[519]*519BUTTLER, J.
Defendant cross-appeals pursuant to ORS 138.040 from a pretrial order denying part of his motions to suppress evidence in three consolidated burglary cases; the state’s appeal from the same order was dismissed on its motion.1 The issue on the cross-appeal is whether the “inventory search” of the glove compartment of a properly impounded automobile, conducted pursuant to the standing policy of the Polk County Sheriffs Department, violates Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution2 or the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The state relies solely on the sheriffs routine policy of inventorying the contents of all impounded motor vehicles to justify both the right to conduct an inventory search and its scope. It does not contend that the officers had probable cause to believe that the automobile was an instrumentality of crime or that there were exigent circumstances authorizing a delayed search incident to the seizure. See State v. Quinn, 290 Or 383, 391, 623 P2d 630 (1981). For that reason, the material facts are brief. Defendant concedes that his car was lawfully [520]*520impounded. After it was towed to the Polk County garage, a locked storage shed, Officer Dunkin searched the passenger compartment of the car to make an inventory, but was “also looking for evidence of a crime.” He opened the glove compartment and inventoried the contents, which included a map and a bottle of wine. He examined the map and observed that the area in which a burglary had occurred was circled. He also inventoried items he found under the seat, opened a wallet and examined its contents. In addition, he opened the trunk but decided not to inventory its contents, because he was worried “about the legality of looking in a locked container, concerning the trunk, as far as the inventory goes, the admissibility.” All of the items that were listed in the inventory were left in the car until the police had obtained two search warrants, after which they were seized. The trial court suppressed all of the evidence seized except the map and wine bottle, the only evidence involved in this appeal.
Defendant contends that the initial “inventory” search of his automobile was unreasonably intrusive and that the map and wine bottle subsequently seized should have been suppressed, relying on principles established in State v. Keller, 265 Or 622, 510 P2d 568 (1973). In that case, the defendant was arrested for driving with a suspended license, and it was necessary to remove her car from the street. Pursuant to a standing administrative order, the police inventoried the contents of the car and observed an open cosmetic case on the floor with its contents, syringes and needles, in plain view. They also observed a fishing tackle box, held closed by a red wire, on the floor of the back seat. They opened the box to inventory its contents and found five vials of liquid, later determined to be contraband. The court held that, under the “plain view” doctrine, the police could seize evidence that was plainly visible to them when they were in a place where they had a right to be. Accordingly, the court upheld the seizure of the syringes and needles; however, it affirmed the trial court’s suppression of the evidence seized from the tackle box after it was opened and searched, because the search of the tackle box was unreasonable under both the Fourth Amendment and Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution. The court stated:
“* * * The vials were within the tackle box which was sealed closed by the red wire, and they were not in ‘plain view.’ The officers testified they were not searching for evidence, but [521]*521were only inventorying the automobile’s contents. With no exigent circumstances present they could have easily inventoried ‘one fishing tackle box,’ along with other items in plain view. If they had probable cause to believe a crime was being committed, after seeing the syringes and needles in the open cosmetic case, they could have sought a search warrant from a disinterested magistrate.” (Emphasis supplied.) 265 Or at 625-26.
We applied Keller in State v. Childers, 13 Or App 622, 511 P2d 447, rev den (1973), to suppress evidence discovered when an officer lifted and looked underneath a sleeping bag laid out in the back compartment of a station wagon, because that evidence was not in plain view and, therefore, the officer had exceeded the scope of a permissible “inventory” of the contents of defendant’s car.
It is clear that the warrantless search of the closed glove compartment of defendant’s car exceeded the scope of the kind of “inventory” authorized by Keller. The state contends, however, that Childers — and impliedly Keller — are no longer good law in light of the United States Supreme Court’s later decision in South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 US 364, 96 S Ct 3092, 49 L Ed 2d 1000 (1976). However, Keller relied on the state constitution, as well as the federal one; here defendant also relies on both. It is true that the court in Keller did not articulate an interpretation of Article I, section 9, different from the Fourth Amendment; it is also true that subsequently the court held in State v. Florance, 270 Or 169, 527 P2d 1202 (1974), that it would follow United States Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Fourth Amendment in applying Article I, section 9. Nonetheless, that equation is not carved in stone, and once the Oregon court has interpreted the state constitutional provision, even though consistent with then existing United States Supreme Court decisions, a subsequent change in the latter’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment does not necessarily change the interpretation of the Oregon counterpart. State v. Caraher, 293 Or 741, 653 P2d 942 (1982).
