[458]*458CALLOW, WILLIAM G., J.
This is a review under sec. (Rule) 809.62, Stats., of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals which affirmed a judgment of conviction by the circuit court of Taylor County, Judge Douglas T. Fox. The circuit court convicted defendant-appellant-petitioner Martin Annala on one count of first degree sexual assault in violation of sec. 940.225(1)(d), Stats. 1983-84.1 The issue raised on review is whether the district attorney abused his discretion in prosecuting Annala. We hold that the district attorney did not abuse his charging discretion and, accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
The facts are not in dispute. In January of 1984, Annala sexually molested an eight-year-old child while babysitting her. Annala was fifteen years old at the time. Shortly thereafter, the child informed her mother about the incident. The child's mother discussed the matter with Annala's parents and it was agreed that Annala should seek counseling and he did receive counseling. No criminal charges were pursued at that time.
In December of 1988, when Annala was twenty years old, the victim received counseling for a variety of emotional problems. She informed her counselor of the 1984 incident. As a routine procedure, the counselor reported the information to the district attorney. The district attorney had a member of the sheriffs department question Annala about the incident. At the interview, Annala was informed of his Miranda2 rights and
1 Section 940.225, Stats. 1983-84, provides in relevant part:
(1) First degree sexual assault. Whoever does any of the following is guilty of a Class B felony:
(d) Has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a person 12 years of age or younger.
2Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
[459]*459he signed a form that he understood those rights. He admitted to the sexual contact with the victim. He also indicated that he knew what he did was wrong and that he had received the help he needed.
Originally, the district attorney decided not to prosecute Annala. The district attorney's decision not to prosecute was based on the age of the case, the defendant's age at the time of the alleged offense, the defendant's psychological counseling treatment, and the remote possibility of further inappropriate contact with the victim. However, following further discussions with the victim's family, their attorney, and a letter from the victim's therapist, the district attorney reluctantly instituted criminal charges against Annala. While the district attorney conceded that prosecuting Annala would be unfair to the defendant, he believed that prosecution would be in the best interests of the victim.
In State v. Becker, 74 Wis. 2d 675, 247 N.W.2d 495 (1976), this court held that before an adult defendant could be tried for an offense committed before he was eighteen years of age where no juvenile proceedings were instituted, the State was required to show at a due process hearing that the prosecution was not delayed manipulatively so as to avoid the juvenile justice system. Becker, 74 Wis. 2d at 678. Following a Becker hearing on August 2, 1989, the trial court found that Annala's prosecution was not intentionally delayed so as to avoid the juvenile justice system nor was it based on an improper motive.
Annala was subsequently tried and convicted of first degree sexual assault in violation of sec. 940.225(1)(d), Stats. 1983-84. Judge Fox sentenced Annala to three years probation and, as a condition of probation, thirty days in county jail. Annala appealed his conviction on the grounds that the district attorney abused his [460]*460prosecutorial discretion in charging Annala. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that there was no abuse of prosecutorial discretion.
As an initial matter, we take this opportunity to express our agreement with the decision in State v. LeQue, 150 Wis. 2d 256, 442 N.W.2d 494 (Ct. App. 1989). Questions of jurisdiction may be considered at any time by the court, regardless of whether such questions were properly raised in the lower courts. Northern States P. Co. v. Hunter Bd. of Supv., 57 Wis. 2d 118, 132-33, 203 N.W.2d 878 (1973). In LeQue, the court of appeals held that the circuit court has jurisdiction to hear and determine charges brought against an adult defendant where the alleged offenses occurred when the defendant was a juvenile that could not be waived into adult court. LeQue, 150 Wis. 2d at 265. The facts in LeQue are almost identical to those in the present case. LeQue was accused of sexually molesting an eight and one-half-years-old child. He was fifteen years of age at the time of the alleged offense. The incident was reported several years later and when LeQue was eighteen years old, he was charged with first-degree sexual assault.
