
Affirmed.