To the contrary, Oregon courts must examine the Oregon law first before considering federal constitutional claims. State v. Kennedy, 295 Or 260, 666 P2d 1316 (1983); State v. Lowry, 295 Or 337, 667 P2d 996 (1983). We do that here, and unless Opperman persuades us that Keller is not controlling and that its application of the Fourth Amendment [522]*522should be followed in applying Article I, section 9, we are bound to follow Keller. Opperman persuades us of neither.3
In that case, an unattended, illegally parked automobile was towed lawfully to an impounded lot. The lot was described as an “old county highway yard” with a “wooden fence partially around part of it, and kind of a dilapidated wire fence”; in the past, towed, locked cars had been broken into and personal effects had been stolen. At the lot, from outside the car, an officer observed a watch on the dashboard and other personal property on the back seat and back floorboard. The car door was then unlocked, and, pursuant to standard police procedures, the officer inventoried the contents of the car, including the contents of the unlocked glove compartment. There he found a plastic bag of marijuana.
All of the items were removed from the car and taken to the police station for safekeeping. The officer testified that he conducted the inventory for safekeeping, because of the history of thefts from automobiles left in the impoundment lot.
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[519]*519BUTTLER, J.
Defendant cross-appeals pursuant to ORS 138.040 from a pretrial order denying part of his motions to suppress evidence in three consolidated burglary cases; the state’s appeal from the same order was dismissed on its motion.1 The issue on the cross-appeal is whether the “inventory search” of the glove compartment of a properly impounded automobile, conducted pursuant to the standing policy of the Polk County Sheriffs Department, violates Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution2 or the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The state relies solely on the sheriffs routine policy of inventorying the contents of all impounded motor vehicles to justify both the right to conduct an inventory search and its scope. It does not contend that the officers had probable cause to believe that the automobile was an instrumentality of crime or that there were exigent circumstances authorizing a delayed search incident to the seizure. See State v. Quinn, 290 Or 383, 391, 623 P2d 630 (1981). For that reason, the material facts are brief. Defendant concedes that his car was lawfully [520]*520impounded. After it was towed to the Polk County garage, a locked storage shed, Officer Dunkin searched the passenger compartment of the car to make an inventory, but was “also looking for evidence of a crime.” He opened the glove compartment and inventoried the contents, which included a map and a bottle of wine. He examined the map and observed that the area in which a burglary had occurred was circled. He also inventoried items he found under the seat, opened a wallet and examined its contents. In addition, he opened the trunk but decided not to inventory its contents, because he was worried “about the legality of looking in a locked container, concerning the trunk, as far as the inventory goes, the admissibility.” All of the items that were listed in the inventory were left in the car until the police had obtained two search warrants, after which they were seized. The trial court suppressed all of the evidence seized except the map and wine bottle, the only evidence involved in this appeal.
Defendant contends that the initial “inventory” search of his automobile was unreasonably intrusive and that the map and wine bottle subsequently seized should have been suppressed, relying on principles established in State v. Keller, 265 Or 622, 510 P2d 568 (1973). In that case, the defendant was arrested for driving with a suspended license, and it was necessary to remove her car from the street. Pursuant to a standing administrative order, the police inventoried the contents of the car and observed an open cosmetic case on the floor with its contents, syringes and needles, in plain view. They also observed a fishing tackle box, held closed by a red wire, on the floor of the back seat. They opened the box to inventory its contents and found five vials of liquid, later determined to be contraband. The court held that, under the “plain view” doctrine, the police could seize evidence that was plainly visible to them when they were in a place where they had a right to be. Accordingly, the court upheld the seizure of the syringes and needles; however, it affirmed the trial court’s suppression of the evidence seized from the tackle box after it was opened and searched, because the search of the tackle box was unreasonable under both the Fourth Amendment and Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution. The court stated:
“* * * The vials were within the tackle box which was sealed closed by the red wire, and they were not in ‘plain view.’ The officers testified they were not searching for evidence, but [521]*521were only inventorying the automobile’s contents. With no exigent circumstances present they could have easily inventoried ‘one fishing tackle box,’ along with other items in plain view. If they had probable cause to believe a crime was being committed, after seeing the syringes and needles in the open cosmetic case, they could have sought a search warrant from a disinterested magistrate.” (Emphasis supplied.) 265 Or at 625-26.
We applied Keller in State v. Childers, 13 Or App 622, 511 P2d 447, rev den (1973), to suppress evidence discovered when an officer lifted and looked underneath a sleeping bag laid out in the back compartment of a station wagon, because that evidence was not in plain view and, therefore, the officer had exceeded the scope of a permissible “inventory” of the contents of defendant’s car.
