[Cite as State v. Boyd, 2025-Ohio-984.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO : : Appellee : C.A. No. 30098 : v. : Trial Court Case No. 2023 CR 00291 : DYLAN BOYD : (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas : Court) Appellant : :
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OPINION
Rendered on March 21, 2025
JOHNNA M. SHIA, Attorney for Appellant
MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by SARAH H. CHANEY, Attorney for Appellee
.............
EPLEY, P.J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant Dylan Boyd appeals from his conviction in the
Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas after he was found guilty of having weapons
while under disability and its attendant firearm specification. He was sentenced to six
years in prison plus the 713 days remaining on his post-release control. For the reasons -2-
that follow, the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} In January 2023, Boyd contacted E.M. to let him know that he was going to
be in town. The two had been friends in high school, but after spending the last several
years in different states (E.M. in Ohio and Boyd in Texas), contact between them had
been intermittent. Growing up, the pair played sports together, spent the night at each
other’s houses, and got to know each other’s families. E.M. said that Boyd “was my dog,
we was cool; we were super tight.” Trial Tr. at 168. Boyd and E.M. made plans to hang
out.
{¶ 3} On the evening of January 14, 2023, Boyd and his girlfriend, Zenia Thomas,
went to E.M.’s home in Huber Heights, which he shared with his girlfriend and daughter.
Boyd, who is trained as a barber, was going to cut E.M.’s hair. Boyd and Thomas arrived
between 7 and 8 p.m. in a white SUV, and E.M. introduced Boyd to his daughter as “Uncle
Dylan.” E.M. and Boyd chatted while E.M.’s hair was being cut, but E.M. thought his friend
was acting strangely. “[L]ooking back there was a lot of stuff that was weird that I just
brushed off because like I said, like it’s my dude. But it’s just like the look he had on his
face like even when he shook my hand . . . you could tell his mind was somewhere else.”
Trial Tr. at 174-175. Boyd and Thomas left around 10 p.m. and with plans to meet up later
with E.M.
{¶ 4} Later that night, Boyd Facetimed E.M. and told him to meet at Boyd’s
grandmother’s house. E.M., along with another friend, arrived at Boyd’s grandmother’s
house between 1 and 2 a.m. and parked beside Boyd’s white SUV in the driveway. E.M. -3-
got out and went to the door, but kept the car running because his friend, Josh Williams,
was still in the car.
{¶ 5} E.M. knocked on the front door and Boyd answered, but as E.M. entered,
Thomas exited. The two men spent a couple minutes inside and then walked back out of
the house to meet Boyd’s brother at a different location. As E.M. began walking toward
his car with Boyd trailing behind, he felt a gun on the back of his head. The next thing
E.M. knew, he woke up on the ground beside his still-running car with blood everywhere.
Everyone else had left. He then wrapped his sweater around his head and managed to
drive himself to Miami Valley Hospital. E.M. explained that “it felt like my head was about
to pop. Like my head was swelling up so bad. Like my brain shifted up to my skull and it
was swelling up.” Trial Tr. at 203.
{¶ 6} E.M. had been shot in the head and his injuries were severe. He testified that
doctors had to cut out a part of his skull to relieve the swelling and that he had to wear a
helmet for a time to protect his brain. He also endured multiple surgeries during his 10-
day stay in the hospital.
{¶ 7} A police investigation led to Boyd’s indictment on two counts of aggravated
robbery (Counts One and Two), two counts of felonious assault (Counts Three and Four),
one count of having weapons while under disability (Count Five), and one count of
attempted murder (Count Six). Each aggravated robbery and felonious assault charge
had an attendant three-year firearm specification and repeat violent offender
specification. The weapons under disability count had an attached three-year firearm
specification. -4-
{¶ 8} On October 11, 2023, Boyd filed a jury waiver on the weapons under
disability charge (Count Five) and the repeat violent offender specifications on Counts
One through Four.
