[623]*623DEITS, C. J.
Defendant and two accomplices robbed a market in Klamath County. Diming the robbery, defendant pushed the owner of the store into a back room, then shot her when she returned to the outer portion of the store. Defendant was charged with three counts of aggravated murder (counts one through three), ORS 163.095, one count of murder (count four), ORS 163.115, and robbery in the first degree (count five), ORS 164.415. He pleaded no contest to all of the charges. Each count of the aggravated murder charges included the same victim but was based on a different underlying felony. The felonies underlying the aggravated murder convictions were: (1) first-degree robbery (count one); (2) second-degree kidnaping (count two); and (3) murder committed in an effort to conceal the identity of the perpetrator of a crime (count three).
The trial court merged the murder conviction with the conviction on the third count of aggravated felony murder and merged the independent robbery conviction with the first count of aggravated felony murder. The court then sentenced defendant to a life sentence with a 30-year minimum on count one, a life sentence with a 30-year minimum on count two to be served consecutive to count one, and a life sentence with a 30-year minimum on count three to run concurrent with count one. Defendant argues that the trial court erred in not merging the three aggravated murder convictions and by imposing the consecutive sentences. We affirm.
ORS 161.062(1) provides that “[w]hen the same conduct or criminal episode violates two or more statutory provisions and each provision requires proof of an element that the others do not, there are as many separately punishable offenses as there are separate statutory violations.” In State v. Crotsley, 308 Or 272, 278, 779 P2d 600 (1989), the Supreme Court held that in order for ORS 161.062(1) to be applicable to defendant’s conduct, the following questions must be answered in the affirmative:
“(1) Did defendant engage in acts that are ‘the same conduct or criminal episode,’ (2) did defendant’s acts violate two or [624]*624more ‘statutory provisions/ and (3) does each statutory ‘provision’ require ‘proof of an element that the others do not.’ ”
The state asserts that this test was satisfied. It acknowledges that, while each count of felony murder required proof that defendant intentionally caused the death of the victim, each count also required proof of an element not required by the others. Count 1 required proof that defendant killed the victim “in the course and in furtherance of’ first-degree robbery. Count 2 required proof that defendant killed the victim “in the course of and in furtherance of “ second-degree kidnaping, and count 3 required proof that defendant killed the victim “in an effort to conceal the identity of a perpetrator” of the robbery.
Defendant argues, relying on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Crotsley and State v. Kizer, 308 Or 238, 779 P2d 604 (1989), that in order to constitute a separate statutory provision for purposes of ORS 161.062(1) the statutory sections must address separate legislative concerns. Defendant points out that in Kizer, the Supreme Court concluded that the legislature was addressing the same legislative concern in each of the two subsections setting forth how forgery could be proven, ORS 165.007,1 and, therefore, only one conviction could be entered. 308 Or at 243. The court noted that the DUII statute, ORS 813.010,2 was a similarly written statute and, accordingly, only one DUII conviction could be entered, even if alternate means of committing DUII are proven. Id.
[625]*625In defendant’s view, the three charges here did not arise from three different crimes but rather from three different theories for proving the same crime. Defendant argues that, simply because the legislature provided for a number of ways of proving aggravated murder, it does not follow that the legislature intended to create distinct and separate crimes for each underlying felony in circumstances such as these where there is only one victim. Defendant contends that the aggravated murder statute is similar to the forgery statute in that under those statutes each theory of proving the respective crimes addresses the same legislative concern, and that under the aggravated murder statute the legislative concern addressed is engaging in criminal felony behavior that is likely to result in the death of someone. Consequently, in defendant’s view, the statutory provisions here are not separate statutory provisions for purposes of ORS 161.062(1) and, therefore, only one aggravated murder conviction may be entered.
We have not addressed the specific argument that defendant makes here; namely, whether ORS 163.095 addresses a single legislative concern for purposes of ORS 161.062(1) or whether the various felonies listed by reference in ORS 163.095(l)(d) identify distinct and separate legislative concerns. We indirectly answered that question in our refusal to merge felony murder convictions that were based on different underlying felonies, even though the convictions involved the same victim, in State v. Burnell, 129 Or App 105, 877 P2d 1228 (1994). In Burnell, the defendant was convicted on two felony murder counts, each based on a different underlying felony but resulting in the death of a single victim. We held:
“When a defendant is found guilty of multiple felony murder counts, if each of the underlying felonies requires proof of an element not required in another count, then the felony murder charges do not merge, notwithstanding the fact that there was only one homicide victim.” Id. at 109. (Emphasis supplied.)