Annala argues that LeQue was improperly decided because on its face sec. 48.18(1), Stats.,3 does not allow waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction unless the offender [461]*461was at least sixteen years old at the time of the alleged offense. He contends that the only means for adult court to obtain jurisdiction over an individual that was a child at the time of the offense is if there has been a proper waiver by the juvenile court. The logical conclusion of his contention is that an adult court could never obtain jurisdiction over an individual that allegedly committed criminal conduct prior to reaching age sixteen because the juvenile court could not waive jurisdiction under sec. 48.18(1). We disagree with the defendant's conclusion and his analysis of the statute.
Statutory interpretation is a question of law. State v. Wittrock, 119 Wis. 2d 664, 669, 350 N.W.2d 647 (1984). This court reviews questions of law de novo, giving no deference to the lower courts. Id.
We employ a number of well settled rules of statutory construction which must guide our analysis.... First and foremost is the rule that our purpose is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Ball v. District No. 4, Area Board, 117 Wis. 2d 529, 537-38, 345 N.W.2d 389 (1984). Our first resort in determining the legislative intent is to the language of the statute itself. Id. at 538. If the meaning of the statute is clear and unambiguous on its face, it is improper to employ extrinsic aids to determine the meaning intended. Standard Theatres v. Transportation Dept, 118 Wis. 2d 730, 740, 349 N.W.2d 178 (1983); Wis. Elec. Power Co. v. Public Service Comm., 110 Wis. 2d 530,534,329 N.W.2d 178 (1983). Conversely, if the language of the statute is ambiguous or unclear, the court will examine the scope, history, context, subject matter, and object of the statute in order to ascertain the intent of the legislature. Ball at 538.
[462]*462Tahtinen v. MSI Ins. Co., 122 Wis. 2d 158, 166, 361 N.W.2d 673 (1985).
We begin our analysis then by examining the language of the relevant statutes.
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[458]*458CALLOW, WILLIAM G., J.
This is a review under sec. (Rule) 809.62, Stats., of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals which affirmed a judgment of conviction by the circuit court of Taylor County, Judge Douglas T. Fox. The circuit court convicted defendant-appellant-petitioner Martin Annala on one count of first degree sexual assault in violation of sec. 940.225(1)(d), Stats. 1983-84.1 The issue raised on review is whether the district attorney abused his discretion in prosecuting Annala. We hold that the district attorney did not abuse his charging discretion and, accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
The facts are not in dispute. In January of 1984, Annala sexually molested an eight-year-old child while babysitting her. Annala was fifteen years old at the time. Shortly thereafter, the child informed her mother about the incident. The child's mother discussed the matter with Annala's parents and it was agreed that Annala should seek counseling and he did receive counseling. No criminal charges were pursued at that time.
In December of 1988, when Annala was twenty years old, the victim received counseling for a variety of emotional problems. She informed her counselor of the 1984 incident. As a routine procedure, the counselor reported the information to the district attorney. The district attorney had a member of the sheriffs department question Annala about the incident. At the interview, Annala was informed of his Miranda2 rights and
1 Section 940.225, Stats. 1983-84, provides in relevant part:
(1) First degree sexual assault. Whoever does any of the following is guilty of a Class B felony:
(d) Has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a person 12 years of age or younger.
2Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
[459]*459he signed a form that he understood those rights. He admitted to the sexual contact with the victim. He also indicated that he knew what he did was wrong and that he had received the help he needed.
Originally, the district attorney decided not to prosecute Annala. The district attorney's decision not to prosecute was based on the age of the case, the defendant's age at the time of the alleged offense, the defendant's psychological counseling treatment, and the remote possibility of further inappropriate contact with the victim. However, following further discussions with the victim's family, their attorney, and a letter from the victim's therapist, the district attorney reluctantly instituted criminal charges against Annala. While the district attorney conceded that prosecuting Annala would be unfair to the defendant, he believed that prosecution would be in the best interests of the victim.
