ROBERTS, Justice.
Hartley S. Armen appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court, Aroostook County, affirming his conviction by the District Court, Presque Isle, of criminal trespass, 17-A.M.R.S.A. § 402(1)(D) (1983).1 Armen contends that the order given him on July 7, 1986, to leave the district office of U.S. Representative Olympia Snowe violated his constitutional rights and was not justified. We affirm Armen’s conviction.
FACTS
Armen had been designated by the Maine Coalition for Peace and Justice in Central America to seek an appointment with Rep. Snowe. He had visited the district office prior to July 7, 1986, “quite a few times” seeking information on public issues, communicating his views on those issues to the office manager and, most significantly, seeking a meeting with Rep. Snowe. On at least one prior occasion he had been arrested at the district office by members of the Presque Isle Police Department. Armen had been unsuccessful in obtaining any commitment from Rep. Snowe for an eventual meeting, either with him or with others in the state who shared his political views. In fact, he had received no answer to his last written request dated May 14, 1986. By his own admission, Armen went to the district office on July 7 feeling “disturbed ... about the fact that she had not met anyone” and “feeling very stubborn about it.”
At trial Armen denied that he went to the district office to get arrested or for the purpose of “sitting-in.” He did, however, anticipate that the police might be called again. For that reason he went to the police department prior to going to the district office. He testified that he “felt that there was apt to be a problem” and he “wanted the police to be forewarned.”
When Armen arrived at the district office on July 7, 1986, another constituent was present in the office. He voluntarily withdrew so that the individual could complete his business. Eventually Armen advised the office manager, Marion Higgins, that he still wanted a meeting with Rep. Snowe and that he had received no answer to his last request. Higgins replied that the Bangor office would have told him that Rep. Snowe could not meet with him. After further discussion Higgins asked Ar-men whether he intended to sit-in at the office if no meeting was arranged. He replied that he would be very reluctant to leave without progress toward arranging a meeting and that, if necessary, he would sit-in or remain in the office. When Higgins asked if he meant then, on that day, Armen replied that if necessary he would sit-in on that day. Higgins advised Armen that she could not allow him to stay in the office indefinitely and he repeated his re[1145]*1145luctance to leave without some indication of a meeting in the future.
Higgins arranged for Armen to talk with Rep. Snowe’s administrative assistant in Washington, D.C. That conversation, however, did not resolve the matter in a manner satisfactory to Armen. After further discussion with Higgins established that an eventual meeting was unlikely, Higgins asked Armen to leave. Armen refused. Higgins told Armen that she would have to call the police and have him arrested. Ar-men stated that he did not want to be arrested, but that was the only way he would leave. Higgins testified that she did not feel threatened and that Armen was not belligerent or abusive. She advised Armen, however, that she felt that his remaining in the office prevented her from doing her job. Although Armen argues on appeal that he then had further business to conduct at the district office, he admits that he never conveyed his intentions to Higgins.
Two police officers, one in uniform, responded to a call from the district office. Armen told the officers that Higgins had asked him to leave and that he refused. The officers asked him to leave and Armen again refused. The officers then arrested Armen.
DISCUSSION
“When, as here, a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, we will set the conviction aside only if no trier of fact rationally could have found the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Brewer, 505 A.2d 774, 775 (Me.1985). A concomitant principle requires that we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. State v. Barry, 495 A.2d 825, 826 (Me.1985). The District Court’s factual determinations are afforded such deference even when those determinations involve issues of constitutional dimension. State v. Durepo, 472 A.2d 919, 921 (Me.1984). Although the determination of the lawful nature of Higgins’ order to Ar-men to leave the district office may have involved narrow factual distinctions, we cannot say on the evidence presented that no trier of fact rationally could have found that element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
Armen contends that the order to leave and his subsequent arrest violated his constitutional rights to petition and free speech. U.S. Const, amend. I and Me. Const, art. I, §§ 4, 15. Although the State can place reasonable time, place and manner restrictions on the exercise of first amendment rights,2 content-based regulations presumptively violate the first amendment. See Ass’n of Ind. Professionals v. MLRB, et al., 465 A.2d 401, 409 (Me.1983). In this instance, Armen’s claim of constitutional violation fails. First, there is no evidence in the record that Higgins asked Armen to leave or that the police arrested Armen because of the content of his message. Presumably the police would arrest anyone who failed to respond to Higgins’ request and attempted to remain in the office as did Armen. The District Court rationally could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Armen was ordered to leave and finally arrested because his presence interfered with the operation of the office, not because he conveyed a particular political message. Second, on the basis of Armen’s own testimony, the District Court could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Armen had concluded his business with the field representative before being asked to leave. Thus, any “restriction” came after Armen had exercised his rights.
