[Cite as Laudato v. Teramana, 2026-Ohio-1585.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY
NICHOLAS LAUDATO : : C.A. No. 30611 Appellant : : Trial Court Case No. 2023 CV 05613 v. : : (Civil Appeal from Common Pleas MARNI ANN TERAMANA D.O. ET AL. : Court) : Appellees : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY & : OPINION
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Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on May 1, 2026, the judgment of the
trial court is affirmed.
Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24.
Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately
serve notice of this judgment upon all parties and make a note in the docket of the service.
Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified
copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note
the service on the appellate docket.
For the court,
CHRISTOPHER B. EPLEY, JUDGE
TUCKER, J., and HUFFMAN, J., concur. OPINION MONTGOMERY C.A. No. 30611
LOUIS C. SCHNEIDER, Attorney for Appellant JOHN B. WELCH and GERALD J. TODARO, Attorneys for Appellees
EPLEY, J.
{¶ 1} Nicholas Laudato, as administrator and personal representative of the estate of
Denise Holland, appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion for a new trial. He claims
that the trial court denied him a fair trial when it failed to dismiss three prospective jurors for
cause during jury selection. For the following reasons, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} On October 19, 2019, 55-year-old Denise Holland went to the emergency
department at Kettering Medical Center for shortness of breath. Holland had been a long-
time smoker, and she suffered from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. She was also
recovering from recent surgery for breast cancer.
{¶ 3} Holland arrived at approximately 10:30 p.m., and while in the waiting room, she
received the first of a series of three breathing treatments in accordance with the advanced
triage guidelines for a patient with respiratory distress. After being taken to a room, she
received care from Dr. Marni Ann Teramana, an emergency medicine physician, and others.
Over the next three hours or so, Holland received the two additional breathing treatments,
got a chest x-ray and an EKG, and was assessed multiple times. At approximately 1:30 a.m.
on October 20, 2019, a nurse administered steroids and then walked Holland around the
emergency department. At 1:55 a.m., Holland was discharged and sent home. She walked
out of the hospital without difficulty.
2 {¶ 4} Between 2:30 a.m. and 3:00 a.m., Holland collapsed in her home. Her daughter,
Lauren, called 911, and Holland was taken by ambulance to Sycamore Hospital. Holland
underwent severe respiratory failure and cardiac arrest, and her brain was deprived of
oxygen. Holland lost consciousness and suffered an anoxic brain injury. She did not recover.
Eventually, Lauren made the decision to discontinue life support. Holland received hospice
care for a week and died on November 11, 2019.
{¶ 5} On April 5, 2021, Lauren, as administrator of Holland’s estate, filed suit against
Dr. Teramana, Emergency Medical Specialists, Inc. (“EMS”), Physician Management Group,
Inc. (“PMG”), and others, alleging negligence, wrongful death, and vicarious
liability/respondeat superior liability. She sought compensatory damages, punitive damages,
attorney’s fees, and expenses. Holland v. Teramana, Montgomery C.P. No. 2021 CV 01369.
On October 15, 2023, the claims against Dr. Teramana, EMS, and PMG were dismissed
without prejudice. Three days later, Laudato, the successor administrator of Holland’s
estate, refiled the action against Dr. Teramana, EMS, and PMG.
{¶ 6} The matter proceeded to a jury trial on May 28, 2024. During voir dire, plaintiff’s
counsel asked if any of the prospective jurors had a strong feeling about lawsuits against
hospitals or doctors. Tr. 55. A few unidentified prospective jurors responded, including one
who stated that society had become “overly litigious.” Tr. 56. In that juror’s opinion, “a lot of
things cost a lot more nowadays because of the litigious nature of where we are today,
unfortunately.” Tr. 58. The parties’ discussion during challenges for cause suggests that
Juror #6 made these comments.
{¶ 7} Plaintiff’s counsel later asked if anyone would be uncomfortable deciding how
much money should be awarded if there were damages in the case. Juror #16 initially
responded that she “[didn’t] even know what to say about that.” Tr. 69. She agreed that she
3 would be uncomfortable and that it “would be a hard decision for me.” Id. When asked why,
she replied, “I know you mentioned that it’s – someone died as a result, and I can’t put a
number on that.” Id.
