[Cite as State v. Boggs, 2020-Ohio-616.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF LORAIN )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 19CA011453
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE JAMIE L. BOGGS COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO Appellant CASE No. 18CR097844
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: February 24, 2020
CALLAHAN, Presiding Judge.
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Jamie Boggs, appeals from his convictions in the Lorain
County Court of Common Pleas. This Court affirms.
I.
{¶2} Late one evening in January, the police received two calls, approximately one
hour apart, about gunshots having been fired in a residential area. Several officers reported to
the area to investigate, but were unable to locate the source of the gunshots. One of those
officers, Officer James Wise, was patrolling the same area about two hours later when he
glanced down a side street and saw a pick-up truck heading toward him. The truck caught his
attention because the driver was operating it without headlights despite the pitch-black
conditions. Officer Wise decided to turn around and wait for the truck. As soon as the truck
reached the intersection, however, it turned away from his cruiser and quickly accelerated in the
opposite direction. Officer Wise then activated his lights and attempted to stop the truck. 2
{¶3} The driver of the truck led Officer Wise on a brief chase through the
neighborhood and struck a car and sign along the way. The chase ended when the truck crashed
into a fire hydrant, and Officer Wise arrested the driver and his passenger, Mr. Boggs. While
searching the truck at the scene, the police discovered a gun case from which the firearm
appeared to be missing. Officer Wise then questioned Mr. Boggs about the gun, and he admitted
that he had thrown it from the truck’s window during the chase. The police recovered the gun
after Mr. Boggs led them back to the area where he had thrown it.
{¶4} Mr. Boggs was indicted on each of the following counts: (1) tampering with
evidence and an attendant firearm specification; (2) receiving stolen property and an attendant
firearm specification; and (3) improperly handling a firearm in a motor vehicle. The State later
dismissed the count for receiving stolen property, and Mr. Boggs went to trial on his remaining
counts. At the conclusion of his trial, a jury found him guilty, and the court sentenced him to a
total of one year and nine months in prison.
{¶5} Mr. Boggs now appeals from his convictions and raises three assignments of error
for review. Because his first and second assignments of error concern much of the same
testimony and evidence, this Court consolidates those assignments of error for ease of review.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE BY FINDING JAMIE L. BOGGS GUILTY OF TAMPERING WITH EVIDENCE WITH A GUN SPECIFICATION[.]
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2
THE JURY IN THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE WHEN IT FOUND THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT, JAMIE L. BOGGS, GUILTY OF TAMPERING 3
WITH EVIDENCE AND IMPROPER HANDLING OF A FIREARM IN A MOTOR VEHICLE AND WITH A GUN SPECIFICATION.
{¶6} In his first and second assignments of error, Mr. Boggs argues that his convictions
for tampering with evidence and improperly handling a firearm in a motor vehicle are based on
insufficient evidence and are against the manifest weight of the evidence. For the following
reasons, this Court rejects his arguments.
{¶7} Initially, this Court notes that Mr. Boggs has addressed both the adequacy of the
State’s evidence and the persuasiveness of its evidence in a single analysis without attempting to
distinguish between the two concepts. Yet, “sufficiency and manifest weight are two separate,
legally distinct arguments.” State v. Vicente-Colon, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 09CA009705, 2010-
Ohio-6242, ¶ 20. The two concepts should be analyzed separately, lest this Court misinterpret an
argument or be forced to disregard it entirely for lack of analysis. See, e.g., State v. Messer, 9th
Dist. Summit No. 28750, 2018-Ohio-5117, ¶ 19. With that in mind, “this Court has attempted to
untangle [Mr. Boggs’] arguments in order to [separately] address them.” State v. Taylor, 9th
Dist. Summit No. 28746, 2018-Ohio-2921, ¶ 26.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
{¶8} “Whether a conviction is supported by sufficient evidence is a question of law
that this Court reviews de novo.” State v. Williams, 9th Dist. Summit No. 24731, 2009-Ohio-
6955, ¶ 18, citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997). The relevant inquiry is
whether the prosecution has met its burden of production by presenting sufficient evidence to
sustain a conviction. Thompkins at 390 (Cook, J., concurring). For purposes of a sufficiency
analysis, this Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). We do not evaluate credibility, and we make all reasonable
inferences in favor of the State. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 273 (1991). The evidence is 4
sufficient if it allows the trier of fact to reasonably conclude that the essential elements of the
crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
{¶9} Tampering with evidence occurs when a person, “knowing that an official
proceeding or investigation is in progress, or is about to be or likely to be instituted, * * *
[a]lter[s], destroy[s], conceal[s], or remove[s] any * * * thing, with purpose to impair its value or
availability as evidence in such proceeding or investigation * * * .” R.C. 2921.12(A)(1). “A
person acts purposely when it is [his] specific intention to cause a certain result * * *.” R.C.