In State v. Becker, 74 Wis. 2d 675, 247 N.W.2d 495 (1976), this court held that before an adult defendant could be tried for an offense committed before he was eighteen years of age where no juvenile proceedings were instituted, the State was required to show at a due process hearing that the prosecution was not delayed manipulatively so as to avoid the juvenile justice system. Becker, 74 Wis. 2d at 678. Following a Becker hearing on August 2, 1989, the trial court found that Annala's prosecution was not intentionally delayed so as to avoid the juvenile justice system nor was it based on an improper motive.
Annala was subsequently tried and convicted of first degree sexual assault in violation of sec. 940.225(1)(d), Stats. 1983-84. Judge Fox sentenced Annala to three years probation and, as a condition of probation, thirty days in county jail. Annala appealed his conviction on the grounds that the district attorney abused his [460]*460prosecutorial discretion in charging Annala. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that there was no abuse of prosecutorial discretion.
As an initial matter, we take this opportunity to express our agreement with the decision in State v. LeQue, 150 Wis. 2d 256, 442 N.W.2d 494 (Ct. App. 1989). Questions of jurisdiction may be considered at any time by the court, regardless of whether such questions were properly raised in the lower courts. Northern States P. Co. v. Hunter Bd. of Supv., 57 Wis. 2d 118, 132-33, 203 N.W.2d 878 (1973). In LeQue, the court of appeals held that the circuit court has jurisdiction to hear and determine charges brought against an adult defendant where the alleged offenses occurred when the defendant was a juvenile that could not be waived into adult court. LeQue, 150 Wis. 2d at 265. The facts in LeQue are almost identical to those in the present case. LeQue was accused of sexually molesting an eight and one-half-years-old child. He was fifteen years of age at the time of the alleged offense. The incident was reported several years later and when LeQue was eighteen years old, he was charged with first-degree sexual assault.
Annala argues that LeQue was improperly decided because on its face sec. 48.18(1), Stats.,3 does not allow waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction unless the offender [461]*461was at least sixteen years old at the time of the alleged offense. He contends that the only means for adult court to obtain jurisdiction over an individual that was a child at the time of the offense is if there has been a proper waiver by the juvenile court. The logical conclusion of his contention is that an adult court could never obtain jurisdiction over an individual that allegedly committed criminal conduct prior to reaching age sixteen because the juvenile court could not waive jurisdiction under sec. 48.18(1). We disagree with the defendant's conclusion and his analysis of the statute.
Statutory interpretation is a question of law. State v. Wittrock, 119 Wis. 2d 664, 669, 350 N.W.2d 647 (1984). This court reviews questions of law de novo, giving no deference to the lower courts. Id.
We employ a number of well settled rules of statutory construction which must guide our analysis.... First and foremost is the rule that our purpose is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Ball v. District No. 4, Area Board, 117 Wis. 2d 529, 537-38, 345 N.W.2d 389 (1984). Our first resort in determining the legislative intent is to the language of the statute itself. Id. at 538. If the meaning of the statute is clear and unambiguous on its face, it is improper to employ extrinsic aids to determine the meaning intended. Standard Theatres v. Transportation Dept, 118 Wis. 2d 730, 740, 349 N.W.2d 178 (1983); Wis. Elec. Power Co. v. Public Service Comm., 110 Wis. 2d 530,534,329 N.W.2d 178 (1983). Conversely, if the language of the statute is ambiguous or unclear, the court will examine the scope, history, context, subject matter, and object of the statute in order to ascertain the intent of the legislature. Ball at 538.
[462]*462Tahtinen v. MSI Ins. Co., 122 Wis. 2d 158, 166, 361 N.W.2d 673 (1985).