Armen also contends that the order to leave the district office was unlawful because it was unjustified. An order to leave property open to the public is lawful only when an authorized person “has some justification for requesting removal.” State v. Tauvar, 461 A.2d 1065, 1067 (Me.1983). Because his actions were peaceful, Armen contends there was no justification for his [1146]*1146removal. Cf Snead v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 803, 188 S.E.2d 197 (1972) (The court found no common law criminal trespass where defendant’s entry was lawful and his conduct did not threaten a breach of the peace). In Tauvar, however, we did not incorporate into section 402(1)(D) the common law doctrine of Snead. Rather, we determined that the Legislature intended by the use of the word “lawful” in section 402(1)(D) to require “some justification” for removal of a person from premises to which the public is invited or within which the public must be served.
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ROBERTS, Justice.
Hartley S. Armen appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court, Aroostook County, affirming his conviction by the District Court, Presque Isle, of criminal trespass, 17-A.M.R.S.A. § 402(1)(D) (1983).1 Armen contends that the order given him on July 7, 1986, to leave the district office of U.S. Representative Olympia Snowe violated his constitutional rights and was not justified. We affirm Armen’s conviction.
FACTS
Armen had been designated by the Maine Coalition for Peace and Justice in Central America to seek an appointment with Rep. Snowe. He had visited the district office prior to July 7, 1986, “quite a few times” seeking information on public issues, communicating his views on those issues to the office manager and, most significantly, seeking a meeting with Rep. Snowe. On at least one prior occasion he had been arrested at the district office by members of the Presque Isle Police Department. Armen had been unsuccessful in obtaining any commitment from Rep. Snowe for an eventual meeting, either with him or with others in the state who shared his political views. In fact, he had received no answer to his last written request dated May 14, 1986. By his own admission, Armen went to the district office on July 7 feeling “disturbed ... about the fact that she had not met anyone” and “feeling very stubborn about it.”
At trial Armen denied that he went to the district office to get arrested or for the purpose of “sitting-in.” He did, however, anticipate that the police might be called again. For that reason he went to the police department prior to going to the district office. He testified that he “felt that there was apt to be a problem” and he “wanted the police to be forewarned.”
When Armen arrived at the district office on July 7, 1986, another constituent was present in the office. He voluntarily withdrew so that the individual could complete his business. Eventually Armen advised the office manager, Marion Higgins, that he still wanted a meeting with Rep. Snowe and that he had received no answer to his last request. Higgins replied that the Bangor office would have told him that Rep. Snowe could not meet with him. After further discussion Higgins asked Ar-men whether he intended to sit-in at the office if no meeting was arranged. He replied that he would be very reluctant to leave without progress toward arranging a meeting and that, if necessary, he would sit-in or remain in the office. When Higgins asked if he meant then, on that day, Armen replied that if necessary he would sit-in on that day. Higgins advised Armen that she could not allow him to stay in the office indefinitely and he repeated his re[1145]*1145luctance to leave without some indication of a meeting in the future.
