State v. Vansickle

2025 Ohio 2232

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: June 26, 2025
• Docket: 2024 CA 0060
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Vansickle, 2025-Ohio-2232.]

COURT OF APPEALS LICKING COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

STATE OF OHIO, : JUDGES: : Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, P.J. Plaintiff - Appellee : Hon. William B. Hoffman, J. : Hon. David M. Gormley, J. -vs- : : ROSCOE VANSICKLE : Case No. 2024 CA 0060 : Defendant - Appellant : OPINION

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Licking County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 23-CR-00817

JUDGMENT: Affirmed

DATE OF JUDGMENT: June 26, 2025

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant

JENNY WELLS APRIL F. CAMPBELL Licking County Prosecuting Attorney Campbell Law, LLC 545 Metro Place South, Suite 100 By: KENNETH W. OSWALT Dublin, Ohio 43017 Assistant Prosecuting Attorney 20 South 2nd Street ROSCOE VANSICKLE, Pro Se Newark, Ohio 43055 A835097 Noble Correctional Institution 15708 McConnelsville Road Caldwell, Ohio 43724 Baldwin, P.J.

{¶1} The appellant, Roscoe Vansickle, appeals the trial court’s denial of his

motion to suppress, his conviction, and his sentence. The Appellee is the State of Ohio.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND THE CASE

{¶2} On November 2, 2023, the Licking County Grand Jury indicted the appellant

for two counts of Possession of a Fentanyl-related Compound in violation of R.C.

2925.11(A) and (C)(11)(g), one count of Aggravated Possession of Drugs

(Methamphetamine) in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and (C)(1)(d), one count of

Aggravated Possession of Drugs (Psilocyn) in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and (C)(1)(d),

one count of Possession of Cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and (C)(4)(b), and

one count of Possession of Drugs (Buprenorphine) in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and

(C)(4)(e). The indictment included a forfeiture specification and major drug offender

specification in violation of R.C. 2981.02(A)(1)(b) and R.C. 2941.1410(B), respectively.

{¶3} On November 27, 2023, the appellant filed a Motion to Suppress.

{¶4} On January 23, 2024, the appellee filed a Memorandum Contra to

Defendant’s Motion to Suppress.

{¶5} On January 24, 2024, the trial court held a hearing on the appellant’s Motion

to Suppress. At the hearing, Deputy Rusty Yates testified that he is employed by the

Delaware County Sheriff’s Office as a Deputy Sheriff. Deputy Yates stated he investigated

a shooting on October 6, 2022, in Sunbury, located in Delaware County. The Sheriff’s

Office received a call from C.C. about an alleged shooting that took place at his residence

that morning. C.C. alleged the appellant had fired a shot at him. When Deputy Yates arrived at C.C.’s residence, he made contact with a female who also lived there. She

provided information on the incident.

{¶6} Deputy Yates said that the Sheriff’s office was unable to contact the

appellant that day by phone or in person. Deputy Yates obtained a warrant to ping the

location of his cell phone. The next day, they received location information on the

appellant but were unable to obtain specific enough data to locate him. C.C. told Deputy

Yates that the appellant came to his neighbor’s, C.H.’s, house just across the county line

in Licking County, Ohio. C.H. lives about .2 miles away from the victim.

{¶7} Law enforcement made contact with C.H., who provided up-to-date

information on the appellant’s whereabouts. The appellant parked his car next to a dump

truck at C.H.’s house in Licking County. The appellant then walked through a soybean

field toward C.C.’s house wearing a backpack.

{¶8} Deputy Yates stated that law enforcement located the appellant’s vehicle at

C.H.’s residence in Licking County. By the time officers located the appellant, he had

crossed the county line into Delaware County, about fifty yards from his vehicle. The

officers took him into custody for a parole violation.

{¶9} Law enforcement found a knife near the appellant and a smoking device on

the appellant. They impounded the appellant’s vehicle to investigate the alleged shooting

further. They saw ammunition in plain view in the vehicle.

{¶10} The appellant was taken back to the Delaware County Jail. While there, law

enforcement interviewed the appellant. During the interview, the appellant denied

shooting at C.C.; he admitted to using drugs earlier in the day and admitted that he had

smoking devices in his vehicle. {¶11} Law enforcement obtained a warrant to search the appellant’s vehicle. In

the vehicle, officers found over $18,000 in cash, drug paraphernalia throughout the

vehicle, and an ammunition box containing a significant amount of drugs.

{¶12} On cross-examination, Deputy Yates testified he did not recover evidence

corroborating C.C.’s accusation. Officers never charged the appellant with Felonious

Assault in connection with the shooting.

{¶13} On January 24, 2024, the trial court denied the appellant’s Motion to

Suppress.

{¶14} On May 15, 2024, the appellant entered a plea of guilty to two counts of

Possession of a Fentanyl-related Compound in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and

(C)(11)(e), one count of Aggravated Possession of Drugs (Methamphetamine) in violation

of R.C. 2925.11(A) and (C)(1)(d), one count of Aggravated Possession of Drugs

(Psilocyn) in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and (C)(1)(d), one count of Possession of

Cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and (C)(4)(b), and one count of Possession of

Drugs (Buprenorphine) in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and (C)(4)(e). The appellant also

entered a plea of guilty to a forfeiture specification in violation of R.C. 2981.02(A)(1)(b).

The appellee dismissed the major drug offender specification.

{¶15} On July 22, 2024, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. At the hearing,

the trial court imposed, in aggregate, a minimum ten-year prison sentence.

{¶16} The appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, and his appellate counsel filed

a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493

(1967). In Anders, the Supreme Court of the United States held that if, after a

conscientious examination of the record, a defendant’s counsel concludes the case is wholly frivolous, then counsel should so advise the court and request permission to

withdraw. Anders at 744. Counsel must accompany the request with a brief identifying

anything in the record that could arguably support the defendant’s appeal. Id. Counsel

also must: (1) furnish the defendant with a copy of the brief and request to withdraw; and

(2) allow the defendant sufficient time to raise any matters that the defendant chooses.

Id. Once the defendant’s counsel satisfies these requirements, the appellate court must

fully examine the proceedings below to determine if any arguably meritorious issues exist.

If the appellate court also determines that the appeal is wholly frivolous, it may grant the

counsel’s request to withdraw and dismiss the appeal without violating constitutional

requirements or may proceed to a decision on the merits if state law so requires. Id.

{¶17} Attorney April Campbell, counsel for appellant, moved to withdraw on

December 2, 2024, pursuant to Anders, informing this Court that she had conscientiously

examined the case, reviewed the entire record and researched all potential issues, and

determined that there were no meritorious issues for review which would support an

appeal. Attorney Campbell requested that this Court make an independent review of the

record to determine whether there are any additional issues that would support an appeal,

and certified that she provided a copy of the appellant’s Anders Brief, along with copies

of the relevant transcripts to the appellant. In addition, this Court informed the appellant

in a December 6, 2024, Judgment Entry that the Court received notice that he had been

informed by his attorney that an Anders brief had been filed on his behalf and provided

notice that supplied the appellant with a copy; and, granted the appellant sixty days from

the date of the entry to file a pro se brief in support of his appeal. The appellant filed a

timely pro se brief. {¶18} The record establishes that the appellant’s counsel has satisfied the

requirements set forth in Anders. Accordingly, we review the record in this case and

determine whether any arguably meritorious issues exist, “… keeping in mind that,

‘Anders equates a frivolous appeal with one that presents issues lacking in arguable

merit. An issue does not lack arguable merit merely because the prosecution can be

expected to present a strong argument in reply or because it is uncertain whether a

defendant will prevail on the issue on appeal. ‘An issue lacks arguable merit if, on the

facts and law involved, no responsible contention can be made that it offers a basis for

reversal.’ State v. Pullen, 2002-Ohio-6788, ¶4 (2nd Dist.); State v. Marbury, 2003-Ohio-

3242, ¶7-8 (2nd Dist.); State v. Chessman, 2005-Ohio-2511, ¶16-17 (2nd Dist.).” State v.

Moore, 2009-Ohio-1416, ¶4 (2nd Dist.).’ ” State v. Reynolds, 2024-Ohio-1956, ¶10 (5th

Dist.).

{¶19} The appellant’s counsel’s brief proposes the following potential

assignments of error:

{¶20} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING VANSICKLE’S MOTION TO

SUPPRESS.”

{¶21} “II. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO FILE A

MOTION TO DISMISS ON SPEEDY TRIAL GROUNDS.”

{¶22} “III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED [sic] ACCEPTING VANSICKLE’S GUILTY

PLEAS UNDER CRIM.R. 11 AND ERRED IN SENTENCING HIM.”

{¶23} Counsel for the appellant included a Certificate of Service, verifying service

to the appellant with a copy of the brief. This Court issued a judgment entry notifying the

appellant that his counsel filed an Anders brief and informing the appellant he could file a pro se brief within sixty days of the entry. The appellant filed a timely pro se brief setting

forth the following two assignments of error:

{¶24} “I. APPELLANT’S CONVICTIONS FOR POSSESSION OF FENTANYL,

POSSESSION OF METHAMPHETAMINE, AGGRAVATED POSSESSION OF

PSILOCYN, POSSESSION OF BUPRENORPHINE, AND COCAINE IN VIOLATION OF

OHIO REVISED CODE 2925.11, ARE IN VOID AS LICKING COUNTY, OHIO WAS THE

IMPROPER VENUE AND JURISDICTION, IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1, SECTION 10

OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION AND SECTION 2901.12 OF THE OHIO REVISED

CODE.”

{¶25} “II.THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY

OVERRULING THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE.”

I.

{¶26} The appellant’s counsel submits as a potential assignment of error that the

trial court erred in denying the appellant’s motion to suppress. We disagree.

ANALYSIS

{¶27} A defendant’s plea of guilty is a complete admission of guilt. Crim.R.

11(B)(1). This Court has previously held that “ ‘ a defendant who voluntarily, knowingly,

and intelligently admits “in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he

is charged * * * may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of

constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.” ’ ” State v. Leeper,

2023-Ohio-239, ¶16 (5th Dist.), quoting State v. Howard, 2017-Ohio-9392, ¶69, quoting

Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 36 L.Ed.2d 235, supra (1973).

Therefore, “by entering a guilty plea, a defendant waives the right to raise on appeal the propriety of a trial court’s suppression ruling.” State v. McQueeney, 2002-Ohio-3731, ¶13

(12th Dist.).

{¶28} By entering his guilty plea in this case, the appellant has waived his right to

assert any challenge to the trial court’s ruling on his motion to suppress.

{¶29} Accordingly, the appellant’s first potential assignment of error is without

merit.

II.

{¶30} The appellant’s counsel submits as a potential assignment of error that the

appellant’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to dismiss on speedy

trial grounds. We disagree.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

{¶31} Our standard of review for ineffective assistance claims is set forth in

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Ohio

adopted this standard in the case of State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136 (1989). These

cases require a two-pronged analysis in reviewing a claim for ineffective assistance of

counsel. First, we must determine whether counsel’s assistance was ineffective, i.e.,

whether counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable

representation and was violative of any of his or her essential duties to the client. If we

find ineffective assistance of counsel, we must then determine whether or not the defense

was actually prejudiced by counsel’s ineffectiveness such that the reliability of the

outcome of the trial is suspect. This requires a showing there is a reasonable probability

that but for counsel’s unprofessional error, the outcome of trial would have been different.

Id. {¶32} Trial counsel is entitled to a strong presumption all decisions fall within the

wide range of reasonable professional assistance. State v. Sallie, 1998-Ohio-343. In

addition, the United States Supreme Court and the Ohio Supreme Court have held a

reviewing court “need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before

examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies.”

Bradley at 143, quoting Strickland at 697.

{¶33} This Court has previously held that by entering a plea of guilty, the appellant

waives his right to challenge the effectiveness of trial counsel for failing to file a motion to

dismiss on speedy trial grounds. State v. Mayle, 2008-Ohio-286 (5th Dist.); citing State v.

Kelley, 57 Ohio St.3d 127 (1991). “Essentially, by entering a guilty plea a defendant

waives all errors, absent a showing that the defendant was coerced or induced into

making the plea. Id.” Mayle at ¶ 39. Therefore, a guilty plea by a defendant waives claims

of ineffective assistance of counsel based upon statutory speedy trial issues. State v.

Barnett, 73 Ohio App.3d 244, 249 (1991).

{¶34} In the case at bar, the appellant does not point to, and we do not find, any

evidence he was coerced or induced into making the plea. Accordingly, the appellant has

waived his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based upon statutory speedy trial

issues.

{¶35} The appellant’s second potential assignment of error is without merit. III.

{¶36} The appellant’s counsel submits as a potential assignment of error that the

trial court erred in accepting the appellant’s guilty pleas under Crim.R. 11 and erred in

sentencing him. We disagree.

Crim.R. 11

{¶37} Our review of the record confirms that the trial court complied with Crim.R.