{¶ 8} After several other prospective jurors expressed difficulty quantifying damages
in the wrongful death context, plaintiff’s counsel asked, “[I]s there anyone who, after talking
about this topic, now feels, well, maybe I’m not an appropriate juror for this case because
it’s going to be a lot harder?” Tr. 77. Among those who raised their hands, Juror #6 replied,
“I don’t think so. I think I – I don’t think that I’m necessarily a great candidate for it, but it’s
just in my perspective, in my line of work [school administrator], and what I’ve . . . worked
through, I think that it would be very difficult for me . . . to not have an unintentional bias.”
Tr. 77-78. Plaintiff’s counsel responded, “So given your background, your experience, your
work, and things like that, you feel like you would have a hard time following the law in this
case, and being a totally fair and impartial juror?” Juror #6 replied, “I do.” Tr. 78.
{¶ 9} Juror #13 also responded to the question, indicating that her brother, who was
disabled, had been in an automobile crash a few years before and had gone to Miami Valley
Hospital. While there, the brother was dropped, and the family decided not to sue because
the fall was an accident. Tr. 78-79. Juror #13 expressed that she did not know if she could
put a “money amount” or “value amount” on life. When asked if she would have a hard time
following the law because she thought it was not possible to put a value on it, Juror #13 said,
“I don’t think so. There is no value on life, to me. I don’t think so. No money value.” Tr. 79.
{¶ 10} In chambers, plaintiff’s counsel challenged Juror #6, Juror #13, and Juror #16,
among others, for cause. Tr. 142-148. The trial court denied those challenges. Tr. 148, 151.
Plaintiff’s counsel later used peremptory challenges to remove Juror #6 and Juror #16 from
4 the jury, and he used his two additional peremptory challenges for others. Juror #13 was not
removed by either party and consequently was seated as a juror.
{¶ 11} On May 31, 2024, the jury found that Dr. Teramana had not been negligent in
the care and treatment of Holland, and it entered a general verdict in favor of Dr. Teramana,
EMS, and PMG. Both parties waived polling of the jury. The trial court issued a final judgment
on June 11, 2024.
{¶ 12} On July 9, 2024, Laudato moved for a new trial, under Civ.R. 59(A)(1) and (2),
raising two issues regarding the jury. First, he argued that the trial court should have
dismissed Juror #6, Juror #13, and Juror #16 for cause. He stated that Juror #13 and Juror
#16 had expressed that they would not be comfortable awarding damages in a civil case
and that Juror #6 was biased based on her opinion that people were overly litigious. Laudato
contended that once a bias had been disclosed, a prospective juror could not be
rehabilitated. Second, he argued that the jury did not deliberate as instructed by the trial
court. He provided an affidavit from one of his attorneys, indicating that the attorney had
spoken with a juror, K.Ke., in the jury room after the verdict was rendered. According to the
affidavit, K.Ke. had said that the jury did not deliberate but simply voted upon entering the
jury room.
{¶ 13} Dr. Teramana, EMS, and PMG opposed the motion for a new trial. They
argued that none of the three jurors had said that they would not award damages if the
evidence supported it or that they could not follow the court’s instructions. They contended
that “[s]tatements that it would be ‘difficult’ or ‘hard’ do not disqualify a juror.” They further
argued that Juror #6’s statement about people being overly litigious was not disqualifying.
They maintained that the trial court had the discretion to determine whether to excuse a juror
for cause, even when the juror has made a statement regarding partiality. Finally, they
5 claimed that the post-verdict statement was inadmissible and that Laudato could not
challenge the deliberative process.
{¶ 14} In his reply brief, Laudato asserted that jurors had engaged in additional
misconduct by discussing witnesses and evidence during breaks throughout the trial. He
provided an affidavit from K.Ke. to support that statement, as well as her prior statement
about the jury’s failure to deliberate before signing the verdict forms.
{¶ 15} On the motion of Dr. Teramana, EMS, and PMG, the trial court struck K.Ke.’s
affidavit under Evid.R. 606(B). Laudato later moved for relief from that decision under
Civ.R. 60(B), but the trial court denied the motion.