2901.22(A). A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when [he] is aware that [his]
conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature. A person has
knowledge of circumstances when [he] is aware that such circumstances probably exist. R.C.
2901.22(B). When examining whether a person knew an official investigation was “likely to be
instituted,” R.C. 2901.22(A), “[l]ikelihood is measured at the time of the act of alleged
tampering.” State v. Straley, 139 Ohio St.3d 339, 2014-Ohio-2139, ¶ 19. Nevertheless, “the
intent required by R.C. 2921.12(A)(1) can be inferred by the defendant’s words, actions, and
demeanor after a crime has been committed.” (Emphasis omitted.) State v. Price, 9th Dist.
Summit No. 28291, 2017-Ohio-4167, ¶ 18.
{¶10} A person commits the offense of improperly handling a firearm in a motor vehicle
if he “knowingly transport[s] or [has] a loaded firearm in a motor vehicle in such a manner that
the firearm is accessible to the operator or any passenger without leaving the vehicle.” R.C.
2923.16(B). The State may prove that a person knowingly transported or had a loaded firearm
by setting forth evidence that the person had actual or constructive possession of the firearm.
See State v. Coleman, 9th Dist. Summit Nos. 28640, 28641, 2018-Ohio-1923, ¶ 23-27. 5
{¶11} Officer Wise testified that his station received calls around 9:30 and 10:30 p.m. in
reference to gunshots having been fired in a residential area. He and other officers patrolled the
area following the 10:30 p.m. call, but did not observe any suspicious activity. Officer Wise then
returned to the area around 1:50 a.m. while on patrol. At that time, he spotted the pick-up truck
in which Mr. Boggs was a passenger. He passed the truck on its approach to a t-intersection and
testified that it caught his attention because its headlights were off. Once he passed by the
intersection, Officer Wise decided to turn around and wait for the truck to pull out. As soon as
the truck arrived at the intersection, however, it turned away from his cruiser and “took off.” He
then activated his overhead lights and gave chase.
{¶12} Officer Wise testified that the driver of the truck ignored his attempts to initiate a
traffic stop. The truck continued to accelerate until it reached the next intersection, at which
point it slowed, turned northbound, and quickly accelerated again. The street on which the truck
had turned resembled a horseshoe and, as the truck approached a wooded area at the top of the
horseshoe, it temporarily drove off the right side of the road. The driver then navigated the truck
back onto the road, completed the bend in the horseshoe, and headed southbound “pedal to the
metal.” The chase ended when the truck turned at the next intersection, struck a parked car, hit a
sign, and collided head on with a fire hydrant. Officer Wise estimated that the entire chase lasted
about 30 seconds and spanned the length of around five city blocks. At its conclusion, Officer
Wise arrested both the driver and Mr. Boggs.
{¶13} Once backup officers arrived, Officer Wise placed Mr. Boggs in another officer’s
cruiser, Mirandized him, and asked him several questions. He testified that, the first time he
questioned Mr. Boggs, he asked him what he and the driver had been doing and whether there
was anything illegal in the truck. Mr. Boggs replied that they had just been “joyriding, hanging 6
out, something along those lines,” and he was not aware of anything illegal in the truck. Another
officer was inventorying the truck on scene, however, and soon advised Officer Wise that he had
found a gun case in the cabin. The case contained two magazines and bore the serial number of a
stolen firearm, but the firearm itself was missing. Accordingly, Officer Wise went to have a
second conversation with Mr. Boggs.
