OPINION
ANDERSON, RUSSELL A., Chief Justice.
Orlando Manuel Bobadilla was convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and sentenced to 144 months in prison following a jury trial in Kandiyohi County. On appeal, the court of appeals reversed his conviction and remanded for a new trial, concluding that, pursuant to Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), the admission at trial of statements by a young child in a risk-assessment interview conducted by a child-protection worker had violated Boba-dilla’s rights under the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution. We conclude that the child’s statements were not testimonial in nature, and that Bobadilla was not otherwise deprived of a fair trial. We therefore reverse the court of appeals’ decision to remand for a new trial, and reinstate Bobadilla’s conviction.
On Friday afternoon, May 2, 2003, 3-year-old T.B. was dropped off by his mother for a weekend visit with his father, who was then residing with several relatives, including T.B.’s uncle, 23-year-old respondent Orlando Bobadilla. T.B.’s mother worked a 3:00 p.m.-ll:00 p.m. shift on weekends, and following the end of her shift on Sunday, May 4, 2003, she picked up T.B. sometime after 11:00 p.m.
As T.B.’s mother was readying T.B. for bed and changing his pull-up diaper, she “noticed that his bottom was a little red” and asked him what had happened. He became nervous and started playing with his hair. She told him that she was his mother and that he could tell her anything. T.B. then told her that “his Uncle Orlando had put his finger in his ‘booty,’ ” T.B.’s word for buttocks. T.B.’s mother said “okay,” finished changing him, and sent him off to his room. She then phoned T.B.’s father and reported what T.B. had said. After hearing of T.B.’s story, T.B.’s grandmother decided that they should take him to the hospital. As T.B. and his mother were waiting to be picked up to go to the hospital by T.B.’s father and grandmother, T.B.’s mother asked him if he had asked Bobadilla to stop. T.B. indicated that he had, and that Bobadilla had said he was sorry.
T.B.’s parents brought T.B. into the hospital’s emergency room where he was examined by an emergency-room physician. After talking to T.B.’s parents, the physician conducted a full-body examination of T.B., and observed an abnormal erythema, or redness, around his rectum. The physician saw no ulcerations or lesions, which would have indicated a chronic problem, and believed the erythema was consistent with what the child had disclosed.
A Willmar Police Department officer was dispatched to the hospital on an assault report. The officer initially met with [247]*247the emergency room nurse and then with TJB.’s parents. After doing so, the officer forwarded his report to both the Investigations Unit of the police department and the Kandiyohi County Family Service Department. Over the next several days, a Kandiyohi County child-protection worker from the Family Service Department tried a number of times to contact T.B.’s mother by phone, finally connecting with her on May 9, 2003. The child-protection worker arranged to have T.B. interviewed that day at the law enforcement center.
T.B. and his parents arrived at the law enforcement center at approximately 1:30 p.m. The child-protection worker and a Willmár police detective, out of uniform, met the family and escorted them to the interview room. The interview room, called the “child friendly room,” was specifically used for interviewing children and featured a video camera that recorded the exchange from behind a one-way mirror. The detective did not participate in the interview, but observed, sitting across from the child-protection worker and T.B. The child-protection worker conducted the interview using the CornerHouse protocol, which she described as a technique “specifically geared towards interviewing children who have been victims of sexual abuse.” The protocol consists of establishing rapport with the child, ascertaining the child’s terms for parts of the anatomy, ascertaining whether abuse occurred, and closing with a “safety message.”. The Corner-House technique instructs the interviewer to ask nonleading questions, to use terms children would understand, and to progress quickly since young children have short attention spans.
The child-protection worker began the interview by asking T.B. about his parents and she then drew pictures of them. Next, using a diagram of a male, she had T.B. identify his names for various parts of the anatomy, starting with the head and moving down. Then the following exchange occurred:
Child-Protection Worker: [H]as anybody hurt your body?
T.B.: Mmm, MmmMmm (affirmative)
CPW: Yeah. Who hurt your body?
T.B.: Orlando did!
CPW: Orlando did * ⅜ * How did Orlando hurt your body?
T.B.: He (inaudible) my (inaudible).
CPW: What?
T.B.: He, he (inaudible) touch my (inaudible). . . ■
CPW: (inaudible) your bootie. Okay. What did he do to your bootie? ■
T.B.: (inaudible) put his finger in there.
