State v. Greenawalt

2025 Ohio 4906

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: October 27, 2025
• Docket: 9-24-40
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Greenawalt, 2025-Ohio-4906.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT MARION COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 9-24-40 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

v.

CHADWICK ALLEN GREENAWALT, SR., OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Appeal from Marion County Common Pleas Court Trial Court No. 22-CR-389

Judgment Affirmed

Date of Decision: October 27, 2025

APPEARANCES:

April F. Campbell for Appellant

Allison M. Kesler for Appellee Case No. 9-24-40

WILLAMOWSKI, J.

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Chadwick Allen Greenawalt, Sr. (“Greenawalt”)

appeals the judgment of the Marion County Court of Common Pleas, arguing that

(1) he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel; (2) the trial court

should have given a self-defense instruction to the jury; (3) the trial court erred by

permitting two witnesses to remain present in the courtroom for portions of the trial;

(4) the trial court erred by not allowing the Defense to play recordings of a witness’s

prior inconsistent statements before the jurors; (5) his conviction for murder in

violation of R.C. 2903.02(B) is not supported by sufficient evidence and is against

the manifest weight of the evidence; and (6) the doctrine of cumulative error applies

to this case. For the reasons set forth below, the judgment of the trial court is

affirmed.

Facts and Procedural History

{¶2} Robert (“Robert”) and Natalie (“Natalie”) Rudd had a lot for their

camper at the River Bend Campground in Marion County, Ohio. The Rudds’ lot

was across the street from where Bryan (“Bryan”) and Shasta (“Shasta”) McDole

had a camper. In 2022, Bryan invited his friend, Greenawalt, to visit his campsite

during the Fourth of July weekend.

{¶3} On July 2, 2022, Greenawalt went to the General Store at the River

Bend Campground and purchased a day pass that permitted him to remain on the

-2- Case No. 9-24-40

premises until 11:00 P.M. He then rode his motorcycle to the McDoles’ camper

and parked his bike. Another camper, Randy Runyon (“Runyon”), testified that

Greenawalt then pulled some bottles of an alcoholic beverage out of the bags on his

motorcycle and began drinking with Bryan.

{¶4} Later that day, Greenawalt spent some time with Shasta’s teenage

nephews, S.M. and T.M. At some point, Greenawalt, S.M., and T.M. decided to

have a footrace. S.M. and T.M. later testified that, while they were running,

Greenawalt said that his knife fell out of his pocket. Another person, D.H., was

present at this time and also reported hearing Greenawalt make this remark, though

D.H. indicated that he never saw the knife that Greenawalt mentioned.

{¶5} T.M. and S.M.’s father had been friends with Greenawalt for a number

of years. For this reason, T.M. had been around Greenawalt several times prior to

this footrace. T.M. testified that Greenawalt regularly carried a pocketknife around

because his job required use of such a tool. He stated that he had seen this

pocketknife and that it had a clip.

{¶6} At around 3:00 P.M. on July 2, 2022, Robert and Natalie arrived at the

campground with their family. They had planned to host a small gathering at their

camper for the families on the neighboring lots. For this reason, Natalie set up a

balloon arch as a decoration for the picnic while Robert prepared some food. After

eating dinner, the Rudds went to a band performance on the campground with their

friends, Roger (“Roger”) and Kathy Morgan.

-3- Case No. 9-24-40

{¶7} Robert left the performance early to tend to the meat he was smoking

for a cookout the following day. Robert had been assisted in this process by his

friend, John Durbin (“Durbin”). After the band performance was over, Robert and

Natalie were sitting outside of their camper with Roger; Durbin; Shasta; S.M.; and

S.M.’s father, Richard Morgan (“Richard”). Bryan and Greenawalt drove up in a

golf cart and joined this group of people sometime after 1:00 A.M. on July 3, 2022.

{¶8} At some point, Bryan popped one of the balloons on the decorative arch

with a cigarette. After Greenawalt walked over to Bryan and began talking with

him, another balloon was popped. Robert testified that these two were asked to

leave because they were popping balloons and appeared to be intoxicated.

Greenawalt and Bryan left the area but came back shortly thereafter. Robert testified

that, after returning, Greenawalt popped another balloon.

{¶9} Multiple people then repeatedly asked him to leave. Robert affirmed

that the “asking turn[ed] into telling” them to leave. (Tr. 485). He also stated that

they asked so many times that they eventually “stop[ped] being polite about it.” (Tr.

485). As Greenawalt walked away, another balloon was popped. Natalie then

walked towards where Greenawalt was standing and said, “I want you guys off my

lot. Get the h**l off of my lot. Just go, just go.” (Tr. 937). Roger testified that he

heard Greenawalt say, “Come on you p***y. Come on you punk b***h.” (Tr. 939).

He also heard Greenawalt say, “Come on, you piece of s**t.” (Tr. 946).

-4- Case No. 9-24-40

{¶10} At this point, a physical altercation began between Greenawalt and

Natalie. Robert and S.M. testified that Greenawalt turned around and struck Natalie

first, hitting her in the face. Robert testified that, in this process, he heard

Greenawalt tell Natalie, “F**k you b***h. I ain’t got to go nowhere.” (Tr. 487).

However, Durbin testified that, from his vantage point, Natalie appeared to have

swung at Greenawalt before he struck her. Similarly, Shasta and Richard stated that

they saw Natalie strike Greenawalt first, hitting the back of his head.

{¶11} Robert then ran to the edge of his lot to separate them. He explained

that he was attempting to “diffuse” the altercation but that Greenawalt “swung” at

him. (Tr. 487). Durbin stated that Robert “took Chad [Greenawalt] to the ground.”

(Tr. 896). Richard, S.M., and Roger went down to the street to separate Robert and

Greenawalt.

{¶12} Roger testified that, by the time he reached the brawl, Robert had

Greenawalt pinned against the McDoles’ picnic table. Roger grabbed Robert and

pulled him away from Greenawalt. Richard screamed, “Stop, this is done, over

with.” (Tr. 1498). He then brought Greenawalt towards the McDoles’ camper.

After this initial altercation had concluded, Richard went to where his wife, Lindsey

Morgan (“Lindsey”), was standing and explained what was happening.

{¶13} Durbin testified that Natalie and Robert were going to go back to their

camper when Greenawalt yelled, “Come on B. Come on B.” (Tr. 897). Durbin

further stated that Greenawalt made this comment “[l]ouder than an adult roar” as

-5- Case No. 9-24-40

he “was walking over.” (Tr. 897). He said that this “coaxed her [Natalie] to go

back over.” (Tr. 897).

{¶14} S.M. testified that, after the initial altercation concluded, Natalie gave

him a hug and that, while they were hugging, Greenawalt “started to run at her . . .

so she ran to him.” (Tr. 742). He testified that Greenawalt yelled, “I’m going to

kill those motherf***ers.” (Tr. 762). S.M. testified that Greenawalt and Natalie

then “ran towards each other” and “kind of met in the middle . . . .” (Tr. 579, 581).

{¶15} Robert testified that he saw Greenawalt “go after” Natalie and get

“ahold of her” in front of the McDoles’ camper. (Tr. 489). Robert stated that he

got Greenawalt away from Natalie and put him into a headlock. Robert testified

that, during this struggle, his knee was injured, and he fell onto the ground. As a

result of this injury, Robert testified that he tried to get up but “couldn’t walk on”

his knee. (Tr. 544).

{¶16} S.M. testified that, as Greenawalt and Natalie struggled in front of the

McDoles’ camper, Natalie got pinned up against a lot sign before they moved

towards the McDoles’ picnic table. S.M. stated that, as Natalie and Greenawalt

struggled, they moved towards the McDoles’ picnic table. Eventually, Natalie was

laying on the picnic table with Greenawalt above her.

{¶17} S.M. testified that he saw Greenawalt’s arm going straight down as he

was hitting Natalie while she was on the picnic table. Robert described

Greenawalt’s motions as “doing downward punches” as Natalie was “laying

-6- Case No. 9-24-40

perfectly flat” on the picnic table. (Tr. 493, 537). Richard testified that he saw

Roger take Greenawalt to the ground. Grabbing Greenawalt, Roger yelled, “it’s

done, it’s over with. Knock it the f**k off now.” (Tr. 940).

{¶18} At this time, Durbin was helping Robert up and began walking with

him to a nearby golf cart. After looking towards the picnic table, Robert saw Natalie

lying on the ground and yelled, “that better not be my f**king wife.” (Tr. 490).

Durbin helped Robert sit down on the golf cart and then went to Natalie. Durbin

testified that he heard Natalie take “three great big gasps of air” and initially thought

that she had been “knocked out” or “was just unconscious.” (Tr. 898).

{¶19} However, Lindsey could not detect a pulse and began performing CPR

on Natalie while Richard dialed 9-1-1. Lindsey testified that, around this time, she

heard Bryan tell Greenawalt, “I hear the cops. You might want to leave.” (Tr.

1487). In response, Greenawalt got onto his motorcycle and left the scene of the

altercation. Robert testified that, around this time, he heard someone say, “we need

to get this cleaned up before they get here.” (Tr. 546). Durbin testified that he saw

people moving around the McDoles’ lot and cleaning the campsite.

{¶20} Christopher O’Connor (“O’Connor”) works as a paramedic at the First

Consolidated Fire District and responded to the 9-1-1 call. When he arrived, Natalie

was not responsive. As he offered medical care, O’Connor noticed a “penetrating

mark” above Natalie’s sternum, though her external bleeding appeared to be

-7- Case No. 9-24-40

“minimal.” (Tr. 860, 865). The paramedics then transported Natalie to Marion

General Hospital where she was pronounced dead.

{¶21} Shortly thereafter, law enforcement arrived at the scene. Lt. Eric

White (“Lt. White”) of the Marion County Sheriff’s Office testified that he was

responding to a reported assault and did not tape of the scene of the incident until

he learned that Natalie had been pronounced dead at the hospital. A crowd of around

fifty people was in the vicinity of the picnic table as law enforcement began to take

witness statements.

{¶22} Deputy John Endicott (“Deputy Endicott”) was also dispatched to the

campground and was informed that a person connected to the reported assault had

left the scene of the incident on a black motorcycle. On his way to the campground,

Deputy Endicott saw Greenawalt on a motorcycle that matched the description of

the report he had received and initiated a traffic stop. Deputy Endicott observed

that Greenawalt had several injuries and detected the odor of an alcoholic beverage

coming from his person.

{¶23} After he requested medical attention, Greenawalt was transported to

Marion General Hospital where his injuries were treated. After he was arrested, law

enforcement searched his person but did not locate any weapons. Roughly six to

seven hours after the incident, a search warrant was approved that permitted law

enforcement to obtain a blood sample from Greenawalt. Subsequent testing

revealed that his blood alcohol level was 0.075.

-8- Case No. 9-24-40

{¶24} Natalie’s remains were transported to Lucas County for an autopsy.

Dr. Jeffrey Hudson (“Dr. Hudson”) testified that the toxicology report indicated that

Natalie’s blood alcohol level was 0.13. He then identified a stab wound on her neck

and a stab wound on her abdomen in addition to a cut on her arm. The characteristics

of these wounds were consistent with having been struck by a sharp object, such as

a blade or knife. He concluded that the stab wound below her neck was the fatal

injury and was inflicted prior to the wounds on her abdomen and arm.

{¶25} Dr. Hudson testified that the object that created the neck injury went

downward three inches into Natalie’s body and transected her carotid artery. He

stated that her carotid artery bled internally and that this wound would have caused

her to lose consciousness within ten to twelve seconds. Further, since the neck

wound was not jagged or surrounded by internal tissue bruising, he concluded this

injury was not caused by contact with a blunt object or from being impaled.

{¶26} Detective Stacy McCurry of the Marion County Sheriff’s Office

conducted a search of the crime scene and did not locate a knife. Similarly,

Detective Christy Utley did not locate a knife or any other weapons in the

saddlebags of Greenawalt’s motorcycle. During the investigation, law enforcement

obtained security camera recordings from the General Store at the campground and

found the footage of Greenawalt purchasing a day pass. In this recording,

Greenawalt had a silver clip on his right pants pocket. Law enforcement did not

-9- Case No. 9-24-40

locate an item that resembled this clip in searching Greenawalt’s person or in

searching his motorcycle.

{¶27} On July 6, 2022, Greenawalt was indicted on two counts of murder in

violation of R.C. 2903.02(B), unclassified felonies; two counts of involuntary

manslaughter in violation of R.C. 2903.04(A), first-degree felonies; one count of

voluntary manslaughter in violation of R.C. 2903.03(A), a first-degree felony; one

count of felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), a second-degree

felony; and one count of felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2), a

second-degree felony. The indictment identified the two counts of felonious assault

as the predicate offenses for the two counts of murder in violation of R.C.

2903.02(B).

{¶28} A six-day jury trial on these charges began on June 10, 2024. The

State called twenty-two witnesses to testify before the Defense called eleven

witnesses. After the Defense rested, the trial court denied Greenawalt’s Crim.R. 29

motion for acquittal and did not give a jury instruction on self-defense. On June 18,

2024, the jury returned verdicts of guilty on all seven counts against Greenawalt.

{¶29} On August 6, 2024, Greenawalt appeared for sentencing. After the

trial court determined that the seven convictions were subject to merger, the State

elected to proceed on the first count of murder in violation of R.C. 2903.02(B). The

trial court ordered Greenawalt to serve a term of life imprisonment with the

-10- Case No. 9-24-40

possibility of parole after fifteen years and then issued its judgment entry of

sentencing on August 9, 2024.

{¶30} Greenawalt filed his notice of appeal on August 19, 2024. On appeal,

he raises the following seven assignments of error:

First Assignment of Error

Trial Counsel were prejudicially ineffective because they abandoned Greenawalt’s self-defense claim. Trial Counsel was prejudicially ineffective for failing to request a self-defense instruction, and for failing to argue it to the jury.

Second Assignment of Error

The trial court committed reversible error by failing to give Greenawalt a self-defense instruction. The State did have the burden to disprove self-defense. Greenawalt was not required to admit to committing the offenses to get this instruction.

Third Assignment of Error

The trial court committed reversible error by permitting the victim’s husband to sit as the State’s representative, during Greenawalt[’s] trial over his objection. And by allowing [S.M.] to watch the remainder of the trial as a ‘victim’ under Evid.R. 615 and Greenawalt’s right to a fair trial.

Fourth Assignment of Error

The trial court reversibly erred in not permitting the jury to hear the prior inconsistent statements of [S.M.]. He was the only witness who claimed Greenawalt threatened Natalie Rudd and the only witness who claimed he saw a knife during the affray.

Fifth Assignment of Error

The State’s evidence that Greenawalt committed each offense [was] legally insufficient as a matter of law.

-11- Case No. 9-24-40

Sixth Assignment of Error

The evidence manifestly weighed against Greenawalt’s convictions.

Seventh Assignment of Error

Greenawalt was denied his right to a fair trial through cumulative error.

For the sake of clarity, we will consider the second assignment of error prior to the

first assignment of error.

{¶31} Greenawalt argues that the trial court erred by failing to give a jury

instruction on self-defense in this case.

Legal Standard

{¶32} “Jury instructions are critically important to assist juries in

determining the interplay between the facts of the case before it and the applicable

law.” State v. Griffin, 2014-Ohio-4767, ¶ 5. “Requested jury instructions should

ordinarily be given if they are correct statements of law, if they are applicable to the

facts in the case, and if reasonable minds might reach the conclusion sought by the

requested instruction.” State v. Adams, 2015-Ohio-3954, ¶ 240. However, “a trial

court need not provide a requested jury instruction unless it finds that sufficient

evidence was presented at trial to support giving the instruction.” State v. Stoychoff,

2021-Ohio-4248, ¶ 9 (3d Dist.).

-12- Case No. 9-24-40

{¶33} “Self-defense is an affirmative defense whereby the defendant, in

essence, admits to the facts of the state’s case but offers additional facts that justify

or excuse the defendant’s use of force.” State v. Lewis, 2025-Ohio-2178, ¶ 41 (6th

Dist.). Under R.C. 2901.05, “a defendant claiming self-defense has the burden of

production—that is, the burden of producing evidence that ‘tends to support’ his use

of force in defending himself.” State v. Estelle, 2021-Ohio-2636, ¶ 18 (3d Dist.). If

the defendant carries this initial burden of production, the State must then carry the

burden of persuasion and prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did

not act in self-defense. State v. Grant, 2023-Ohio-2720, ¶ 68 (3d Dist.).

{¶34} In deciding whether the defendant has carried this burden of

production, “[t]he question is not whether the evidence should be believed but

whether the evidence, if believed, could convince a trier of fact, beyond a reasonable

doubt, that the defendant was acting in self-defense.” State v. Palmer, 2024-Ohio-

539, ¶ 21.

Similarly to the standard for judging the sufficiency of the state’s evidence, if the defendant’s evidence and any reasonable inferences about that evidence would allow a rational trier of fact to find all the elements of a self-defense claim when viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, then the defendant has satisfied the burden.

State v. Messenger, 2022-Ohio-4562, ¶ 25. The defendant’s burden is “not a heavy

one and . . . might even be satisfied through the state’s own evidence.” Id. at ¶ 22.

‘Finally, a defendant’s bare assertion that he acted in self-defense will be insufficient . . . . His assertions must be coupled with supporting

-13- Case No. 9-24-40

evidence from whatever source and of a nature and quality sufficient to raise reasonable doubt as to guilt.’

(Citations omitted.) State v. Davidson-Dixon, 2021-Ohio-1485, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.). “If

the evidence generates only a mere speculation or possible doubt, such evidence is

insufficient to raise the affirmative defense, and submission of the issue to the jury

will be unwarranted.” State v. Miller, 2025-Ohio-1920, ¶ 24 (4th Dist.), quoting

State v. Melchior, 56 Ohio St.2d 15, 20 (1978).

{¶35} A defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on the use of deadly force

in self-defense if he produced evidence that

(1) he was not at fault in creating the situation that led to the affray, (2) he had a ‘bona fide belief’ that he was ‘in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm’ and his only way to escape was by using force, and (3) he did not violate a duty to retreat.

Palmer at ¶ 23, quoting Messenger at ¶ 14. See State v. Bender, 2024-Ohio-1750,

¶ 21 (3d Dist.) (noting that the act of stabbing another person will generally

constitute the use of deadly force). “The elements of self-defense are cumulative;

the defendant’s failure to show legally sufficient evidence raising an issue on any

of the elements warrants the refusal of a self-defense instruction.” State v. Brennan,

2024-Ohio-4687, ¶ 63 (5th Dist.).

{¶36} As to the first element for self-defense, the “concept [of being at fault]

is broader than simply not being the immediate aggressor.” Bender at ¶ 27, quoting

State v. Elam, 2022-Ohio-1895, ¶ 14 (12th Dist.). The person at fault “can be the

first to use force or the person whose ‘wrongful’ behavior provoked the assault.”

-14- Case No. 9-24-40

State v. Rose, 2024-Ohio-5689, ¶ 28 (1st Dist.). “In other words, ‘a defendant

voluntarily participating in or initiating a confrontation, especially for purposes

other than protection, cannot justify or excuse’ her use of force.” Id., quoting State

v. Smith, 2021-Ohio-1185, ¶ 23 (8th Dist.). See also State v. Fields, 2025-Ohio-

2248, ¶ 21 (1st Dist.).

{¶37} As a result, “a person cannot provoke a fight or voluntarily enter

combat and then claim self-defense.” State v. Canankamp, 2023-Ohio-43, ¶ 38 (3d

Dist.), quoting State v. James, 2021-Ohio-1112, ¶ 21 (2d Dist.). Further, a person

“cannot claim self-defense when he ‘willingly advanced toward a volatile situation’

by confronting the victim to continue an earlier altercation[.]” State v. Warth, 2023-

Ohio-3641, ¶ 43 (1st Dist.), quoting State v. Sekic, 2011-Ohio-3978, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.).

See also State v. Smith, 2024-Ohio-2811, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.) (concluding a defendant

was at fault where the evidence suggested that “no violence would have ensued” if

he had not willingly “advanced toward and confronted the victim”).

{¶38} “The second element of self-defense in a deadly force scenario

requires both a subjective belief of imminent danger and an objectively reasonable

basis for that belief.” State v. Smiley, 2025-Ohio-2666, ¶ 38 (5th Dist.).

The trier of fact ‘first must consider the defendant’s situation objectively, that is, whether, considering all of the defendant’s particular characteristics, knowledge, or lack of knowledge, circumstances, history, and conditions at the time of the attack, []he reasonably believed []he was in imminent danger.’ . . . ‘Then, if the objective standard is met, the [trier of fact] must determine if,

-15- Case No. 9-24-40

subjectively, this particular defendant had an honest belief that []he was in imminent danger.’

(Citations omitted.) (Brackets and emphasis sic.) State v. Patterson, 2025-Ohio-280,

¶ 42 (10th Dist.), quoting State v. Thomas, 77 Ohio St.3d 323, 330 (1997).

Implicit in the second element of self-defense is the requirement that the degree of force used was warranted under the circumstances and proportionate to the perceived threat. State v. Kean, 2019-Ohio-1171, ¶ 58 (10th Dist.). As to the degree of force that is permitted, the defendant is privileged to use the amount of force that is reasonably necessary to repel the attack. State v. Williford, 49 Ohio St.3d 247 (1990). In other words, one may use a commensurate amount of force as the circumstances require to protect oneself against an attack.

Smiley at ¶ 41. “If the force used was so disproportionate that it shows a purpose to

injure, self-defense is unavailable.” Grant, 2023-Ohio-1305, at ¶ 70 (3d Dist.),

quoting State v. Barker, 2022-Ohio-3756, ¶ 27 (2d Dist.). Further, “[w]hen an

imminent threat has ceased, self-defensive actions become unreasonable.” State v.

Brown, 2025-Ohio-2351, ¶ 26 (1st Dist.).

{¶39} Finally, as to the third element, R.C. 2901.09(B) now specifies that

“[a] person has no duty to retreat before using force in self-defense . . . if that person

is in a place in which the person lawfully has a right to be.” This “stand your

ground” provision “removes, in most cases, the duty to retreat before using self-

defense.” Bender, 2024-Ohio-1750, at ¶ 66 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Degahson,

2022-Ohio-2972, ¶ 15 (2d Dist.).

-16- Case No. 9-24-40

Standard of Review

{¶40} A “trial judge is in the best position to gauge the evidence before the

jury and is provided the discretion to determine whether the evidence adduced at

trial was sufficient to require an instruction.” State v. Fulmer, 2008-Ohio-936, ¶ 72.

For this reason, appellate courts examine whether a trial court’s decision not to give

a requested jury instruction was an abuse of discretion given the circumstances of

the case. Grant, 2023-Ohio-2720, at ¶ 65 (3d Dist.).

{¶41} An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment but is present

where a decision is arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable. State v. Sullivan,

2017-Ohio-8937, ¶ 20 (3d Dist.). “If the evidence adduced at trial is legally

insufficient to raise the issue of self-defense, the court is not obligated to instruct

the jury regarding this claim and has discretion to completely remove it from the

jury’s consideration.” State v. Barnd, 85 Ohio App.3d 254, 259 (3d Dist. 1993).

Legal Analysis

{¶42} Greenawalt raises two main arguments herein. First, he asserts that

the evidence produced at trial was sufficient to entitle him to a jury instruction on

self-defense. Turning to the first element of self-defense, we will examine whether

evidence was produced at trial from which the jurors could have found that

Greenawalt was not at fault in creating the altercation in which deadly force was

employed against Natalie.

-17- Case No. 9-24-40

{¶43} The evidence produced at trial indicates that two physical altercations

occurred in the early morning of July 3, 2022. The initial altercation began soon

after Greenawalt returned to the Rudds’ lot. Greenawalt had previously been asked

to leave the Rudds’ lot because he had been popping the balloons on Natalie’s

decorative arch. The testimony at trial indicates that, after Greenawalt returned, he

began engaging in the behavior that had previously prompted the Rudds to ask him

to leave. Multiple witnesses testified that the Rudds and several others present

asked Greenawalt to leave because of this behavior.

{¶44} Natalie eventually approached Greenawalt at the edge of her lot and

loudly asked him to leave her property. In response, he told her, “f**k you, you

p***y b***h. You p***y, come on.” (Tr. 960). While the witnesses gave

conflicting testimony about whether Natalie or Greenawalt used physical force first,

the initial altercation between Robert, Natalie, and Greenawalt concluded when

Roger and Richard managed to separate these individuals.

{¶45} S.M. affirmed that the scene remained calm for around three minutes.

He testified that Natalie gave him a hug and that Greenawalt “started to run at her

while [they were] . . . hugging . . . so she ran to him.” (Tr. 742). S.M. stated that

Greenawalt yelled, “I’m going to kill these mother***ers.” (Tr. 762). He then

affirmed that Greenawalt went “after her [Natalie]” and said that “he [Greenawalt]

started running and she [Natalie] started running. . . . They both ran towards each

other” and “kind of met in the middle.” (Tr. 581, 579).

-18- Case No. 9-24-40

{¶46} Similarly, Durbin testified that, at this point, Robert was going to take

Natalie back to their camper when Greenawalt said, “Come on B. Come on B.”

(Tr. 897). These statements were “directed at Natalie” and made “[l]ouder than an

adult roar or a yell.” (Tr. 898). Durbin indicated that Greenawalt yelled these

statements “as he was walking over” and that this comment “coaxed her to go back

over.” (Tr. 897). Robert also testified that Greenawalt “went back after Natalie

again for the second time.” (Tr. 489). This second altercation ended when

Greenawalt was pulled away from Natalie at the picnic table moments before she

was unconscious on the ground.

{¶47} In addressing these facts on appeal, Greenawalt makes much of the

conflicting testimony as to whether he or Natalie resorted to physical force first

during the initial altercation. As a preliminary matter, we note that, in the lead-up

to the physical struggle, Greenawalt returned to the Rudds’ lot; persisted in the

behavior that he had been told to stop during his prior visit; did not initially respond

to repeated requests for him to leave from multiple people after he returned to their

lot; and insulted Natalie with profanity. See Warth, 2023-Ohio-3641, at ¶ 43 (1st

Dist.), citing State v. Gaston, 2013-Ohio-2331, ¶ 16-17 (8th Dist.).

{¶48} But even more relevant to this analysis, the evidence at trial indicates

that this initial altercation ended when Roger and Richard intervened and separated

the parties. At this point, Robert and Natalie had withdrawn from the dispute and

were going to go back to their camper. The State produced evidence that, after the

-19- Case No. 9-24-40

initial altercation concluded, Greenawalt then began to scream insults at Natalie

while advancing in her direction and that this conduct led to the altercation in which

he used deadly force. See State v. Walker, 2021-Ohio-2037, ¶ 19 (8th Dist.)

(“Generally, a defendant, having willingly advanced toward a volatile situation

cannot rely on the affirmative defense of self-defense.”). See also Fields, 2025-

Ohio-2248, at ¶ 21 (1st Dist.).

{¶49} In response, the Defense did not present any evidence that would

suggest that, after the initial altercation ended, Robert or Natalie undertook any

actions that evinced an intention to threaten Greenawalt or to rekindle the physical

altercation. As noted previously, “‘a defendant voluntarily participating in or

initiating a confrontation, especially for purposes other than protection, cannot

justify or excuse’ her use of force.” Rose, 2024-Ohio-5689, at ¶ 28 (1st Dist.),

quoting Smith, 2021-Ohio-1185, at ¶ 23 (8th Dist.). Having reviewed the evidence

in the record, we conclude that the Defense did not produce sufficient evidence to

raise an issue as to the first element of self-defense.

{¶50} While Greenawalt’s failure to substantiate the first element of self-

defense is sufficient to conclude that a jury instruction was properly denied, we note

that the Defense also did not produce evidence that indicates Greenawalt “had a

‘bona fide belief’ that he was ‘in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm’

and his only way to escape was by using force[.]” Palmer, 2024-Ohio-539, at ¶ 23,

-20- Case No. 9-24-40

quoting Messenger, 2022-Ohio-4562, at ¶ 14. See also Brennan, 2024-Ohio-4687,

at ¶ 63 (5th Dist.).

{¶51} The testimony at trial indicates that Natalie sustained the fatal wound

while she was lying flat against a picnic table with Greenawalt above her. At this

point, Robert had suffered a knee injury and required assistance to walk. For this

reason, he was not near the picnic table and was not part of the physical altercation.

The record contains no indication that Natalie—or any other person present—was,

at this point, in a position to place Greenawalt in danger of death or great bodily

harm.

{¶52} Further, Robert testified that he saw Greenawalt make a stabbing

motion three times while above Natalie. Similarly, the State introduced a recording

of the 9-1-1 call that Richard and Lindsey had placed on July 3, 2022. The

dispatcher testified that a person on the call reported that Greenawalt had hit Natalie

three times.

{¶53} Dr. Hudson also testified that he identified three wounds on Natalie’s

body. Based on the condition of these wounds, Dr. Hudson concluded that the

wounds on her abdomen and arm were inflicted after Natalie had already been

stabbed in the neck. He also concluded that Natalie’s internal bleeding would have

likely caused her to lose consciousness within ten to twelve seconds of sustaining

her neck injury.

-21- Case No. 9-24-40

{¶54} Dr. Hudson’s testimony also indicates that Natalie was struck below

her neck with a sharp object that created a wound that was three inches deep. This

“stab wound to the neck” was consistent with “some kind of blade or knife.” (Tr.

1397, 1400). State v. Ray, 2013-Ohio-3671, ¶ 32 (12th Dist.) (finding self-defense

inapplicable where the defendant “used deadly force” by stabbing the victim in the

supraclavicular region with a hunting knife” because the defendant “was not faced

with deadly force, only fists”).

{¶55} Having examined the evidence in the record, we conclude that the

Defense did not produce evidence from which a finder of fact could conclude that

Greenawalt had a bona fide belief that he was in imminent danger of death or great

bodily harm at the time Natalie sustained the fatal wound. Since Greenawalt did

not produce sufficient evidence to raise self-defense, the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in refusing to give a jury instruction on self-defense.1

{¶56} Second, Greenawalt argues that he did not need to admit to stabbing

Natalie in order to receive a self-defense jury instruction. At trial, the main strategy

of the Defense was to argue that the State could not establish that Natalie’s fatal

wound was inflicted by Greenawalt. See State v. Oates, 2013-Ohio-2609, ¶ 13 (3d

Dist.). In particular, the Defense emphasized that no knife was located in the

1 The State also argues that the third element of self-defense was not substantiated because the day pass that Greenawalt purchased at the campground permitted him to be on the premises until 11:00 P.M. on July 2, 2022. Since the brawl occurred after midnight on July 3, 2022, the State asserts that Greenawalt was not lawfully present on the campground at the time of the altercation. As we have already found the first two elements were not supported by sufficient evidence, we do not address this argument.

-22- Case No. 9-24-40

investigation. The Defense also suggested that Natalie could have sustained the

fatal injury from contact with the bolt on the lot sign or a nearby piece of rebar

during the brawl.

{¶57} In response, the State argued that Greenawalt had not produced

sufficient evidence to raise self-defense or even acknowledged that he committed

the act that caused Natalie’s death. However, even if Greenawalt had admitted to

stabbing Natalie in the neck, the evidence produced at trial was still not sufficient

to warrant a jury instruction on self-defense. For this reason, we need not—and do

not—make a determination regarding this second argument.

{¶58} In conclusion, Greenawalt failed to produce evidence at trial that was

sufficient to create an issue as to each of the elements of self-defense and, as a result,

failed to raise this affirmative defense. For this reason, Greenawalt’s arguments fail

to establish that the trial court abused its discretion when it did not give a jury

instruction on self-defense in this case. Accordingly, the second assignment of error

is overruled.

{¶59} Greenawalt argues that he was denied his right to the effective

assistance of counsel when his trial counsel withdrew the request for a self-defense

instruction.

-23- Case No. 9-24-40

{¶60} “Ohio law presumes that a licensed attorney’s representation was

competent.” State v. Morgan, 2024-Ohio-625, ¶ 13 (3d Dist.). “In order to prove

an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the appellant must carry the burden of

establishing (1) that his or her counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) that this

deficient performance prejudiced the defendant.” State v. McWay, 2018-Ohio-3618,

¶ 24 (3d Dist.), quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).

{¶61} To establish deficient performance, the appellant must demonstrate

that defense “counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the

‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” State v. Howton,

2017-Ohio-4349, ¶ 35 (3d Dist.), quoting Strickland at 687. In general, matters that

fall within the ambit of trial strategy or debatable tactics do not constitute ineffective

assistance of counsel. State v. Wears, 2023-Ohio-4363, ¶ 32 (3d Dist.). Further,

defense counsel is not required to “raise meritless issues or even all arguably

meritorious issues.” State v. Mayse, 2017-Ohio-1483, ¶ 24 (3d Dist.).

{¶62} To establish prejudice, “the defendant must show a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have

been different.” State v. Bibbs, 2016-Ohio-8396, ¶ 13 (3d Dist.). “If the appellant

does not establish one of these two prongs, the appellate court does not need to

consider the facts of the case under the other prong of the test.” State v. Gear, 2023-

Ohio-1246, ¶ 50 (3d Dist.).

-24- Case No. 9-24-40

{¶63} On appeal, Greenawalt argues that his defense attorneys were

ineffective for abandoning a strategy based upon self-defense and withdrawing the

request for a jury instruction on self-defense. However, in the second assignment

of error, we concluded that the evidence produced at trial was not sufficient to entitle

Greenawalt to a self-defense instruction. The failure to make a futile request does

not constitute deficient performance. See Grant, 2023-Ohio-2720, at ¶ 97 (3d Dist.);

State v. May, 2015-Ohio-4275, ¶ 35 (8th Dist.).

{¶64} Further, the Defense sought to raise doubts about whether Greenawalt

was the cause of the fatal wound that Natalie suffered. Given the lack of support

for a self-defense instruction, the decision to pursue this alternative defense was a

reasonable trial strategy. For these reasons, we conclude that Greenawalt has failed

to establish that he was deprived of his right to the effective assistance of

counsel. Accordingly, his first assignment of error is overruled.

{¶65} Greenawalt argues that the trial court incorrectly concluded that

Robert and S.M. were victims within the meaning of Marsy’s Law and erred in

finding that they had a right to be present in the courtroom after they had testified

as witnesses.

-25- Case No. 9-24-40

{¶66} In 2017, the Ohio Constitution was amended when the voters approved

a provision known as “Marsy’s Law.” This provision was designed to “give[] crime

victims and their families meaningful and enforceable rights . . . .” In re J.G., 2021-

Ohio-1624, ¶ 50 (3d Dist.). Marsy’s Law defines a victim

a person against whom the criminal offense or delinquent act is committed or who is directly and proximately harmed by the commission of the offense or act. The term ‘victim’ does not include the accused or a person whom the court finds would not act in the best interests of a deceased, incompetent, minor, or incapacitated victim.

Ohio Const., Art. I, § 10a(D). A person who qualifies as a “victim” has the right,

“upon request, to reasonable and timely notice of all public proceedings involving

the criminal offense . . . against the victim, and to be present at all such

proceedings[.]” Ohio Const., Art. I, § 10a(A)(2).

{¶67} “While the Marsy’s Law now incorporates a victim’s right to be

present at all public proceedings involving a criminal offense into the Ohio

Constitution, the notion that a victim may remain present during the trial

proceedings is not new.” Cleveland v. Alrefaei, 2020-Ohio-5009, ¶ 57 (8th Dist.).

Prior to the passage of Marsy’s law, Evid.R. 615 and R.C. 2930.09 addressed the

victim’s right to be present at trial. See State v. Marshall, 2009-Ohio-2197, ¶ 41-43

(12th Dist.). These provisions were revised after the passage of Marsy’s Law and

“provide . . . guidance in reviewing . . . [a] trial court’s denial of . . . [a defendant’s]

request to exclude the alleged victims from . . . trial.” Alrefaei at ¶ 57.

-26- Case No. 9-24-40

{¶68} Evid.R. 615 addresses the separation and exclusion of witnesses at

trial and reads, in its relevant part, as follows:

(A) Except as provided in division (B) of this rule, at the request of a party the court shall order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses, and it may make the order of its own motion. An order directing the ‘exclusion’ or ‘separation’ of witnesses or the like, in general terms without specification of other or additional limitations, is effective only to require the exclusion of witnesses from the hearing during the testimony of other witnesses.

(B) This rule does not authorize exclusion of any of the following persons from the hearing:

...

(4) In a criminal proceeding, a victim of the charged offense to the extent that the victim’s presence is authorized by statute enacted by the General Assembly or by the Ohio Constitution. As used in this rule, ‘victim’ has the same meaning as provided in Chapter 2930 of the Revised Code.

“The obvious purpose of an order excluding a witness from a courtroom is to prevent

a witness from shaping or fabricating his testimony to conform to testimony

previously given.” State v. Navarro, 2025-Ohio-227, ¶ 40 (3d Dist.), quoting State

v. Jones, 1980 WL 351056, * 8 (4th Dist. July 14, 1980).

{¶69} “Issues surrounding the separation of witnesses . . . are within the

sound discretion of the trial court.” Navarro at ¶ 41. See State v. McConnaughey,

2021-Ohio-3320, ¶ 26 (1st Dist.) (the issue of whether to permit a victim to be

present in the courtroom during a trial is generally committed to the trial court’s

-27- Case No. 9-24-40

discretion). “The burden is on the defendant to show the presence of the alleged

victim compromised the defendant’s right to a fair trial.” Alrefai, 2020-Ohio-5009,

at ¶ 60. See also State v. Pennington, 2024-Ohio-5681, ¶ 67 (4th Dist.).

{¶70} Greenawalt raises two main arguments herein. First, he asserts that

the trial court erred by failing to enforce the order separating the witnesses at trial.

In this case, the Defense objected when Robert sought to remain in the courtroom

once he had finished testifying. The Defense then argued that Robert needed to be

excluded from the proceeding because he could potentially be called to testify again

later in the trial. Another objection was raised on the same grounds when S.M.

entered the courtroom after he testified.

{¶71} After both of these objections, the State argued that, as family

members of the decedent, S.M. and Robert were victims within the meaning of

Marsy’s Law and had a right to be present at the proceeding.2 After hearing the

arguments of the parties, the trial court concluded that Robert and S.M. had a right

to remain in the courtroom. On appeal, Greenawalt argues that Natalie’s family

members were not necessarily victims under Marsy’s Law and that the trial court’s

failure to enforce the separation order deprived him of a fair trial.

2 Robert was Natalie’s husband, and S.M.’s mother was Natalie’s first cousin.

-28- Case No. 9-24-40

{¶72} However, the record contains no indication that Robert or S.M. were

present in the courtroom prior to testifying as witnesses during the State’s case-in-

chief. At the beginning of trial, the State told the trial judge that no witnesses that

the prosecution intended to call were present in the courtroom. Once the Defense

objected to Robert’s presence, the trial court noted that he “was out of the courtroom

prior to his testimony.” (Tr. 555). Similarly, when the Defense objected to S.M.

entering the courtroom after he testified, the trial court inquired into whether he

could begin to assert any of the rights that he might have as a victim that far in the

proceeding. Further, neither Robert nor S.M. were subsequently called to testify

during the remainder of the trial.

{¶73} As noted previously, “[t]he purpose of separating witnesses is to

prevent them from hearing the testimony of other witnesses and tailoring their

testimony accordingly.” State v. Kelley, 2023-Ohio-3972, ¶ 30 (8th Dist.), quoting

State v. Stroud, 2023-Ohio-569, ¶ 41 (11th Dist.). In this case, Robert and S.M.

could not have tailored their testimony in this manner because neither of them took

the stand after hearing any of the other witnesses speak at trial.

{¶74} Because of the timeframes in which these two witnesses were in the

courtroom, Greenawalt cannot establish that their presence interfered with the

protections offered by a separation order or affected the fairness of his trial. Thus,

even if the trial court incorrectly found that Robert and S.M. were victims under

Marsy’s Law, any resulting error is harmless. For this reason, we do not need to

-29- Case No. 9-24-40

decide whether these two witnesses qualified as victims under the Ohio Constitution

to resolve this issue and make no determination on this matter. Since Greenawalt

has failed to demonstrate prejudice, his first argument is without merit.

{¶75} Second, Greenawalt asserts that Robert was permitted to sit at

counsel’s table with the prosecutor as the State’s representative. In State v.

Montgomery, the Ohio Supreme Court found that “permitting the alleged victim to

sit at the prosecutor’s table during the criminal trial and to be designated and

introduced to the jury as the state’s representative” constituted structural error. Id.,

2022-Ohio-2211, ¶ 33. We turn to determining whether the record establishes that

Robert did, in fact, sit at the counsel’s table as the State’s representative at trial.

{¶76} At the beginning of voir dire and at the beginning of trial, the county

prosecutor stated the names of the two other people who were sitting with him at

counsel’s table. Joining him were an assistant county prosecutor and a detective

from the sheriff’s office. See State v. Wilburn, 2023-Ohio-4865, ¶ 67 (4th Dist.).

These were the only occasions at trial where those who were sitting alongside the

prosecutor at counsel’s table were expressly identified. In contrast to Montgomery,

neither the trial court nor the prosecutor ever referred to Robert as the State’s

representative in front of the jurors. Id., 2022-Ohio-2211, at ¶ 19, 36.

{¶77} In the absence of a statement formally designating Robert as the

State’s representative or expressly indicating that he was sitting at counsel’s table,

-30- Case No. 9-24-40

Greenawalt points to the following portion of an exchange that occurred after the

Defense objected to Robert remaining in the courtroom:

[Defense Counsel]: I was just saying, and I’m checking with my office, but if we have Mr. [Robert] Rudd subpoenaed, we would ask the separation of witnesses remain. . . .

[Prosecutor]: I don’t know if he’s been served or not. What I do know is pursuant to Marsy’s Law, he’s the victim. So as a matter of fact, I think there was recently a case where the victim was allowed to sit at counsel table. So we would ask, given the Constitutional protections he has, that he be allowed to sit.

[Defense Counsel]: And if I may briefly respond, Your Honor, given the Constitutional argument that was raised. I believe that the Constitution requires that a member of the victim’s family be present—or allows for a member of the victim’s family be present, of which, there are numerous. And I would also note he was not in the courtroom up to this point. So if he was going—if the allegation was going to be that he had a Constitutional right to be here, he would have never been separated by the State to begin with.

[Defense Counsel]: . . . I am empathetic to the situation that there’s to be a representative from the family. You can’t march in 50 different people and then claim . . . the entire family are victims . . . . I think there are other members of the family present to satisfy the Constitutional requirement that the victim’s family be allowed to be present.

[Trial Court]: I’m not aware of anything in Marsy’s Law that says you can pick one representative.

[Defense Counsel]: I don’t think it says that either. I think it’s to allow a member of the family—as [the prosecutor] . . . stated, a member of the family sat at counsel table. They did not have the entire family.

-31- Case No. 9-24-40

[Prosecutor]: No, I think that case it was the actual sexual assault victim who sat at counsel table.

....

[Defense Counsel]: . . . I think he just has to be removed to insure the sanctity of the proceedings. . . .

[Trial Court]: . . . [A]ren’t you basically arguing that Mr. Rudd, if he’s allowed to stay in the courtroom and you do call him, which is an if, and then if he changes his testimony based on what he heard from other witnesses, then he may have—the Defendant may have his right to a fair trial compromised if those things all happen.

(Emphasis added.) (Tr. 549-551, 555). In this exchange, the prosecutor appears to

have been unfamiliar with the current law on this subject, but the context of his

statements suggests he was arguing that, if a trial court had permitted a victim to sit

at counsel’s table after testifying as a witness in another case, then it was assuredly

permissible for the trial court to permit Robert to remain in the room after testifying

as a witness in this case.3

{¶78} While another case in which a trial court had permitted the “actual

sexual assault victim . . . [to] s[i]t at counsel table” was referenced, the trial court

and the Defense did not respond by discussing the propriety of allowing Robert to

sit at counsel’s table. (Tr. 551). Rather, the Defense discussed the “requirement

3 The prosecutor was correct that another trial court had permitted a sexual assault victim to sit at counsel’s table as the State’s representative. State v. Montgomery, 2019-Ohio-5178, ¶ 24 (5th Dist.). However, on appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court found that designating the victim as the State’s representative and permitting her to sit at counsel’s table constituted structural error in a decision released on June 30, 2022. Montgomery, 2022-Ohio-2211, at ¶ 33. Thus, the prosecutor appears to have been unaware of how this situation was ultimately handled by the Ohio Supreme Court.

-32- Case No. 9-24-40

that the victim’s family be allowed to be present.” (Tr. 551). These arguments

expressly addressed who could represent the family in the courtroom but did not

address who could represent the State at counsel’s table in this case.

{¶79} The content of this sidebar establishes that Robert was, in the words

of the trial court, “allowed to stay in the courtroom.” (Tr. 551). The evidence in

the record does not establish that Robert was sitting as the State’s representative at

counsel’s table. Based on the evidence contained in the record currently before us,

we cannot determine that the structural error identified in Montgomery occurred in

this case. Id., 2022-Ohio-2211, at ¶ 33. For this reason, Greenawalt’s second

argument herein is without merit. Accordingly, the third assignment of error is

overruled.

{¶80} Greenawalt argues that he should have been permitted to introduce

extrinsic evidence of S.M.’s prior inconsistent statements at trial.

{¶81} “Evid.R. 613 governs impeachment by self-contradiction.” State v.

Dodridge, 2025-Ohio-2856, ¶ 45 (4th Dist.). Evid.R. 613(B) reads as follows:

(B) Extrinsic Evidence of Prior Inconsistent Statement of Witness. Extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness is admissible if both of the following apply:

(1) If the statement is offered solely for the purpose of impeaching the witness, the witness is afforded a prior opportunity to explain or deny the statement and the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to

-33- Case No. 9-24-40

interrogate the witness on the statement or the interests of justice otherwise require;

(2) The subject matter of the statement is one of the following:

(a) A fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action other than the credibility of a witness;

(b) A fact that may be shown by extrinsic evidence under Evid.R. 608(A), 609, 616(A), or 616(B);

(c) A fact that may be shown by extrinsic evidence under the common law of impeachment if not in conflict with the Rules of Evidence.

When seeking to admit extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement, the

relevant party must lay a foundation in which:

(1) the witness is presented with the former statement; (2) the witness is asked whether he made the statement; (3) the witness is given an opportunity to admit, deny or explain the statement; and (4) the opposing party is given an opportunity to interrogate the witness on the inconsistent statement.

State v. Mack, 73 Ohio St.3d 502, 514-515 (1995), quoting State v. Theuring, 46

Ohio App.3d 152, 155 (1st Dist. 1988).

{¶82} “If a witness denies making a prior inconsistent statement, a proper

foundation has been laid, and if, in addition, the prior inconsistent statement does

not relate to a collateral matter, extrinsic evidence is admissible.” State v. Ollison,

2016-Ohio-8269, ¶ 60 (10th Dist.), quoting State v. Ferguson, 2013-Ohio-4798, ¶

15 (10th Dist.). See also State v. Greene, 2024-Ohio-35, ¶ 44 (12th Dist.).

“[H]owever, when a witness admits making a prior statement, it is not an abuse of

discretion for the trial court to exclude extrinsic evidence of the statement.” State

-34- Case No. 9-24-40

v. Edwards, 2025-Ohio-641, ¶ 40 (8th Dist.). See State v. Pierce, 2011-Ohio-4873,

¶ 82 (2d Dist.) (Where the prior inconsistent statement is admitted, “there is no need

for extrinsic evidence.”).

{¶83} Appellate courts apply an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing

a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude extrinsic evidence subject to Evid.R.

613(B). Greene at ¶ 45. “An abuse of discretion is more than an error in judgment

but is present where the trial court made a decision that was arbitrary, unreasonable,

or unconscionable.” State v. Yemsvat, 2025-Ohio-1971, ¶ 6 (3d Dist.). In applying

this standard, “an appellate court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the trial

court.” State v. Richey, 2021-Ohio-1461, ¶ 40 (3d Dist.).

{¶84} At trial, S.M. indicated that he sat for a police interview on July 6,

2022 when he was fourteen years old. On cross-examination, the Defense

confronted S.M. with a series of statements that he made during the police interview

that were inconsistent with his testimony on direct examination. S.M. then admitted

to making a series of prior inconsistent statements. The trial judge said, “All the

answers that I heard he [S.M.] acknowledged that his statements prior were

inconsistent.” (Tr. 737). On appeal, Greenawalt essentially argues that the

recording of S.M. should have been admitted regardless of whether S.M. admitted

to making these inconsistent statements in front of the jury.

-35- Case No. 9-24-40

{¶85} However, this Court and our sister districts have held that a trial court

does not abuse its discretion by excluding extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent

statement where a witness admits to having made that statement. State v. Osborne,

1988 WL 91322, *6 (3d Dist. Sept. 1 1988); State v. Shook, 2014-Ohio-3987, ¶ 52

(3d Dist.); State v. Green, 2023-Ohio-4360, ¶ 72 (3d Dist.). See also State v.

Harrison, 2022-Ohio-4627, ¶ 22 (2d Dist.); Dodridge, 2025-Ohio-2856, at ¶ 46-48

(4th Dist.); State v. West, 2017-Ohio-4055, ¶ 69 (5th Dist.); State v. Spaulding,

2017-Ohio-7993, ¶ 16 (6th Dist.); Edwards, 2025-Ohio-641, at ¶ 40 (8th Dist.); City

of Columbus v. Flowers, 2019-Ohio-5205, ¶ 20 (10th Dist.); Greene, 2024-Ohio-

35, at ¶ 44 (12th Dist.).

{¶86} Given the precedent of our district regarding the admissibility of

extrinsic evidence pursuant to Evid.R. 613(B), Greenawalt’s argument does not

establish that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the recording of the

police interview after finding that S.M. had admitted to making these prior

inconsistent statements. Accordingly, the fourth assignment of error is overruled.

{¶87} Greenawalt argues that his conviction for murder in violation of R.C.

2903.02(B) is not supported by sufficient evidence.

{¶88} A sufficiency-of-the-evidence analysis examines whether the State

has carried its burden of production at trial. Richey, 2021-Ohio-1461, at ¶ 16 (3d

-36- Case No. 9-24-40

Dist.). “On review, an appellate court is not to consider whether the evidence at

trial should be believed but whether the evidence, if believed, could provide a legal

basis for the finder of fact to conclude that the defendant is guilty of the crime

charged.” State v. Daniels, 2024-Ohio-1536, ¶ 13 (3d Dist.).

Accordingly, the applicable standard ‘is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’

State v. Reed, 2024-Ohio-4838, ¶ 30 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Plott, 2017-Ohio-

38, ¶ 62 (3d Dist.).

{¶89} Ohio’s felony-murder statute is contained in R.C. 2903.02(B). State

v. Nolan, 2014-Ohio-4800, ¶ 8. Pursuant to this provision, the State must prove that

the defendant “cause[d] the death of another as a proximate result of the offender’s

committing or attempting to commit an offense of violence that is a felony of the

first or second degree and that is not a violation of section 2903.03 or 2903.04 of

the Revised Code.” Thus, to establish a violation of R.C. 2903.02(B), the State must

prove that the defendant committed a qualifying predicate offense that proximately

caused the victim’s death. State v. Scott, 2024-Ohio-5595, ¶ 12 (2d Dist.).

{¶90} In turn, the crime of felonious assault is listed as an offense of violence

in R.C. 2903.11.4 To establish that a person committed felonious assault in violation

4 After Greenawalt’s convictions merged at sentencing, the State elected to proceed on the first count of murder in violation of R.C. 2903.02(B). The State listed felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) as the predicate offense for the first count of murder in the indictment.

-37- Case No. 9-24-40

of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) as a second-degree felony, the State must prove that the

defendant “knowingly . . . [c]ause[d] serious physical harm to another . . . .” See

R.C. 2903.11(D)(1)(a). Notably, “[t]he felony-murder statute imposes what is in

essence strict liability. Though intent to commit the predicate felony is required,

intent to kill is not.” Nolan at ¶ 9.

{¶91} On appeal, Greenawalt raises two main arguments that assert the State

failed to produce sufficient evidence that he committed the act that caused Natalie’s

death. First, he argues that Natalie came into contact with several blunt objects

during the brawl that could have potentially caused the fatal wound. At trial, the

Defense pointed out that Natalie was pushed up against a lot sign that had a bolt

protruding outward and was near a flowerpot that was broken during the fight.

{¶92} At trial, Dr. Hudson identified three wounds to Natalie that were

located on her abdomen, her arm, and near her neck. In speaking of these injuries,

he noted that these were “sharp force” injuries that appeared to be caused by “some

kind of blade or knife.” (Tr. 1397). Similarly, he noted that the “V-shape” of the

injury on Natalie’s arm indicated that this was “an incised wound made by a sharp

instrument.” (Tr. 1399).

{¶93} Dr. Hudson also testified that the stab wound near Natalie’s neck

transected her carotid artery and was the fatal injury. He concluded that the injury

near Natalie’s neck was around three inches deep and was made with a sharp object,

-38- Case No. 9-24-40

“like a knife.” (Tr. 1400). He also stated that fatal wound was accompanied by

“traveling abrasions . . . [o]r superficial incised wounds caused by withdrawing of

the knife.” (Tr. 1402). While Dr. Hudson could not be “100 percent” sure that the

instrument that created this injury was a knife, he emphasized that “[i]t ha[d] to be

a sharp object” to create the type of internal injuries that he observed. (Tr. 1406,

1426).

{¶94} At trial, the prosecutor asked about whether contact with a bolt or rebar

could cause an injury with these characteristics. In response, Dr. Hudson indicated

that contact with those types of objects would result in “blunt force or impaling

type[s] of injuries.” (Tr. 1409). He testified that, if Natalie had been impaled by an

object, the entrance wound would have been jagged; the outside of the wound would

have been surrounded by abrasions; she would have had internal tissue bruising; and

the damage to the arteries would have been irregular or crushed rather sharply

incised.

{¶95} While the police investigation did not recover a knife, three

witnesses—T.M., S.M., and D.H.—testified that they heard Greenawalt say that his

knife had fallen out of his pocket during a footrace on the evening of July 2, 2022.

While T.M. and D.H. stated that they did not actually see the knife that was

mentioned, T.M. stated that he saw Greenawalt picking something up. S.M.

testified that he saw the knife in Greenawalt’s hands and watched him put it into a

golf cart.

-39- Case No. 9-24-40

{¶96} T.M. also testified that he knew Greenawalt because his father had

been friends with Greenawalt for years. T.M. stated that Greenawalt’s job involved

constructing pools and that he, for this reason, regularly carried a knife in his pocket.

T.M. further testified that he had previously seen Greenawalt’s pocketknife and

noticed that it had a clip. The State introduced footage from a security camera at

the campground in which a silver clip was visible on Greenawalt’s right pants

pocket. However, law enforcement did not locate an item with such a clip when

searching Greenawalt or his motorcycle.

{¶97} The trial testimony also establishes that Greenawalt left the scene of

the incident on his motorcycle before law enforcement arrived and was apprehended

some distance from the campground. A reasonable trier of fact could conclude from

this evidence that Natalie’s fatal wound was not caused by blunt-force contact with

a bolt or similar object during the brawl. Thus, we conclude that this first argument

is without merit.

{¶98} Second, Greenawalt argues that, since none of the witnesses testified

that they saw him stab Natalie with a sharp instrument, the State did not produce

evidence that establishes he inflicted the fatal wound on her neck. As an initial

matter, we note that the prosecution was not required to produce eyewitness

testimony to establish that Greenawalt caused the fatal wound in this case. See State

v. Turks, 2009-Ohio-1837, ¶ 31 (3d Dist.). To the contrary,

-40- Case No. 9-24-40

[a] conviction can be obtained solely based on circumstantial evidence. . . . ‘[P]roof of guilt may be made by circumstantial evidence as well as by real evidence and direct or testimonial evidence, or any combination of these three classes of evidence. All three classes have equal probative value, and circumstantial evidence has no less value than the others.’

(Citation omitted.) State v. Boyd, 2025-Ohio-984, ¶ 37 (2d Dist.), quoting State v.

Nicely, 39 Ohio St.3d 147, 151 (1988).

{¶99} Turning to the evidence presented at trial, Dr. Hudson stated that the

fatal wound near Natalie’s neck transected her carotid artery and led to significant

internal bleeding. Importantly, Dr. Hudson concluded that, based on the amount of

internal bleeding from her carotid artery and the coloration of her other organs,

Natalie would have likely lost consciousness within ten to twelve seconds of

sustaining this fatal wound. He also indicated that condition of the three main

wounds on Natalie’s body indicated the fatal wound on her neck was inflicted before

the injuries on her abdomen and arm.

{¶100} Robert testified that, towards the end of the altercation, he observed

Natalie lying flat on the McDoles’ picnic table with Greenawalt “on top of her.” (Tr.

537). Robert testified that he saw Greenawalt making a “downward” punching

motion three times. (Tr. 494). S.M. similarly testified that he saw Greenawalt

making “a stabbing motion” at Natalie while she was on the picnic table. (Tr. 580).

S.M. stated that the fight was then broken up by Roger.

-41- Case No. 9-24-40

{¶101} Similarly, Richard testified that Roger pulled Greenawalt “to the

ground . . . [r]ight up by the picnic table” just as he noticed that Natalie was lying

on the ground. (Tr. 1502). At this time, Durbin went over to Natalie and believed

that she “was knocked out” or “just unconscious.” (Tr. 898). He testified that he

heard Natalie make three big gasps of air before Lindsey indicated that Natalie did

not have a pulse.

{¶102} Since Dr. Hudson’s expert opinion indicates that Natalie lost

consciousness within ten to twelve seconds of being stabbed in the neck, Robert,

Durbin, and S.M.’s testimony establishes that Greenawalt was above Natalie at the

picnic table and making downward motions towards her during the timeframe in

which she sustained the fatal wound. A reasonable trier of fact could infer from this

evidence that Greenawalt inflicted the fatal wound. Thus, we conclude that this

second argument is without merit.

{¶103} Having viewed the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, we

conclude that Greenawalt’s arguments have failed to establish that his conviction

for murder in violation of R.C. 2903.02(B) was not supported by sufficient

evidence. Accordingly, the fifth assignment of error is overruled.

{¶104} Greenawalt argues that his conviction for felony murder in violation

of R.C. 2903.02(B) is against the manifest weight of the evidence.

-42- Case No. 9-24-40

{¶105} “A manifest-weight analysis examines whether the State has carried

its burden of persuasion at trial.” State v. Carroll, 2024-Ohio-1626, ¶ 58 (3d Dist.).

On review, “an appellate court’s function . . . is to determine whether the greater

amount of credible evidence supports the verdict.” State v. Harvey, 2020-Ohio-329,

¶ 12 (3d Dist.), quoting Plott at ¶ 73.

Appellate courts “must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all of the reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses, and determine whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the factfinder ‘clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’”

State v. Randle, 2018-Ohio-207, ¶ 36 (3d Dist.), quoting Plott at ¶ 73, quoting State

v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997).

{¶106} Greenawalt raises three main arguments to establish that his

convictions are against the manifest weight of the evidence. First, he argues that

the weight of the evidence does not support the conclusion that he caused Natalie’s

death by stabbing her with a sharp instrument. At trial, the Defense emphasized the

fact that no knife was discovered during the police investigation. Further, Durbin,

Richard, Shasta, and Bryan testified that they did not see Greenawalt with a weapon

on the night of the incident. While T.M. testified that Greenawalt regularly carried

-43- Case No. 9-24-40

a knife, Bryan testified that he had known Greenawalt for a number of years but did

not know him to carry a knife.

{¶107} However, D.H., S.M., and T.M. each testified that, earlier that

evening, they heard Greenawalt state that his pocketknife had fallen out of his

pocket during a footrace. While D.H. and T.M. did not see Greenawalt’s knife,

T.M. did see Greenawalt bend over to pick up something. S.M. further testified

that, at the time of the footrace, he saw a pocketknife in Greenawalt’s hands and

saw him put it into a nearby golf cart.

{¶108} On cross-examination, S.M. did admit to making several prior

inconsistent statements about the knife during his interview with law enforcement.

S.M. had previously indicated to law enforcement that he did not see the knife after

Greenawalt mentioned dropping it during the footrace. Further, on direct

examination, he indicated that the knife was in Greenawalt’s pocket, but he had

previously reported to law enforcement that he did not see a knife during the

altercation.

{¶109} In addressing the absence of a knife at the scene, the State pointed

out that Greenawalt had left the campground on his motorcycle as several

bystanders were rendering aid to Natalie; that people were moving around the

campsite in a panic after the incident; and that Lt. White had testified that the crime

scene was not secured until after Natalie had been pronounced dead.

-44- Case No. 9-24-40

{¶110} The Defense also suggested that the fatal wound may have been

caused at some other point of the altercation by Natalie’s contact with a blunt object.

S.M. testified that Natalie was pinned up against a sign that had a bolt protruding

from its surface. Bryan also testified that a flowerpot in front of his camper appeared

to have been damaged during the altercation.

{¶111} However, Dr. Hudson testified that the fatal injury was caused by a

sharp, blade-like object. On cross-examination, he admitted that he could not be

one hundred percent sure that Natalie was stabbed with a knife. But he discounted

the possibility of Natalie having been impaled because wounds received in such a

manner are jagged and surrounded by tissue bruising. For this reason, he concluded

that her injury was not likely caused by blunt-force contact with a bolt or another

similar object.

{¶112} The Defense also emphasized that a number of the witnesses had

difficulty discerning what was transpiring at different points of this altercation.

During his testimony, Roger pointed out that the incident occurred at night while

the lights at the nearby camper were out and that this affected the visibility of the

incident. However, Robert, Richard, and S.M. testified that they were still able to

see that Greenawalt was at the picnic table with Natalie just before she fell to the

ground.

{¶113} Robert and S.M. also indicated that Greenawalt was making striking

motions at Natalie at this point. The medical examiner testified that Natalie would

-45- Case No. 9-24-40

have lost consciousness within ten to twelve seconds after receiving the stab wound

near her neck. As noted previously, the evidence produced by the State establishes

that Greenawalt was making punching or stabbing motions at Natalie in the relevant

timeframe. Having reviewed the evidence in the record, we conclude that this first

argument does not establish that Greenawalt’s conviction is against the manifest

weight of the evidence.

{¶114} Second, Greenawalt argues that S.M. provided the most

incriminating account of what transpired but was shown on cross-examination to

have given multiple inconsistent statements about the incident. At trial, the

prosecution called six witnesses who observed portions of the altercation between

Greenawalt and Natalie. Importantly, S.M. was not the only witness who placed

Greenawalt over Natalie at the picnic table just before she lost consciousness and

fell to the ground. He was also one of three witnesses who heard Greenawalt

mention that he had a knife during the footrace on July 2, 2022. Thus, these two

critical portions of S.M.’s testimony were cumulative to other trial testimony.

{¶115} In this case, the jurors were presented with S.M.’s testimony on direct

examination and heard him admit to making multiple, prior inconsistent statements

on cross-examination. The jurors, as the finders of fact, were free to believe all,

some, or none of the testimony produced by the State at trial. State v. Reed, 2024-

Ohio-4838, ¶ 48 (3d Dist.). For this reason, “[a] determination that a witness is not

credible on review is insufficient to reverse a verdict based on the manifest-weight

-46- Case No. 9-24-40

standard.” State v. Schulman, 2020-Ohio-4146, ¶ 56 (3d Dist.). Having reviewed

the relevant evidence, we conclude that this second argument does not establish that

Greenawalt’s conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence.

{¶116} Third, Greenawalt argues that self-defense offered a better

explanation for what transpired than the theory presented by the State at trial. At

trial, the State produced evidence that suggested Greenawalt was impaired at the

time that he went to the Rudds’ lot and popped the balloons on Natalie’s arch.

Robert testified that, at the time of the altercations, Greenawalt had been drinking

with Bryan; was stumbling as he walked; and had slurred speech.

{¶117} In response, the Defense argued that subsequent testing indicated that

his blood alcohol level of 0.075 was below the legal limit for driving, but the State

pointed out that the warrant authorizing law enforcement to take a blood sample

from Greenawalt was not approved until six or seven hours after the incident. The

Defense also pointed out that Natalie had a blood alcohol level of 0.13.

{¶118} While they were in this condition, Natalie approached Greenawalt

and told him to leave her property, leading to a physical altercation that lasted until

Richard and Roger separated the parties. The State argued that, across these events,

Greenawalt grew increasingly angry at Natalie and sought to retaliate against her.

The prosecution presented evidence that the Rudds were going to go back to their

camper when Greenawalt yelled insults at Natalie and advanced towards them.

-47- Case No. 9-24-40

{¶119} Further, S.M. affirmed that he saw Greenawalt “go running at

Natalie” after making this remark. S.M. testified that, at this point, he heard

Greenawalt yell, “I am going to kill those motherf**kers.” (Tr. 579). On cross-

examination, S.M. did admit that he had not previously told law enforcement about

hearing Greenawalt make this comment. But Robert, S.M., and Durbin described

Greenawalt as advancing towards Natalie while screaming profanity at her.

{¶120} In response to this testimony, the Defense did not present any

evidence that suggested Robert or Natalie engaged in actions that were provocative,

threatening, or otherwise evinced an intention to rekindle the altercation. Robert

testified that Greenawalt eventually had Natalie up against the picnic table and made

a downward, stabbing motion at her three times before she fell to the ground. After

Natalie was unconscious on the ground, Greenawalt got onto his motorcycle and

fled the scene of the incident.

{¶121} While Greenawalt argues that self-defense is a better explanation for

his actions than the State’s theory of the case, we have already concluded under the

second assignment of error that the evidence produced at trial was not sufficient to

support a jury instruction on self-defense. In other words, the evidence presented

at trial could not be reasonably interpreted such that self-defense could provide a

cogent explanation for Greenawalt’s use of deadly force against Natalie.

{¶122} Having examined the evidence in the record, we conclude that the

State’s theory of the case is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. State

-48- Case No. 9-24-40

v. Adkins, 2020-Ohio-1618, ¶ 80 (8th Dist.) (A conviction is not against the manifest

weight of the evidence “merely because the jury found the state’s version of the

events to be more believable than appellant’s theory of the case.”). For this reason,

Greenawalt’s third argument is without merit. The record contains no indication

that the jurors lost their way and returned a verdict that was against the manifest

weight of the evidence. Accordingly, the sixth assignment of error is overruled.

{¶123} Greenawalt argues that the alleged errors he has identified in this

appeal had the cumulative effect of denying him a fair trial.

{¶124} “The cumulative-error doctrine provides that ‘a conviction will be

reversed when the cumulative effect of errors in a trial deprives a defendant of a fair

trial even though each of the numerous instances of trial-court error does not

individually constitute cause for reversal.’” State v. Belton, 2016-Ohio-1581, ¶ 169,

quoting State v. Powell, 2012-Ohio-2577, ¶ 223. “To find cumulative error, a court

must first find multiple errors committed at trial and determine that there is a

reasonable probability that the outcome below would have been different but for the

combination of the harmless errors.” In re J.M., 2012-Ohio-1467, ¶ 36 (3d Dist.).

{¶125} Greenawalt argues that the alleged errors he identified in his prior six

assignments of error provide a basis for his conviction to be reversed pursuant to

-49- Case No. 9-24-40

the doctrine of plain error. However, we have already determined that the

arguments in these prior assignments of error are without merit. Since Greenawalt

has not identified any errors that were committed at his trial, he has failed to

demonstrate cumulative error. State v. Lewis, 2020-Ohio-6894, ¶ 91 (3d Dist.).

Accordingly, the seventh assignment of error is overruled.

Conclusion

{¶126} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant in the particulars

assigned and argued, the judgment of the Marion County Court of Common Pleas

is affirmed.

ZIMMERMAN and MILLER, J.J., concur.

-50- Case No. 9-24-40

JUDGMENT ENTRY

For the reasons stated in the opinion of this Court, the assignments of error

are overruled and it is the judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the

trial court is affirmed with costs assessed to Appellant for which judgment is hereby

rendered. The cause is hereby remanded to the trial court for execution of the

judgment for costs.

It is further ordered that the Clerk of this Court certify a copy of this Court’s

judgment entry and opinion to the trial court as the mandate prescribed by App.R.

27; and serve a copy of this Court’s judgment entry and opinion on each party to the

proceedings and note the date of service in the docket. See App.R. 30.

John R. Willamowski, Judge

William R. Zimmerman, Judge

Mark C. Miller, Judge

DATED: /hls

-51-