We begin our analysis then by examining the language of the relevant statutes. Article VII, sec. 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution and sec. 753.03, Stats., vests within the circuit court the power to hear and determine all civil and criminal actions and proceedings unless exclusive jurisdiction is given to some other court. Chapter 48 of the Wisconsin Statutes, "The Children's Code," was enacted to specifically address the unique needs of children in areas such as custody, parental rights, adoption, foster homes, day care, and delinquency. Section 48.12(1), Stats., expressly provides that the juvenile court shall have "exclusive jurisdiction, except as provided in . . . [s.] 48.18, over any child 12 years of age or older who is alleged to be delinquent as defined in s. 48.02(3m)."
The plain language of the statute unambiguously explains that the exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile court is of a limited nature and applies only to allegations against a child, not allegations against an adult.4 [463]*463"Child" is defined under sec. 48.02(2), Stats., to mean "a person who is less than 18 years of age." Furthermore, "delinquent" under sec. 48.02(3m), Stats., means "a child who is less than 18 years of age and 12 years of age or older who has violated any state or federal criminal law." The jurisdiction of the juvenile court is determined by the individual's age at the time charged, not the individual's age at the time of the alleged offense. State ex rel. Koopman v. Waukesha County Court, 38 Wis. 2d 492, 497-500, 157 N.W.2d 623 (1968); State v. Becker, 74 Wis. 2d 675, 676, 247 N.W.2d 495 (1976); State v. Avery, 80 Wis. 2d 305, 310, 259 N.W.2d 63 (1977). Therefore, the juvenile court does not have jurisdiction over allegations against an adult defendant, regardless of the defendant's age when the alleged offense occurred.
Annala further contends that the present interpretation of sec. 48.12(1), Stats., creates an anomaly under sec. 48.12(2), Stats. Section 48.12(2) specifies that:
If a proceeding is commenced under this section before a child is 18 years of age, but the child becomes 18 before admitting facts of the petition at the pica hearing or if the child denies the facts, before an adjudication, the [juvenile] court retains jurisdiction over the case to dismiss the action with prejudice, to waive its jurisdiction under s. 48.18, or to enter into a consent decree.
See also In Interest of TDP, 109 Wis. 2d 495, 326 N.W.2d 741 (1982). Annala maintains that the adult court could not acquire jurisdiction over an adult defendant that allegedly violated the law when he or she was less than sixteen years of age because the juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction over such delinquent children [464]*464and the only alternatives available to the juvenile court once the child turns eighteen is to dismiss the action with prejudice or enter into a consent decree. The defendant points out that, under sec. 48.18, Stats., the juvenile court could not waive its jurisdiction with respect to a child that allegedly violated the law prior to his or her sixteenth birthday, with the exception for first or second-degree intentional homicide.
Inapposite to the defendant's contention, our longstanding interpretation of sec. 48.12(1), Stats., does not create an anomaly with respect to sec. 48.12(2), Stats. While Koopman, Becker, and Avery predate 1977 Wis. Laws ch. 354 which revised sec. 48.18(1), Stats., and 1979 Wis. Laws ch. 300 which created sec. 48.12(2), Stats., the legislative changes in no way rendered our past decisions inapplicable. Rather, the legislative changes were entirely consistent with the interpretations of this court.
First, sec. 48.12(2), Stats., applies only "[i]f a court proceeding has been commenced under this section before a child is 18 years of age...." It does not apply to proceedings commenced after a child becomes eighteen years of age. The initial jurisdiction of the juvenile court is framed in terms of the defendant's age at the time of prosecution because the juvenile court is only empowered under secs. 48.34 and 48.344, Stats., to impose rehabilitation treatment programs that are designed to benefit delinquent children. The programs are not designed to benefit an adult that has committed a criminal act, regardless of whether the criminal act was committed when the defendant was a child. Waiver of the juvenile court's jurisdiction is framed in terms of the defendant's age at the time of the alleged offense. Logically, the [465]*465juvenile court may not waive its jurisdiction if it does not have jurisdiction in the first instance.
