[Cite as State v. Brock, 2025-Ohio-2538.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO : : C.A. No. 30374 Appellee : : Trial Court Case No. 2024 CR 00184 v. : : (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas JONAS BROCK : Court) : Appellant : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY & : OPINION
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Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on July 18, 2025, the judgment of the
trial court is affirmed.
Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24.
Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately
serve notice of this judgment upon all parties and make a note in the docket of the service.
Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified
copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note
the service on the appellate docket.
For the court,
[[Applied Signature]] MICHAEL L. TUCKER, JUDGE
Lewis, J., and Hanseman, J., concur. -2-
OPINION MONTGOMERY C.A. No. 30374
CHIMA R. EKEH, Attorney for Appellant MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by MICHAEL P. ALLEN, Attorney for Appellee
TUCKER, J.
{¶ 1} Jonas Brock appeals from his conviction following a jury trial on charges of
gross sexual imposition and illegal use of a minor in nudity-oriented material.
{¶ 2} Brock challenges the trial court’s refusal to excuse two prospective jurors for
cause, requiring him to exercise peremptory challenges on them. He contends the trial court
erred in admitting incriminating video evidence absent a proper foundation. He claims the
trial court erred in failing to use his proposed special jury instructions. Finally, he asserts that
his convictions were based on legally insufficient evidence and were against the manifest
weight of the evidence.
{¶ 3} We conclude that the trial court did not err in refusing to excuse the two
prospective jurors for cause, admitting the challenged videos into evidence, or declining to
give the requested special jury instructions. Having reviewed the record, we are also
unpersuaded by Brock’s legal-sufficiency and manifest-weight arguments regarding the
State’s evidence. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment will be affirmed.
I. Background
{¶ 4} The charges against Brock involved his touching his girlfriend’s 10-year-old
daughter’s bare buttocks and recording cell-phone videos of the activity. The State’s primary
witness at trial was the child’s mother, T.H. She testified that Brock lived with her and her -3- three daughters when she accessed two of his cell phones on the morning of January 15,
2024, and found three videos among deleted files. T.H. testified that the videos depicted
Brock fondling her 10-year-old daughter’s bare buttocks while the child appeared to be
asleep in the couple’s bed. After seeing the videos, T.H. confronted Brock, who insisted that
they depicted the torso of a silicone sex doll. Brock then left the house, and T.H. called the
police.
{¶ 5} The child underwent a forensic interview at CARE House as part of the police
investigation, but she did not disclose any abuse or sexual assault. A detective also
interviewed Brock. During the interview, he again claimed that the videos showed the torso
of a silicone sex doll he had found while cleaning out a vacant apartment in the fall of 2023.
Brock explained that he brought the doll home in a duffle bag and hid it. He claimed that he
then dressed the doll in the 10-year-old child’s clothing and made the videos. Brock
maintained that he deleted the videos and discarded the doll on the same day that T.H.
discovered the recordings.
{¶ 6} In his defense, Brock presented testimony from a private investigator who had
been retained to research sex dolls. The investigator testified as to the availability of realistic-
looking silicone dolls in a variety of skin tones and textures with customizable blemishes
including freckles and scars.
{¶ 7} Based on the evidence presented, the jury found Brock guilty of both charges.
The trial court imposed concurrent sentences totaling a minimum of two and a maximum of
three years in prison. It also designated him a Tier II sex offender. Brock timely appealed,
advancing five assignments of error. The trial court stayed execution of his sentence pending
the outcome of the appeal. -4-
II. Analysis
{¶ 8} Brock’s first assignment of error states:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO STRIKE JURORS FOR
CAUSE IN VIOLATION OF BROCK’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A FAIR
TRIAL AND IMPARTIAL JURY.
