An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA24-948
Filed 1 October 2025
Columbus County, Nos. 21CRS052533-230, 21CRS052534-230
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
TYQUISE BAKER, Defendant.
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 8 September 2023 by Judge
Richard Kent Harrell in Columbus County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of
Appeals 26 August 2025.
Stephen G. Driggers, for defendant-appellant.
Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Associate Deputy Attorney General Daniel P. Mosteller, for the State.
FLOOD, Judge.
Defendant Tyquise Baker appeals from the trial court’s judgment entered on a
jury’s verdict finding him guilty of first degree murder and assault with a deadly
weapon inflicting serious injury. On appeal, Defendant argues the trial court: first,
erred by denying his motion to dismiss the first degree murder charge where there
was insufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation, and second, abused its STATE V. BAKER
Opinion of the Court
discretion in allowing the State, in rebuttal, to introduce the recording of Defendant’s
statements to detectives from the hospital. Upon careful review, we hold the trial
court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss where the State presented
substantial evidence of premeditation and deliberation through witness testimony,
such that it was for the jury to decide. We dismiss Defendant’s second argument
regarding rebuttal evidence for lack of preservation as Defendant failed to file a
motion to suppress.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
On 14 September 2021, Defendant drove to visit Sean Frazier, who was “like
an uncle” to Defendant; Defendant planned to repair a water leak and replace a
headlight during his visit. Fraizer lived at 545 Dessie Road in Columbus County,
North Carolina, and his house was known in the community as a “drug house.”
That same evening, Teonacah Evans, her brother Larry Evans (“LJ”), Julius
Miller, and Steven Barfield rode in Barfield’s Honda Accord to Frazier’s house “to go
buy some weed.” Miller brought along two rifles, one of which was an AR style
5.56mm semi-automatic. There is conflicting testimony as to whether a man named
Rameek Freeman was with this group, arrived separately, or arrived at Frazier’s
house at all.
Once the group arrived at Frazier’s house, they noticed five or six cars parked
by the house and a few people standing outside, including Defendant. Miller exited
the Honda, carrying the AR 5.56mm rifle, and walked up to Defendant with Evans
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by Miller’s side. Testimony is conflicting after this point as to the events that occurred
after Evans, Miller, LJ, and Barfield exited the vehicle.
According to Evans, as she and Miller walked up to Defendant, Defendant
asked Miller: “Why do you have a gun on you?” Miller responded: “What do you mean?
Every time you see me, I have a gun on me.” Evans testified Miller had his rifle
“[p]ointing at the ground” during this conversation, and when Miller turned his back
on Defendant, Defendant “pulled out his gun and started shooting” and “shot
[Miller,]” then Miller fell “instantly” and was killed. Evans then claimed Defendant
“look[ed] at me, and it[ was] like the bullet came out in slow motion and hit me in my
arm. I didn’t know I was hit in my stomach, but I knew I was hit in my arm[.]” Evans
was ultimately shot three times—“right on [her] shoulder,” “in [her] stomach[,]” and
a graze on her arm. Evans ran to the Honda, got in the back, and then climbed into
the driver’s seat and drove to her mother’s house without checking for anybody
because she “felt like [she] was fixin’ to die.” Evans testified Freeman was not at the
scene.
According to Defendant, however, after arriving at the house, LJ, Freeman,
and Barfield “walked around” him while Evans and Miller “walked up to [him].”
Defendant stated Miller “had [the rifle] pointed down when they was [sic] walking
up, and then he walked right to me and put it on me.” Defendant testified he
exclaimed: “Bro, what you doing out here with that gun? What you got going on out
here with that gun?” Miller replied: “Anywhere I go, you going to see me with my
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gun.” He then “clicked it[,]” and said, “You know what time it is.” Defendant testified
“[w]hen [Miller] clicked it . . . Freeman . . . start[ed] shooting.” In response to
Freeman’s shooting, according to Defendant: “I went in my waistband, I had a 9-
millimeter Ruger . . . and I just start shooting . . . I started running back shooting
backwards, boom-boom-boom[.]” Defendant was shot in the “back two times.” He
stated he “was just shooting[,]” trying to “sho[ot his] way back in the house[.]”
