State v. Avila

Opinions

Opinion

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellant,

v.

ANGEL AVILA, Appellee.

No. 1 CA–CR 25–0320

FILED 08-27-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Navajo County No. S0900CR202500446

The Honorable Joseph Samuel Clark, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Navajo County Attorney’s Office, Holbrook By Myles A. Braccio Kieva Foutz (certified limited practice student) Counsel for Appellant

The Rigg Law Firm, P.L.L.C., Pinetop By Brett R. Rigg Counsel for Appellee

Opinion of the Court

OPINION

Judge D. Andrew Gaona delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Presiding Judge David B. Gass1 joined. Judge Anni Hill Foster dissented.

G A O N A, Judge:

¶1 The State charged Angel Avila with transportation of a dangerous drug for sale and possession of a narcotic drug for sale after a traffic stop on Interstate 40. After an evidentiary hearing, the superior court granted Avila’s motion to suppress evidence seized during that traffic stop. The court found, given the totality of the circumstances based on the evidence presented, there wasn’t reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop to wait for a K-9 unit to arrive.

¶2 The State challenges that order on appeal. Because the State doesn’t demonstrate error, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶3 We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the superior court’s ruling and consider only the evidence presented at the suppression hearing. State v. Majalca, 251 Ariz. 325, 327 ¶ 2 (App. 2021).

¶4 An Arizona Department of Public Safety trooper stopped Avila on I-40 for speeding. The trooper testified that Avila appeared nervous, was driving a rental car, and provided somewhat inconsistent descriptions of his travel plans. The trooper noted that Avila slowed upon seeing him, adopted a posture partially concealed behind the car’s B-pillar (the vertical support located between the front and rear doors), and

1 Judge David B. Gass was a sitting member of this court when the matter was assigned to this panel of the court. He retired effective June 30, 2026. In accordance with the authority granted by Article VI, Section 3, of the Arizona Constitution, and under A.R.S. § 12-145, the Chief Justice of the Arizona Supreme Court has designated Judge David B. Gass as a judge pro tempore in the Court of Appeals for the purpose of participating in the resolution of cases assigned to this panel during his term in office and for the duration of Administrative Order 2026-87.

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remained on a video call during the encounter. The trooper also observed a plastic tote in the back of the car.

¶5 Once the trooper confirmed Avila’s license and that the car’s registration and insurance were valid, he decided to issue Avila a warning for speeding. After making that decision, and while the warning was printing, the trooper asked Avila whether there were drugs in his car. Avila admitted having marijuana, but denied having other drugs. After completing the warning for speeding, the trooper told Avila he would be “good to go” if there wasn’t “over an ounce [of marijuana] in the car.” The trooper then asked Avila for consent to search the car, and Avila first gave oral consent. But Avila later changed his mind and refused consent after reading his rights on a “consent to search form” the trooper provided. At that point, the trooper requested a drug detection K-9.

¶6 It took 39 minutes for the K-9 to arrive. The dog then alerted to Avila’s car and a search revealed 25 pounds of methamphetamine and 2.5 pounds of fentanyl. The State charged Avila with transportation of a dangerous drug for sale and possession of a narcotic drug for sale.

¶7 Avila moved to suppress the evidence seized from the car, arguing the trooper lacked reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop. At the evidentiary hearing, the trooper (the only witness) testified that the following circumstances made him suspicious of Avila:

• Avila reduced his speed from 82 mph to 69 mph in a 75-mph zone;

• As he drove by the trooper, Avila appeared nervous, with a “deerin -the-headlights” expression and reclined behind the B-pillar;

• The stop occurred on I-40, which the trooper described as a known drug corridor;

• Avila was driving a rental car for a short period, with only a snippet of the rental agreement available on his phone;

• During the stop, Avila appeared nervous, spoke rapidly, and fidgeted with an apparent eye infection;

• Avila remained on a video call with a woman he claimed to be his wife throughout the stop;

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• Avila’s travel plans seemed inconsistent (Avila first said he was traveling to Gallup to visit an aunt and cousins, and then he said he was picking up a cousin and bringing him back to Phoenix);

• The trooper saw a plastic tote and no other luggage or personal belongings, aside from food and drink wrappers; and

• Avila first consented to a search of the car but later refused.

¶8 The superior court granted Avila’s motion to suppress. At the close of the State’s case, the court found that, considering “the totality of the circumstances,” it didn’t think reasonable suspicion existed. After the State asked the court for “a more particular finding of fact,” the court identified some circumstances and inferences on which the trooper relied, found many of them weak or unsuspicious, and concluded that, collectively, they didn’t establish reasonable suspicion.

¶9 The State timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction under A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, -4032(6).

DISCUSSION

¶10 The State argues the superior court abused its discretion by disregarding the totality of the circumstances. It contends the trooper’s observations, considering his training and experience, established reasonable suspicion that Avila was engaged in criminal activity. We disagree.

