SECOND DIVISION MILLER, P. J., MERCIER and HODGES, JJ.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk’s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. https://www.gaappeals.us/rules
June 15, 2023
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A23A0415. THE STATE v. SHOEMAKER.
HODGES, Judge.
In this appeal, the State asks us to decide whether a defendant, charged by
accusation with a felony during the roughly one-year applicability of OCGA § 17-7-
70.1 (a.1) (2021), must have been tried before subsection (a.1) was automatically
repealed on June 30, 2022. The Superior Court of Athens-Clarke County determined
that OCGA § 17-7-70.1 (a.1) (2021) did not allow defendants charged under its
provisions to be tried after June 30, 2022 and dismissed a charge of possession of a
firearm during the commission of a crime against Andrew Logan Shoemaker. For the
following reasons, we reverse.
When questions of law are at issue, as here, we apply a de novo standard of
review. See Jordan v. State, 322 Ga. App. 252, 255 (4) (a) (744 SE2d 447) (2013) (noting that “the phrase ‘plain legal error’ should not be used to designate the de novo
standard of review”); State v. Brooks, 301 Ga. App. 355, 356 (687 SE2d 631) (2009).
So viewed, the record shows that, following issuance of a May 6, 2022 arrest warrant,
the State charged Shoemaker with one count each of possession of marijuana with
intent to distribute (OCGA § 16-13-30 (j)) (“Count 2”) and possession of a firearm
during the commission of a felony (OCGA § 16-11-106) (“Count 3”) in a May 12,
2022 accusation.1 Shoemaker entered a plea of not guilty at his June 16, 2022
arraignment and moved to dismiss Count 3 on July 5, 2022, arguing that a violation
of OCGA § 16-11-106 could only be charged by indictment.
Following a hearing, the trial court agreed and granted Shoemaker’s motion to
dismiss. In reaching its decision, the trial court concluded that: (1) OCGA § 17-7-70.1
(a) (1) does not include possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony
among the crimes that may be charged by accusation; (2) even though OCGA § 17-7-
70.1 (a) allowed “the State . . . to accuse . . . Shoemaker of an offense ordinarily done
by indictment,” the State did not try Shoemaker in violation of the statutory mandate
that defendants “shall be tried[;]” and (3) OCGA § 17-7-70.1 (a.1) (2021) did not
1 Shoemaker waived a commitment hearing and received bond on the charges on May 11, 2022.
2 include a saving clause that would allow defendants accused before the June 30, 2022
repealer to be tried after that date. The State appeals pursuant to OCGA § 5-7-1 (a)
(1).2
In a single enumeration of error, the State contends that the trial court erred by
“interpreting [OCGA § 17-7-70.1 (a.1) (2021)] in service to a nonexistent
‘constitutional right.’”3 We agree that the trial court erred, and will address each
segment of the State’s argument in turn.
2 The Court thanks the District Attorneys’ Association of Georgia for offering an amicus curiae brief. 3 As no constitutional issues were raised in Shoemaker’s motion to dismiss or decided in the trial court’s order, the gravamen of the State’s argument seems to be that the trial court erred by viewing the application of OCGA § 17-7-70.1 (a.1) (2021) through the lens of the Fifth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution’s statement that “no person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment of indictment of a Grand Jury. . . .” However, this presupposes reliance on a constitutional issue upon which there is no ruling by the trial court. “We are a court for the correction of errors of law committed by the trial court where proper exception is taken[.]” Williams v. State, 277 Ga. App. 106, 108 (2) (625 SE2d 509) (2005). Because constitutional issues were neither raised nor ruled upon by the trial court, this argument presents nothing for our review. See, e.g., In the Interest of A. A., 253 Ga. App. 858, 862 (3) (560 SE2d 763) (2002) (“A constitutional issue . . . must be clearly raised in the trial court and distinctly ruled upon there. Contentions regarding a constitutional issue which were not made below are thus not passed upon here.”) (citation and punctuation omitted).