{¶ 9} Brock contends the trial court erred in overruling his motion to strike two
prospective jurors for cause. During voir dire, both prospective jurors, a male and a female,
struggled with the concept of a defendant’s choosing not to testify in a criminal case. They
stated that they would expect an innocent person to tell his story. The male prospective juror
also stated that the testimony of a police officer is more credible than the testimony of other
witnesses due to the additional oath that law-enforcement officers take. The female
prospective juror stated that if a parent claimed a child had been sexually abused but the
child denied abuse, she would be more likely to believe the parent based solely on the
parent’s status as a parent. After questioning by counsel, the trial court questioned both
prospective jurors and ultimately denied Brock’s for-cause challenges. Brock then exercised
peremptory challenges to remove both prospective jurors.
{¶ 10} On appeal, Brock contends the two prospective jurors were subject to
dismissal for cause under R.C. 2313.17(B)(9) and R.C. 2313.17(D). The former provision
provides that good cause exists to remove a prospective juror if the person’s answers
disclose that he or she “cannot be a fair and impartial juror or will not follow the law[.]” The
latter provision provides that “any petit juror may be challenged on suspicion of prejudice
against or partiality for either party . . . or other cause that may render the juror at the time
an unsuitable juror.” A challenge under subdivision (D) “shall be sustained if the court has -5- any doubt as to the juror’s being entirely unbiased.”
{¶ 11} In Estate of Price v. Kidney Care Specialist, LLC, 2024-Ohio-3122 (2d Dist.),
appeal allowed, 2024-Ohio-5529, we recognized that R.C. 2313.17(B)(1-8) identifies eight
“principal challenges that, if established, require the juror’s removal.” Id. at ¶ 9, citing Hall v.
Banc One Mgt. Corp., 2007-Ohio-4640, ¶ 1. “This is so because the challenges set forth by
R.C. 2313.17 (B)(1-8) are objective determinations which, if established, preclude a trial
court’s discretion to conclude that despite the existence of a R.C. 2313.17(B)(1-8)
disqualifier, the juror may nonetheless be an appropriate juror.” Id., citing Hall at ¶ 36.
{¶ 12} The challenge created by R.C. 2313.17(B)(9), however, is different. It “requires
the court to make a subjective determination about a potential juror’s fairness and impartiality
and therefore requires the exercise of judicial discretion.” Hall at ¶ 1, citing Berk v. Matthews,
53 Ohio St.3d 161 (1990); see also Estate of Price at ¶ 10. When addressing a challenge
under R.C. 2313.17(B)(9), a trial court may engage in further questioning of a prospective
juror and, in the exercise of its discretion, may conclude that the juror is capable of being
fair, impartial, and following the law. Estate of Price at ¶ 12 (“However, unlike the immutable
R.C. 2313.17(B)(1-8) disqualifiers, a juror’s initial response to a question regarding the
burden of proof or another legal topic is not fixed but instead is subject to change following
further questioning and explanation. As such, we conclude that the appellate standard of
review when evaluating a R.C. 2313.17(B)(9) challenge—whether for an inability to be fair
and impartial or to follow the law—is the abuse of discretion standard.”).
{¶ 13} Similarly, R.C. 2313.17(D) “ ‘requires the court to make a subjective
determination about a potential juror’s fairness and impartiality and therefore requires the
exercise of judicial discretion.’ ” Curley v. Wilcox, 2023-Ohio-3507, ¶ 17 (2d Dist.), quoting
Hall at ¶ 1. “ ‘The determination of whether a juror is impartial or biased involves a judgment -6- of credibility, which may not be apparent from the record on appeal. Therefore, a reviewing
court will defer to the trial judge who sees and hears the juror.’ ” Id., quoting Hunt v. E.
Cleveland, 2019-Ohio-1115, ¶ 37 (8th Dist.).
{¶ 14} Upon review, we see no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s refusal to excuse
either of the two prospective jurors for cause under R.C. 2313.17(B)(9) or R.C. 2313.17(D).
While being questioned by defense counsel, the male prospective juror ultimately affirmed
that he could hold a police officer to “the same level” and the “same standard as everyone
else” who testified. Regarding the need for a defendant to testify, the male and female
prospective jurors both ultimately assured the trial court that they could follow the law
regarding Brock’s constitutional right not to testify. They agreed not to consider for any
purpose his failure to testify at trial.
{¶ 15} Regarding the female prospective juror’s statement about believing a parent’s
testimony over a child’s testimony when there is a conflict, defense counsel asked the
following question: “If a parent says that their child has been sexually molested, but the child
says no, nothing happened, who here thinks it’s likely that something still happened?” The
female prospective jury responded affirmatively, stating that “the parent would probably
know” and that “the child probably don’t understand that something did happen.” Upon
further questioning, the female prospective juror confirmed that she would be more likely to
believe the parent “in that hypothetical.” The female prospective juror expressed an inability
to follow a rule requiring her not to give a parent’s testimony more credibility than a child’s
testimony based on the parent’s status as a parent.
{¶ 16} The female prospective juror’s position on the foregoing issue would be
problematic if the present case involved conflicting testimony from T.H. and her 10-year-old
daughter. But the hypothetical scenario envisioned by defense counsel remained purely -7- hypothetical, as it did not transpire at trial. As noted above, T.H. testified that the videos at
issue depicted Brock fondling her 10-year-old daughter’s buttocks. Unlike the hypothetical
scenario presented by defense counsel, the child did not contradict T.H. by claiming that
nothing had happened. The child did not testify, and no statements by the child were
introduced through any other witnesses. A detective testified only that the child made “no
disclosures,” which is not the same as saying nothing happened. The detective’s testimony
established only that the child did not talk about the incident, quite possibly because she
purportedly was asleep when it occurred.
{¶ 17} Given that defense counsel’s scenario involving conflicting parent-child
testimony remained purely hypothetical, the female prospective juror’s view favoring a
parent’s testimony over a child’s was immaterial. “The relevant inquiry during voir dire is
whether the juror’s beliefs would prevent or substantially impair his or her performance of
the duty in accordance with the instructions and oath.” State v. Franklin, 2002-Ohio-5304,
¶ 34. Here the female prospective juror’s belief about a parent’s testimony being more
credible than a child’s conflicting testimony did not impair her ability to serve because the
case did not involve that issue. “[P]rejudice not directed personally at the accused or
materially affecting the fairness of the trial does not automatically qualify for dismissal.”
Baldwin’s Ohio Practice Criminal Law § 64:3 (3d ed.); see also Shifflett v. Virginia, 221 Va.
760, 771 (1981) (“Whether a juror is impartial and stands indifferent to the cause is to be
determined in light of the controverted issues.”); Artis v. Santos, 95 F.4th 518, 529 (7th Cir.
2024) (reasoning that “[i]mmaterial and uncontestable beliefs prejudice no one and are not,
strictly speaking, ‘biases’ ”); Garry v. Borger, 2023-Ohio-905, ¶ 16 (1st Dist.) (“After
interviewing this juror, the trial court was convinced that she would make an effective juror
and that any bias she may have would not be relevant in the present civil case.”). -8- {¶ 18} For the foregoing reasons, we do not believe the trial court acted
unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unconscionably in refusing to excuse either of the two
prospective jurors for cause. Accordingly, Brock’s first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 19} The second assignment of error states:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ADMITTED THE VIDEO
EVIDENCE CONTAINED IN STATE’S EXHIBIT 1-A, 1-B, AND 1-C.
{¶ 20} Brock contends the trial court erred in admitting the cell-phone videos into
evidence. Although T.H. discovered the videos on his two cell phones, he argues that she
provided no “foundation” testimony establishing her personal knowledge that the videos
depicted her daughter’s buttocks. Brock notes that T.H. did not describe any specific
characteristics or defining features of her daughter’s buttocks. She simply looked at the
videos and expressed certainty that they showed her 10-year-old daughter’s bottom. Brock
asserts that this testimony “was not sufficient to constitute the minimal foundation of
authenticity necessary to establish the identity of a person in a video beyond a reasonable
doubt.”
{¶ 21} Upon review, we find Brock’s argument to be unpersuasive. T.H. testified
about finding the videos on Brock’s cell phones, and she confirmed that the videos shown
at trial were the same ones she had discovered. This testimony adequately authenticated
the recordings as accurate depictions of what she had seen on Brock’s cell phones. We note
too that Brock never denied making the videos. The issue at trial was whether they showed
T.H.’s daughter or a silicone doll.
{¶ 22} As for the subject matter of the videos, we see nothing improper about T.H.’s
testimony that she knew her daughter and knew that the recordings depicted her daughter’s
buttocks. T.H.’s failure to reference distinguishing characteristics or unique features of her -9- daughter’s bottom went to the weight of her testimony, not its admissibility or the authenticity
of the recordings. The second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 23} The third assignment of error states:
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FAILING TO
ADOPT BROCK’S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN VIOLATION OF
HIS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL UNDER THE FIFTH, SIXTH, AND
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION.
{¶ 24} Brock contends the trial court erred in failing to provide the jury with six special
instructions he proposed. The first stated that the prosecution was required to prove that the
videos depicted “an actual, living human being” or a “person” rather than “an inanimate
object, such as a silicone doll.” The second stated that a silicone doll is not a “person” and
that a not-guilty verdict was required if jurors had reasonable doubt as to whether the videos
showed a “living human being.” The third advised that the prosecution was required to prove
that the individual depicted in the videos “was not an inanimate object.” The fourth stated
that the prosecution was required to prove that the individual depicted was under age 13.
The fifth stated that the defense had no obligation to prove that the videos depicted a silicone
doll and, instead, that the prosecution bore the burden to prove “that the images show[ed] a
living human being under the age of thirteen.” The sixth specified that the prosecution was
required to prove each of the following: “That the images depict a human being; That the
human being depicted was not inanimate; like a doll; and That the human being depicted
was under the age of thirteen years.” The trial court declined to give any of these instructions,
relying instead on standard Ohio jury instructions addressing gross sexual imposition and
illegal use of a minor in nudity-oriented material.
{¶ 25} “A defendant is only entitled to have his proposed jury instructions given when -10- they are correct statements of the law, pertinent to the evidence in the record or to material
issues, and are timely presented and not already included in the substance of the jury
charge.” State v. Elliott, 2014-Ohio-4958, ¶ 23, (2d Dist.), citing State v. Guster, 66 Ohio
St.2d 266, 269 (1981). “When reviewing the trial court’s jury instructions, the proper standard
of review is whether the trial court’s decision to give or exclude a particular jury instruction
was an abuse of discretion under the facts and circumstances of the case.” (Citation
omitted.) State v. Fair, 2011-Ohio-4454, ¶ 65 (2d Dist.).
{¶ 26} Here the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give the requested
instructions because they were included in the substance of its jury charge. Regarding gross
sexual imposition, the trial court instructed the jury that a guilty verdict required it to find,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that Brock had engaged in sexual contact with another person
who was less than 13 years old. The trial court defined “sexual contact” as touching an
erogenous zone of another person for purposes of sexually arousing or gratifying either
person.
{¶ 27} As for illegal use of a minor in nudity-oriented material, the trial court instructed
the jury that a guilty verdict required a finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Brock had
“photographed a minor who was not the Defendant’s child or ward in a state of nudity, or
created or produced any material or performance that showed a minor who was not the
Defendant’s child or ward in a state of nudity.” The trial court specifically instructed the jury
that a “minor” for purposes of this charge meant a person under age 18. The trial court also
instructed the jury that “nudity” included showing “human male or female genitals, pubic
area, or buttocks” or “a human breast.”