{¶14} Officer Wise stated that, at first, Mr. Boggs claimed not to know anything about
the gun. Officer Wise then decided to tell him that the driver had attributed the gun to him.
According to Officer Wise, Mr. Boggs remained silent for about 20 seconds before admitting
that he had thrown the gun from the truck’s window. Mr. Boggs then agreed to show the officers
where he had thrown the gun. Officer Wise testified that Mr. Boggs led them to a wooded area
at the top of the horseshoe street where the truck had temporarily driven off the road. After
searching for the gun without success, officers called in a K-9 unit and were able to locate it.
There was testimony that the gun was a six-shot revolver and was fully loaded upon recovery.
There also was testimony that both the driver and Mr. Boggs tested positive for gunshot residue.
{¶15} Mr. Boggs argues that his tampering conviction is based on insufficient evidence
because the State failed to prove that he threw the gun from the truck either (1) because he knew
an investigation related to the gun was forthcoming, or (2) because he purposely intended to
impair its value or availability as evidence. See R.C. 2921.12(A)(1). He notes that the police
never asked him why he threw the gun, but his testimony established that he did so strictly for
his own safety. He asserts that his actions, standing alone, did not establish his knowledge or
intent because “Ohio does not recognize the ‘unmistakable crime’ doctrine in connection with
the offense of tampering,” State v. Barry, 145 Ohio St.3d 354, 2015-Ohio-5449, ¶ 26. Further,
he notes that the police were able to recover the gun and complete their investigation because he 7
led them to it without any attempt to deny or cover up his actions. Thus, he argues that his
actions did not, in fact, impair the gun’s evidentiary value and/or availability and there was
insufficient evidence of his purpose to cause impairment.
{¶16} Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier
of fact could have concluded that the State proved each of the elements of Mr. Boggs’ tampering
conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d at 273. The State set forth
evidence that Mr. Boggs threw a loaded revolver from the window of the truck while Officer
Wise was in pursuit and attempting to execute a traffic stop. Compare Barry, 145 Ohio St.3d
354, 2015-Ohio-5449, ¶ 26-27 (tampering not proven where defendant concealed drugs several
hours before officers stopped her vehicle and there was no evidence regarding the likelihood of a
future investigation). Shots had been fired in that same area a few hours earlier, and the only
explanation Mr. Boggs offered for riding around in the dark at almost 2:00 a.m. in a truck with
no headlights was that he and the driver were “joyriding.” Moreover, the evidence showed that
he disposed of the gun when the driver temporarily drove off the road next to a wooded area.
Based on the foregoing, the jury reasonably could have inferred that (1) Mr. Boggs knew an
investigation regarding the gun was likely to be instituted, and (2) he and the driver made a
calculated decision to drive off the road and dispose of the gun in an area it was less likely to be
found rather than simply throwing it from a moving vehicle. See R.C. 2921.12(A)(1). See also
State v. Simpson, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 11CA010138, 2012-Ohio-3195, ¶ 27; State v. Walker, 9th
Dist. Summit No. 25744, 2011-Ohio-5779, ¶ 22-23. Although Mr. Boggs provided testimony to
the contrary, sufficiency tests the adequacy of the State’s evidence, not its persuasiveness. See
State v. Soucek, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 17CA011226, 2018-Ohio-3834, ¶ 4. Thus, any alternative
explanations he offered for his conduct are not a factor in this Court’s sufficiency review. 8
{¶17} As noted, “the intent required by R.C. 2921.12(A)(1) can be inferred by the
defendant’s words, actions, and demeanor after a crime has been committed.” (Emphasis in
original.) Price, 2017-Ohio-4167, at ¶ 18. The jury heard testimony that Mr. Boggs initially
withheld any information about the gun from Officer Wise, claiming that he and the driver were
merely “joyriding,” that he was not aware of anything illegal in the truck, and that he had no
knowledge of any gun. Only when Officer Wise told him that the driver had attributed the gun
to him did Mr. Boggs pause, reconsider, and admit that he had thrown the gun during the chase.