Section 48.12(2), Stats., is strictly a procedural provision providing an incentive for cases involving minors to be filed in the juvenile justice system where, commensurate with immaturity, an appropriate disposition can be fashioned. The district attorney is required under the statute to consider the legislative conclusion that the child defendant and society in most cases will benefit most from the programs at the disposal of the juvenile court and an efficient disposition of the matter. Finally, the child defendant should logically prefer to be brought before juvenile court if the alternative is the adult criminal justice system. The dissent's construction of the statutes would provide an incentive for the child that commits a criminal act before turning sixteen years old to attempt to frustrate discovery of the criminal conduct as well as the identity of the offender until the child's eighteenth birthday, thereby avoiding legal accountability.
We have recognized that the jurisdictional limit of the juvenile court is susceptible to prosecutorial abuse. Therefore, to protect the interests of the child defendant and to preserve the important purposes of the Children's Code we have proclaimed that the state may not delay charging a child in order to avoid juvenile court jurisdiction. State v. Montgomery, 148 Wis. 2d 593, 603-04, 436 N.W.2d 303 (1989); Becker, 74 Wis. 2d at 678. No such prosecutorial misconduct was involved here.
Second, the practical effect of Annala's contention would be to lower the statute of limitations under sec. 939.74(1), Stats., for felony crimes from six years to something less than six years where the defendant was between the ages of twelve and sixteen years old at the time of the alleged criminal conduct. We do not think [466]*466that the legislature intended to allow a minor who is less than sixteen years old who commits a serious felony to cajole or manipulate the victim or conceal the crime or conceal suspected culpability for the crime until reaching eighteen years of age and thereby conclusively frustrating the State's ability to hold him or her accountable for the wrongdoing. Had the legislature intended to effectuate this drastic change in the law, it would have done so in an express and clearly understandable manner.
Third, Chapter 950 of the Wisconsin Statutes, Rights of Victims and Witnesses of Crime, illustrates a legislative recognition and intent to protect the rights of victims of crime.5 Section 950.01, Stats., specifically provides:
950.01 Legislative intent. In recognition of the civic and moral duty of victims and witnesses of crime to fully and voluntarily cooperate with law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies, and in further recognition of the continuing importance of such citizen cooperation to state and local law enforcement efforts and the general effectiveness and well-being of the criminal justice system of this state, the legislature declares its intent, in this chapter, to ensure that all victims and witnesses of crime are [467]*467treated with dignity, respect, courtesy and sensitivity; and that the rights extended in this chapter to victims and witnesses of crime are honored and protected by law enforcement agencies, prosecutors and judges in a manner no less vigorous than the protections afforded criminal defendants.
The basic bill of rights for victims under Chapter 950 applies equally to delinquent acts committed by a child as it does to crimes committed by a competent adult. Section 950.02(lm), Stats. Any interpretation of sec. 48.12, Stats., that erases the culpability of child offenders would frustrate the express legislative recognition of victim's rights.
Fourth, while not applicable to this case, the law provides the juvenile court the ability to waive its jurisdiction in a case commenced before the child becomes eighteen years of age involving criminal activity prior to the child's sixteenth birthday. At any time during the juvenile proceeding or when the child becomes eighteen, the juvenile court could appropriately enter into a consent decree with the juvenile offender. "If the court finds that the child has failed to fulfill the express terms and conditions of the consent decree or the child objects to the continuation of the consent decree, the court may waive its jurisdiction." Section 48.12(2), Stats.
Annala also contends that the present interpretation of sec. 48.12(1), Stats., is unconstitutional on equal protection grounds. He asserts that strict scrutiny is the proper analysis for this statute because freedom from imprisonment is a fundamental right. Constitutional questions are questions of law which we review independent of the decisions by the lower courts. State v. Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d 31, 41, 315 N.W.2d 703 (1982).