{¶ 9} The case progressed to a jury trial on March 4, 2024. After several days of
testimony, Boyd was found not guilty of both counts of aggravated robbery, both counts
of felonious assault, and attempted murder. After a bench trial on March 15 on the
weapons under disability count, the trial court found him guilty of both the underlying
charge and the firearm specification. Boyd was sentenced to 36 months for having a
weapon while under disability, a mandatory three years for the firearm specification (to
be served prior to and consecutively to the underlying count), and the remaining 713 days
of post-release control from a prior conviction in 2012.
{¶ 10} Boyd has appealed, raising six assignments of error.
II. Jurisdiction to try the firearm specification
{¶ 11} In his first assignment of error, Boyd argues that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to try him on the firearm specification because his jury waiver was only for the
underlying charge of having weapons while under disability, not the specification. We
disagree.
{¶ 12} According to R.C. 2945.05, in all criminal cases, a defendant may waive a
jury trial and instead be tried by the court. To be effective, the waiver must be “(1) in
writing, (2) signed by the defendant, (3) filed, (4) made part of the record, and (5) made
in open court.” State v. Lomax, 2007-Ohio-4277, ¶ 9. Courts must strictly comply with
these requirements. State v. Grier, 2010-Ohio-5751, ¶ 15 (2d Dist.). Further, “[a] jury -5-
waiver must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.” State v. Bays, 87 Ohio St.3d 15, 19
(1999).
{¶ 13} Boyd does not appear to challenge the voluntariness of his jury waiver; the
waiver was made in open court, in writing, was signed by Boyd, was made part of the
record, and was filed with the clerk. Instead, he contends that the waiver only covered the
having weapons under disability charge, not the firearm specification. The implication,
according to Boyd, is that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to hear the specification.
{¶ 14} A firearm specification cannot be tried on its own because “[it] is, by its very
nature, ancillary to, and completely dependent upon, the existence of the underlying
criminal charge or charges to which the specification is attached.” State v. Nagel, 84 Ohio
St.3d 280, 286 (1999). It is a “penalty enhancement” for the predicate offense, not its own
criminal offense. State v. Ford, 2011-Ohio-765, syllabus. Further, the statutory language
in R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(a) indicates that the imposition of a prison term for a firearm
specification is contingent upon a conviction of a felony.
{¶ 15} Boyd’s proposition that he waived a jury trial on only the having weapons
under disability charge and not the specification would create an absurd result. In that
scenario, the jury would have before it a “disembodied” or “orphaned” specification. The
jury would have had the attempted murder, aggravated robbery and felonious assault
counts (with their specifications) to consider, and then a seemingly random specification
referencing a non-existent “aforesaid offense.”
{¶ 16} Because the firearm specification was dependent on the underlying having
weapons while under disability charge, the trial court had jurisdiction to try Boyd on both. -6-
His first assignment of error is overruled.
III. Collateral Estoppel and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
{¶ 17} Next, Boyd claims that the “State’s successive prosecution for [having
weapons while under disability] and the attached gun specification was barred by
collateral estoppel” and that trial counsel was ineffective for not moving for dismissal.
Appellant’s Brief at 12.
Collateral Estoppel
{¶ 18} The United States Supreme Court held that collateral estoppel is embodied
in the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee against double jeopardy. State v. Eason, 2016-Ohio-
5516, ¶ 56 (8th Dist.), citing Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445-446 (1970). The Double
Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution declares that no person shall “be
subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb,” and similarly,
Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution provides that “[n]o person shall be twice put
in jeopardy for the same offense.” The protections given by the Ohio and United States
Constitutions are coextensive. State v. Martello, 2002-Ohio-6661, ¶ 7.
{¶ 19} In practice, “[t]he Double Jeopardy Clause protects against three abuses:
(1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2) a second prosecution
for the same offense after conviction, and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense.”
State v. Ruff, 2015-Ohio-995, ¶ 10.
{¶ 20} Boyd argues that, because he was tried and acquitted by the jury of
aggravated robbery, felonious assault, and attempted murder, he could not be tried by
the court on another count (having weapons while under disability) based on the same -7-
set of facts. He is mistaken.