{¶ 16} On August 14, 2025, the trial court denied Laudato’s motion for a new trial.
The court summarily rejected Laudato’s motion to grant a new trial due to alleged juror
misconduct. As for the court’s failure to strike the prospective jurors for cause, the trial court
first noted that Laudato had failed to support the motion with a transcript and citations to the
relevant statements. The court concluded that, on that basis alone, the motion could be
denied.
{¶ 17} Nevertheless, the trial court indicated that it had reviewed the video-recording
of voir dire, and although it was “left to speculate or guess which juror responses Plaintiff is
referring to and challenging in his motion,” the court concluded that none of the challenges
for cause was improperly denied. The court stated that the record contained no instance
where a prospective juror affirmatively indicated an inability or unwillingness to follow the
court’s instructions or to be fair and impartial and was not stricken; none of the jurors
identified by Laudato had expressed any disqualifying bias. The court further rejected
Laudato’s contention that the three challenged jurors should have been automatically
6 disqualified without the possibility of rehabilitation, and it found that the two Sixth District
cases that Laudato had relied upon were distinguishable.
{¶ 18} Laudato appeals from the trial court’s judgment. In his sole assignment of
error, he claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial.
II. Motion for a New Trial Under Civ.R. 59
{¶ 19} Civ.R. 59 enumerates several bases upon which a new trial may be granted,
including (1) “[i]rregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury, magistrate, or prevailing
party, or any order of the court or magistrate, or abuse of discretion, by which an aggrieved
party was prevented from having a fair trial,” and (2) “[m]isconduct of the jury or prevailing
party.” Civ.R. 59(A)(1) and (2). Laudato’s argument regarding the trial court’s failure to
exclude certain jurors for cause falls under Civ.R. 59(A)(1), whereas his argument regarding
the jurors’ conduct fits squarely within Civ.R. 59(A)(2).
{¶ 20} We review the trial court’s determinations on a motion for a new trial under
Civ.R. 59(A)(1) and (A)(2) for an abuse of discretion. Nwafo v. Ugwualor, 2024-Ohio-189,
¶ 11 (12th Dist.). On appeal, Laudato has only challenged the trial court’s denial of his motion
for new trial based on the court’s failure to exclude Juror #6, Juror #13, and Juror #16 for
cause. Accordingly, our review is limited to that issue.
{¶ 21} The Ohio Constitution provides the right of trial by jury. Ohio Const., art. I, § 5.
It is well established that this right “carries with it by necessary implication the right to a trial
by a jury composed of unbiased and unprejudiced jurors.” Lingafelter v. Moore, 95 Ohio St.
384, 387 (1917). “Voir dire serves the purposes of allowing the court and the parties to
identify and remove jurors to ensure an impartial jury.” State v. Froman, 2020-Ohio-4523,
¶ 49.
7 {¶ 22} The Ohio legislature has provided nine grounds on which a party may
challenge a prospective juror for cause. See R.C. 2313.17; Curley v. Wilcox, 2023-Ohio-
3507, ¶ 14. The principal challenges identified in R.C. 2313.17(B)(1)-(8) “consist of
objectively verifiable facts and conclusions, which, if found valid by the court, require the
court to excuse the prospective juror.” Hall v. Banc One Mgt. Corp., 2007-Ohio-4640, ¶ 1.
The trial court “may not rehabilitate or exercise discretion to seat the prospective juror upon
the prospective juror’s pledge of fairness.” Id. at syllabus.
{¶ 23} In contrast, under R.C. 2313.17(B)(9), a prospective juror may be dismissed
for cause if “the person discloses by the person’s answers that the person cannot be a fair
and impartial juror or will not follow the law as given to the person by the court.” This ground
requires the trial court “to make a subjective determination about a potential juror’s fairness
and impartiality and therefore requires the exercise of judicial discretion.” Hall at ¶ 1, citing
Berk v. Matthews, 53 Ohio St.3d 161 (1990); see also, e.g., State v. Humphreys, 2026-Ohio-
373, ¶ 46 (2d Dist.); Estate of Price v. Kidney Care Specialist, LLC, 2024-Ohio-3122, ¶ 10
(2d Dist.), citing Hall at ¶ 38. “When addressing a challenge under R.C. 2313.17(B)(9), a
trial court may engage in further questioning of a prospective juror and, in the exercise of its
discretion, may conclude that the juror is capable of being fair, impartial, and following the
law.” State v. Brock, 2025-Ohio-2538, ¶ 12 (2d Dist.).