3 In construing the statutes at issue here, we are guided by the following rules of
construction:
The ordinary signification shall be applied to all words. Where the language of a statute is plain and susceptible to only one natural and reasonable construction, courts must construe the statute accordingly. Criminal statutes are construed strictly against the State, they must be read according to the natural and obvious import of their language, and their operation should not be limited or extended by application of subtle and forced interpretations.
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Flakes v. State, 365 Ga. App. 97, 98 (a) (877
SE2d 635) (2022). Furthermore, we must avoid “a statutory construction that will
render some of the statutory language mere surplusage[.]” Kennedy v. Carlton, 294
Ga. 576, 578 (2) (757 SE2d 46) (2014). “Finally, in construing the statute so as to
give effect to the legislative intent a mere segment of the statute should not be lifted
out of context and construed without consideration of all the other parts of the
statute.” City of Jesup v. Bennett, 226 Ga. 606, 609 (2) (176 SE2d 81) (1970).
(a) Pre-2021 OCGA § 17-7-70.1 (a) (2020). OCGA § 17-7-70.1 (a) (1)
provided that “the district attorney shall have authority to prefer accusations, and
. . . defendants shall be tried on such accusations according to the same rules of
substantive and procedural laws relating to defendants who have been indicted by a
4 grand jury[,]” if the defendant is charged with certain felony crimes and either (1) has
been “bound over to the superior court based on a finding of probable cause pursuant
to a commitment hearing[;]” or (2) has “expressly or by operation of law waived a
commitment hearing[.]” OCGA § 17-7-70.1 (a) (1) (A) - (E) (2020) listed the felony
cases which were subject to this provision, primarily including crimes of theft,
forgery, escape, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.4
(b) Addition of OCGA § 17-7-70.1 (a.1) (2021). Relevant to this case, however,
the General Assembly added subsection (a.1), which became effective on May 4,
2021, to OCGA § 17-7-70.1 and provided that
[n]otwithstanding any other law to the contrary, the district attorney shall have authority to prefer accusations, and the accused shall be tried on such accusations according to the same rules of substantive and procedural laws relating to defendants who have been indicted by a grand jury for any felony, other than a serious violent felony, in which an accused has:
(A) Been bound over to the superior court based on a finding of probable cause pursuant to a commitment hearing under Article 2 of this chapter;
4 If our analysis ended here, the State’s accusation against Shoemaker for possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime would be invalid, as it is not among the listed felony cases subject to OCGA § 17-7-70.1.
5 (B) Expressly or by operation of law waived a commitment hearing;
(C) Been released on bond pending a commitment hearing; or
(D) Been confined in jail for at least 45 days since his or her arrest, unless such time frame has been waived in writing by the accused.
(Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 17-7-70.1 (a.1) (2) (2021). By its own terms,
subsection (a.1) was repealed on June 30, 2022. See OCGA § 17-7-70.1 (a.1) (4)
(2021).5
(c) Post-2022 OCGA § 17-7-70.1 (a) (2023). Following the automatic repealer
of OCGA § 17-7-70.1 (a.1) (2021), OCGA § 17-7-70.1 (a) remained in effect and
again listed a series of felony cases — which did not include possession of a firearm
during the commission of a crime — in which a district attorney could charge a
defendant by accusation.
(d) Analysis. With this backdrop in mind, application of these statutes to the
present case is relatively straightforward.
5 Of note, OCGA § 17-7-70.1 (a) (2021) remained in force during the effectiveness of OCGA § 17-7-70.1 (a.1), adding various crimes involving controlled substances and marijuana as a category of felony cases in which a district attorney could charge a defendant by accusation. See OCGA § 17-7-70.1 (a) (1) (F).
6 (i) District Attorney’s Authority to Charge Shoemaker by Accusation with a
Felony. Prior to May 4, 2021, the State could not have charged Shoemaker by
accusation with possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, as it was
not among the category of felony cases for which, under certain circumstances, “the
district attorney shall have authority to prefer accusations[.]” See OCGA § 17-7-70.1
(a) (1) (A) - (E) (2020).
After OCGA § 17-7-70.1 (a.1) became effective on May 4, 2021, however, the
listing of felony cases was no longer singularly controlling as, “[n]otwithstanding any
other law to the contrary,” district attorneys were granted limited “authority to prefer
accusations, and the accused shall be tried on such accusations according to the same
rules of substantive and procedural laws relating to defendants who have been
indicted by a grand jury for any felony, other than a serious violent felony” if certain
criteria are present, including when an accused has “[e]xpressly or by operation of
law waived a commitment hearing[.]” (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 17-7-70.1 (a.1)
(2), (2) (B) (2021). Once OCGA § 17-7-70.1 (a.1) (2021) was repealed effective June
30, 2022, OCGA § 17-7-70.1 (a) remained and included the listing of felony cases for
which a district attorney could charge a defendant by accusation, rather than the more
permissive “any felony” codified in OCGA § 17-7-70.1 (a.1) (2021).
7 At the outset, then, OCGA § 17-7-70.1 (a.1) (2021) clearly authorized the
district attorney to charge Shoemaker with a felony by accusation at any point
between May 4, 2021 and June 30, 2022.6 Accordingly, the trial court erred in
concluding that the district attorney could not charge Shoemaker with a felony by
accusation because possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime “is
excluded from [OCGA § 17-7-70.1 (a) (1) (A) - (E) (2020)].”
(ii) Necessity of Trial Prior to June 30, 2022. Once the district attorney’s
charging decision was issued pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-70.1 (a.1) (2021), and
Shoemaker entered a plea of not guilty, Georgia law provided that Shoemaker “shall
be tried on such [accusation] according to the same rules of substantive and
6 Contrary to Shoemaker’s argument, there is no conflict between OCGA § 17- 7-70.1 (a.1) (2021) and OCGA § 17-7-70.1 (a) (2021) in terms of what felony cases could be charged by accusation. We first note that “the legislature is presumed to know the condition of the law and to enact statutes with reference to it[.]” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Williams v. State, 299 Ga. 632, 634 (791 SE2d 55) (2016). Therefore, it is clear that the plain language of OCGA § 17-7-70.1 (a.1) (2021) authorized the district attorney’s accusation in this case “because the provisions of the statute enacted latest in time carry greater weight[.]” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. More importantly, OCGA § 17-7-70.1 (a.1) (2021) contains the clause that it applies “[n]otwithstanding any other law to the contrary,” manifesting a legislative intent to allow accusation of any felony cases rather than the limited felony cases listed in OCGA § 17-7-70.1 (a) (2021). See id. (“a specific statute will prevail over a general statute, absent any indication of a contrary legislative intent”) (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied). As a result, Shoemaker’s arguments analyzing general and specific statutory provisions are inapposite.
8 procedural laws relating to defendants who have been indicted by a grand jury. . . .”
OCGA § 17-7-70.1 (a.1) (2) (2021); see also OCGA § 17-7-70.1 (same); OCGA § 17-
7-70.1 (2020) (same). As a result, through its multiple iterations over the past few
years, this provision of OCGA § 17-7-70.1 has remained constant.
One such rule “of substantive and procedural” law provides that “[i]n those
cases in which a plea of not guilty is entered, the court shall set the case down for trial
at such time as shall be determined by the court.” OCGA § 17-7-91 (b). Absent a
speedy trial demand or other intervening factor, then, trial courts are afforded
significant latitude in scheduling trials, as there are no deadlines or other prescribed
dates by which a trial must occur. That being so, whether a defendant was charged
with a felony by accusation pursuant to: (1) OCGA § 17-7-70.1 (a) on May 3, 2021;
(2) OCGA § 17-7-70.1 (a.1) on May 16, 2022 (the date of Shoemaker’s accusation);
or (3) OCGA § 17-7-70.1 (a) on July 1, 2022 is irrelevant — in each case, the
defendant must be “tried . . . according to the same rules of substantive and
procedural laws relating to defendants who have been indicted by a grand jury[,]”
including that the trial court, upon the defendant’s entry of a not guilty plea, “shall
set the case down for trial at such time as shall be determined by the court.”
9 Therefore, the June 30, 2022 repealer of OCGA § 17-7-70.1 (a.1) (2021) does
not mandate that a defendant charged within the effective dates of that statute must
likewise be tried within the effective sates of that statute. To the contrary, the
defendant must only be tried “at such time as shall be determined by the [trial] court.”
OCGA § 17-7-91 (b).7 Once again, this principle has been consistent throughout the
different versions of OCGA § 17-7-70.1. As a result, the trial court’s conclusion that
the State was required to try Shoemaker, within the time that OCGA § 17-7-70.1 (a.1)
(2021) was in effect, was erroneous.
(iii) Effect of Absence of Saving Clause. As a general matter, “when a statute
making described conduct a crime is repealed prior to final judgment on a conviction,
the repeal ends the prosecution if the legislature has not provided otherwise in a
saving clause.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Daker v. Williams, 279 Ga. 782,
784 (621 SE2d 449) (2005); see also Robinson v. State, 256 Ga. 564, 565-566 (350
SE2d 464) (1986) (same). It is clear that versions of OCGA § 17-7-70.1 in force after
the repeal of OCGA § 17-7-70.1 (a.1) (2021) do not include a savings clause.
7 For these reasons, Shoemaker’s argument that a case “must be tried prior to the ‘sunset’ of the law” is unavailing.
10 However, the absence of such a clause is of no concern, because no such provision
was necessary to preserve Shoemaker’s prosecution.
In Daker and Robinson, the defendants were charged with specific crimes that
were modified or repealed before the defendants appeared for trial. In Robinson, the
defendant was charged with trafficking in cocaine, but prior to trial, the General
Assembly repealed a subsection of the trafficking statute and enacted in its place a
new subsection that changed the definition of the crime. 256 Ga. at 564-565. As a
result of the repeal of the old law and enactment of a new law without a saving
clause, our Supreme Court noted that the defendant’s “conduct was no longer defined
by the legislature as trafficking in cocaine[.]” Id. at 566. Accordingly, the defendant’s
prosecution “was at an end before the trial.” Id.
In contrast, the defendant in Daker was convicted of aggravated stalking, but
the General Assembly amended the aggravated stalking statute while the defendant’s
conviction was on direct appeal. 279 Ga. at 782-783. The defendant contended that
the amendment to the statute, which did not include a saving clause, voided his
conviction. Id. at 782. Our Supreme Court disagreed, noting that “[a] conviction may
stand if it was authorized under both the original definition of the crime and the
revised definition contained in the statutory amendment” and that “the activity for
11 which [the defendant] was indicted and convicted remained a crime both before and
after the amendment of the statute.” Id. at 785.
Here, no saving clause was necessary. Violations of OCGA § 16-11-106 for
possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime are the same both before
and after June 30, 2022. Therefore, the activity with which Shoemaker was charged
remained a crime both before and after June 30, 2022. See Daker, 279 Ga. at 785.
Stated differently, nothing about the specific crime charged in this case changed.
Compare Robinson, 256 Ga. at 565-566. Only the manner in which the crime was
charged was altered, and there is no indication that a saving clause is necessary to
preserve a prosecution under such circumstances. It follows that the trial court erred
in granting Shoemaker’s motion to dismiss on this basis.
In sum, OCGA § 17-7-70.1 (a.1) (2021) authorized the district attorney’s May
16, 2022 accusation against Shoemaker for the felony of possession of a firearm
during the commission of a crime. As with any other case, felony or misdemeanor,
the trial court is empowered to “set the case down for trial at such time as shall be
determined by the court” without any limitation, save for speedy trial demands which
are not at issue in this case. See OCGA § 17-7-91 (b). Therefore, we conclude that the
12 trial court erred in dismissing Count 3 of the accusation against Shoemaker, and we
reverse the trial court’s judgment.
Judgment reversed. Miller, P. J., and Mercier, J., concur.