[468]*468Equal protection requires strict scrutiny of a legislative classification only when the classification impermis-sibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976). Contrary to the defendant's assertion, there exists no fundamental right to be treated as a juvenile nor is there a fundamental right not be incarcerated for criminal behavior. See Stokes v. Genakos, 441 F. Supp. 147, 149 n.2 (D.C. Mass. 1977), and United States v. Jenkins, 734 F.2d 1322, 1327 (9th Cir. 1983). Further, Annala is not a member of a suspect class. Therefore, the appropriate analysis is whether the legislative classification rationally furthers a purpose identified by the legislature. Murgia, 427 U.S. at 312-14.
Great deference is afforded to legislative classifications under the rational basis test. Peterson v. Lindner, 765 F.2d 698, 705 (7th Cir. 1985); Jenkins, 734 F.2d at 1327. In the present situation, the legislature's purpose in providing deferential treatment for juvenile offenders is, "[consistent with the protection of the public interest, to remove from children committing delinquent acts the consequences of criminal behavior and to substitute therefor a program of supervision, care and rehabilitation." Section 48.01(1)(c), Stats.6 Children committing [469]*469delinquent acts remain culpable for their criminal behavior. However, the legislature recognized that persons charged as children have rehabilitative and treatment needs of children. The programs under the Children's Code are specifically tailored to address the unique needs of children. Permitted dispositions by the juvenile court include placing the child under the supervision of an agency or suitable adult, ordering the child to participate in alcohol and other drug abuse education and treatment programs, in alcohol and other drug abuse education and treatment programs, ordering the child's parents or [470]*470guardians to provide certain special care, ordering the child to participate in a supervised work program, and revoking the child's driving license. Sections 48.34 and 48.344, Stats. Persons charged as adults, however, generally will not benefit from the treatment programs designed to benefit children. Therefore, a legislative classification based on an individual's age at the time of prosecution rather than an individual's age at the time of the alleged offense is rationally related to the purposes of the Children's Code.7 We see no equal protection problem with the present legislative classification.
[471]*471Unlike the defendant in LeQue, Annala voluntarily undertook rehabilitation treatment that could have been required by the juvenile court had he been found guilty of a delinquent act. However, the fact that Annala voluntarily undertook rehabilitation treatment is not a jurisdictional consideration nor is it a bar to prosecution. Rather, it is a factor to be considered by the circuit court in its sentencing decision. The sentencing court is required to exercise its discretion to sentence a convicted defendant consistent with the nature of the offense, the character and rehabilitative needs of the defendant, and the need to protect the public. State v. Sarabia, 118 Wis. 2d 655, 673, 348 N.W.2d 527 (1984).
Therefore, consistent with previous cases decided by this court, we conclude that the age of the defendant at the time the defendant is charged determines the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, regardless of the defendant's age at the time of the alleged offense. The exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile court under the Children's Code applies only to matters that are filed in the juvenile court prior to the alleged offender's eighteenth birthday. The circuit court has jurisdiction over matters not exclusively within the jurisdictional province of the juvenile court. This construction provides an incentive for cases involving minors to be handled in the juvenile justice system, where the juvenile court can order the appropriate treatment and rehabilitation of the juvenile offender. Any other construction of the statutes would provide a significant incentive for the juvenile offender to use every avenue to avoid prosecution until he or she reaches eighteen years of age. The dissent's conclusion that there should be no punishment for either major or minor criminal conduct of a juvenile offender if [472]*472the conduct is not discovered or prosecuted before the offender reaches the age of majority would encourage such offensive behavior. In order to discourage criminal conduct by juvenile offenders, the message that we must convey is that there will be punishment for criminal behavior.
Annala's primary argument in this case is that the district attorney abused his prosecutorial discretion in charging the defendant. Annala maintains that the district attorney charged him to alleviate pressure the victim's parents were placing on him; that he issued the complaint believing it would be dismissed; and when this did not occur he prosecuted Annala to avoid public embarrassment and unfavorable publicity. Therefore, Annala claims that the district attorney's decision to prosecute was based on an improper motive.