See also State v. Hessel, 117 Or App 113, 122, 844 P2d 209 (1992), rev den 318 Or 26 (1993).
[626]*626The basis for defendant’s convictions on the aggravated murder counts here was that defendant “personally and intentionally committed homicide under the circumstances set forth in ORS 163.115
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[623]*623DEITS, C. J.
Defendant and two accomplices robbed a market in Klamath County. Diming the robbery, defendant pushed the owner of the store into a back room, then shot her when she returned to the outer portion of the store. Defendant was charged with three counts of aggravated murder (counts one through three), ORS 163.095, one count of murder (count four), ORS 163.115, and robbery in the first degree (count five), ORS 164.415. He pleaded no contest to all of the charges. Each count of the aggravated murder charges included the same victim but was based on a different underlying felony. The felonies underlying the aggravated murder convictions were: (1) first-degree robbery (count one); (2) second-degree kidnaping (count two); and (3) murder committed in an effort to conceal the identity of the perpetrator of a crime (count three).
The trial court merged the murder conviction with the conviction on the third count of aggravated felony murder and merged the independent robbery conviction with the first count of aggravated felony murder. The court then sentenced defendant to a life sentence with a 30-year minimum on count one, a life sentence with a 30-year minimum on count two to be served consecutive to count one, and a life sentence with a 30-year minimum on count three to run concurrent with count one. Defendant argues that the trial court erred in not merging the three aggravated murder convictions and by imposing the consecutive sentences. We affirm.
ORS 161.062(1) provides that “[w]hen the same conduct or criminal episode violates two or more statutory provisions and each provision requires proof of an element that the others do not, there are as many separately punishable offenses as there are separate statutory violations.” In State v. Crotsley, 308 Or 272, 278, 779 P2d 600 (1989), the Supreme Court held that in order for ORS 161.062(1) to be applicable to defendant’s conduct, the following questions must be answered in the affirmative:
“(1) Did defendant engage in acts that are ‘the same conduct or criminal episode,’ (2) did defendant’s acts violate two or [624]*624more ‘statutory provisions/ and (3) does each statutory ‘provision’ require ‘proof of an element that the others do not.’ ”
The state asserts that this test was satisfied. It acknowledges that, while each count of felony murder required proof that defendant intentionally caused the death of the victim, each count also required proof of an element not required by the others. Count 1 required proof that defendant killed the victim “in the course and in furtherance of’ first-degree robbery. Count 2 required proof that defendant killed the victim “in the course of and in furtherance of “ second-degree kidnaping, and count 3 required proof that defendant killed the victim “in an effort to conceal the identity of a perpetrator” of the robbery.
Defendant argues, relying on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Crotsley and State v. Kizer, 308 Or 238, 779 P2d 604 (1989), that in order to constitute a separate statutory provision for purposes of ORS 161.062(1) the statutory sections must address separate legislative concerns. Defendant points out that in Kizer, the Supreme Court concluded that the legislature was addressing the same legislative concern in each of the two subsections setting forth how forgery could be proven, ORS 165.007,1 and, therefore, only one conviction could be entered. 308 Or at 243. The court noted that the DUII statute, ORS 813.010,2 was a similarly written statute and, accordingly, only one DUII conviction could be entered, even if alternate means of committing DUII are proven. Id.
[625]*625In defendant’s view, the three charges here did not arise from three different crimes but rather from three different theories for proving the same crime. Defendant argues that, simply because the legislature provided for a number of ways of proving aggravated murder, it does not follow that the legislature intended to create distinct and separate crimes for each underlying felony in circumstances such as these where there is only one victim. Defendant contends that the aggravated murder statute is similar to the forgery statute in that under those statutes each theory of proving the respective crimes addresses the same legislative concern, and that under the aggravated murder statute the legislative concern addressed is engaging in criminal felony behavior that is likely to result in the death of someone. Consequently, in defendant’s view, the statutory provisions here are not separate statutory provisions for purposes of ORS 161.062(1) and, therefore, only one aggravated murder conviction may be entered.
We have not addressed the specific argument that defendant makes here; namely, whether ORS 163.095 addresses a single legislative concern for purposes of ORS 161.062(1) or whether the various felonies listed by reference in ORS 163.095(l)(d) identify distinct and separate legislative concerns. We indirectly answered that question in our refusal to merge felony murder convictions that were based on different underlying felonies, even though the convictions involved the same victim, in State v. Burnell, 129 Or App 105, 877 P2d 1228 (1994). In Burnell, the defendant was convicted on two felony murder counts, each based on a different underlying felony but resulting in the death of a single victim. We held:
“When a defendant is found guilty of multiple felony murder counts, if each of the underlying felonies requires proof of an element not required in another count, then the felony murder charges do not merge, notwithstanding the fact that there was only one homicide victim.” Id. at 109. (Emphasis supplied.)
See also State v. Hessel, 117 Or App 113, 122, 844 P2d 209 (1992), rev den 318 Or 26 (1993).
[626]*626The basis for defendant’s convictions on the aggravated murder counts here was that defendant “personally and intentionally committed homicide under the circumstances set forth in ORS 163.115(l)(b).” ORS 163.095(l)(d). The circumstances as set forth in ORS 163.115(l)(b) are the enumerated bases that we held would support separate felony murder convictions in Burnell. The only substantive distinction between the felony murder statute, ORS 163.115(l)(b), and the aggravated felony murder statute, ORS 163.095(l)(e), then, is that to prove aggravated felony murder, the state must prove that the defendant “personally and intentionally committed homicide” while involved in the commission of the underlying crime. We see no reason to conclude that separate convictions for felony murder with different underlying crimes do not merge but that separate convictions for aggravated murder with different underlying crimes do merge.
Defendant recognizes our holdings in Burnell and Hessel but urges us to reconsider those decisions.3 We see no reason to depart from our holdings in Burnell and Hessel, and we do not agree with defendant that the Supreme Court’s decision in Kizer requires otherwise. In Kizer, the court indicated that the term “statutory provision,” as used in ORS 161.062, did not necessarily depend on a technical determination of how many subsections a statute included. The court explained that the critical question was whether the legislature was attempting to define a “single crime” by the different subsections. The court stated:
“ ‘Statutory provision’ in ORS 161.062 was not defined to mean a section, subsection, or paragraph; consistent with [627]*627its purposes, the term can be interpreted to mean any provision defining a ‘single crime,’ whatever visual form the provision is given.” Kizer, 308 Or at 243.
In this case, each of the three counts of aggravated murder was based on a different underlying felony that required proof of an element not required by the other counts.
Further, we conclude that, consistent with the court’s reasoning in Crotsley, defendant’s record here should reflect that his conduct consisted of three different crimes. In its decision in Crotsley, the Supreme Court made it clear that merger was not automatically required if the same conduct and victim was involved. In Crotsley, there was one victim, a 14-year-old girl. The defendant was charged with first-degree rape and three counts of first-degree sodomy, because he used forcible compulsion. He was also charged with third-degree rape and three counts of third-degree sodomy, because the victim was under the age of 16. The defendant argued that the first- and third-degree rape, and the first- and third-degree sodomy charges, were alternative, charges for the same criminal act and that “the legislature intended that convictions and sentences for lower degrees of rape and sodomy would be included within convictions and sentences for first degree rape and sodomy.” Crotsley, 308 Or at 275-76. The corut concluded that the first- and third-degree rape convictions did not merge and that the first- and third-degree sodomy convictions did not merge, even though the first- and third-degree rape convictions were based on the same act and the first- and third-degree sodomy convictions were based on the same act. The court explained:
“The proponents of ORS 161.062 clearly intended that criminal records accurately reflect all crimes actually committed and that a person who commits multiple crimes by the same conduct or during the same criminal episode should have a criminal record reflecting each crime committed rather than only a single conviction which would not accurately portray the nature and extent of that person’s conduct.” Id. at 276-77.
We conclude that, in each of the three counts of aggravated murder of which defendant is convicted, the legislature was trying to address a separate and distinct legislative concern, each of which was intended to be a “single [628]*628crime.” Conduct supporting each of the three aggravated murder convictions did not merely constitute three alternative ways to commit a single crime. Each involved different harm to the victim and, in our view, each constituted conduct that the legislature intended to punish separately. As in Crotsley, if a single conviction were entered here, it would not accurately portray the nature and extent of defendant’s conduct.
The concurrence contends that the context of the text of ORS 163.095 suggests that the legislature did not intend to punish separately the various kinds of underlying acts that would support a conviction for aggravated murder. Rather, in the concurrence’s view, the factors in ORS 163.095 are simply alternative theories to show that the offense of aggravated murder has been committed, and the legislature did not intend for those alternatives to be separately punished. 153 Or App at 632. In reaching that conclusion, the concurrence relies on the fact that “aggravated murder is ‘murder as defined in ORS 163.115’ ” and that “murder is ‘criminal homicide’ that occurs when a person intentionally ‘causes the death of another human being’ ” under ORS 163.005. 153 Or App at 631. The concurrence reasons that, because the focus of these definitions is on a single act, it follows that aggravated murder must be a single crime.
We do not find this definition to be determinative. The concurrence overlooks the fact that under ORS 163.115, murder can be proven by showing that a person intentionally committed a criminal homicide, ORS 163.115(l)(a), or by proving that a criminal homicide was committed “in the course of and in furtherance of’ or while attempting to commit an enumerated crime or while attempting to flee the scene of the crime, ORS 163.115(l)(b), or by proving murder by abuse of a person under the age of 14, ORS 163.115(l)(c).4 The felony murder statute, ORS 163.115(l)(b), provides the same list of crimes that ORS 163.095(l)(e) refers to to support a conviction for aggravated felony murder. As noted above, we have held that:
[629]*629“When a defendant is guilty of multiple felony murder counts, if each of the underlying felonies requires proof of an element not required in another count, then the felony murder charges do not merge, notwithstanding the fact that there was only one homicide victim.” Burnell, 129 Or App at 109.
Further, the concurrence focuses on the potential sentences for convictions of aggravated murder and concludes that, because the “practical effect” of imposing separate sentences for each conviction based on different underlying harms is the same as a single conviction for aggravated murder, the legislature did not intend that the “alternatives” be separately punished. However, whether convictions should merge is a separate question from whether convictions should merge for purposes of sentencing. State v. Linth-waite, 295 Or 162, 176, 665 P2d 863 (1983). The context of ORS 161.062(1) itself makes that clear when it states that there are as many separately punishable offenses as there are separate statutory violations. As we noted above, unless the convictions stand separately on defendant’s criminal record, that record will not accurately reflect the nature and extent of defendant’s actions. The fact that, under Oregon’s complex sentencing scheme, defendant may ultimately serve the same amount of time in prison whether he is sentenced to consecutive sentences or whether his convictions, and thus, sentences, merge, is irrelevant. The trial court did not err in entering separate convictions on each of the aggravated murder convictions.
Defendant also argues that, even if multiple convictions could have been entered on the three counts of aggravated felony murder, the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences on counts one and two. He argues that “(1) the second aggravated felony murder offense was merely incidental to the aggravated felony murder conviction on count 1 and (2) there was no harm or risk of harm in Count 2 that was not already addressed by the sentence imposed in count 1.”
ORS 137.123(5) provides that:
[630]*630“The court has discretion to impose consecutive terms of imprisonment for separate convictions arising out of a continuous and uninterrupted course of conduct only if the court finds:
“(a) That the criminal offense for which a consecutive sentence is contemplated was not merely an incidental violation of a separate statutory provision in the course of the commission of a more serious crime but rather was an indication of defendant’s willingness to commit more than one criminal offense; or
“(b) The criminal offense for which a consecutive sentence is contemplated caused or created a risk of causing greater or qualitatively different loss, injury or harm to the victim!.]”
The trial court concluded that:
“The offense for which a consecutive sentence is contemplated, i.e., Aggravated Murder, Count II, is not merely an incidental violation of a separate statutory offense, but was an indication of defendant’s willingness to commit more than one criminal offense.”
The evidence in the record supports the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences on counts one and two. The state asserted that, if the case went to trial, it would present evidence that the victim was the proprietor of the store that defendant and his accomplices robbed. One of these individuals pulled a gun on the victim and forced her into the back room. After the victim returned to the store, defendant fought with and shot her. Defendant’s pushing and fighting with the 72-year-old victim went beyond acts that were merely incidental to robbing the store because there is no evidence that it was necessary (i.e., incidental) to lock up this victim in order to carry out the robbery. See, e.g., State v. Sumerlin, 139 Or App 579, 589, 913 P2d 340 (1996) (offenses not incidental where defendant need not have driven in an intoxicated state to commit offense of reckless driving and need not exceed the speed limit to be convicted of offense of driving under the influence of intoxicants).
In addition, there can be no doubt that the harm caused by the crime of robbery in the course of committing a murder is distinct from the harm caused by the crime of [631]*631kidnaping in the course of committing murder. ORS 137.123(5)(b). Robbery is concerned with loss of property, ORS 164.395; kidnaping is concerned with loss of personal liberty, ORS 163.225. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences on the separate aggravated felony murder counts. See State v. Reeves, 134 Or App 38, 42, 894 P2d 1170, rev den 321 Or 284 (1995).
Affirmed.