¶11 We review a suppression ruling for an abuse of discretion. State v. Adair, 241 Ariz. 58, 60 ¶ 9 (2016). We “defer to the [superior] court’s factual findings, including findings on credibility and the reasonableness of the inferences drawn by the officer” if supported by the record. State v. Teagle, 217 Ariz. 17, 22 ¶ 19 (App. 2007); see State v. Alvarez-Soto, 261 Ariz. 21, 24 ¶ 13 (2025). But we review de novo whether those facts establish reasonable suspicion. Alvarez-Soto, 261 Ariz. at 24 ¶ 13.

¶12 A traffic stop is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, Majalca, 251 Ariz. at 328 ¶ 12, and “must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate [its] purpose,” State v. Kjolsrud, 239 Ariz. 319, 322 ¶ 10 (App. 2016) (citation omitted). At that point, “[a]uthority for the seizure . . . ends,” Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015), unless (1) the encounter becomes consensual or (2) “the officer develops a reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot,” Majalca,

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251 Ariz. at 329 ¶ 14 (citation omitted); see also Kjolsrud, 239 Ariz. at 322–23

¶ 10 (citations omitted).

¶13 Reasonable suspicion exists when, based on “the totality of the circumstances—the whole picture,” an officer has “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” State v. Evans, 237 Ariz. 231, 234 ¶ 8 (2015) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Although officers may draw reasonable inferences from observed facts based on their training and experience, reasonable suspicion cannot rest on inchoate or unparticularized hunches. See Kjolsrud, 239 Ariz. at 323 ¶ 15. In determining whether reasonable suspicion existed, courts consider the “specific reasonable inferences” the officer could draw from the observed facts. Evans, 237 Ariz. at 234 ¶ 8 (citation omitted). Those inferences must remain grounded in the particular circumstances observed and must collectively support a fair and particularized inference of criminal activity. See id. at 234 ¶¶ 8, 10. But courts need not defer to an officer’s “inferences” that are mere hunches, unsupported by the record, lack credibility, or fail to connect the officer’s specialized knowledge to the specific circumstances observed. See Teagle, 217 Ariz. at 24 ¶ 26; Kjolsrud, 239 Ariz. at 324 ¶ 17 n.1; State v. Fornof, 218 Ariz. 74, 79 ¶ 19 n.5 (App. 2008).

I. The Record Doesn’t Show the Superior Court Failed to Apply the Totality-of-the-Circumstances Standard.

¶14 Contrary to the State’s contention, the record doesn’t show that the superior court failed to apply the totality-of-the-circumstances standard. When ruling at the evidentiary hearing, the court said it considered “the totality of the circumstances” and concluded reasonable suspicion was lacking. Although the court discussed several of the trooper’s observations individually—explaining why it found certain inferences weak, speculative, or unpersuasive—that discussion reflected the weight the court assigned those observations in deciding whether the circumstances collectively established reasonable suspicion, not a failure to consider them together. What’s more, the court elaborated on those observations only after the State requested a more particularized finding of fact. And the weight given to evidence, the credibility of witnesses, and the resolution of conflicting testimony are all factual findings made by the superior court to which we owe great deference. See Teagle, 217 Ariz. at 22 ¶ 19; State v. Estrada, 209 Ariz. 287, 292 ¶ 22 (App. 2004).

¶15 The totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry prohibits a “divide- and-conquer” analysis that parses facts into isolated components and evaluates whether each circumstance, viewed alone, independently

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establishes reasonable suspicion. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002); see also State v. O’Meara, 198 Ariz. 294, 296 ¶ 10 (2000). Courts thus can’t dismiss observations just because innocent explanations exist, nor require each fact to be individually suspicious before considering it in the totality calculus. See O’Meara, 198 Ariz. at 296 ¶¶ 8–10. There is instead “a gestalt to the totality of the circumstances test,” requiring courts to consider the “whole picture” collectively. Id. ¶¶ 10–11.

¶16 Under this totality-of-the-circumstances test, the superior court still functions in its ordinary role as factfinder and assesses the credibility, weight, and persuasive force of an officer’s observations and the inferences drawn from them. See Teagle, 217 Ariz. at 22 ¶ 19. The cases cautioning against improper “divide-and-conquer” analyses typically involve reviewing courts isolating facts, excluding them from the calculus because innocent explanations existed, or reweighing the evidence contrary to the deference owed to the trial court’s factual findings. See, e.g., Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 272–78; O’Meara, 198 Ariz. at 295–96 ¶¶ 8–12; State v. Magner, 191 Ariz. 392, 397–401 ¶¶ 12–35 (App. 1998), disapproved in part by O’Meara, 198 Ariz. at 296 ¶ 12. The superior court here considered the trooper’s observations collectively, evaluated the reasonableness of the inferences the trooper drew from those observations, and concluded the circumstances— taken together—didn’t establish a fair and particularized basis for suspecting criminal activity.

¶17 The dissent would hold that the superior court didn’t apply the totality-of-the-circumstances test despite saying it did before, while, and after it made additional factual findings at the State’s request. Indeed, during Avila’s closing argument, the court interrupted counsel to clarify that “what we’re really trying to get to is whether or not all these things taken as a whole” established reasonable suspicion to continue the detention and call the K-9. The dissent’s contrary conclusion is difficult to reconcile with the superior court’s express statement of the inquiry it undertook.

