State v. Beall

2024 Ohio 750

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: March 1, 2024
• Docket: 29866
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Beall, 2024-Ohio-750.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO : : Appellee : C.A. No. 29866 : v. : Trial Court Case No. 2018 CR 02084/1 : JOSHUA BEALL : (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas : Court) Appellant : :

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OPINION

Rendered on March 1, 2024

JOSHUA BEALL, Appellant, Pro Se

MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by ANDREW T. FRENCH, Attorney for Appellee

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HUFFMAN, J.

{¶ 1} Joshua Beall appeals pro se from an amended judgment of the Montgomery

County Court of Common Pleas that denied his pro se “Motion to Dismiss for Lack of

Subject Matter Jurisdiction or in the alternative Motion for Leave to File Motion for New

Trial Instanter.” For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. -2-

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{¶ 2} In March 2019, Beall was convicted of murder, attempted murder, felonious

assault, robbery, complicity to commit robbery, failure to comply, improper handling of

firearms in a motor vehicle, and having weapons while under disability. Beall appealed

his convictions, and we affirmed the judgment of the trial court on direct appeal. State v.

Beall, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28335, 2021-Ohio-1326.

{¶ 3} On May 18, 2020, while his direct appeal was pending, Beall filed a petition

for post-conviction relief in which he asserted that he had been denied the effective

assistance of counsel and his Sixth Amendment right to call witnesses in his own defense

at trial. The trial court denied the petition without a hearing, and we affirmed that

judgment. State v. Beall, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 29280, 2022-Ohio-1259.

{¶ 4} On March 28, 2022, Beall filed the motion at issue in this appeal; the State

responded, and Beall filed a reply to the State’s response. The trial court overruled the

motion on May 18, 2023. Beall filed a notice of appeal on August 2, 2023.

{¶ 5} On August 9, 2023, the State filed a motion to dismiss Beall’s appeal, noting

that Beall’s notice of appeal indicated that he was appealing from a judgment filed on

June 10, 2023, and there was no such filing on that date. The State further argued that

Beall’s appeal was untimely.

{¶ 6} We overruled the State’s motion to dismiss the appeal on August 25, 2023.

In our order, we construed Beall’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction/motion for leave to file a motion for new trial, which the trial court had denied,

as a petition for post-conviction relief, because it (1) was filed after Beall’s direct appeal, -3-

(2) claimed a denial of constitutional rights, (3) sought to render the judgment void, and

(4) asked for vacation of the judgment and sentence. We also noted that it appeared

that the trial court had not instructed the clerk to serve its May 18, 2023 amended decision

pursuant to Civ.R. 58(B), as there was no notation of service on the docket. As such,

we concluded that the 30-day period for filing a notice of appeal referenced in App.R.

4(A)(1) “never began to run,” and we found that Beall’s notice of appeal was timely filed.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR AND ANALYSIS

{¶ 7} Beall asserts two assignments of error which we will consider together:

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING

MOTION WITHOUT A HEARING.

APPELLANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS WHEN COURT

IGNORED CLEAR VIOLATION OF SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION.

{¶ 8} Beall’s motion was addressed to Counts 10 and 11 of his indictment: failure

to comply with an order or signal of a police officer and improper handling of a firearm in

a motor vehicle; those offenses occurred in Hamilton County. Citing R.C. 2901.12(H),

Beall asserted that “the indictment fail[ed] to allege proper venue” and that the trial court

had lacked subject-matter and personal jurisdiction as to Counts 10 and 11 because he

“was not indicted for a ‘course of conduct’ under the statute.” He further asserted that

the State had suppressed evidence “with regard to his knowing and voluntary waiver of

his rights under Miranda,” namely a positive drug test, which Beall characterized as Brady

material. According to Beall, he had been “substantially impaired” when speaking to

medical personnel and police detectives, and the drug test results were “material to the -4-

admissibility of testimonial evidence and [his] alleged confession.” Beall argued that the

alleged Brady violation established prosecutorial misconduct that deprived him of a fair

trial. Finally, he argued that the “improper admission of Counts 10 and 11 into the

indictment, while those counts were pending in Hamilton County, allowed the State to

insert improper ‘other act’ evidence into the trial that otherwise would not have been

admissible.”

{¶ 9} In overruling Beall’s motion, the trial court noted Beall’s reliance upon R.C.

2901.12, which pertains to venue, and concluded that the “true legal issues” raised by

Beall’s motion were venue and prosecutorial misconduct, not subject matter jurisdiction.

The court found that any issue related to venue, unlike subject matter jurisdiction, was

not jurisdictional, had to be raised before trial, and was barred by res judicata. Regarding

prosecutorial misconduct and the alleged Brady material, the court determined that the

drug test results had not been Brady material “because they would have merely assisted

Beall in his motion to suppress”; therefore, the State did not commit prosecutorial

misconduct, and Beall was not “materially prejudiced.” As to the alleged “other acts”

evidence presented through Counts 10 and 11, the court found that res judicata barred

Beall’s arguments and that it had not been prejudicial error pursuant to Evid.R. 404(B) for

Counts 10 and 11 to be tried with the other charges in the indictment.

{¶ 10} The court separately addressed Beall’s motion for leave to file a motion for

new trial. The court concluded that the motion was untimely, as it was filed outside the

timeframe set forth in Crim.R. 33(B), which permits such a motion to be filed within 14

days after a verdict or, in the case of newly-discovered evidence, within 120 days after -5-

the verdict. The court also found that Beall’s motion failed to set forth any grounds that

he had been unavoidably prevented from filing the motion in a timely manner.

{¶ 11} In his first assigned error, Beall asserts that he “presented a clear legal

argument, regarding the Jurisdictional Priority Rule,” based on the fact that he was

“charged and Arraigned in Hamilton County for the charges that arose from his interaction

with Sharonville Police.” He argues that his Montgomery County indictment included

charges “that happened solely in Hamilton County” and that he had not been pursued

from Montgomery County to Hamilton County when he was arrested. Beall asserts that

he presented evidence that he had been charged in two jurisdictions for the same criminal

acts and that he had been entitled to an evidentiary hearing “to resolve the issue of the

alleged void indictment.”

{¶ 12} In his second assignment of error, Beall argues that “with regard to the

Hamilton County charges, Montgomery County Common Pleas Court did not have

subject matter jurisdiction to hear or enter judgment on actions already charged in

Hamilton County” and that the State “committed fraud by including these charges.” He

argues that Counts 10 and 11 “were not part of a continuing course of conduct from

Montgomery County to Hamilton County” and that he was denied due process rights when

he was charged “with an erroneous indictment, and later when this voided indictment was

used in his conviction” in Montgomery County. We note that there is no evidence in the

record before us that Beall was charged or convicted in Hamilton County.

{¶ 13} Beall does not raise the denial of his motion for leave to file a motion for a

new trial. -6-

{¶ 14} The State responds that Beall’s arguments fail for three reasons: Beall

confuses subject-matter jurisdiction with venue, res judicata bars his arguments regarding

venue and, even if his venue argument were not barred, venue in Montgomery County

was proper for Counts 10 and 11 pursuant to a continuing course of conduct.

{¶ 15} “[A] postconviction proceeding is not an appeal of a criminal conviction but,

rather, a collateral civil attack on the judgment.” State v. Calhoun, 86 Ohio St.3d 279,

281, 724 N.E.2d 905 (1999). A petition for “postconviction relief is a means by which the

petitioner may present constitutional issues to the court that would otherwise be

impossible to review because the evidence supporting those issues is not contained in

the record of the petitioner's criminal conviction.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Monroe,

2015-Ohio-844, 29 N.E.3d 391, ¶ 37 (10th Dist.). “This means that any right to

postconviction relief must arise from the statutory scheme enacted by the General

Assembly.” State v. Apanovitch, 155 Ohio St.3d 358, 2018-Ohio-4744, 121 N.E.3d 351,

¶ 35. Accordingly, postconviction review is a narrow remedy, because res judicata bars

any claim that was or could have been raised at trial or on direct appeal. State v. Steffen,

70 Ohio St.3d 399, 410, 639 N.E.2d 67 (1994).

{¶ 16} “Because subject-matter jurisdiction involves a court's power to hear a case,

the issue can never be waived or forfeited and may be raised at any time.” State v.

Mbodji, 129 Ohio St.3d 325, 2011-Ohio-2880, 951 N.E.2d 1025, ¶ 10, citing Pratts v.