The police then had to expend resources searching for the gun and requesting a K-9 unit when
their initial search proved fruitless. Although Mr. Boggs did not actually succeed in impairing
the gun’s evidentiary value or availability, the State was only required to prove that he acted with
that purpose in mind. See R.C. 2921.12(A)(1). Based on the evidence presented at trial, the jury
reasonably could have concluded that Mr. Boggs concealed or removed the gun for that purpose.
See Simpson, 2012-Ohio-3195, at ¶ 27; Walker, 2011-Ohio-5779, at ¶ 22-23. Accordingly, he
has not shown that his tampering conviction is based on insufficient evidence.
{¶18} Mr. Boggs also argues that his conviction for improperly handling a firearm in a
motor vehicle is based on insufficient evidence. According to Mr. Boggs, there was no evidence
that he knowingly transported the gun because both the truck and the gun belonged to the driver.
Yet, a person violates R.C. 2923.16(B) merely by “hav[ing] a loaded firearm in a motor vehicle
in such a manner that the firearm is accessible to the operator or any passenger without leaving
the vehicle.” (Emphasis added.) There was no dispute that the revolver was fully loaded upon
recovery. Further, Mr. Boggs admitted that he took actual possession of the gun when he threw
it from the truck’s window. The State, therefore, set forth evidence from which the jury
reasonably could have concluded that Mr. Boggs had the gun, that it was loaded, and that it was 9
accessible to him as the passenger. See R.C. 2923.16(B); Coleman, 2018-Ohio-1923, at ¶ 23-27.
Mr. Boggs has not shown that his conviction is based on insufficient evidence. Thus, to the
extent his assignments of error address the sufficiency of his convictions, they are overruled.
Manifest Weight of the Evidence
{¶19} When considering whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the
evidence, this Court must:
review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.
State v. Otten, 33 Ohio App.3d 339, 340 (9th Dist.1986). A reversal on this basis is reserved for
the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction. Id., citing
State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist.1983).
{¶20} Mr. Boggs testified in his own defense. He testified that the driver of the truck
lived in his neighborhood, but was more of an acquaintance than a friend and had a bad
reputation. Earlier that day, the driver had greeted Mr. Boggs outside, and the two had ended up
playing video games at Mr. Boggs’ house for about an hour. According to Mr. Boggs, the driver
returned to his house sometime after midnight, when he was already asleep, and offered to take
him to the store for cigarettes. The two then drove to a gas station about two miles away and
purchased several items before heading back to their neighborhood.
{¶21} Mr. Boggs testified that he was sleeping with his head against the passenger
window of the driver’s pick-up truck when he heard a gunshot. The sound startled him awake
and, when he looked over, he saw the driver had his arm out the window and was pulling it back
inside. A gun was in the driver’s hand, and he began reloading it as he continued to drive. Mr. 10
Boggs then started “freaking out” and told the driver to take him home. As soon as the driver
pulled into Mr. Boggs’ driveway, however, he immediately reversed course without allowing
Mr. Boggs to get out. They continued to drive, and Officer Wise attempted to pull them over.
{¶22} Mr. Boggs testified that the driver began speeding away from Officer Wise and
set the gun down. As the truck turned, the gun slid over the seat and hit Mr. Boggs in the leg.
Mr. Boggs claimed that he became afraid for his life because he was worried the gun might go
off or the driver, who had a reputation for playing with guns, might pick it up and use it to shoot
him or the officer. Accordingly, “before even thinking about it * * *, [he] grabbed [the gun] and
threw it out the window * * *.” Mr. Boggs denied that he was afraid of the police finding the
gun or getting into trouble for having fired it earlier that evening. He stated that he was just
“terrified” that “[his] life was at risk.” According to Mr. Boggs, as soon as he learned that the
driver had accused him of throwing the gun from the truck’s window, he agreed to lead the
police to the gun. He claimed that he otherwise never had an opportunity to explain what
happened that evening because he was never asked for an explanation.
{¶23} As noted, Officer Wise testified that Mr. Boggs failed to mention anything about
a gun when they first spoke. Mr. Boggs claimed that he and the driver had just been “joyriding,
hanging out, something along those lines,” and he was not aware of anything illegal in the truck.
At no point did he inform Officer Wise that he was afraid of the driver, that he had told the
driver to stop, that the driver had fired a gun, or that he felt he had no choice but to get rid of the
gun. Indeed, Mr. Boggs initially claimed not to know anything about a gun when Officer Wise
first asked him about it. Not until Officer Wise claimed that the driver had attributed the gun to
Mr. Boggs did Mr. Boggs reluctantly reveal that he had thrown the gun from the truck. Further, 11
when Officer Wise specifically asked Mr. Boggs whether he or the driver had shot a gun that
night, he recalled Mr. Boggs either remaining silent or responding no.
{¶24} Mr. Boggs argues that the jury lost its way by convicting him. He argues that the
evidence presented herein did not support the conclusion that the gun belonged to him, that he
knew about it before the driver fired it, or that he acted with the requisite mens rea. Rather, he
asserts, the evidence tended to show that the gun belonged to the driver and he (Mr. Boggs) only
threw it from the truck out of fear or a desire to save lives. Mr. Boggs notes that he cooperated
with the police and readily led them to the location where he threw the gun. Accordingly, he
argues that the evidence weighs heavily against the jury’s conclusion that he acted with the
requisite mens rea to commit either of the offenses with which he was convicted.
{¶25} Having reviewed the record, we cannot conclude that the jury lost its way when it
found Mr. Boggs guilty of tampering with evidence and improperly handling a firearm in a
motor vehicle. Though Mr. Boggs claims he made a split-second decision motivated strictly by
fear and surprise, the jury heard testimony that he was less than forthcoming with Officer Wise
when initially questioned. It also heard testimony that he failed to mention any of the details he
provided in his testimony to the police at the time of his arrest or while being held in custody.
This Court has repeatedly recognized that “[a] verdict is not against the manifest weight of the
evidence because the finder of fact chose to believe the State’s witnesses rather than the
defendant’s version of the events.” State v. Martinez, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 12CA0054, 2013-
Ohio-3189, ¶ 16. As the trier of fact, the jury was in the best position to evaluate the credibility
of the witnesses and was “‘free to believe all, part, or none of the testimony of each witness.’”
State v. Clark, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 14AP0002, 2015-Ohio-2978, ¶ 24, quoting Prince v. Jordan,
9th Dist. Lorain No. 04CA008423, 2004-Ohio-7184, ¶ 35. Mr. Boggs has not shown that this is 12
the exceptional case where the evidence weighs heavily against his convictions. See Otten, 33
Ohio App.3d at 340. As such, this Court rejects his argument that his convictions are against the
manifest weight of the evidence. Mr. Boggs’ first and second assignments of error are overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 3
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO PROVIDE THE JURY WITH INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING THE DEFENSE OF DURESS.
{¶26} In his third assignment of error, Mr. Boggs argues that the trial court erred when it
refused to instruct the jury on duress. This Court disagrees.
{¶27} “[A] trial court must fully and completely give the jury all instructions which are
relevant and necessary for the jury to weigh the evidence and discharge its duty as the fact
finder.” State v. Comen, 50 Ohio St.3d 206 (1990), paragraph two of the syllabus; R.C. 2945.11
(“In charging the jury, the court must state to it all matters of law necessary for the information
of the jury in giving its verdict.”). Although trial courts enjoy broad discretion in fashioning jury
instructions, they must “present a correct, pertinent statement of the law that is appropriate to the
facts.” State v. White, 142 Ohio St.3d 277, 2015-Ohio-492, ¶ 46, citing State v. Griffin, 141
Ohio St.3d 392, 2014-Ohio-4767, ¶ 5, and State v. Lessin, 67 Ohio St.3d 487, 493 (1993). This
Court reviews a trial court’s decision to provide a requested jury instruction for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Simin, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26016, 2012-Ohio-4389, ¶ 40, quoting State v.