{¶ 24} R.C. 2313.17(D) is a catchall provision that allows a prospective juror to be
challenged “on suspicion of prejudice against or partiality for either party, . . . or other cause
that may render the juror at the time an unsuitable juror.” As with R.C. 2313.17(B)(9), the
catchall provision requires the trial court to make a subjective determination regarding the
prospective juror’s partiality or suitability and thus requires an exercise of discretion. Brock
at ¶ 13.
8 {¶ 25} Upon review, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of
Laudato’s motion for a new trial based on the court’s refusal to excuse Juror #6, Juror #13,
and Juror #16 for cause under R.C. 2313.17(B)(9) or (D).
{¶ 26} Laudato’s primary argument is that the prospective jurors could not be
rehabilitated once they expressed bias or an inability to follow the trial court’s instructions,
because a challenge under R.C. 2313.17(B)(9) is a principal challenge. We agree with the
trial court that our case law does not support Laudato’s assertion. We rejected a similar
argument by counsel for an estate in Estate of Price, concluding that the argument was
inconsistent with Hall. Estate of Price, 2024-Ohio-3122, at ¶ 12 (2d Dist.). Following Estate
of Price, we expressly stated in Brock that a trial court is permitted to engage in additional
questioning of a prospective juror and to determine, in the exercise of its discretion, whether
that prospective juror is capable of being fair, impartial, and following the law. Brock, 2025-
Ohio-2538, at ¶ 12 (2d Dist.).
{¶ 27} We have further explained that such an argument “is not compatible with the
reality that prospective jurors come to the process without legal training or experience which,
given the relatively informal give-and-take voir dire process, can result in a juror making a
statement that, in isolation, would allow a conclusion that the prospective juror will not follow
the law as instructed by the trial court.” Estate of Price at ¶ 12. We noted that “a juror’s initial
response to a question regarding the burden of proof or another legal topic is not fixed but
instead is subject to change following further questioning and explanation.” Id.
{¶ 28} The Ohio Supreme Court has accepted Estate of Price for review, specifically
on the issue of whether a prospective juror may be rehabilitated after the prospective juror
has disclosed that he or she cannot be a fair and impartial juror or will not follow the law as
9 given by the court. See 11/26/2024 Case Announcements, 2024-Ohio-5529. We decline to
reconsider our reasoning in that case here.
{¶ 29} Laudato further claims, in a single sentence, that the three prospective jurors
were not, in fact, rehabilitated. This argument fails for two reasons. First, Laudato has waived
his ability to raise this argument. In response to the motion for a new trial, defense counsel
argued that the trial court’s denial of the challenges for cause was reasonable, because the
three prospective jurors did not express any disqualifying bias, and that “to the extent they
indicated any initial bias, they were rehabilitated.” (Emphasis in original.) In reply to the
defense, Laudato’s counsel emphasized that the three prospective jurors had made
comments reflecting that they could not be fair and impartial. Counsel did not assert,
alternatively, that the attempts to rehabilitate were inadequate. In its decision denying the
motion for a new trial, the trial court noted that “Plaintiff does not dispute Defendants’
assertion that the challenged jurors were rehabilitated.” Laudato cannot raise a lack of
rehabilitation for the first time on appeal. Edwards v. Galluzzo, 2024-Ohio-2005, ¶ 22
(2d Dist.) (“Parties may not raise any new issues or legal theories for the first time on appeal
that were not raised in the lower court.”).
{¶ 30} Second, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when it
determined that the challenges for cause as to Jurors #6, #13, and #16 were appropriately
{¶ 31} Although Jurors #13 and #16 expressed discomfort with placing a value on
life, no prospective juror responded that an estate should not be able to get damages for a
decedent’s pain and suffering. Tr. 82. When asked if there should be an upper limit on how
much a jury should be able to give, none of the three prospective jurors at issue responded
affirmatively. Tr. 83. No one felt that Holland’s daughter should not get money under any
10 circumstances. Tr. 85. No one told plaintiff’s counsel that they would have difficulty speaking
up if another juror did not want to follow the law during deliberations. Tr. 84.