Defendant explained he must have dropped his gun, because when he “ran in the
house, [Frazier] said I didn’t have no gun in my hand[.]”
Kloey Nance, a witness to the events, testified she saw eight or more cars in
Frazier’s driveway that evening and about ten people outside. Nance testified she saw
Evans, Barfield, LJ, and Freeman get out of a car, but could not “recall” if Miller was
with them. Nance and Frazier’s daughter, Tiny Frazier, were talking in Nance’s car
by the road when they heard gunshots. Nance testified she heard “a couple shots, but
then it sounded like a whole ‘nother different, like, couple shots, like, two different
guns, maybe, but [she] d[idn’t] know.” Nance began driving away when Barfield
“pulled on the back door and got in the back of the car[,]” and Nance drove him to his
aunt’s house.
When law enforcement responded to Frazier’s house, they found, among other
things, Miller’s deceased body, Miller’s AR 5.56mm rifle, a rifle magazine, and 9-
millimeter shell casings. Law enforcement analysis of these casings determined two
different 9-millimeter guns had fired the shots, with a single Glock-type firearm firing
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ten of them. None of the casings matched Miller’s AR 5.56mm rifle, and no 9-
millimeter guns were found as part of the investigation.
On 15 September 2021, the day after the shooting, Detectives Adam Sellers
and Jeremy Barber interviewed Defendant after his surgery. Defendant later
testified at trial that during this hospital interview, he told the detectives: “A car
pulled up, people started shooting at me[,]” but “I can’t tell you who shot me” because
Defendant’s lawyer had told him not to talk to the police. Defendant further testified
he “probably did” talk to officers at the hospital, but he “couldn’t remember” because
he “was sedated then[.]” Defendant remained in intensive care for twenty-three days.
On 8 December 2021, Defendant was indicted with the first degree murder of
Miller, and assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury against Evans.
At trial, Dr. Paul Yell, Associate Chief Medical Examiner, testified Miller had
died from “multiple gunshot wounds[.]” Yell explained Miller’s body had sixteen
entrance wounds and thirteen exit wounds, most of which were to Miller’s back, with
a few of the back wounds showing signs that Miller had been shot from “six inches to
about three or four feet away.” Yell could not, however, determine the order in which
the bullets hit Miller. The bullet remnants in Miller’s body were consistent “with
handgun bullets[,]” but they were too deformed to determine their caliber or the
specific gun that shot them.
Firearms examiner Brooke Layne testified the shell casings found at the scene
were fired from two different handguns: Cartridge casings identified as Q1 through
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Q10 were fired from the same gun, while casings identified as Q11 through Q18 were
fired from another gun.
During rebuttal, the State sought to introduce an audio recording of
Defendant’s conversation with the detectives at the hospital. Defendant’s counsel
objected to the introduction of the hospital recording, emphasizing Defendant had
just gotten out of surgery before the detectives saw him and had already
acknowledged the conversation during his testimony. The trial court overruled the
objection. Also during the State’s rebuttal, Detective Sellers testified he and his
partner had “advised [Defendant] who we were, what we were there for, to speak with
him, and gave him the option to speak with us, and he did.” Although Detective
Sellers admitted he could not attest to Defendant’s coherence during the interview
because “[he is] not a doctor,” he recounted that Defendant’s “words were clear”
during the interview.
At the close of the State’s evidence and at the close of all evidence, Defendant
moved to dismiss the first degree murder charge. The trial court denied the motion
each time explaining sufficient evidence had been presented to the jury, and “the
issue of credibility of the witness is for the jury to determine, not the Court.”
Similarly, during the charge conference, the trial court observed: “We’ve got two
completely different versions of the same event. The jury is going to have to determine
who they find to be credible.”
Using language from the pattern first degree murder instruction, the trial
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court instructed the jury that it needed to find premeditation and deliberation to
return a guilty verdict on first degree murder. The court also instructed the jury on
self defense for all the charges.
The jury returned guilty verdicts against Defendant, finding him guilty of the
first degree murder of Miller, and guilty of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting
serious injury against Evans. The trial court sentenced Defendant to life without
parole for first degree murder and 33-to-52 months of incarceration for assault with
a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury. Defendant timely appealed.
II. Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction to review this appeal from a final judgment of a
superior court, pursuant to N.C.G.S. §§ 7A-27(b)(1) and 15A-1444(a) (2023).
III. Analysis
On appeal, Defendant argues the trial court (A) erred by denying his motion to
dismiss the first degree murder charge where there was insufficient evidence of
premeditation and deliberation, and (B) abused its discretion in allowing the State,
in rebuttal, to introduce the recording of Defendant’s statements to detectives from
the hospital. We address each argument in turn.
A. Premeditation and Deliberation
Defendant first argues the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss
the first degree murder charge. Specifically, Defendant contends the State did not
produce sufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation as required for first
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degree murder. We disagree.
“We review the trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss de novo.” State v.
Summey, 228 N.C. App. 730, 733 (2013) (citation omitted). In reviewing, we must
determine “whether there is substantial evidence (1) of each essential element of the
offense charged, or of a lesser offense included therein, and (2) of [the] defendant’s
being the perpetrator of such offense.” State v. Fritsch, 351 N.C. 373, 378 (2000).
“Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.” State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 78–79 (1980)
(citations omitted). “The [c]ourt must consider the evidence in the light most
favorable to the State and the State is entitled to every reasonable inference to be
drawn from that evidence[,]” and “[c]ontradictions and discrepancies do not warrant
dismissal of the case but are for the jury to resolve.” State v. Horskins, 228 N.C. App.
217, 220 (2013). Additionally, it is the jury’s role to “assess witness credibility.” State
v. McCutcheon, 281 N.C. App. 149, 153 (2021) (citation omitted).
“Murder in the first degree is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice
and with premeditation and deliberation.” Horksins, 228 N.C. App. at 221 (citation
omitted). “Premeditation means that the act was thought over beforehand for some
length of time, however short[,]” and “[d]eliberation means an intent to kill, carried
out in a cool state of blood, . . . and not under the influence of a violent passion or a
sufficient legal provocation.” State v. Taylor, 362 N.C. 514, 531 (2008) (citation
omitted). “The phrase ‘cool state of blood’ means that the defendant’s anger or
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emotion must not have been such as to overcome the defendant’s reason.” State v.
Elliott, 344 N.C. 242, 267 (1996) (citation omitted). “Because premeditation and
deliberation are ordinarily not susceptible to proof by direct evidence, they are most
often proved by circumstantial evidence.” Taylor, 362 N.C. at 531.
Our Supreme Court has “identified certain conduct on the part of a defendant
before, during, and after a murder that supports an inference of premeditation and
deliberation[,]” including the following:
(1) entering the site of the murder with a weapon, which indicates the defendant anticipated a confrontation and was prepared to use deadly force to resolve it, (2) firing multiple shots, because some amount of time, however brief, for thought and deliberation must elapse between each pull of the trigger, (3) pausing between shots, and (4) attempting to cover up involvement in the crime.
Id. at 531 (citation modified). Additional factors to consider include “the nature and
number of the victim’s wounds,” whether the defendant “left the deceased to die
without attempting to obtain assistance for the deceased,” whether the defendant
“disposed of the murder weapon,” “whether the defendant later lied about what
happened[,]” “[t]hreats and declarations of [the] defendant before and during the
course of the occurrence giving rise to the death of deceased[,]” and “[t]he dealing of
lethal blows after deceased has been felled and rendered helpless.” Horskins, 228 N.C.
App. at 222 (citations omitted). “In analyzing premeditation and deliberation, courts
look to the totality of the circumstances rather than a single factor.” State v. Walker,
286 N.C. App. 438, 442 (2022) (citation omitted).
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Defendant relies on State v. Hague, 295 N.C. App. 380 (2024), State v. Corn,
303 N.C. 293 (1981), and State v. Williams, 144 N.C. App. 526 (2001) to argue there
was insufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation presented by the State.
Defendant’s reliance is misplaced.