Evans, 9th Dist. Medina No. 07CA0057-M, 2008-Ohio-4772, ¶ 12. An abuse of discretion is
present when a trial court’s decision “‘is contrary to law, unreasonable, not supported by
evidence, or grossly unsound.’” Menke v. Menke, 9th Dist. Summit No. 27330, 2015-Ohio-2507,
¶ 8, quoting Tretola v. Tretola, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-14-24, 2015-Ohio-1999, ¶ 25.
{¶28} Duress is an affirmative defense in Ohio. State v. Poole, 33 Ohio St.2d 18, 19
(1973). To prove duress, 13
one must establish the following: (1) a harm due to the pressure of a human force; (2) the harm sought to be avoided was greater than, or at least equal to that sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged; (3) the actor reasonably believed at the moment that his act was necessary and was designed to avoid the greater harm; (4) the actor was without fault in bringing about the situation; and (5) the threatened harm was imminent, leaving no alternative by which to avoid the greater harm.
State v. Flinders, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26024, 2012-Ohio-2882, ¶ 30. “All the conditions must
be met, and the court must find as a matter of law that the evidence is sufficient to warrant an
instruction on the affirmative defense of necessity or duress.” State v. Cross, 58 Ohio St.2d 482,
488 (1979). “‘If the evidence generates only a mere speculation or possible doubt, such evidence
is insufficient to raise the affirmative defense, and submission of the issue to the jury will be
unwarranted.’” Flinders at ¶ 29, quoting State v. Getsy, 84 Ohio St.3d 180, 198-199 (1998).
The defense “is strictly and extremely limited in application and will probably be effective in
very rare occasions.” Cross at 488.
{¶29} The trial court refused to instruct the jury on duress because it determined that
Mr. Boggs set forth insufficient evidence in support of that defense. Mr. Boggs argues that the
court erred in its conclusion because the record reflects that he only threw the gun from the truck
out of fear. He notes that the driver ignored his protests to stop the truck and refused to let him
out. Further, he notes that the driver subjected him to the possibility of either accidentally
getting shot by the gun as it was sliding around the truck’s cabin or purposely getting shot if he
(the driver) decided to use it on him. Because the evidence reflects that he acted strictly out of
fear for his own safety and the safety of others, Mr. Boggs argues that he was entitled to an
instruction on duress.
{¶30} Having reviewed the record, this Court cannot conclude that the trial court abused
its discretion when it refused to instruct the jury on duress. See Simin, 2012-Ohio-4389, at ¶ 40, 14
quoting Evans, 2008-Ohio-4772, at ¶ 12. The evidence of duress that Mr. Boggs set forth was
speculative at best. See Flinders at ¶ 29, quoting Getsy at 198-199. He claimed that he was
afraid of the driver because the driver had a reputation for playing with guns. Yet, there was no
evidence the driver ever actually threatened to shoot anyone. Even under Mr. Boggs’ version of
the events, he was able to pick up the gun, hold it, and dispose of it without any reaction on the
part of the driver. Mr. Boggs failed to present any evidence that the driver actually forced him to
dispose of the gun. See State v. Turner, 9th Dist. Summit No. 18618, 1998 WL 225049, *2 (May
6, 1998). Thus, it was not unreasonable for the court to conclude that he was not entitled to an
instruction on duress. See Cross at 488. Mr. Boggs’ third assignment of error is overruled.
III.
{¶31} Mr. Boggs’ assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Lorain
County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of
this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is 15
instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
LYNNE S. CALLAHAN FOR THE COURT
SCHAFER, J. TEODOSIO, J. CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
MARK S. ONDREJECH, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
DENNIS P. WILL, Prosecuting Attorney, and BRIAN P. MURPHY, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.