It is clear that the warrantless search of the closed glove compartment of defendant’s car exceeded the scope of the kind of “inventory” authorized by Keller. The state contends, however, that Childers — and impliedly Keller — are no longer good law in light of the United States Supreme Court’s later decision in South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 US 364, 96 S Ct 3092, 49 L Ed 2d 1000 (1976). However, Keller relied on the state constitution, as well as the federal one; here defendant also relies on both. It is true that the court in Keller did not articulate an interpretation of Article I, section 9, different from the Fourth Amendment; it is also true that subsequently the court held in State v. Florance, 270 Or 169, 527 P2d 1202 (1974), that it would follow United States Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Fourth Amendment in applying Article I, section 9. Nonetheless, that equation is not carved in stone, and once the Oregon court has interpreted the state constitutional provision, even though consistent with then existing United States Supreme Court decisions, a subsequent change in the latter’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment does not necessarily change the interpretation of the Oregon counterpart. State v. Caraher, 293 Or 741, 653 P2d 942 (1982).
To the contrary, Oregon courts must examine the Oregon law first before considering federal constitutional claims. State v. Kennedy, 295 Or 260, 666 P2d 1316 (1983); State v. Lowry, 295 Or 337, 667 P2d 996 (1983). We do that here, and unless Opperman persuades us that Keller is not controlling and that its application of the Fourth Amendment [522]*522should be followed in applying Article I, section 9, we are bound to follow Keller. Opperman persuades us of neither.3
In that case, an unattended, illegally parked automobile was towed lawfully to an impounded lot. The lot was described as an “old county highway yard” with a “wooden fence partially around part of it, and kind of a dilapidated wire fence”; in the past, towed, locked cars had been broken into and personal effects had been stolen. At the lot, from outside the car, an officer observed a watch on the dashboard and other personal property on the back seat and back floorboard. The car door was then unlocked, and, pursuant to standard police procedures, the officer inventoried the contents of the car, including the contents of the unlocked glove compartment. There he found a plastic bag of marijuana.
All of the items were removed from the car and taken to the police station for safekeeping. The officer testified that he conducted the inventory for safekeeping, because of the history of thefts from automobiles left in the impoundment lot. The court concluded that, under the “facts and circumstances” of that case, the conduct of the police was “not ‘unreasonable.’ ”
Those facts were not present in Keller, and we have no reason to believe the Supreme Court would have decided Keller differently if Opperman had preceded it. Further, to contend that Opperman should control the present case ignores several important differences between the record in that case and the record here. First, the “inventory” here was not justified by a need to protect the owner’s property. Unlike in Opperman, there is no evidence of past thefts from the impound lot; the car was stored in a locked storage shed, and there is no suggestion that any such problem existed. There is no evidence here that any valuables were in plain view to tempt a thief and thereby trigger the officer’s concern for the safekeeping of the property. More importantly, the police left defendant’s personal effects in the car rather than removing them for safekeeping. The state’s rationale for itemizing the contents of the car to protect the owner’s property rings hollow, given the obvious proposition that doing so, without removing it from [523]*523the car, provides no greater protection for defendant’s property than not inventorying it.
Further, we think it is clear that an “investigatory motive,” which the court in Opperman noted was not present there, 428 US at 375-76, lay behind the search here. The record indicates that the impounding officers “suspected” that the car might have been used in a burglary. The officer conducting the “inventory” stated that he was “also looking for evidence of a crime” and that he opened the trunk but did not “inventory” the property he observed, because he was concerned about its admissibility in evidence. It is clear that the reason given by the court in Opperman as justifying a true inventory of the contents of an impounded vehicle does not exist in this case; here, there was no true inventory.
Because Opperman rests on factors not present here or in Keller, it does not dispose of defendant’s asserted rights under the Fourth Amendment and does not invalidate Keller, to the extent that the court relied on the federal constitution; neither does it diminish Keller’s holding that the search violated the state constitution. Unless and until the Supreme Court overrules it, Keller is the law of this state. Given that Keller was cited with approval in State v. Quinn, supra, 290 Or at 390, and in State v. Caraher, supra, we assume that it is alive and well.
In Quinn, the court invalidated a warrantless search of the defendant’s car after its seizure and defendant’s arrest, even though one of the reasons given by the searching officer was that the police were responsible for the contents of the car, which he believed to contain stolen property. 290 Or at 386. The court held that the officer was entitled to seize evidence in plain view and went on to say:
“* * * Extension of the search to the more private areas of the car, beneath the seats and into the glove compartment and trunk, however, was not permissible under any exception to the warrant requirement. Hence, the discovery of the women’s underclothing beneath the seat violated the constitutional right of the defendant to be free from searches which are not authorized by judicial warrant.” 290 Or at 393.
It would be anomalous to hold that a permissible warrantless search of an automobile seized from a person who has been [524]*524arrested and charged with a crime4 is more limited in scope than that permitted when a person’s car is simply impounded.
We hold that defendant’s rights under the state constitution were violated. It follows that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the map and wine bottle seized from the closed glove compartment of his automobile.
Reversed and remanded on defendant’s cross-appeal, with instructions to suppress map and wine bottle seized from glove compartment of defendant’s car.