Higgins arranged for Armen to talk with Rep. Snowe’s administrative assistant in Washington, D.C. That conversation, however, did not resolve the matter in a manner satisfactory to Armen. After further discussion with Higgins established that an eventual meeting was unlikely, Higgins asked Armen to leave. Armen refused. Higgins told Armen that she would have to call the police and have him arrested. Ar-men stated that he did not want to be arrested, but that was the only way he would leave. Higgins testified that she did not feel threatened and that Armen was not belligerent or abusive. She advised Armen, however, that she felt that his remaining in the office prevented her from doing her job. Although Armen argues on appeal that he then had further business to conduct at the district office, he admits that he never conveyed his intentions to Higgins.
Two police officers, one in uniform, responded to a call from the district office. Armen told the officers that Higgins had asked him to leave and that he refused. The officers asked him to leave and Armen again refused. The officers then arrested Armen.
DISCUSSION
“When, as here, a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, we will set the conviction aside only if no trier of fact rationally could have found the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Brewer, 505 A.2d 774, 775 (Me.1985). A concomitant principle requires that we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. State v. Barry, 495 A.2d 825, 826 (Me.1985). The District Court’s factual determinations are afforded such deference even when those determinations involve issues of constitutional dimension. State v. Durepo, 472 A.2d 919, 921 (Me.1984). Although the determination of the lawful nature of Higgins’ order to Ar-men to leave the district office may have involved narrow factual distinctions, we cannot say on the evidence presented that no trier of fact rationally could have found that element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
Armen contends that the order to leave and his subsequent arrest violated his constitutional rights to petition and free speech. U.S. Const, amend. I and Me. Const, art. I, §§ 4, 15. Although the State can place reasonable time, place and manner restrictions on the exercise of first amendment rights,2 content-based regulations presumptively violate the first amendment. See Ass’n of Ind. Professionals v. MLRB, et al., 465 A.2d 401, 409 (Me.1983). In this instance, Armen’s claim of constitutional violation fails. First, there is no evidence in the record that Higgins asked Armen to leave or that the police arrested Armen because of the content of his message. Presumably the police would arrest anyone who failed to respond to Higgins’ request and attempted to remain in the office as did Armen. The District Court rationally could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Armen was ordered to leave and finally arrested because his presence interfered with the operation of the office, not because he conveyed a particular political message. Second, on the basis of Armen’s own testimony, the District Court could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Armen had concluded his business with the field representative before being asked to leave. Thus, any “restriction” came after Armen had exercised his rights.
Armen also contends that the order to leave the district office was unlawful because it was unjustified. An order to leave property open to the public is lawful only when an authorized person “has some justification for requesting removal.” State v. Tauvar, 461 A.2d 1065, 1067 (Me.1983). Because his actions were peaceful, Armen contends there was no justification for his [1146]*1146removal. Cf Snead v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 803, 188 S.E.2d 197 (1972) (The court found no common law criminal trespass where defendant’s entry was lawful and his conduct did not threaten a breach of the peace). In Tauvar, however, we did not incorporate into section 402(1)(D) the common law doctrine of Snead. Rather, we determined that the Legislature intended by the use of the word “lawful” in section 402(1)(D) to require “some justification” for removal of a person from premises to which the public is invited or within which the public must be served. We held that Tauvar’s prior misconduct was sufficient justification for the order to leave despite the absence of evidence of a present threat to the peace. Tauvar, 461 A.2d at 1067.
Higgins testified that the district office is maintained for the purpose of handling constituent concerns. Members of the public are invited to enter to express their concerns and obtain information on legislation. Because of the public invitation, Armen’s initial entry was not a trespass. Upon completion of his legitimate business, Armen was not privileged to remain. Armen argues, nevertheless, that Higgins arbitrarily ordered him to leave before he had the opportunity to complete his business. The record indicates and Ar-men concedes that he had not informed Higgins that he had additional matters to discuss. Because the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the State supports a finding that Armen had completed his business and that his continued presence interfered with the operation of the district office, we conclude that the District Court was not compelled to entertain a reasonable doubt as to the lawfulness of Higgins’ order.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
McKusick, C.J., and Nichols, Wathen, Glassman and Clifford, JJ., concurring.