¶18 According to the dissent, the record “contradict[s]” the superior court’s repeated application of that test because the court went through many of the State’s proffered justifications for the prolonged traffic stop and found them unpersuasive. As just one example, the dissent believes it was improper for the superior court to find that both “Avila’s speeding and then slowing down” and “[t]he fact that [the area was] a known drug corridor, while it is one thing to be considered as part of a whole” were “particularly weak.” The dissent believes “[t]hese statements show that the court pursued the type of ‘divide-and-conquer analysis’

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precluded by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).” The dissent also reasons that the superior court considered the totality of the circumstances from its own perspective rather than that of an objectively reasonable officer, while also disregarding the trooper’s training and experience.

¶19 But those conclusions all require appellate inferences our deferential standard of review prohibits. As stated above, and as we reemphasize here: we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the superior court’s ruling (whatever it may be). See Majalca, 251 Ariz. at 327 ¶ 2. We draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the superior court’s factual findings. State v. Guillory, 199 Ariz. 462, 465 ¶ 9 (App. 2001). And while we may infer factual findings necessary to sustain the ruling, we do so only if they don’t conflict with the court’s express findings. State v. Zamora, 220 Ariz. 63, 67 ¶ 7 (App. 2009).

¶20 Nothing in the record suggests the superior court misapplied the totality-of-the-circumstances test by excluding any individual factor from its analysis. Nor does the record “contradict” the superior court’s express application of that test. Take the trooper’s observation that I-40 is a “known drug corridor.” The superior court didn’t disregard that observation; it acknowledged that it’s “one thing to be considered as part of a whole” but was “particularly weak” based on the trooper’s testimony. That’s the very definition of considering one factor in an analysis of the “totality of the circumstances.” See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277–78 (although “some factors [were] more probative than others,” “[t]aken together” they justified the stop).

¶21 Nor does the record support the dissent’s assertion that the superior court disregarded the trooper’s training and experience. At the evidentiary hearing, the court considered the trooper’s testimony (as the only witness), including his training and experience. But considering that experience didn’t require the court to accept every inference the trooper drew from his observations. The court could reject those inferences when the trooper failed to sufficiently connect his training and experience to why the observed conduct was suspicious. Fornof, 218 Ariz. at 79 ¶ 19 n.5 (“Although an officer’s level of experience may well add to the totality of objective circumstances justifying a stop in many cases . . . the state failed to introduce any evidence or elicit specific testimony relating [the] Officer[‘s] . . . considerable years of experience to the suspicious conduct he observed.”). As the dissent notes, see infra ¶ 56, the “trooper’s factual testimony went unchallenged.” The lack of a “challenge,” however, doesn’t mean the trooper’s testimony connected his observations to an objectively reasonable inference of criminal activity. The State bore that burden, see

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Ariz. R. Crim. P. 16.2(b), and could’ve asked other questions to try to fill these evidentiary gaps. It didn’t. And our standard of review precludes us from doing the State’s job for it on appeal. See State v. Sweeney, 224 Ariz. 107, 114 ¶ 28 (App. 2010), disapproved in part by Alvarez-Soto, 261 Ariz. at 28 ¶ 29 (we don’t supply facts supporting an officer’s suspicion when the officer’s testimony supplies none).

¶22 Nor did the superior court substitute its own view for that of an objectively reasonable officer with this trooper’s training and experience. Deciding what an objectively reasonable officer would infer from the circumstances is the superior court’s job. The court doesn’t “substitute its judgment” for that of an objectively reasonable officer merely by concluding that the trooper’s experience and testimony didn’t make his asserted inferences objectively reasonable. That the superior court didn’t credit everything the trooper said doesn’t mean it disregarded his experience or substituted its own subjective view for the objective reasonable-officer standard. This assessment of the trooper’s testimony and the inferences it supported is the sort of factfinding decision we entrust to superior court judges every day. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to sustaining the ruling (as we must), Majalca, 251 Ariz. at 327 ¶ 2, we instead conclude the court considered the trooper’s training and experience but found it insufficient to support the inferences he drew, see Guillory, 199 Ariz. at 465 ¶ 9.

¶23 Reduced to its essence, the dissent does not “defer to the [superior] court’s factual findings, including findings on credibility and the reasonableness of the inferences drawn by the officer.” Teagle, 217 Ariz. at 22 ¶ 19. Instead, it reaches a different legal conclusion only after assigning greater weight to observations the superior court found weak, accepting factual inferences the superior court rejected, and inferring legal error from a record that reflects the opposite. All this defies the “long-standing principle that appellate courts [do] not independently review evidence,” and oversteps our limited role of “review[ing] whether the [superior] court’s findings are reasonably supported by the record, not to reweigh the credibility or effect of [the] evidence itself.” Alvarez-Soto, 261 Ariz. at 27–28 ¶¶ 29, 32.

¶24 We appreciate that the procedural posture here differs from our normal review of a suppression ruling: that is, when the shoe is on the other foot with the defendant appealing and the State arguing we shouldn’t re-weigh the evidence. But because the standard of review applies to all parties equally, we decline to re-weigh the evidence here as both the State and dissent urge.