In Hague, this Court reversed the defendant’s conviction of first degree murder
for lack of sufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation where the evidence
showed “[the victim] provoked [the d]efendant, an injured 72-year-old man, by yelling
at him and pushing him to the ground,” and “the evidence further demonstrated that
it had been [the d]efendant’s ‘habit’ since serving in the Vietnam war to carry his gun
when leaving the house.” 295 N.C. App. at 391. Additionally this Court considered
the following evidence: “[the d]efendant did not threaten [the victim] before or during
their interaction leading to the shooting”; “[the victim] was shot once”; “[the
d]efendant did not deal additional lethal blows after [the victim] had fallen to the
ground”; “[the d]efendant left the scene to call law enforcement although aware that
others present were also calling for assistance”; “[the d]efendant did not dispose of
his gun, rather he unloaded it, placed it on the picnic table and directed law
enforcement to it upon their arrival”; and “[a]lthough the witnesses’ testimony
conflicted at trial, [the d]efendant’s statements in his 911 call were consistent with
his testimony at trial” and the defendant did not “attempt to lie about killing [the
victim] or conceal any facts to law enforcement.” Id. at 391. This Court concluded
that, “[u]nder the totality of the circumstances, giving equal weight to all factors, we
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are unable to hold [the d]efendant’s conduct met the threshold of premeditation and
deliberation.” Id. at 391.
In Corn, our Supreme Court reversed the defendant’s conviction of first degree
murder after the defendant had shot and killed the victim after the victim “walked
over to the couch on which [the] defendant was lying, grabbed [the] defendant, and
began slinging him around and attempting to hit him[,]” and “accused [the] defendant
of being a homosexual.” 303 N.C. at 295. The Court explained that the evidence
showed:
[The victim] entered [the] defendant’s home in a highly intoxicated state, approached the sofa on which [the] defendant was lying, and insulted [the] defendant by a statement which caused [the] defendant to reply “you son- of-a-bitch, don’t accuse me of that.” [The d]efendant immediately jumped from the sofa, grabbing the .22 caliber rifle which he normally kept near the sofa, and shot [the victim] several times in the chest. The entire incident lasted only a few moments.
Id. at 297–98. Our Supreme Court reversed the conviction of first degree murder,
reasoning that “[t]here [was] no evidence that [the] defendant acted in accordance
with a fixed design or that he had sufficient time to weigh the consequences of his
actions[,]” as the defendant “did not threaten [victim] before the incident or exhibit
any conduct which would indicate that he formed any intention to kill him prior to
the incident in question[,]” and “[t]here was no significant history of arguments or ill
will between the parties.” Id. at 298. Further, “[a]lthough [the] defendant shot [the
victim] several times, there is no evidence that any shots were fired after he fell or
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that [the] defendant dealt any blows to the body once the shooting ended[,]” and thus,
“[a]ll the evidence tends to show that defendant shot [the victim] after a quarrel, in a
state of passion, without aforethought or calm consideration.” Id. at 298.
Finally, in Williams, this Court reversed the defendant’s conviction of first
degree murder for lack of premeditation and deliberation where
there was no evidence that [the] defendant and [the victim] knew each other before the altercation at the club. There also was no evidence of animosity or that [the] defendant had made threatening remarks to [the victim]. Furthermore, the defendant was provoked by [the victim’s] assault to which [the] defendant immediately retaliated by firing one shot resulting in the immediate cessation of the altercation after [the victim] fell. Finally, [the] defendant’s actions before and after the shooting did not show planning or forethought on his part. After committing the crime in front of a crowd of bystanders, [the] defendant left the scene immediately but turned himself in the next day.
144 N.C. App. at 530–31.
In Hague, Corn, and Williams, the uncontested evidence shows each victim
physically provoked and assaulted the defendants; the defendants either shot only
once or, as in Corn, did not deal any blows once the victim was down; and none of the
defendants lied or tried to conceal the murders. Here there is conflicting evidence as
to whether Miller provoked and assaulted Defendant, whether Defendant continued
to shoot Miller once he was down, and whether Defendant intentionally or
unintentionally lied during his conversation with detectives at the hospital. Where it
is the jury’s role to “assess witness credibility[,]” see McCutcheon, 281 N.C. App. at
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153, and where “[c]ontradictions and discrepancies do not warrant dismissal of the
case but are for the jury to resolve[,]” see Horskins, 228 N.C. App. at 220, the trial
court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss as the State presented
substantial evidence through the testimony of Evans that Defendant, unprovoked,
deliberately shot and killed Miller, see Smith, 300 N.C. at 78–79. Accordingly, we
affirm the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to dismiss.
B. Recording of Defendant’s Statements to Detectives
Defendant next argues the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the
State, in rebuttal, to introduce the recording of Defendant’s statements to detectives
while at the hospital. Specifically, Defendant contends the trial court should not have
admitted Defendant’s statements where those statements were not made voluntarily.
We disagree.
This Court reviews the trial court’s admission of rebuttal evidence for abuse of
discretion. See N.C.G.S. § 15A-1226(b) (2023); see also State v. Johnston, 344 N.C.
596, 605 (1996). “Abuse of discretion results where the court’s ruling is manifestly
unsupported by reason or is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a
reasoned decision.” State v. Blankenship, 259 N.C. App. 102, 111–12 (2018).
Our statutes provide that “[e]ach party has the right to introduce rebuttal
evidence concerning matters elicited in the evidence in chief of another party[,]”
including “new evidence during rebuttal which could have been offered in the party’s
case in chief or during a previous rebuttal[.]” N.C.G.S. § 15A-1226(a) (2023). The trial
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court, “in [its] discretion[,] may permit any party to introduce additional evidence at
any time prior to verdict.” N.C.G.S. § 15A-1226(b); see also Johnston, 344 N.C. at 605
(“The State has the right to introduce evidence to rebut or explain evidence elicited
by [the] defendant[.]”).
“In North Carolina, the legislature has statutorily specified the procedures for
determining whether a defendant’s statements are voluntarily made. When the
prosecution seeks to use a defendant’s statement in his criminal trial, the defendant
may challenge the admissibility of this evidence by a motion to suppress.” State v.
Johnson, 304 N.C. 680, 683 (1982) (citation omitted). Our statutes provide a
defendant “may move to suppress evidence only prior to trial unless the defendant
did not have [a] reasonable opportunity to make the motion before trial or unless a
motion to suppress is allowed during trial under subsection (b) or (c).” N.C.G.S. § 15A-
975(a) (2023) (emphasis added). Subsections (b) and (c) provide a defendant may file
a motion to suppress evidence during a trial only if:
(b) . . . the State has failed to notify the defendant’s counsel or, if he has none, the defendant, sooner than 20 working days before trial, of its intention to use the evidence, and the evidence is:
(1) Evidence of a statement made by a defendant; (2) Evidence obtained by virtue of a search without a search warrant; or (3) Evidence obtained as a result of search with a search warrant when the defendant was not present at the time of the execution of the search warrant.
(c) If, after a pretrial determination and denial of the
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motion, the judge is satisfied, upon a showing by the defendant, that additional pertinent facts have been discovered by the defendant which he could not have discovered with reasonable diligence before the determination of the motion, he may permit the defendant to renew the motion before the trial or, if not possible because of the time of discovery of alleged new facts, during trial.
N.C.G.S. §§ 15A-975(b), (c) (2023).
Defendant acknowledges he “did not move to suppress his statements to law
enforcement at the hospital the day after the incident, as required by N.C.G.S. §15A-
975(a), nor do the exceptions of N.C.G.S. §15A[-]975(b) or (c) apply.” Thus, this
argument is not preserved on appeal and is dismissed. See State v. Howie, 153 N.C.
App. 801, 802 (2002) (“A motion to suppress made before or during trial is required
to properly preserve for appeal an objection to the admissibility of evidence.”).
IV. Conclusion
Upon careful review, we hold the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s
motion to dismiss where the State presented substantial evidence of premeditation
and deliberation through witness testimony, such that it was for the jury to decide.
We dismiss Defendant’s second argument regarding rebuttal evidence for lack of
preservation where Defendant failed to file a motion to suppress.
NO ERROR
Judges TYSON and HAMPSON concur.
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Report per Rule 30(e).
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