11 when it accepted the appellant’s plea, engaging in a thorough colloquy with the

appellant regarding his guilty plea. The trial court advised the appellant of the

constitutional rights he was waiving by pleading guilty, informed him of the maximum

potential penalties, and confirmed his understanding of these rights. The trial court

questioned the appellant to determine whether his plea was validly entered and

determined it was. Accordingly, the appellant’s guilty plea was knowingly, voluntarily, and

intelligently given, and there was no error in the trial court’s acceptance of the appellant’s

guilty plea.

Sentence

{¶38} Felony sentences are reviewed under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). State v. Goings,

2014-Ohio-2322, ¶20 (6th Dist.). An appellate court may increase, modify, or vacate and

remand a judgment only if it clearly and convincingly finds either “(a) the record does not

support the sentencing court’s findings under division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13,

division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section 2929.14, or division (I) of section 2929.20 of the

Revised Code, whichever, if any, is relevant” or “(b) the sentence is otherwise contrary to

law.” Id. See, also, State v. Yeager, 2016-Ohio-4759, ¶7 (6th Dist.) In the case sub judice, the sentence imposed by the trial court was within the statutory parameters and supported

by the record.

{¶39} Accordingly, the appellant’s third potential assignment of error is without

Pro Se Assignment of Error I & II.

{¶40} In the appellant’s first and second assignments of error argued in his pro se

brief, the appellant argues that his convictions are void because Licking County, Ohio,

was the improper venue and jurisdiction, and the appellant challenges the court’s ability

to deny a motion to suppress where it did not have jurisdiction. We disagree.

{¶41} Initially, we noted the appellant entered a plea of guilty. As we discussed in

the appellant’s first potential assignment of error, the appellant waived his right to

challenge, on appeal, the trial court’s decision denying his motion to suppress. State v.

McQueeney, 2002-Ohio-3731, ¶13 (12th Dist.); State v. Leeper, 2023-Ohio-239 (5th

Dist.). Additionally, his guilty plea also waived any venue-related challenges. State v.

Phelps, 2022-Ohio-3025, ¶29 (5th Dist.). However, a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent

guilty plea does not waive jurisdictional defects in the proceedings.

{¶42} Therefore, to the extent the appellant is challenging the venue or the trial

court’s denial of his motion to suppress, we find those arguments are without merit.

However, we will address the appellant’s pro se jurisdictional arguments.

{¶43} “ ‘Subject-matter jurisdiction of a court connotes the power to hear and

decide a case upon its merits’ and ‘defines the competency to render a valid judgment in

a particular action.’ ” Cheap Escape Co. v. Haddox, L.L.C., 2008-Ohio-6323, ¶6, quoting Morrison v. Steiner, 32 Ohio St.2d 86, 87 (1972). A court without subject-matter

jurisdiction lacks the power to adjudicate the merits of a case. Pratts v. Hurley, 2004-

Ohio-1980, ¶11. Therefore, parties may challenge jurisdiction at any time during the

proceedings. Id. “Whether a trial court possessed subject-matter jurisdiction is a question

of law which we consider de novo.” Golf Village North, LLC v. City of Powell, Ohio, 2018-

Ohio-151, ¶17 (5th Dist.).

{¶44} The appellant appears to argue that because law enforcement is based in

Delaware County, then the Licking County Court of Common Pleas did not have

jurisdiction to hear this case. The appellant seems to be confusing the trial court’s

jurisdiction with law enforcement’s territorial jurisdiction. “a court’s subject matter

jurisdiction is determined without regard to the rights of the individual parties involved in

a particular case.” State v. Beall, 2024-Ohio-750, ¶16 (2nd Dist.). Therefore, whether or

not law enforcement officers from Delaware County exceeded their territorial jurisdiction

by searching his vehicle in Licking County does not impact the subject matter jurisdiction

of the trial court. At the suppression hearing, the evidence showed the appellant parked

his vehicle in Licking County while there were illegal drugs in the vehicle. Accordingly, the

appellant’s claim that the Licking County Court of Common Pleas lacks jurisdiction is

without merit.

{¶45} The appellant’s first and second assignments of error argued in his pro se

brief are overruled. CONCLUSION

{¶46} Based upon the foregoing, and after independently reviewing the record,

we agree with appellate counsel’s conclusion that no non-frivolous claims exist that would

justify remand or review of the appellant’s conviction or sentence. We, therefore, find the

appeal to be wholly frivolous under Anders. Attorney Campbell’s motion to withdraw as

counsel for the appellant is hereby granted, and the judgment of the Licking County Court

of Common Pleas is hereby affirmed.

By: Baldwin, P.J.

Hoffman, J. and

Gormley, J. concur.