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¶25 In the end, the dissent’s approach would place trial courts in an untenable position. If a court explains why individual facts or inferences are unpersuasive, it risks being accused of parsing the evidence factor-byfactor , misapplying the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis or, if its explanation2 is less than precise, of substituting its judgment for that of the officer. On the other hand, a court providing little to no explanation risks criticism for insufficient analysis and nontransparency. The totality-of-the- circumstances test requires neither exhaustive discussion nor blind acceptance of an officer’s inferences. Instead, it requires that the trial court consider all the relevant circumstances together. And that is exactly what the superior court did. The dissent’s contrary view transforms de novo review of the ultimate legal question into de novo review of the trial court’s assessment of the evidence itself. We reject that approach.

II. The Superior Court Didn’t Abuse Its Discretion When It Suppressed the Evidence.

¶26 The remaining question then is whether—considering the circumstances collectively—the superior court abused its discretion in concluding the State failed to establish reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop. That determination matters because if the State failed to establish reasonable suspicion of additional criminal activity, the trooper couldn’t lawfully detain Avila while awaiting the K-9 unit, and Avila’s continued detention violated the Fourth Amendment. See Kjolsrud, 239 Ariz. at 322 ¶ 10 (“[A]uthority for the seizure ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed.”) (cleaned up); Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354 (“[T]he tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure’s mission—to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop.”) (cleaned up).

¶27 Although framed as a challenge to the superior court’s legal conclusion, the State’s argument largely turns on its disagreement with the superior court’s assessment of the persuasive force and probative value of the trooper’s observations and inferences. But, again, we don’t reweigh the

2 For example, the dissent focuses on the superior court’s statement that it “didn’t hear anything in particular that made me feel like his level of nervousness would be out of the ordinary under today’s environment” to conclude the court substituted its own judgment for that of the trooper. Infra ¶ 57. But the superior court’s expression of how it evaluated the evidence with the verb “feel” tells us nothing about whether it properly applied the totality-of-the-circumstances test.

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evidence or reassess credibility issues on appeal. Estrada, 209 Ariz. at 292 ¶ 22.

¶28 To start, the court wasn’t required to credit the trooper’s characterization of Avila’s conduct as suspicious when the trooper’s own actions diminished the significance of those observations. See Sweeney, 224 Ariz. at 114 ¶ 29. The record shows the trooper already observed most of the circumstances he later identified as suspicious—Avila’s nervousness, travel along I-40 in a rental car, reduction in speed upon seeing law enforcement, travel plans, continued video call, and plastic tote—before deciding to issue a warning.

¶29 What happened after the trooper made that decision? First, Avila admitted that he had marijuana. But Arizona law allows adults to possess certain amounts of marijuana, A.R.S. § 36-2852(A)(1), and the State presented no facts suggesting Avila possessed an unlawful quantity or otherwise engaged in marijuana-related criminal activity. In fact, the trooper testified that Avila said there was nothing unlawful in the car.

¶30 Second, Avila refused to consent to a search of his car. But that was his Constitutional right. Cf. State v. Valenzuela, 239 Ariz. 299, 301 ¶ 1 (2016) (“Although the Fourth Amendment generally prohibits warrantless searches, they are permitted if there is free and voluntary consent to search.”). And his refusal to consent “cannot constitute a circumstance that gives rise to reasonable suspicion.” Sweeney, 224 Ariz. at 115 ¶ 32. Were it any other way, “nothing would prevent warrantless searches of random individuals, because either the grant or refusal of consent would eventually justify the searches” and “the Fourth Amendment would be rendered largely meaningless by placing every person in such a Catch-22.” Id.

¶31 The dissent doesn’t address these timing concerns, instead treating the encounter as if the trooper’s decision to merely issue a warning never occurred. The dissent cites Majalca for this proposition: “In the context of a traffic stop, the detention becomes unreasonable ‘[u]pon completion of the traffic stop’s mission’ unless ‘during the encounter, the officer develops a reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.’” See infra ¶ 51. But Majalca also held that “a traffic stop justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning ticket becomes unreasonable, and thus unconstitutional, when it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete the stop’s mission of issuing the warning ticket.” 251 Ariz. at 328–29 ¶ 13 (cleaned up). In short, though the precise moment at which the stop was prolonged isn’t clear from the record

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(and we need not determine that point to decide this appeal), the superior court could reasonably consider this sequence in evaluating the significance and persuasiveness of the trooper’s observations under the totality of the circumstances. See Sweeney, 224 Ariz. at 114–15 ¶¶ 29–32.

¶32 Considering all these circumstances together, the State hasn’t shown that the superior court erred. True, the trooper may have interpreted those circumstances as suspicious, viewing (for example) Avila’s nervousness as unusually pronounced, his video call as possible coordination of a story, and his travel plans inconsistent. But the superior court considered those observations and inferences and then assigned them limited probative weight after evaluating their reasonableness and persuasive force. We defer to those findings if supported by the record. See Teagle, 217 Ariz. at 22 ¶ 19.