Hurley, 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, 806 N.E.2d 992, ¶ 11. “Subject-matter

jurisdiction refers to the constitutional or statutory power of a court to adjudicate a

particular class or type of case.” Corder v. Ohio Edison Co., 162 Ohio St.3d 639, 2020- -7-

Ohio-5220, 166 N.E.3d 1180, ¶ 14, citing Pratts at ¶ 11-12. “A court's subject-matter

jurisdiction is determined without regard to the rights of the individual parties involved in

a particular case.” Id., quoting Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 141 Ohio St.3d 75, 2014-

Ohio-4275, 21 N.E.3d 1040, ¶ 19. In other words, “the focus is on whether the forum

itself is competent to hear the controversy.” Id., quoting State v. Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d

480, 2020-Ohio-2913, 159 N.E.3d 248, ¶ 23, citing 18A Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal

Practice and Procedure, Section 4428, 6 (3d Ed.2017) (“Jurisdictional analysis should be

confined to the rules that actually allocate judicial authority among different courts.”).

{¶ 17} Article IV, Section 4(A) of the Ohio Constitution provides that “[t]here shall

be a court of common pleas and such divisions thereof as may be established by law

serving each county of the state,” and Article IV, Section 4(B) provides that “[t]he courts

of common pleas and divisions thereof shall have such original jurisdiction over all

justiciable matters * * * as may be provided by law.” Corder at ¶ 15. The general subject

matter jurisdiction of Ohio courts of common pleas is defined entirely by statute. Id.

“The court of common pleas has original jurisdiction of all crimes and offenses, except in

cases of minor offenses the exclusive jurisdiction of which is vested in courts inferior to

the court of common pleas.” R.C. 2931.03. Pursuant to R.C. 2931.03, “ ‘a common

pleas court has subject-matter jurisdiction over felony offenses.’ ” State v. Harper, 160

Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-Ohio-2913, 159 N.E.3d 248, ¶ 25, quoting Smith v. Sheldon, 157

Ohio St.3d 1, 2019-Ohio-1677, 131 N.E.3d 1, ¶ 8.

{¶ 18} Based upon the foregoing, the trial court correctly found that the subject-

matter jurisdiction of the court was not in dispute; the trial court was a competent forum, -8-

having been allocated judicial authority over the subject matter of Beall’s felony offenses

pursuant to R.C. 2931.03. Thus, Beall was not entitled to a hearing on his petition on

the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction.

{¶ 19} We note that Beall’s petition was also untimely, although the trial court did

not address its untimeliness. The requirement that a petition for postconviction relief be

timely-filed is jurisdictional. Pursuant to R.C. 2953.21(A)(2)(a), Beall was required to file

a petition for postconviction relief “no later than three hundred sixty-five days after the

date on which the trial transcript [was] filed in the court of appeals in the direct appeal of

the judgment of conviction or adjudication * * *.” “[A] court may not entertain a petition

filed after the [365–day period] * * * or a second petition or successive petitions for similar

relief on behalf of a petitioner unless division (A)(1) or (2) of this section applies.” R.C.

2953.23(A). For an exception to apply, Beall was required to demonstrate that he had

been either: (1) unavoidably prevented from discovering the facts upon which he relied to

present his claim for relief; or that (2) subsequent to the period prescribed in R.C.

2953.21(A)(2) or to the filing of an earlier petition, the United States Supreme Court had

recognized a new federal or state right that applied retroactively to his situation and the

petition asserted a claim based on that right. R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(a). Beall was also

required to show by clear and convincing evidence, that but for constitutional error at trial,

no reasonable factfinder would have found him guilty of the offense(s) of which he was

convicted. R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(b). Unless the petition is timely filed, the court is not

permitted to consider the substantive merits of the petition. State v. Greathouse, 2d Dist.

Montgomery No. 24084, 2011-Ohio-4012, ¶ 10, citing State v. Beaver, 131 Ohio App.3d -9-

458, 461, 722 N.E.2d 1046 (11th Dist.1998) (the trial court should have summarily

dismissed appellant's untimely petition without addressing the merits). Beall’s petition

was a successive petition, and he did not establish that either of the exceptions in R.C.

2953.23(A) applied to excuse its untimeliness, so the trial court was not permitted to

consider the substantive merits of the petition.

{¶ 20} Having determined that the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction was not

at issue and that Beall’s petition for post-conviction relief was successive and untimely,

his assignments of error are overruled.

{¶ 21} The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

EPLEY, P.J. and LEWIS, J., concur.