CPW: He just put his finger in there? Okay * * *.
T.B. then identified what he meant by “booty” by pointing to the buttocks area on the diagram the child-protection worker had provided.
The child-protection worker asked T.B. where he and Bobadilla were at the time of the incident, and T.B. said they were in- his father’s room. She asked where his father was while it happened. T.B. said that his father had gone downstairs and then come upstairs, but he also said “yeah” when asked if his father had seen it happen.Then the child-protection worker asked him if he would show her what had happened using an anatomically correct doll. He said he would, but ultimately did not. She also asked if Orlando touched him on his skin or on his clothes, and T.B. replied, “My skin.” The child-protection worker then closed the interview by telling T.B. that what had happened was not okay, and that he should tell someone, like his mother, if something similar ever happened again.
[248]*248Bobadilla was charged with first-degree criminal sexual conduct, in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(a) (2004) (engaging in sexual penetration with another person under 13 years of age when the actor is more than 36 months older than the complainant), and second-degree criminal sexual conduct,'in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1(a) (2004) (engaging in sexual contact with another person under 13 years of age when the actor is more than 36 months older than the complainant).
At trial, the district court found T.B. incompetent to testify, but ruled that his statements to his mother and his statements in the child-protection interview were sufficiently reliable to permit their admission as substantive evidence under the hearsay exception embodied in Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd. 3 (2004). Therefore, the court allowed T.B.’s mother and the child-protection worker to testify about T.B.’s statements, and also allowed the state to show the videotape of T.B.’s interview. In addition to the evidence of T.B.’s statements, the emergency-room physician testified regarding her medical examination of T.B. T.B.’s father also testified, stating that he left his son alone with Bobadilla for only seconds when he went downstairs to retrieve the family cat, but that he might have told police that he was gone for 5 minutes or so. The detective testified that Bobadilla, in his police interview, said that T.B.’s father was gone for 15-20 minutes looking for the cat. Boba-dilla testified on his own behalf and denied the allegations of sexual misconduct.
The jury found Bobadilla guilty as charged. The district court entered judgment of conviction for the first-degree criminal sexual conduct charge and imposed the 144-month presumptive sentencing guidelines term, together with 5 years of conditional release. On appeal, Bobadil-la challenged certain evidentiary rulings and argued that T.B.’s statements in the child-protection interview were testimonial statements and therefore the admission of those statements without a prior opportunity for cross-examination violated his constitutional right of confrontation under the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford, which had been decided while his appeal was pending. 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177. Though the court of appeals rejected Bobadilla’s other arguments, the court agreed that his right of confrontation had been violated, and therefore reversed his conviction and remanded the matter for a new trial. We granted the state’s petition for review.
I.
The Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution ensures that a criminal defendant “shall enjoy the right * * * to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const, amend. VI; see also Minn. Const. Art. 1, § 6. Prior to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford, an unavailable witness’s out-of-court statement would not violate the Confrontation Clause if the statement fell under a hearsay exception, and if it bore “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness,” or “adequate indicia of reliability.” Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980); see State v. Hansen, 312 N.W.2d 96, 102 (Minn.1981). The Crawford court rejected this approach, concluding that “[r]eliability is an amorphous, if not entirely subjective, concept.” 541 U.S. at 63, 124 S.Ct. 1354. The Court explained:
[The Confrontation Clause] commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination. The Clause thus reflects a judgment, not only about the desirability of reliable evidence (a point [249]*249on which there could be little dissent), but about how reliability can best be determined.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Accordingly, Crawford explained that the Confrontation Clause should be interpreted as a procedural, rather than a substantive guarantee, aimed at curbing abuses that were inherent in “the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50, 61, 124 S.Ct. 1354. In light of this procedural focus, Crawford instructs that the right of confrontation attaches not to judicially determined “reliable” statements, but to all statements by “witnesses against the accused — in other words, those who bear testimony.” Id. at 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (quotation marks omitted). Thus, Crawford’s Confrontation Clause test bars at trial all “testimonial” out-of-court statements when the accused is not afforded “a prior opportunity to cross-examine” the declarant. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61, 124 S.Ct. 1354. In this case, it is undisputed that T.B. was not subject to cross-examination, and so our sole inquiry under the Confrontation Clause is whether T.B.’s statements in the interview with the child-protection worker were “testimonial” under Crawford.
The Crawford Court determined that the case before it presented a clearly testimonial situation. See 541 U.S. at 53 n. 4, 124 S.Ct. 1354 n. 4. Crawford and his wife were both given Miranda warnings and separately interrogated by police officers after Crawford had stabbed a man who had allegedly raped his wife. Id. at 38, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Crawford’s wife observed the stabbing and her statements describing the incident to the police officers were introduced in her husband’s trial under the statements-against-penal-interest exception to the hearsay rule, since her statements tended to show that she had a role in facilitating the assault. Id. at 38-40, 124 S.Ct. 1354.
The Crawford Court considered the wife’s statement — a “recorded statement, knowingly given in response to structured police questioning” — to be clearly testimonial, but “refus[ed] to articulate a comprehensive definition” of testimonial statements. Id. at 53 n. 4, 68 n. 10, 124 S.Ct. 1354. The Court listed three formulations of. testimonial statements, though it declined to choose among them:
1. ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent — that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably exp'ect'to be used prosecutorially;
2. extrajudicial statements contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions;
3. statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.'
Id. at 51-52, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (internal citations, quotation marks, and ellipses omitted; numbering added).
Though it is unclear whether any of these three formulations are'authoritative, Crawford explained that all three “share a common nucleus” of testimonial statements, which includes, “at a minimum * * * prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and * * * police interroga[250]*250tions1 Id. at 52, 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354. The Crawford Court also explained that a testimonial statement “is typically a solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.” Id. at 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (quotation marks omitted). Therefore, “[a]n accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not.” Id. at 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354.
As interpreted by Crawford, the Confrontation Clause is aimed at protecting against abuses by both declarants and government questioners. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44, 56 n. 7, 67, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Crawford explains that the Framers wrote the Clause not only in consideration of scheming declarants like the infamous Lord Cobham, who was allowed to present self-serving and uncross-examined testimony in the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, but also in consideration of corrupt government officials, explaining that “[the. Framers], knew that, * * * government officers[ ] could not always be trusted to safeguard the rights of the. people.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44, 67, 124 S.Ct. 1354.. The Crawford Court observes that the “[i]nvolvement of government officers in the production of testimony with an eye toward trial presents unique potential for prosecutorial abuse.” Id. at. 56 n. 7, 124 S.Ct. 1354.
We have dealt extensively with testimonial statements under Crawford once previously. In State v. Wright, we held that a 911 call reporting an assault and a police interview with the assault victims, conducted soon after the incident, were both non-testimonial. 701 N.W.2d 802, 804, 815 (Minn.2005). However, we explained that we would determine whether statements were testimonial on a case-by-case basis, especially given the uncertainty surrounding Confrontation Clause issues following Crawford. Wright, 701 N.W.2d at 812. In making the determination that the statements at issue in Wright were not testimonial, we articulated eight relevant considerations:
(1) whether the declarant was a victim or an observer; (2) the declarant’s purpose in speaking with the officer (e.g., to obtain assistance); (3) whether it was the police or the declarant who initiated the conversation; (4) the location where the statements were made (e.g., the de-clarant’s home, a squad car, or the police station); (5) the declarant’s emotional state when the statements were made; (6) the level of formality and structure of the conversation between the officer and declarant; (7) the officers’ purpose in speaking with the declarant (e.g., to secure the scene, determine what happened, or collect evidence); and (8) if and how the statements were recorded.
Id. at 812-13. The second and seventh factors — the purpose of the statements from the perspective of the declarant and from the perspective of the government questioner — were the central considerations. See id. at 811, 813-14. The other six factors are probative of these two. We believe that Wright’s focus on the purpose of the statements from the perspectives of both the declarant and the government questioner is consonant with Crawford’s concern with abuses by both declarants and government questioners.