The district attorney is afforded great discretion in determining whether to initiate prosecution in a particular case. Sears v. State, 94 Wis. 2d 128, 133, 287 N.W.2d 785 (1980); State v. Karpinski, 92 Wis. 2d 599, 607, 285 N.W.2d 729 (1979). Few limits are imposed upon the district attorney's prosecutorial discretion. It is an abuse of discretion for the prosecutor to bring charges when the evidence is clearly insufficient to support a conviction or to bring charges on counts of doubtful merit to coerce the defendant to plead guilty to a less serious offense. Thompson v. State, 61 Wis. 2d 325, 328-30, 212 N.W.2d 109 (1973). Furthermore, we have stated that " 'the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation' so long as 'the selection was [not] deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.' " Sears, 94 Wis. 2d at 134 (quoting from Olyer v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962)). See [473]*473also Unnamed Petitioners v. Connors, 136 Wis. 2d 118, 128, 401 N.W.2d 782 (1987), overruled on other grounds by State v. Unnamed Defendant, 150 Wis. 2d 352, 358, 441 N.W.2d 696 (1989), stating "[o]nly where there has been an aura of discrimination has this court indicated that checks were to be placed upon a prosecutor's charging decision."
Annala does not suggest that the district attorney prosecuted him based upon meritless charges nor does he suggest that discrimination played a part in the prosecuting decision. Instead, Annala contends that abuse of discretion should be found because the prosecutor brought the charges based on an improper motive. In essence, Annala requests this court to expand its current doctrine concerning prosecutorial discretion by allowing the court to consider the non-discriminatory subjective motivations of the district attorney. We decline to do so.
When probable cause exists for prosecution, the court should not consider the subjective motivations of the district attorney in making his charging decision, except to determine whether a discriminatory basis was involved. On numerous occasions, we have explained that in general the district attorney is answerable to the people of the state and not to the courts or the legislature as to the manner in which he or she exercises prosecutorial discretion. State ex rel. Kurkierewicz v. Cannon, 42 Wis. 2d 368, 378, 166 N.W.2d 255 (1969); Thompson, 61 Wis. 2d at 332; State v. Kenyon, 85 Wis. 2d 36, 42, 270 N.W.2d 160 (1978); Karpinski, 92 Wis. 2d at 608; and Unnamed Petitioners, 136 Wis. 2d at 126. Political review through the electoral process is sufficient to ensure the proper application of prosecutorial discretion. If this court placed the nondiscriminatory subjective motivations of the district attorney under [474]*474scrutiny with respect to the charging decision, it would likely create an enormous amount of litigation challenging prosecutorial discretion that has little or nothing to do with the defendant's guilt or innocence.
Because we decline to extend abuse of discretion challenges to the nondiscriminatory subjective motivations of the district attorney, we need not proceed further to address the district attorney's motivations in this case. For explanatory purposes, however, we emphasize that public protection and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant are only two of the many factors that go into a district attorney's decision to prosecute. Equally compelling factors include the best interests of the victim and the community. The rehabilitative needs of a child victim of a sex crime may demand not only prosecution of the offender but significant punishment if that will have a positive influence on the child victim's recovery from the effects of the crime. See State v. Jones, 151 Wis. 2d 488, 496, 444 N.W.2d 760 (Ct. App. 1989). Failure to prosecute under the reasoning of the dissent "may inflict a greater harm on the child by allowing the alleged abuser to go free and by demonstrating to the child that the state of Wisconsin does not place a high enough value on the child's suffering to bring to justice the person alleged to have caused the suffering." State v. Gilbert, 109 Wis. 2d 501, 507, 326 N.W.2d 744 (1982). The district attorney is elected to wrestle with balancing all of the interests involved to arrive at a decision whether to prosecute. In the absence of meritless charges or discriminatory motives, this court should not second guess the district attorney's charging decision.
The district attorney's decision to prosecute Annala was based upon factors which he properly may consider and upon which, in his discretion, he properly may pros[475]*475ecute. Therefore, we conclude that the district attorney in this case did not abuse his prosecutorial discretion in charging Annala. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
By the Court. — The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed.