ANDREASEN, Justice.
Tommie R. Boleyn was convicted of operating while intoxicated (OWI), second offense, in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2 (1993) and driving while his license was barred in violation of Iowa Code section 321.561. On appeal, he contends that the district court erred in failing to grant his motion for judgment of acquittal for lack of showing that he was operating a motor vehicle. Although Boleyn was not operating the vehicle when encountered by police officers, we find sufficient circumstantial evidence that Boleyn had operated the vehicle while intoxicated. Accordingly, his convictions are affirmed.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
In the evening of September 3, 1994, officer David Bloem of the Oelwein Police Department found Boleyn sleeping in the driver’s seat of a vehicle parked in a cemetery. Boleyn was wearing his seat belt, slumped over the steering wheel, with an open bottle of beer between his thighs. The keys were in the ignition, but the engine was not running.
In an attempt to arouse Boleyn, the officer knocked on the driver’s side window, but received no response. Boleyn did not awaken until the officer shook him by the shoulders several times. When Boleyn awoke, the officers noticed a definite odor of alcohol. Boleyn’s eyes were watery and bloodshot, his speech was slurred, and he seemed confused. When exiting the vehicle, Boleyn stumbled and staggered, almost falling down. When asked why he was in the cemetery, he replied, “I drove out here to see my dead father.” When asked where he started driving from, he stated Maynard, the town in which he lives.
Boleyn, upon failing a field sobriety test and later declining to provide a body specimen for analysis, was charged with operating while intoxicated and operating a motor vehicle while his license was barred. Boleyn was previously convicted of OWI in 1991 and his license was barred at the time of his arrest. See Iowa Code § 321.560. Following a bench trial, Boleyn was found guilty of both offenses and sentenced accordingly.
II. Standard of Review.
Our scope of review is for correction of errors at law. Iowa R.App.P. 4. On review of a ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Iowa R.App.P. 14(f)(2). We accept any legitimate inferences that may reasonably be deduced from the evidence. State v. Weaver, 405 N.W.2d 852, 853 (Iowa 1987). We uphold the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal if there is any substantial evidence in the record supporting the charges. Id. Substantial evidence is evidence which would convince a rational trier of fact the defendant is guilty of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
III. Operating While Intoxicated.
The offense of operating while intoxicated consists of two essential elements: (1) the operation of a motor vehicle (2) while under the influence of alcohol. Iowa Code § 321J.2. Boleyn contends there is insufficient evidence to prove he was operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated the evening he was arrested. He urges that sleeping in a motionless vehicle with the engine not run[205]*205ning does not constitute operation of a motor vehicle.
We have approved the definition of “operate” as “the immediate, actual physical control over a motor vehicle that is in motion and/or has its engine running.” Munson v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 513 N.W.2d 722, 724-25 (Iowa 1994); see also State v. Murray, 539 N.W.2d 368, 369 (Iowa 1995). In Munson, we addressed whether the arresting officer, pursuant to our implied consent law, possessed reasonable grounds to believe Munson was operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. Munson, 513 N.W.2d at 723. Mun-son was found asleep behind the steering wheel of his vehicle parked in a private parking area. Id. The keys were in the ignition, the radio on, but the engine was not running. Id. at 723-24. We held that, as a matter of law, there was no substantial evidence that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe Munson was operating a vehicle at the time he was observed in the parking lot. Id. at 725. Likewise, we conclude that Boleyn, who was sleeping in a motionless vehicle with the engine not running, was not operating a vehicle when he was approached by the officers.
This conclusion, however, does not end the inquiry. The operation of a motor vehicle by a defendant charged with operating while intoxicated may be established by circumstantial evidence as well as direct evidence. State v. Braun, 495 N.W.2d 735, 739 (Iowa 1993). Circumstantial and direct evidence are equally probative. Iowa R.App.P. 14(0(16).
In Munson we also considered whether the officer had reasonable grounds to believe Munson operated his vehicle while intoxicated before he was observed in the parking lot. Munson, 513 N.W.2d at 725. Although Mun-son admitted later that he had driven the vehicle to the parking lot and had not drunk anything after parking his vehicle, this admission was not made to the officer prior to his invoking the implied consent law. Id. We concluded “that at the time the officer invoked implied consent he did not have reasonable grounds to believe that Munson had been operating while intoxicated.” Id.
In Braun, we also addressed whether the arresting officer had the requisite reasonable grounds under the implied consent law to believe Braun had operated his vehicle in an intoxicated condition. Braun, 495 N.W.2d at 739. Braun was found asleep at the steering wheel of a vehicle parked in the middle of the highway with the engine not running. Id. at 737. We found an abundance of circumstantial evidence that Braun had driven to the location where officers found him, and had driven there in an intoxicated condition:
Braun was asleep in the driver’s seat, with all of the controls within his reach. The car was dangerously parked in the middle of an undivided highway. [The officer] did not see any other person walking along the highway away from the ear. No alcohol containers were found in the ear nor were seen on the ground. Braun appeared drunk and [the officer] smelled alcohol on his breath. Finally, Braun admitted at the scene ... and again at the public safety building that he had drunk intoxicants and then driven to the location on [the highway].
Id. at 739.
The reasonable grounds test is determined under the facts and circumstances known to the officers at the time the implied consent law is evoked. Id. at 738. Here, Boleyn contests the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the verdict, not the invocation of the implied consent statute. Therefore all the evidence is considered in determining whether he had operated the vehicle while intoxicated prior to the arrival of the officers. See State v. Robinson,
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ANDREASEN, Justice.
Tommie R. Boleyn was convicted of operating while intoxicated (OWI), second offense, in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2 (1993) and driving while his license was barred in violation of Iowa Code section 321.561. On appeal, he contends that the district court erred in failing to grant his motion for judgment of acquittal for lack of showing that he was operating a motor vehicle. Although Boleyn was not operating the vehicle when encountered by police officers, we find sufficient circumstantial evidence that Boleyn had operated the vehicle while intoxicated. Accordingly, his convictions are affirmed.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
In the evening of September 3, 1994, officer David Bloem of the Oelwein Police Department found Boleyn sleeping in the driver’s seat of a vehicle parked in a cemetery. Boleyn was wearing his seat belt, slumped over the steering wheel, with an open bottle of beer between his thighs. The keys were in the ignition, but the engine was not running.
In an attempt to arouse Boleyn, the officer knocked on the driver’s side window, but received no response. Boleyn did not awaken until the officer shook him by the shoulders several times. When Boleyn awoke, the officers noticed a definite odor of alcohol. Boleyn’s eyes were watery and bloodshot, his speech was slurred, and he seemed confused. When exiting the vehicle, Boleyn stumbled and staggered, almost falling down. When asked why he was in the cemetery, he replied, “I drove out here to see my dead father.” When asked where he started driving from, he stated Maynard, the town in which he lives.
Boleyn, upon failing a field sobriety test and later declining to provide a body specimen for analysis, was charged with operating while intoxicated and operating a motor vehicle while his license was barred. Boleyn was previously convicted of OWI in 1991 and his license was barred at the time of his arrest. See Iowa Code § 321.560. Following a bench trial, Boleyn was found guilty of both offenses and sentenced accordingly.
II. Standard of Review.
Our scope of review is for correction of errors at law. Iowa R.App.P. 4. On review of a ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Iowa R.App.P. 14(f)(2). We accept any legitimate inferences that may reasonably be deduced from the evidence. State v. Weaver, 405 N.W.2d 852, 853 (Iowa 1987). We uphold the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal if there is any substantial evidence in the record supporting the charges. Id. Substantial evidence is evidence which would convince a rational trier of fact the defendant is guilty of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
III. Operating While Intoxicated.
The offense of operating while intoxicated consists of two essential elements: (1) the operation of a motor vehicle (2) while under the influence of alcohol. Iowa Code § 321J.2. Boleyn contends there is insufficient evidence to prove he was operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated the evening he was arrested. He urges that sleeping in a motionless vehicle with the engine not run[205]*205ning does not constitute operation of a motor vehicle.
We have approved the definition of “operate” as “the immediate, actual physical control over a motor vehicle that is in motion and/or has its engine running.” Munson v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 513 N.W.2d 722, 724-25 (Iowa 1994); see also State v. Murray, 539 N.W.2d 368, 369 (Iowa 1995). In Munson, we addressed whether the arresting officer, pursuant to our implied consent law, possessed reasonable grounds to believe Munson was operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. Munson, 513 N.W.2d at 723. Mun-son was found asleep behind the steering wheel of his vehicle parked in a private parking area. Id. The keys were in the ignition, the radio on, but the engine was not running. Id. at 723-24. We held that, as a matter of law, there was no substantial evidence that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe Munson was operating a vehicle at the time he was observed in the parking lot. Id. at 725. Likewise, we conclude that Boleyn, who was sleeping in a motionless vehicle with the engine not running, was not operating a vehicle when he was approached by the officers.
This conclusion, however, does not end the inquiry. The operation of a motor vehicle by a defendant charged with operating while intoxicated may be established by circumstantial evidence as well as direct evidence. State v. Braun, 495 N.W.2d 735, 739 (Iowa 1993). Circumstantial and direct evidence are equally probative. Iowa R.App.P. 14(0(16).
In Munson we also considered whether the officer had reasonable grounds to believe Munson operated his vehicle while intoxicated before he was observed in the parking lot. Munson, 513 N.W.2d at 725. Although Mun-son admitted later that he had driven the vehicle to the parking lot and had not drunk anything after parking his vehicle, this admission was not made to the officer prior to his invoking the implied consent law. Id. We concluded “that at the time the officer invoked implied consent he did not have reasonable grounds to believe that Munson had been operating while intoxicated.” Id.
In Braun, we also addressed whether the arresting officer had the requisite reasonable grounds under the implied consent law to believe Braun had operated his vehicle in an intoxicated condition. Braun, 495 N.W.2d at 739. Braun was found asleep at the steering wheel of a vehicle parked in the middle of the highway with the engine not running. Id. at 737. We found an abundance of circumstantial evidence that Braun had driven to the location where officers found him, and had driven there in an intoxicated condition:
Braun was asleep in the driver’s seat, with all of the controls within his reach. The car was dangerously parked in the middle of an undivided highway. [The officer] did not see any other person walking along the highway away from the ear. No alcohol containers were found in the ear nor were seen on the ground. Braun appeared drunk and [the officer] smelled alcohol on his breath. Finally, Braun admitted at the scene ... and again at the public safety building that he had drunk intoxicants and then driven to the location on [the highway].
Id. at 739.
The reasonable grounds test is determined under the facts and circumstances known to the officers at the time the implied consent law is evoked. Id. at 738. Here, Boleyn contests the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the verdict, not the invocation of the implied consent statute. Therefore all the evidence is considered in determining whether he had operated the vehicle while intoxicated prior to the arrival of the officers. See State v. Robinson, 288 N.W.2d 337, 340 (Iowa 1980).
At the time of his arrest, Boleyn stated that he had drunk “one quart” of beer, and had started drinking at home. The only alcohol container in the vicinity was the three-quarters full thirty-two ounce bottle of beer between his thighs. At trial, he admitted that he started drinking at noon and consumed between six and twelve beers before going to the cemetery. He further admitted that he could feel the effects of the alcohol when he traveled to the cemetery. There is substantial evidence that Boleyn [206]*206was intoxicated while en route to the cemetery.
At trial, Boleyn claimed that his son drove him to the cemetery. His son testified that he drove his stepfather to the cemetery but walked away about ten or fifteen minutes later. Prior to his arrest, Boleyn made no indication that someone else had driven the vehicle to the cemetery. Rather, he stated explicitly, “I drove out here to see my dead father.” Furthermore, no one was observed walking away from the vehicle. It was not until Boleyn was arrested and taken to the police station, an hour after his initial contact with the officers, that he claimed his son drove the vehicle to the cemetery. We grant considerable deference to the district court’s findings on the credibility of witnesses. State v. Evans, 495 N.W.2d 760, 762 (Iowa 1993); see State v. Frake, 450 N.W.2d 817, 818-19 (Iowa 1990). We believe the court, as the fact-finder, acted within its province in rejecting Boleyn’s delinquent and self-serving claim and the corroborative testimony of his son.
After our review of the record, considered in the light most favorable to the State, we find substantial evidence that Boleyn had driven to the cemetery in an intoxicated condition. The fact that he shut off the engine before he was observed by officers does not nullify his prior unlawful operation of the vehicle. Accordingly, we affirm Boleyn’s conviction of operating while intoxicated, second offense.
IV. Driving While Barred.
The offense of driving while barred is committed when a person convicted as an habitual offender operates a motor vehicle during the period their license is barred. Iowa Code § 321.561. Boleyn’s license was barred at the time the present OWI offense was committed. Because there is substantial evidence that Boleyn drove to the cemetery, his conviction for driving while barred is also affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
All justices concur except SNELL, J., who dissents.