¶33 The record here supports the superior court’s findings. The trooper acknowledged motorists commonly appear nervous during traffic stops and attributed Avila’s fidgeting to a possible eye infection. The court also explored whether broader social conditions in the current political climate affect how motorists—particularly Hispanic drivers—present during police encounters. The trooper agreed they do, noting the uptick in nervousness in Hispanic drivers. The court considered that context in evaluating the weight to assign to the trooper’s testimony about Avila’s nervousness. On this record, the court reasonably treated nervousness as a weak inference.

¶34 The court likewise rejected the trooper’s conclusion that Avila’s travel plans were inconsistent, determining that Avila’s statements described different portions of the same trip rather than materially conflicting plans. The trooper acknowledged Avila’s responses aligned with visiting family. And during his testimony, the trooper identified different relatives and destinations associated with the trip but didn’t explain why Avila’s statements reflected inconsistent travel plans.

¶35 The trooper also acknowledged he didn’t hear the substance of Avila’s video call, and that it was common for motorists to take videos or talk on their phone during encounters with law enforcement. The court further treated travel along I-40 and Avila’s reduction in speed upon seeing the trooper as carrying limited probative value. Among other things, the trooper acknowledged most motorists slow when they see law enforcement. And as to the plastic tote, the court found the trooper’s inference speculative. When the State asked about the tote on direct examination, the trooper said it was a plastic tote to put “Christmas

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ornaments” in, but didn’t remember what Avila told him was in it. The court could also consider whether the trooper’s own testimony undermined his inferences. See Sweeney, 224 Ariz. at 114 ¶ 27 (rejecting an officer’s “objectively unsupported expressions of suspicion” when he testified, in part, that both the presence and absence of luggage would’ve caused suspicion). The record supports all these findings.

¶36 In assessing the evidence, the court wasn’t required to credit the trooper’s inferences just because he had decades of experience and thousands of traffic stops under his belt. An officer’s experience by itself doesn’t establish reasonable suspicion. See Fornof, 218 Ariz. at 76 ¶ 6. The State had to show that the particular facts, viewed through the trooper’s training and experience, reasonably supported the inference of criminal activity and wasn’t just a “hunch.” See Alvarez-Soto, 261 Ariz. at 25 ¶ 17; Fornof, 218 Ariz. at 79 ¶ 19 n.5 (while officer experience may give meaning to otherwise innocent conduct, the officer still must connect that experience to the particular observations supporting reasonable suspicion). The superior court could reasonably find the trooper failed to make that connection here.

¶37 Accepting the superior court’s factual findings, we next consider de novo whether the facts here, viewed collectively from the perspective of an objectively reasonable officer, establish reasonable suspicion. Teagle, 217 Ariz. at 22, 25 ¶¶ 19, 29. Put differently, we must decide whether the facts known to the trooper before prolonging the stop would give an objectively reasonable officer “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting [Avila] of criminal activity.” Evans, 237 Ariz. at 234 ¶ 8 (citation omitted); Teagle, 217 Ariz. at 24 ¶ 26.

¶38 The circumstances here—traveling on I-40 toward Gallup on a Sunday morning, braking upon seeing law enforcement, appearing nervous, remaining on a video call, driving a rental car, having a plastic tote in the back of the car, taking a short trip, and visiting family—don’t collectively provide an objectively reasonable officer with a fair and particularized basis for suspecting criminal activity. See Evans, 237 Ariz. at 234–35 ¶¶ 10–12. Considered together, these circumstances didn’t meaningfully distinguish Avila from ordinary lawful motorists. See id. (the particularized suspicion requirement necessarily doesn’t “describe a very large category of presumably innocent travelers” and “behavior that is entirely ordinary . . . cannot reasonably give rise to particularized suspicion”) (citation omitted).

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¶39 The dissent cites to United States v. Valdes-Vega, 738 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc), and United States v. Mendez, 118 F.3d 1426 (10th Cir. 1997), for the propositions that an officer’s testimony about drugsmuggling routes and contradictory or implausible travel plans can support reasonable suspicion. See infra ¶ 56. True enough. But neither case holds that either traveling on a known drug corridor (of which there are many) or giving an unusual travel explanation carries meaningful weight by itself in the reasonable-suspicion analysis. Both instead highlight the fact-specific nature of the trial court’s inquiry and the role of an officer’s training and experience in explaining why particular circumstances are suspicious in a way suggesting criminal activity. See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 268–74. The dissent’s reliance on these cases without further context blurs that distinction.

¶40 In Valdes-Vega, two experienced border patrol agents stopped a truck 70 miles north of the Mexican border. 738 F.3d at 1079. The agents didn’t just rely on the interstate’s reputation as a smuggling route. They explained why their particular observations mattered: the stop occurred at the last checkpoint on an interstate commonly used by smugglers; the truck had Mexican plates, was suitable for carrying large amounts of contraband, and was difficult to see into; and the driver sped, weaved through traffic, and changed his driving as he approached and drove through the checkpoint in a way the agents recognized as common among smugglers. Id. at 1079–80. The court concluded that, viewed together and through the agents’ experience, those circumstances distinguished Valdes-Vega from ordinary traffic and supported reasonable suspicion. Id. at 1080 (Valdes- Vega’s behavior wasn’t “so innocuous as to suggest that he was merely plucked from a crowd at random.”).