Our , approach in Wright is consistent with the approach of numerous other [251]*251courts that have also determined that the testimonial question turns on whether government questioners or declarants take or give a statement “with an eye toward trial.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n. 7, 124 S.Ct. 1354. For example, when the facts indicate that both a government questioner and a declarant are, to a substantial degree, acting with an eye toward trial, courts have consistently held that the de-clarant’s statements are testimonial. See, e.g., United States v. Saner, 313 F.Supp.2d 896, 901-02 (S.D.Ind.2004) (deciding that incriminating statements made to an investigating prosecutor were testimonial); People v. Zarazua, No. H025472, 2004 WL 837914, *4 (Cal.Ct.App. 6th Dist. Apr. 20, 2004) (determining that an adult rape and assault victim’s videotaped statement to police at the police station was testimonial); People v. Vigil, 104 P.3d 258, 262-63 (Colo.Ct.App.2004) (determining that a statement by a 7-year-old declarant during a police interrogation was testimonial where the child understood the punitive consequences of his statements), cert. granted, 2004 WL 2926003 (Colo. Dec.20, 2004); see also Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (stating that “[a]n accuser who-makes a formal statement to government officers bears testimony”). In the converse situation, when both a questioner and a declarant are not, to any substantial degree, acting with an eye toward trial, courts have consistently held that the de-clarant’s statements are not testimonial, as we did in Wright,2 701 N.W.2d at 813-14. Most courts have also determined that a statement is testimonial if a government questioner is acting largely for the purpose of preserving a statement for trial, even if the declarant is not. E.g., United States v. Bordeaux, 400 F.3d 548, 556 (8th Cir.2005) (deciding that a statement was testimonial when a young child was interviewed for the purpose of collecting information for law enforcement), reh’g en banc denied (May 27, 2005); State v. Mack, 337 Or. 586, 101 P.3d 349, 352 (2004) (same); People ex reL. R.A.S., 111 P.3d 487, 488 (Colo. Ct.App.2004) (same).3
[252]*252Often, government questioners and declarants will have multiple purposes. But the fact that a statement is given or taken partially for reasons other than preservation for trial does not preclude a determination that the statement is testimonial. E.g., Bordeaux, 400 F.3d at 556 (stating that “Crawford does not indicate, and logic does not dictate, that multi-pur-pose statements cannot be testimonial”). For instance, a police officer will often be acting, to at least some degree, with an eye toward trial, even when responding to an emergency. But where preservation for trial is merely incidental to other purposes, such as assessing and responding to an immediate danger, a statement will not be deemed testimonial. See, e.g., Ham-mon, 829 N.E.2d at 458 (statement was not testimonial where an officer taking a statement “was principally in the process of accomplishing the preliminary tasks of securing and assessing the scene”). Our decision in Wright provides an instructive example. In Wright, we acknowledged that officers at the scene were acting at least to some degree with an evidence-gathering purpose, but observed that, nonetheless, the officers’ actions were primarily “a response to a call for assistance and preliminary determination of ‘what happened’ and whether there was immediate danger, rather than an effort to gather evidence for a future trial.” Id. at 813-14. Thus, producing evidence for trial must be at least a substantial purpose of the statement.4
These decisions, our own decision in Wright, and Crawford itself all instruct us that the key to determining whether a statement is testimonial is whether either a declarant or government questioner is acting, to a substantial degree, in order to produce a statement for trial.5 See espe-[253]*253dally Hammon, 829 N.E.2d at 456 (concluding that “if either [a declarant or questioner] is principally motivated by a desire to preserve the statement. [for use at a future trial] it is sufficient to render the statement ‘testimonial,’ ” and determining that “development ‘with an eye toward trial’ is in our view the critical component” of determining whether a statement is testimonial under Crawford).
Whether a declarant or government questioner is acting, to a substantial degree, in order to produce a statement for trial is determined by asking whether a reasonable government questioner or de-clarant in the relevant situation would exhibit that purpose. We make this inquiry, as opposed to an inquiry into the subjective motivations of declarants or questioners, because Crawford explained that “only cross-examination” can reveal a declarant’s subjective perception of his or. her situation. 541 U.S. at 66, 124 S.Ct. 1354. In addition, this approach is consistent with our reasoning in Wright, in which we looked to the likely motivations of reasonable people in the relevant situations, see 701 N.W.2d at 811, 813-14, but rejected an inquiry that hinged on the perspective of an objectively situated person who was unaffected by the context in which the statement was made, see id. at 814. In so doing, we explained that the latter approach would be overbroad, and would improperly ignore statements’ “interrogative qualities,” or the contextual aspects of the questioning. Id. Finally, we note that an inquiry into the purpose of a reasonable government questioner or declarant in the relevant situation also conforms with Crawford’s, core categories of testimonial statements — “prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a formal trial; and * * * police interrogations” — since a reasonable questioner taking a statement in any one of those situations would always exhibit a substantial concern with producing a statement for use in legal proceedings. 541 U.S. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354.