{¶ 21} The keystone of the double jeopardy protection is that a person cannot be
tried or punished more than once for the same offense. In this case, Boyd was tried before
the jury and found not guilty of two counts of aggravated robbery, two counts of felonious
assault, and one count of attempted murder. Under the Fifth Amendment, he could not
have been tried again for those crimes. However, Boyd was not tried by the jury for having
weapons while under disability, as he waived his right to a jury trial on that offense.
{¶ 22} Further, the double jeopardy clause is not implicated with the seemingly
inconsistent verdicts reached in the two trials. “The several counts of an indictment
containing more than one count are not interdependent and an inconsistency in a verdict
does not arise out of inconsistent responses to different counts, but only arises out of
inconsistent responses to the same count.” State v. Lovejoy, 79 Ohio St.3d 440, 446
(1997). Boyd chose to have the having weapons while under disability count tried by the
court. “The court is its own fact-finder in such a situation . . . [and] is not prohibited from
finding a defendant guilty of having weapons while under disability after a jury finds him
not guilty of certain offenses during which he was said to have possessed a gun.” State
v. Hudson, 2017-Ohio-645, ¶ 17 (7th Dist.). Accord State v. Wellman, 2015-Ohio-4875,
¶ 6 (10th Dist.) (issue preclusion does not prevent the court from finding a defendant guilty
of having weapons while under disability after a jury found him not guilty of felonious
assault).
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
{¶ 23} Boyd also asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for not raising these -8-
issues. To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Boyd must prove that his
attorney was ineffective under the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687 (1984). The test has two parts. First, he must show that counsel’s
performance was deficient. Id. at 687. “This requires showing that counsel made errors
so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by
the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense.” Id.
{¶ 24} With respect to the first prong, much deference is given to trial counsel. “[A]
court must indulge in a strong presumption that the challenged action might be considered
sound trial strategy. Thus, judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly
deferential.” State v. Bird, 81 Ohio St.3d 582, 585 (1998). To demonstrate prejudice, the
second prong, “the defendant must prove that there exists a reasonable probability that,
were it not for counsel’s errors, the result of the trial would have been different.” State v.
Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136 (1998), paragraph one of the syllabus.
{¶ 25} We have already concluded that there were no double jeopardy or collateral
estoppel problems in this case, and because of that, we cannot conclude that Boyd’s trial
counsel made any errors, let alone ones so severe that they rose to the level of being
constitutionally deficient. Boyd’s second assignment of error is overruled.
IV. Manifest weight and sufficiency of the evidence
{¶ 26} In his third assignment of error, Boyd asserts that his conviction was based
on insufficient evidence and against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Sufficiency of the Evidence -9-
{¶ 27} “[S]ufficiency is a term of art meaning that legal standard which is applied
to determine whether the case may go to the jury or whether the evidence is legally
sufficient to support the jury verdict as a matter of law.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d
380, 386 (1997). It is essentially a test of adequacy: whether the evidence is legally
sufficient to sustain a verdict is a question of law. Id.
{¶ 28} “An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to
determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the
defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Marshall, 2010-Ohio-5160, ¶ 52
(2d Dist.), quoting State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the
syllabus. “The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. A conviction based on
legally insufficient evidence constitutes a denial of due process and will bar a retrial.
Thompkins at 386-387.
Manifest Weight of the Evidence
{¶ 29} When an appellate court reviews whether a conviction is against the
manifest weight of the evidence, “[t]he court, reviewing the entire record, weighs the
evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of the witnesses and
determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and
created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and
a new trial ordered.” Id. at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st -10-
Dist. 1983). A case should not be reversed as being against the manifest weight of the
evidence except “ ‘in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against
the conviction.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Id.