{¶ 32} Moreover, at the beginning of defense counsel’s voir dire questioning, counsel
asked whether the prospective juror’s could follow the court’s instructions. Tr. 91. No one
said that they could not. Counsel later asked if everyone understood that there would be no
damage award unless the plaintiff proved negligence by Dr. Teramana. Tr. 96. Again, no
one responded. Defense counsel asked Juror #6 specifically if she could put her negative
experiences aside and “actually look at the evidence in this case and decide whether Dr.
Teramana was negligent? Whether she caused this patient’s death?” Tr. 99. Juror #6
responded that she could “look at the evidence in order to make a general decision, along
with a group of people. I think all of us would be remiss if we didn’t – had no biases.” Tr. 99-
100.
{¶ 33} At the conclusion of counsel’s questioning, the trial court asked a series of
questions of the prospective jurors, including:
• Does anyone here have any religious, moral, or ethical issues with
awarding money damages that are intended to punish Dr. Teramana in
this case, should the evidence support those damages?
• Does anyone here believe that there is a maximum amount of money
damages that should be awarded to punish a party in a case like this?
• Does anyone here think that they could not award money damages
intended to punish the Defendants in this case because one of the
Defendants is a doctor?
• Does anyone here think that they could not award money damages
intended to punish the Defendants in this case for any reason?
11 • [I]s there anything in your personal experience or background that we
haven’t directly asked you about that causes you to question or have
concerns about your ability to be a fair and impartial juror in this case?
Anything at all?
• Okay. Lastly, we’ve had a lot of discussion this morning about feeling
uncomfortable about this process, feeling uncertain about how some of
the issues are decided, referencing our past experiences. And all of
these feelings are very, I would say very normal and natural, to be
expected when you are walking into a courtroom in the morning and
you literally have no idea what it is that you’re going to be called upon
to decide. Okay? Again, as I indicated in the beginning, you as the jury
are the Judge of the facts. I am the Judge of the law. And if selected to
sit on the jury in this case, you will take an oath to be fair and impartial
and to not be influenced by bias, prejudice, or sympathy. And again, I
will provide you with the instructions of law that you are to follow as you
conduct your deliberations. . . . Is there anyone here saying today that
they cannot obey the law other than what we have already discussed?
Is there anyone else here today saying that they cannot obey the law?
See Tr. 129-133. None of the three prospective jurors at issue responded negatively to these
questions. The trial court was entitled to consider the prospective jurors’ answers to the
group questions in determining whether they could be fair and impartial or could follow the
court’s instructions. See State v. Rogers, 2025-Ohio-4794, ¶ 52-61.
{¶ 34} Although a prospective juror’s silence in response to a judge’s group question
likely might not be sufficient to overcome an unequivocal declaration that the prospective
12 juror could not afford the parties a fair trial, see id. at ¶ 58, the trial court reasonably
concluded that none of the three prospective jurors had affirmatively expressed an inability
or unwillingness to follow the court’s instructions or to be fair and impartial. The trial court
viewed the answers of Juror #13 and Juror #16 regarding damages as expressing a
predisposition against awarding damages but not an affirmative indication of their
unwillingness to follow the court’s instructions or to be fair and impartial. As noted in
Teramana’s appellate brief, it is possible that their discomfort with placing a value on a life
might have led them to award a larger, not smaller, damage award. Regardless, the trial
court found that their subsequent answers later affirmed their ability to render a fair and
impartial verdict. As for Juror #6, the court noted that the prospective juror’s initial statement
about society’s being overly litigious was a general opinion about society, not about the case
itself, and that she also later affirmed that she could follow the law and be fair and impartial.
The court reasonably concluded that none of the three prospective jurors expressed a
disqualifying bias.
{¶ 35} The assignment of error is overruled.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 36} The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
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TUCKER, J., and HUFFMAN, J., concur.