II.
In the context of child-declarant cases, courts in several jurisdictions have held that the statements of children in interviews conducted by social workers or police investigators are testimonial. We note that the facts of many of these cases can be distinguished from the present situation. See, e.g., Snowden, 846 A.2d at 39-41, 47 (finding the statements of 10- and 8-year-old children to be testimonial when the statements were taken pursuant to a statute that allows the admission at trial of children’s out-of-court statements regardless of whether the children are incompetent or unavailable to testify). Moreover, as with other cases in which testimonial questions arise, these eases have consistently determined that children’s statements are testimonial in situations where either the declarant or government questioner was acting, to a substantial degree, in order to produce a statement for trial.6 [254]*254Using a similar rationale, several courts have considered the statements of children to social workers or police officers to be tantamount to police interrogations, and therefore testimonial. E.g., T.P. v. State, 911 So.2d 1117, 1123 (Ala.Crim.App.2004) (stating that “because [an interview of a child by a social worker] was intended to be used as an investigative tool for a potential criminal prosecution, the interview is similar to a police interrogation and, thus, falls within the definition of ‘testimonial’ contained in Crawford ”), cert. denied (Ala. Mar. 11, 2005). As we noted above, we think it is reasonable to conclude that in any situation tantamount to a “police interrogation” under Crawford, the government questioner taking the statement would be acting, to a substantial degree, in order to produce a statement for trial.
But in this case, neither the child-protection worker nor the child declarant, T.B., were acting, to a substantial degree, in order to produce a statement for trial. The parties do not dispute that the interview of T.B. was conducted in accord with a statutory scheme for reporting, investigating, and responding to threats to children’s health or welfare. Minn.Stat. § 626.556 (2004). This statutory scheme provides that certain individuals must report the maltreatment of minors either to law enforcement or to the local welfare agency. Id. Following a report of abuse, “the local welfare agency shall immediately conduct an assessment including gathering information on the existence of substance abuse and offer protective social services for purposes of preventing further abuses, safeguarding and enhancing the welfare of the abused or neglected minor, and preserving family life whenever possible.” Minn.Stat. § 626.556, subd. 10(a). To the extent that an allegation of abuse alleges a violation of a criminal statute, the local welfare agency and law enforcement must “coordinate the planning and execution of their respective investigation and assessment efforts to avoid a duplication of fact-finding efforts and multiple interviews.” Id. Both the welfare agency and law enforcement must prepare separate reports. Id. The local welfare agency is required to use a “nondirective” question-and-answer format and to make audio-video recordings of the interviews of alleged victims of sexual abuse. Minn.Stat. § 626.556, subd. 10(j)(2).
The clearly delineated purpose of this statutory scheme is to protect the health and welfare of children:
[255]*255[T]he public policy of this state is to protect children whose health or welfare may be jeopardized through physical abuse, neglect, or sexual abuse. In furtherance of this public policy, it is the intent of the legislature under this section to strengthen the family and make the home, school, and community safe for children by promoting responsible child care in all settings; and to provide, when necessary, a safe temporary or permanent home environment for physically or sexually abused or neglected children.
In addition, it is the policy of this state to require the reporting of neglect, physical or sexual abuse of children in the home, school, and community settings; to provide for the voluntary reporting of abuse or neglect of children; to require the assessment and investigation of the reports; and to provide protective and counseling services in appropriate cases.
Minn. § Stat. 626.556, subd. 1. This statute stands in contrast to statutes such as the Maryland statute at issue in Snowden, 156 Md.App. 139, 846 A.2d 36. In Snowden, the court found an interview testimonial where the statutory interviewing scheme was designed with the express purpose of facilitating the creation of out-of-court statements for a future trial. Id. at 47.