{¶ 30} “Although sufficiency and manifest weight are different legal concepts,
manifest weight may subsume sufficiency in conducting the analysis; that is, a finding that
a conviction is supported by the manifest weight of the evidence necessarily includes a
finding of sufficiency.” (Citations omitted.) State v. McCrary, 2011-Ohio-3161, ¶ 11 (10th
Dist.). Accord State v. Winbush, 2017-Ohio-696, ¶ 58 (2d Dist.). As a result, “a
determination that a conviction is supported by the weight of the evidence will also be
dispositive of the issue of sufficiency.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Braxton, 2005-Ohio-
2198, ¶ 15 (10th Dist.).
{¶ 31} To secure a conviction for having weapons while under disability, the State
had to prove that Boyd (1) had been convicted of a felony offense of violence, and (2)
that he had knowingly acquired, had, carried, or used a firearm. R.C. 2923.13(A)(2).
Additionally, to prove the firearm specification, it had to show that Boyd, in committing
having weapons under disability, had, displayed, brandished, indicated that he
possessed, or used the firearm to facilitate the offense. Because there is no question that
Boyd was a felon who had previously been convicted of committing an offense of violence,
the analysis is only whether there was evidence to establish that he had knowingly
acquired, had, carried, or used a firearm.
{¶ 32} At trial, E.M. testified that throughout the evening of January 14, 2023, Boyd
had acted strangely. “[L]ooking back there was a lot of stuff that was weird that I just -11-
brushed off because, like I said, [that’s] my dude. But it’s just . . . the look he had on his
face . . . even when he shook my hand . . . you can tell his mind was somewhere else.”
Trial Tr. at 174-175. E.M.’s feeling that something was “off” about Boyd continued when
he arrived at Boyd’s grandmother’s house. In fact, while inside the house, he texted
Williams (who was sitting in the car waiting for E.M. to return) that something was wrong.
{¶ 33} E.M. then told the jury that, as he exited the house, Boyd was following
close behind, and suddenly E.M. felt a gun on the back of his head. E.M. knew it had to
be Boyd holding the gun because they were the only two outside in the driveway at that
time; Williams and Thomas were sitting in separate cars by then. He also testified that it
was Boyd who told him, “You already know what this is,” to which E.M. replied, “Man, you
can have that shit.” Trial Tr. at 198. E.M. stated that that he took Boyd’s comment to mean
that it was a robbery, so he put his hands up in the air. He further admitted at trial that he
was wearing a $30,000 necklace at the time, had a baggie of Percocets with him, and
typically carried a large amount of cash.
{¶ 34} In the hours after being shot but before losing consciousness at the hospital,
E.M. told multiple people, including his girlfriend, Williams, and a nurse, that Boyd had
been the shooter. “I needed somebody to know something because . . . I was fading in
and out of consciousness. I didn’t know if I was about to survive.” Trial Tr. at 206.
{¶ 35} In addition to E.M.’s stating that Boyd was his shooter, Williams testified
that, while he did not see the gun from his position in the front seat of E.M.’s car, he saw
E.M. put his hands in the air, ask for mercy, and then heard a gunshot. Trial Tr. at 384-
391. -12-
{¶ 36} Nevertheless, Boyd argues that the conviction based on circumstantial
evidence should not stand.
{¶ 37} A conviction can be obtained solely based on circumstantial evidence. State
v. Nicely, 39 Ohio St.3d 147, 151 (1998). “[P]roof of guilt may be made by circumstantial
evidence as well as by real evidence and direct or testimonial evidence, or any
combination of these three classes of evidence. All three classes have equal probative
value, and circumstantial evidence has no less value than the others.” Id.; see also United
States v. Andrino, 501 F.2d, 1373, 1378 (9th Cir. 1974) (“Circumstantial evidence is not
less probative than direct evidence, and, in some instances, is even more reliable.”).
{¶ 38} “When the State relies on circumstantial evidence to prove an essential
element of the offense charged, there is no need for such evidence to be irreconcilable
with any reasonable theory of innocence in order to support a conviction.” Jenks, 61 Ohio
St.3d 259, paragraph one of syllabus, overruling State v. Kulig, 37 Ohio St.2d 897 (1974).