¶41 Mendez also considered the defendant’s unusual travel explanation as just one circumstance among several. Mendez said he was traveling to Colorado Springs to visit his sister, yet the Arizona-registered car he drove purportedly belonged to his sister’s husband, and Mendez couldn’t provide her address. Mendez, 118 F.3d at 1431. More significantly, the veteran officer observed a crooked dashboard faceplate (missing screws) and a dismounted radio—physical alterations consistent with vehicle compartments used to conceal contraband. Id. Mendez also shows why context and degree matter: the court gave only “the most minute significance” to the absence of luggage in the back seat because the car had a trunk, where travelers ordinarily store luggage. Id. The court found reasonable suspicion only after considering the circumstances together, coupled with additional meaning the officer’s experience supplied. Id. at 1431–32.

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¶42 Neither case, then, supports the dissent’s apparent inference that because a type of fact supported reasonable suspicion in one case, it does so in all others. That’s not how reasonable suspicion—a “fact specific” inquiry requiring context—works. Fornof, 218 Ariz. at 77 ¶ 11; see also Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273–74. The question is not whether courts have labeled drug-trafficking routes, travel plans, nervousness, or other conduct relevant in the abstract. The question is what degree of suspicion those facts generated here, viewed together and through whatever meaning the trooper’s training and experience supplied. On this record, the superior court could reasonably conclude they supplied little. See, e.g., Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996) (“[W]hat may not amount to reasonable suspicion at a motel located alongside a transcontinental highway at the height of the summer tourist season may rise to that level in December in Milwaukee.”).

¶43 Indeed, the trooper’s identified facts aren’t “specific, distinct, or particular” to Avila, and don’t “eliminate most members of the public.” Evans, 237 Ariz. at 234 ¶ 10 (“[T]hat most non-criminal activity does not give rise to ‘suspicion’ also serves to prevent the reported facts from applying to too many people.”). If the circumstances here are “atypical in a way that suggests possible criminal conduct,” reasonable suspicion would no longer be reasonable—“too many people” would be subject to governmental intrusion for ordinary conduct. Id. at 234–35 ¶¶ 10, 12.

¶44 The State’s reasonable suspicion theory thus turns on the trooper’s interpretation of otherwise innocuous and lawful conduct. Id. at

¶ 11 (although lawful conduct may, in unusual cases, support reasonable suspicion, the circumstances must collectively give rise to a fair and particularized inference of criminal activity). And though an officer’s training and experience informs the analysis, it doesn’t transform otherwise innocuous conduct—or a “hunch”—into reasonable suspicion absent a particularized basis connecting those observations to criminal activity. See Sweeney, 224 Ariz. at 113 ¶ 24; Fornof, 218 Ariz. at 79 ¶ 19 n.5; State v. Boteo- Flores, 230 Ariz. 105, 108 ¶ 12 (2012) (“[S]eemingly innocent behavior can form the basis for reasonable suspicion if an officer, based on training and experience, can perceive and articulate meaning in given conduct, which would be wholly innocent to the untrained observer.”) (emphasis added) (cleaned up).

¶45 Saying Avila’s conduct was suspicious isn’t the same as sufficiently explaining why it was suspicious, or articulating how the trooper’s training and experience led him to perceive Avila’s specific conduct as suspicious. An officer need not testify how his observations

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“reduce or eliminate the possibility that innocent travelers will be subject to seizures.” Evans, 237 Ariz. at 235 ¶¶ 13–14, 17. But that doesn’t relieve the State of establishing why the circumstances, viewed through the lens of the trooper’s training and experience, support an objectively particularized suspicion of criminal activity. See Boteo-Flores, 230 Ariz. at 108–09 ¶¶ 12–13, 16; Ariz. R. Crim. P. 16.2. When the State relies on the trooper’s training and experience (as it does here) to give otherwise ordinary conduct suspicious significance, the record must contain the connection between that experience and the inference drawn. Again, we don’t reweigh the superior court’s assessment of the trooper’s inferences or the probative value assigned to the observations the court discussed. See Teagle, 217 Ariz. at 22

¶ 19.

¶46 We acknowledge that the prolonged stop uncovered large amounts of methamphetamine and fentanyl—both dangerous drugs wreaking havoc on society. But that cannot blind us to the Fourth Amendment’s protections and requirements, including that reasonable suspicion must exist before law enforcement prolongs a traffic stop. See Sweeney, 224 Ariz. at 114 ¶ 28. And of course, “the ultimate discovery of contraband cannot retroactively justify an otherwise unwarranted detention.” Id.

¶47 Giving due deference to the superior court’s factual findings and considering the circumstances collectively, the trooper lacked reasonable suspicion to prolong the traffic stop.

CONCLUSION

¶48 The superior court didn’t abuse its discretion in granting the motion to suppress. We affirm.

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Justice Foster, dissenting

F O S T E R, Judge, dissenting:

¶49 I respectfully dissent because the court: (1) weighed individual factors rather than considered the evidence under the totality of the circumstances and (2) failed to view the evidence from the perspective of a reasonably objective law enforcement officer.