Avoiding multiple interviews is a critical concern when dealing with children not only because the interviews are often traumatic for the child, but also because multiple interviews increase the chance that the children will be confused by unnecessarily suggestive questions. That, by statute, the initial risk-assessment interview is recorded does not, therefore, necessarily indicate that the purpose of the interview was to create a formalized statement for trial. Given the clear need to limit a child’s exposure to stressful and confusing interviews, and the accompanying need to accurately assess risks to the child, there is a compelling need for a single recorded assessment interview solely in order to best protect the health and welfare of the child.7
Here, the interview of T.B. was initiated by a child-protection worker in response to a report of sexual abuse for the overriding purpose of assessing whether abuse occurred, and whether steps were therefore needed to protect the health ánd welfare of the child. In the interview, the child-protection worker established rapport with T.B., identified the child’s terms for human anatomy, made a touch and abuse inquiry, and closed the interview. If part of the purpose of this interview was to produce a statement for use at a future trial, such a purpose was at best incidental to the main purpose: assessing and responding to imminent risks to T.B.’s health and welfare. Much like the at-the-scene police questioning in Wright, the interview of T.B. “represent[s] a response to a call for assistance and preliminary determination of ‘what happened’ and whether there was immediate danger, rather than an effort to gather evidence for a future trial.” 701 N.W.2d at 813-14. Moreover, given T.B.’s very young age, it is doubtful that he was even capable of understanding that his statements would be used at a trial. As amicus [256]*256American Prosecutors Research Institute makes clear, children of T.B.’s age are simply unable to understand the legal system and the consequences of statements made during the legal process.
Certainly, communications in initial-assessment interviews may very well evolve into testimonial statements. An interview with an older child who understands the law-enforcement consequences of his statement, or an interview with more significant law-enforcement involvement might both exhibit a greater purpose on the part of a declarant or government questioner to produce statements for use at a future trial. See, e.g., Vigil, 104 P.3d at 262-63 (determining that a statement was testimonial where the court indicated that the child understood the punitive consequences of his statements); R.A.S., 111 P.3d at 488, 490 (determining that a child’s statement was testimonial where the child was interviewed by an investigating police officer 3 days after an abuse incident). But we conclude that in this case, neither T.B. nor the child-protection worker were acting, to a substantial degree, in order to produce a statement for trial, and therefore T.B.’s statements in the assessment interview were not testimonial.
III.
Bobadilla also challenges certain evidentiary rulings made by the district court. Evidentiary rulings are committed to the trial court’s discretion and will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Bjork, 610 N.W.2d 632, 636 (Minn.2000). And reversal is not warranted unless there is a reasonable doubt that the result would have been different had the evidence not been admitted. State v. Martin, 695 N.W.2d 578, 583 (Minn.2005) (citing State v. Litzau, 650 N.W.2d 177, 182 (Minn.2002)).
First, Bobadilla argues that even aside from Confrontation Clause issues there were not sufficient “indicia of reliability” to admit T.B.’s interview statements. Hansen, 312 N.W.2d at 102. A court must consider “the time, content, and circumstances of the statement and the reliability of the person to whom the statement is made” in determining whether there are sufficient indicia of reliability under Minn.Stat. § 595.02, subd. 3.8 Here, the trial court articulated several sound factors on which it relied in deciding to admit T.B.’s statements. Specifically, the court noted: (1) that the statement was made close in time to the event; (2) that the statement was unusual and consistent with T.B.’s prior reporting; (3) that the questions were not leading or suggestive; and (4) that neither the interviewer nor the detective had any reason to lie. We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the statements met the statutory requirements of reliability.
Second, Bobadilla contends that the testimony of the child-protection worker and the detective concerning the content of the videotaped interview with T.B. was needlessly cumulative under Minn. R. Evid. 403. However, the detective was not permitted to testify about the content of the interview, the child-protection worker’s testimony was received without objection, and error, if any, was harmless given that the jury saw the videotape itself.
Finally, Bobadilla asserts that the district court committed error by exclud[257]*257ing exculpatory statements contained in his police statements. He argues that his consistent denials of the allegations were admissible as prior consistent statements under Minn. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B). The rule requires the speaker to be subject to cross-examination at trial. At the time the court ruled on the state’s motion in limine, the cross-examination requirement had not been satisfied. Again error, if any, in the exclusion of the exculpatory statements was harmless, particularly where the jury heard of his consistent denials through the testimony of his brother.
In summary, we hold that statements made by a young child in a risk-assessment interview conducted by a child-protection worker in accordance with the statutory scheme outlined in Minn.Stat. § 626.556 were not testimonial when neither the child nor the child-protection worker were acting, to a substantial degree, in order to produce a statement for trial. We also hold that Bobadilla was not deprived of a fair trial by the district court’s evidentiary rulings.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and judgment of conviction reinstated.
GILDEA, J., not having been a member of this court at the time of the argument and submission, took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.