“Circumstantial evidence is as inherently probative as direct evidence.” State v. Winton,
2017-Ohio-6908, ¶ 23 (2d Dist.).
{¶ 39} Based on the evidence presented at trial – both direct and circumstantial –
we cannot say that the trial court clearly lost its way when it found Boyd guilty of having
weapons while under disability and the firearm specification. His conviction was based on
sufficient evidence and was supported by the evidence. Therefore, the third assignment
of error is overruled.
V. Evidentiary Issues
{¶ 40} In his fourth assignment of error, Boyd asserts that the court erred when it -13-
“ruled that evidence was inadmissible without considering the evidence itself and instead
relying on counsel’s opinion of its admissibility.” Appellant’s Brief at 21. This assignment
of error seems to revolve around allegedly threatening text messages that Boyd’s
girlfriend, Thomas, testified she had received.
{¶ 41} “The admission or exclusion of evidence rests within the sound discretion
of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion.”
State v. Malloy, 2011-Ohio-30, ¶ 64, (2d Dist.). “A trial court abuses its discretion when it
makes a decision that is unreasonable, unconscionable, or arbitrary.” (Citation omitted.)
State v. Darmond, 2013-Ohio-966, ¶ 34. A court’s decision is unreasonable only “if there
is no sound reasoning process that would support that decision. It is not enough that the
reviewing court . . . would not have found that reasoning process persuasive.” AAAA
Ents., Inc. v. River Place Community Urban Redevelopment, Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157,
161 (1990).
{¶ 42} During her cross-examination, Thomas told the jury that she did not inform
authorities that E.M. had been shot because she “was getting threatening text messages.”
Trial Tr. at 584, 589. She conceded that she could have, but did not, share those text
messages with law enforcement, though she purportedly handed them over to defense
counsel. During an ensuing sidebar (in which the court expressed concern over the fact
that the State had not received the alleged text messages during reciprocal discovery),
defense counsel related that while he did get messages from Thomas, none were what
he considered to be threatening. Following the sidebar, the line of questioning from the
State changed to a different topic, and the alleged threatening text messages were not -14-
mentioned again during Thomas’s testimony.
{¶ 43} At no time did either side move to admit the alleged threatening messages
– that defense counsel denied even existed – and the trial made no ruling on text
messages from Thomas. There cannot be an error with the admission of evidence when
there is no evidence to admit.
{¶ 44} Further, Boyd argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to proffer
the alleged evidence for review and for failing to use “other evidentiary rules to permit the
use of the text messages.” Appellant’s Brief at 25. This argument must fail, too, because
there is no evidence that threatening text messages even existed. Further, even
assuming for argument’s sake that they did exist, counsel’s decision not to use them could
have been trial strategy. “[A] court must indulge in a strong presumption that the
challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy. Thus, judicial scrutiny of
counsel’s performance must be highly deferential.” State v. Bird, 81 Ohio St.3d 582, 585
(1998). Boyd’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.
VI. Consideration of Acquitted Charges
{¶ 45} Boyd’s next argument is that the trial court violated Evid.R. 404(B) when it
considered the acquitted charges in deciding the bench trial’s verdict. In other words, he
believes the trial court should have been barred from considering the facts presented at
the jury trial to reach its different conclusion in the bench trial. We disagree.
{¶ 46} “[W]here a case is separated and the same judge presided over both the
jury and bench trial, the judge ha[s] the discretion to consider the evidence from the jury
trial in the bench trial.” State v. Johnson, 2017-Ohio-7264, ¶ 21 (2d Dist.), quoting -15-
Whitfield v. Intnatl. Truck & Engine Corp., 755 F.3d 438, 447, fn. 4 (7th Cir. 2014). Accord
State v. Webb, 2010-Ohio-6122 (10th Dist.) (finding that a conviction for having weapons
under disability was supported by sufficient evidence where the defendant chose to have
a bench trial on the weapons under disability charge and a jury trial on his other related
charges, and the only testimony presented during the bench trial concerned the
defendant’s prior felony conviction with other relevant evidence being drawn from the jury
trial).
{¶ 47} Here, the trial court presided over the jury trial, at which it heard testimony
from E.M. that it was Boyd who shot him in the back of the head. That evidence, along
with the uncontested prior felony conviction, was available for the court to make its
decision in the having weapons while under disability bench trial.
{¶ 48} Boyd also suggests the trial court acted with bias and “prejudgment,” and
he cites an off-handed comment the trial court made at the jury trial during a sidebar.
When defense counsel informed the court that Boyd’s grandmother would be his first
witness, the court quipped “Okay. My grandma – she’d grab Dylan and drag him off the
stand and slap him around.” Trial Tr. at 542. While the comment appears to have been a
lighthearted joke, it was probably unnecessary. It did not, however, indicate that Boyd
was “pre-judged” by the court.
{¶ 49} Boyd’s fifth assignment of error is overruled.
VII. Sentence
{¶ 50} In his sixth and final assignment of error, Boyd argues that his maximum
sentence was unsupported by the record. -16-
{¶ 51} A trial court has full discretion to impose any sentence within the authorized
statutory range, and it is not required to make any findings or give its reasons for imposing
a maximum or more than minimum sentence. State v. Jones, 2021-Ohio-325, ¶ 85 (2d
Dist.). “However, a trial court must consider the statutory criteria that apply to every felony
offense, including those set out in R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12.” Id.
{¶ 52} When reviewing felony sentences, we must apply the standard of review
set forth in R.C. 2953.08(G). Under that statute, an appellate court may increase, reduce,
or modify a sentence, or vacate it altogether and remand for resentencing, if it “clearly
and convincingly finds either (1) the record does not support certain specified findings or
(2) that the sentence imposed is contrary to law.” State v. Worthen, 2021-Ohio-2788, ¶ 13
(2d Dist.).
{¶ 53} According to the Ohio Supreme Court, we may not independently “weigh
the evidence in the record and substitute [our] judgment for that of the trial court
concerning the sentence that best reflects compliance with R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.”
State v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-6729, ¶ 42. The inquiry is simply whether the sentence is
contrary to law. A sentence is contrary to law when it falls outside the statutory range for
the offense or if the sentencing court does not consider R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. State
v. Dorsey, 2021-Ohio-76, ¶ 18 (2d Dist.).
{¶ 54} In the case at bar, there is no dispute that Boyd’s 36-month sentence was
within the statutory range of third-degree felonies, but he argues that it, combined with
the imposition of 713 days of post-release control time, did not achieve the principles and
purposes of sentencing under R.C. 2929.11, and that the court improperly weighed the -17-
seriousness and recidivism factors from R.C. 2929.12.
{¶ 55} At the March 21, 2024 sentencing hearing, the court stated that it had
reviewed the presentence investigation (which included information about his previous
adult felony convictions for aggravated robbery, felonious assault, and kidnapping) and
that it had considered the principles and purposes of sentencing pursuant to R.C. 2929.11
and the seriousness and recidivism factors of R.C. 2929.12. It also noted that the firearm
specification must be served consecutively to and prior to the sentence for having
weapons while under disability, and that the post-release control time must be served
consecutively to the underlying count.
{¶ 56} Based on the record before us, Boyd’s sentence was not contrary to law; it
was within the parameters for third-degree felonies, the firearm specification was required
to be served prior to and consecutively to the underlying felony sentence, and remaining
post-release control time was mandated to be served consecutively as well. Further, the
trial court considered the principles and purposes of felony sentencing and the
seriousness and recidivism factors. To the extent that Boyd argues his sentence was
unsupported by the record, that argument is foreclosed by Jones. Even if it were not, we
would find that there was ample evidence in the record to support the sentence. The
assignment of error is overruled.
VIII. Conclusion
{¶ 57} The judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.
............. -18-
TUCKER, J. and HUFFMAN, J., concur.