¶50 As the majority states, this Court reviews a suppression ruling for abuse of discretion, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the ruling. Supra ¶ 11; State v. Alvarez-Soto, 261 Ariz. 21, 24, ¶ 13 (2025). But this Court reviews the superior court’s legal determination that reasonable suspicion existed de novo. Id. Appellate courts rarely reverse a superior court’s decision to suppress evidence. But when the superior court states the correct legal test, but then fails to apply it, reversal is required. Here, the court stated that it considered the “totality of the circumstances” presented at the evidentiary hearing. But the record shows the court instead viewed each individual factor and balanced the weight of each separately. This misconstrues the totality of the circumstances test and substitutes the court’s view of the factors supporting reasonable suspicion for a reasonably objective officer’s.

¶51 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects against “unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. In the context of a traffic stop, the detention becomes unreasonable “[u]pon completion of the traffic stop’s mission” unless “during the encounter, the officer develops a reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” Majalca, 251 Ariz. at 329, ¶ 14. Reasonable suspicion is a low bar and justifies a stop or detention when a law enforcement officer suspects that a crime has or is occurring. Fornof, 218 Ariz. at 76, ¶ 5; see also State v. Sisco, 239 Ariz. 532, 536, ¶ 15 (2016) (probable cause, a higher standard than reasonable suspicion, “requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity”). Reasonable suspicion represents a “minimal level of objective justification” that “is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). It is a low bar. See State v. Serna, 235 Ariz. 270, 276, ¶ 27 (2014) (reasonable suspicion is a “low standard, readily established in many [ ] settings”). Courts review reasonable suspicion in the context of the totality of the circumstances from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer. State v. Teagle, 217 Ariz. 17, 25 ¶ 29 (App. 2007) (citation omitted).

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¶52 Though the majority adequately summarizes the trooper’s testimony, it omits critical testimony that provides additional context for this dissent. The record shows the trooper testified to the following:

• He conducted approximately 25,000 traffic stops during his 24-year career.

• He received extensive training on traffic enforcement and drug interdiction.

• His experience provided him with an understanding of normal and abnormal motorist behavior during a traffic stop.

• While the I-40 corridor is a major drug trafficking corridor, he acknowledged that not every motorist that uses I-40 is transporting drugs.

• While a quick deceleration upon noticing a law enforcement vehicle is “normal”, slowing to a speed significantly below the speed limit as Avila did was not.

• Avila’s “deer in the headlight look” and “nervous expression as he passed by” was abnormal in that other drivers are generally focused on driving or their conversations with passengers.

• Avila’s reclined position was consistent with an attempt to prevent contact with law enforcement.

• Drug traffickers routinely use rental vehicles rather than personal vehicles to save money but he acknowledged that there are legitimate reasons why a person may rent a vehicle for a trip.

• Avila’s nervousness during the contact was consistent with normal reactions, and current events may have heightened his nervousness because he was Hispanic.

• That while people are prone to have someone listen during traffic stops, Avila’s attention to the phone call distracted him from contact with the trooper.

• That Avila’s interaction with the person on the phone more than the trooper conducting the stop, was abnormal.

• While Avila’s inconsistent explanation for his reasons for travel could be innocently explained, his explanation raised the trooper’s

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suspicion because Avila’s story changed from going to visit family in Gallup to transporting a cousin back to Phoenix.

• It was abnormal that Avila’s nervous behavior continued even after the trooper informed Avila that he would only receive a warning.

• Although Avila demonstrated some “normal” behavior during the contact with the trooper, the totality of Avila’s behavior was not typical of a normal traffic stop in the trooper’s experience and the totality of all of the information gained before and during the traffic stop supported reasonable suspicion that Avila was trafficking drugs.

• The trooper never told Avila he was free to go.

¶53 During the trooper’s questioning, the State asked about the factors the trooper identified to support his suspicions. At least eight separate times during the trooper’s testimony the State asked about or the trooper referenced his training and experience in relation to the meaning of the factors he used to determine reasonable suspicion existed. And at the end of the trooper’s testimony the State asked, “[s]o, [Avila] provided a lot of possible explanations for the things you observed. In your training and experience, is it normal to see all of these indicators combined in the general motoring public.” The trooper responded “No.”

¶54 After the superior court announced that it “considered the totality of the circumstances” in determining the trooper lacked reasonable suspicion to detain Avila, the State pressed the court for “a more particular finding of fact.” The State asked the court if it was “finding the officer believable” and “[didn’t] doubt any of the things that [the trooper] says” but “just [didn’t] think what he has was enough.” The court responded that “I can go into a little bit more detail about where I think some of these things are not particularly weighty.”

¶55 The court then explained its evaluation of the trooper’s observations during the stop. The court evaluated Avila’s behavior, reviewing aloud the trooper’s observations individually and untethered to the trooper’s view in totality. For instance, the court stated: Avila’s speeding and then slowing down was “particularly weak,” and “[t]he fact that [the area was] a known drug corridor, while it is one thing to be considered as part of a whole . . . [wa]s particularly weak.” (emphasis added). Noting the trooper’s testimony, the court found that the video call “[wa]s a fairly common thing that happens these days. People want witnesses. And the trooper indicated [such conduct] is more common now than ever.” But

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this finding failed to consider the trooper’s testimony concerning his experience during other stops where the person just listens, rather than impedes interaction with the officer. Finally, the court stated it “d[idn]’t know how suspicious” it was that Avila had a tote and no luggage, stating “[h]e can put clothes and stuff in a tote just as easily as [he] can put it in a duffle bag. And to consider that suspicious is just as speculative as saying there were clothes in the tote.” Again, none of the court’s comments regarding these separate indicators suggest that it considered these facts in the context of an objectively reasonable officer, with this trooper’s training and experience. See Teagle, 217 Ariz. at 24, ¶ 26 (totality of the circumstances analysis allows officers to draw on their own experience and specialized training). These statements show that the court legally erred by pursuing the type of “divide-and-conquer analysis” precluded by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274.

¶56 “The totality of the circumstances, not each factor in isolation, determines whether reasonable suspicion exists.” Boteo-Flores, 230 Ariz. at 108, ¶ 12 (citation omitted). Deferring to the court’s factual findings, as this Court must, is easy to do here. The trooper’s factual testimony went unchallenged. Alvarez-Soto, 261 Ariz. at 24, ¶ 13. Here, even removing Avila’s behaviors that the court properly rejected, such as the refusal to sign a consent to search, the record contains substantial evidence to support the trooper’s particularized suspicion. See Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 10 (determination of reasonable suspicion considers not innocent or guilty conduct but the “degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types of noncriminal acts”) (citation omitted). For instance, courts have held that an agent’s testimony about drug smuggling routes supports a finding of reasonable suspicion. Valdez-Vega, 738 F.3d at 1079. And "contradictory or implausible travel plans can contribute to a reasonable suspicion of illegal activity". Mendez, 118 F.3d at 1431.

¶57 The superior court compounded its legal error when it stated, “I didn’t hear anything in particular that made me feel like his level of nervousness would be out of the ordinary under today’s environment.” So even assuming the court considered the totality of the circumstances (it did not), it did so from its own perspective and not “from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer.” See Teagle, 217 Ariz. at 25, ¶ 29 (quotation omitted).

¶58 “[S]eemingly innocent behavior can form the basis for reasonable suspicion if an officer, based on training and experience, can ‘perceive and articulate meaning in given conduct[,] which would be wholly innocent to the untrained observer.’” Boteo-Flores, 230 Ariz. at 108,

¶ 12 (quotation omitted). But “reasonable suspicion under the Fourth

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Amendment does not require officers to testify about how their observations reduce or eliminate the possibility that innocent travelers will be subject to seizures or trial courts to make specific findings on that issue.” Evans, 237 Ariz. at 235, ¶ 17.

¶59 Here, the trooper acknowledged that some of Avila’s behavior could be innocent. But viewing even seemingly innocent behavior and the “mosaic of facts and circumstances ‘from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer,’” can support a law enforcement officer’s particularized suspicion of criminal activity, which is a “low bar” to meet. Teagle, 217 Ariz. at 25, ¶ 29; see also Boteo-Flores, 230 Ariz. at 108, ¶ 12. Though a superior court need not defer to a law enforcement officer’s judgment, it cannot substitute its judgment for that of the law enforcement officer. The court did just that. It viewed the trooper’s testimony from its own perspective separating individual factors from the whole and disregarding the trooper’s 24 years of experience and over 25,000 traffic stops. This was legal error. See Teagle, 217 Ariz. at 24, ¶ 26; Boteo-Flores, 230 Ariz. at 107–08, ¶ 12; Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 60–61 (2014).

¶60 The majority takes issue with my citation of Valdez-Vega and Mendez. But I cite those cases to show that the superior court quickly dismissed indicators that law enforcement routinely use to support and courts have affirmed support reasonable suspicion. Thus, it was not unreasonable for a reasonable law enforcement officer to use such factors to determine that criminal activity was afoot. But the superior court dismissed similar factors that the trooper used in this case to support his determination of reasonable suspicion in its totality. As the majority points out, that was but one factor among many that can justify reasonable suspicion. By dismissing those independent factors which courts have determined support reasonable suspicion, the record does not support that the superior court viewed the factors in the totality or that it viewed the factors from a reasonable officer’s perspective.

¶61 While courts should hold law enforcement accountable when they improperly detain someone, nothing in the record suggests that occurred here. The trooper articulated specific facts, which, when viewed under an objectively reasonable law enforcement officer standard, supported a reasonable belief that Avila was involved in criminal activity warranting further investigation. Fornof, 218 Ariz. at 76, ¶ 5; see also Sisco, 239 Ariz. at 536, ¶ 15. And because the record supports a legal determination that reasonable suspicion existed, Avila’s detention was not unlawfully prolonged under Rodriguez. See 575 U.S. at 355 (an officer may not prolong a traffic stop “absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an individual”).

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¶62 Because the superior court failed to view the totality of the circumstances and instead considered the trooper’s testimony subjectively, I would reverse.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court FILED: JR

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