{¶ 28} The foregoing instructions made clear the applicable age requirements and
the fact that convictions required Brock to have recorded an actual person rather than a -11- silicone doll. The trial court was not required to specify that a silicone doll is not a human
person or that a human person is not an inanimate object. The trial court’s jury charge also
adequately explained the burden of proof. We see nothing relevant in Brock’s proposed
instructions that was not incorporated in the trial court’s jury charge. Therefore, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give the requested special instructions. The third
assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 29} The fourth and fifth assignments of error state:
BROCK’S CONVICTIONS WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE.
BROCK’S CONVICTIONS WERE AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT
OF THE EVIDENCE.
{¶ 30} Brock’s final two assignments of error challenge the legal sufficiency and
manifest weight of the evidence to sustain his convictions for gross sexual imposition and
{¶ 31} Regarding legal sufficiency, Brock contends the State presented legally
insufficient evidence to prove (1) that the videos depicted a person, i.e., a “living, breathing,
human,” (2) when the recordings were made, or (3) that the sexual contact was for the
purpose of sexually arousing or gratifying either person, as required for a gross-sexual-
imposition conviction.
{¶ 32} In support of his manifest-weight argument, Brock suggests that T.H.’s
daughter could not have slept through the recording incident, which involved him pulling
down the child’s jeans, rubbing and spreading her buttocks, and pushing his fingers toward
her vagina. He notes that the torso depicted in the videos did not flinch, shift, or make any
movement. He also points out that the torso showed no signs of breathing and that the -12- videos showed no face, hands, or legs. He stresses too that CARE House team members
were unable to say whether the videos depicted a person or a silicone doll. Brock contends
T.H.’s explanation about her daughter being a heavy sleeper defied credibility. He also notes
that she failed to mention any identifying characteristics or defining features of her
daughter’s buttocks. Finally, Brock points out that T.H. originally misidentified a pink
sweatshirt as being depicted in the videos when speaking to police.
{¶ 33} In contrast to T.H.’s testimony, Brock contends he credibly told a detective that
the videos depicted the torso of a sex doll he found when cleaning an apartment. According
to the detective, Brock admitted sneaking the doll home, dressing it in T.H.’s 10-year-old
daughter’s clothes, and making videos of himself touching it. Brock also told the detective
that he made the videos because he and T.H. had not been sexually active for some time,
and he wanted to masturbate while viewing them. Brock claimed he discarded the doll and
deleted the videos the same day T.H. discovered the recordings because they had
reconciled with each other. Brock also cites his private investigator’s testimony about the
existence and availability of realistic-looking silicone dolls. Finally, he notes that T.H.’s
daughter did not disclose any abuse to CARE House team members and did not testify at
trial.
{¶ 34} “An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine
whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant’s
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence
in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio
St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. -13- {¶ 35} Our analysis is different when reviewing a manifest-weight argument. When a
conviction is challenged on appeal as being against the weight of the evidence, an appellate
court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences,
consider witness credibility, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence,
the trier of fact “clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that
the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d
380, 387 (1997). A judgment should be reversed as being against the manifest weight of the
evidence “only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the
conviction.” State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983).
{¶ 36} With the foregoing standards in mind, we reject Brock’s legal-sufficiency
argument. T.H. testified without any doubt that the videos depicted her 10-year-old
daughter’s bare buttocks. This testimony alone, if believed, was legally sufficient for the jury
to find that the recordings depicted a live person, not a silicone doll. State v. Belsar, 2025-
Ohio-57, ¶ 14 (2d Dist.) (recognizing that the testimony of a single witness, if believed, may
be legally sufficient to support a conviction). As for when the videos were made, Brock
himself admitted to a detective that he made them sometime in December 2023. The record
also contains evidence that the video files found on his cell phones were dated “20231231.”
Consistent with Brock’s admission, the detective reasonably inferred that this meant
December 31, 2023. At that time, T.H.’s daughter was 10 years old. Finally, Brock admitted
to the detective that he made the videos with the intent of masturbating while watching them.
This admission was legally sufficient to establish that he touched T.H.’s daughter’s
erogenous zone for the purpose of sexually arousing or gratifying himself. Even if we accept
Brock’s assertion that he had no present intent to sexually arouse or gratify himself at the
precise time he made the videos, R.C. 2907.01(B) imposed no such requirement. The -14- statute simply required him to touch the victim’s erogenous zone “for the purpose of sexually
arousing or gratifying either person.” Brock’s admission that he intended later to masturbate
to the videos established his intent to sexually arouse or gratify himself. For the foregoing
reasons, we reject his legal-sufficiency challenge to his convictions.
{¶ 37} Regarding the manifest weight of the evidence, Brock raises credibility issues
that properly were for the jury to resolve. As noted above, he argues that T.H.’s young
daughter could not have slept through the incident, that the torso depicted in the videos did
not move or show signs of breathing, that CARE House employees could not say whether
the recordings depicted a person or a doll, that T.H.’s testimony that her daughter was a
heavy sleeper defied credibility, that T.H. failed to mention any distinguishing features on
her daughter’s buttocks, that T.H. misidentified a pink sweatshirt as being shown in the
videos, that he provided a consistent explanation for his possession and recording of a
silicone doll, that his private investigator testified about the existence of lifelike silicone dolls,
and that T.H.’s daughter did not disclose any abuse to CARE House team members and did
not testify at trial.
{¶ 38} Having reviewed the record, we cannot say the jury created a manifest
miscarriage of justice in rejecting Brock’s arguments and finding him guilty. T.H. testified that
the torso depicted in the videos was wearing her 10-year-old daughter’s clothing in a bed
where the child slept. T.H. recognized her daughter’s blankets, jeans, and shirt. T.H.
additionally noticed that the torso depicted in the videos was wearing jeans without
underwear. She testified that her 10-year-old daughter tended not to wear underwear. T.H.
also explained that the child was a heavy sleeper. She repeatedly opined that her daughter
likely would have remained asleep during the recording of the videos. We note too that Brock
never produced the silicone doll that he claimed to have recorded. When being interviewed -15- by the detective, he asserted that he had thrown it away earlier on the same day that T.H.
discovered the videos. At trial, the detective also noted that the shirt on the torso in the
videos “went out to the right” where an arm would be if a person were wearing it. The
detective further opined that a hood on the shirt appeared to be “popped up” as if there were
a head present.
{¶ 39} As for Brock’s argument about CARE House representatives not knowing
whether the videos depicted a person or a doll, the detective testified that they
acknowledged lacking any special ability to make such an evaluation. We note too that T.H.’s
failure to mention any distinguishing features may have impacted the weight of her testimony
but did not preclude the jury from relying on it and finding it credible. T.H. testified without
hesitation or uncertainty that “I just know my baby—my baby’s bottom.” The jury was entitled
to credit this testimony. Initially, T.H. did mistakenly refer to a pink sweatshirt as being seen
in the videos. She later realized her mistake and gave police a white article of clothing that
was depicted in the videos. As for Brock’s argument about the child not disclosing any abuse
to CARE House team members, the record reflects only that she made “no disclosures.” In
its closing argument, the State correctly noted that making “no disclosures” was not the
same as saying nothing happened. It established only that the child did not talk about the
incident.
{¶ 40} Ultimately, the jury had to decide whether the bare buttocks depicted in the
videos wearing T.H.’s daughter’s clothing in a bed where the child slept was the child’s body
or whether it was silicone torso that Brock had found, snuck into the house, recorded, and
then discarded in an unspecified location on the same day that T.H. discovered the videos.
In resolving this issue in favor of the State and finding Brock guilty, the jury did not clearly
lose its way. This was not an exceptional case in which the evidence weighed heavily against -16- his convictions. The fourth and fifth assignments of error are overruled.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 41} The judgment of the Montgomery County Common Pleas Court is affirmed.
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LEWIS, J. and HANSEMAN, J., concur.