Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
September 15, 2026
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 60241-5-II
Respondent,
v.
WALTER ROY HINDS, UNPUBLISHED OPINION Appellant.
GLASGOW, J.—The trial court removed Walter Hinds from drug court after several violations of his drug court contract and placed Hinds’ case on the criminal docket. After a bench trial based on agreed evidence, the trial court convicted Hinds of possession of a stolen motor vehicle (count 1); violation of a protection order, domestic violence (count 2); and fourth degree assault, domestic violence (count 3). Hinds’ counsel conceded at trial that there was sufficient evidence to support counts 2 and 3, and the trial court’s findings reflected that concession.
Hinds appeals his convictions for counts 2 and 3, as well as his sentence. Hinds argues that the trial court’s findings of fact relying on his counsel’s concession were inadequate to support the convictions for those counts. We conclude that Hinds invited any error related to the adequacy of the trial court’s findings regarding counts 2 and 3. Hinds also argues that he was denied an opportunity for allocution at sentencing. We conclude that Hinds waived allocution by failing to raise his desire to allocute below. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
I. DRUG COURT CONTRACT
A. Background The State charged Walter Hinds with possession of a stolen motor vehicle (count 1);
violation of a protection order, domestic violence (count 2); and fourth degree assault, domestic violence (count 3). Each charge originated from a different incident occurring in 2021 and 2022. Hinds entered the Jefferson County Drug Court program in August 2022. B. Drug Court Contract In August 2022, Hinds signed a drug court contract stating that “upon remand from Drug Court, the Court will determine the issue of guilt on the pending charge(s) based solely upon law enforcement reports, including but not limited to: witness statements; field tests; lab tests; fingerprint comparisons; 911 recordings; recorded statements; handwriting comparisons; and ballistic reports.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 26 (term 25). Hinds waived his rights to testify and present other evidence. Hinds agreed to “a stipulated trial based on the reports contained in the discovery of [his] case.” CP at 27 (term 28). The agreement further stated, “I understand this contract and the statements contained herein are not an admission of guilt and are not sufficient, by themselves, to warrant a finding of guilt. If I am terminated from Drug Court, I understand that at a bench trial the court will determine if I am guilty or not guilty of this/these charge(s) based solely on the admitted evidence.” Id. (term 29).
In May 2024, the State moved to remand Hinds from drug court for “violating the terms of his Drug Court Contract.” CP at 40. The trial court granted the motion and remanded the case to the criminal docket for a bench trial.
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II. BENCH TRIAL
A. Evidence, Arguments, and Verdict The trial court then held a bench trial based on the agreed evidence, including law enforcement reports, as provided in the drug court contract. To support count 1, the possession of a stolen motor vehicle charge, the State produced a narrative report by the Jefferson County Sherriff’s Office. The narrative report stated that officers were investigating a report of a stolen pickup truck when they found Hinds near the stolen truck on the side of a road. An eyewitness observed Hinds arrive in the stolen truck, and there were items belonging to Hinds in the bed of the truck. Hinds first denied any involvement with the truck, then he stated that someone had loaned him the truck. He later admitted to lying to law enforcement about the truck and hiding the key. Hinds’ personal items were found inside the cab of the truck.
To support the protection order violation, the State produced a probable cause report and a narrative report, as well as a copy of the protection order. The domestic violence protection order prohibited Hinds from coming within 500 feet of Maree Carstensen, the protected person. Hinds had been served with the protection order. A law enforcement officer saw Hinds with Carstensen, and Carstensen said they had been spending time together recently.
To support the assault charge, the State produced a probable cause statement and a narrative report; a Jefferson County Domestic Violence Packet (“DV packet”); photos of the victim; and service phone logs. The report explained that Charles Thomas got into an argument with Hinds’ girlfriend, which resulted in Hinds punching and pushing Thomas. Hinds then drove away. Thomas was bleeding and had multiple injuries Prior to this incident, Hinds had been living with Thomas for around a year.
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During argument at the bench trial, Hinds conceded there was sufficient evidence to support a guilty verdict for the violation of the protection order (count 2) and the fourth degree assault charge (count 3). Hinds’ counsel stated, “I think there’s sufficient evidence with respect to the no-contact order violation and the assault four that is not domestic violence.” 1 Verbatim Rep. of Proc. (VRP) at 10. Defense counsel argued that there was insufficient evidence to support the domestic violence designation for the assault charge. Defense counsel also said, “But with respect to the stolen vehicle, I think the Court is reading a pretty brief report and the -- but you’ve got to find beyond a reasonable doubt that this vehicle was stolen. . . . But with respect to the other counts I don’t have an argument.” 1 VRP at 10-11.
Regarding count 1, defense counsel argued there was insufficient evidence to support the element that Mr. Hinds possessed the vehicle knowing it was stolen. The trial court then recited the evidence supporting the contested finding that Hinds was guilty of count 1, possession of a stolen motor vehicle. The trial court found beyond a reasonable doubt that Hinds was guilty of that charge.
The trial court acknowledged the concession defense counsel made regarding count 2, the violation of the no-contact order and reviewed the associated police report. As a result, the trial court found beyond a reasonable doubt that Hinds was guilty of violation of a no-contact order, domestic violence.
The trial court also recited the facts supporting the contested domestic violence designation for the assault charge. The court identified that Hinds and Thomas, the victim of the assault, lived together for approximately a year. Upon the court’s recitation of facts, Hinds’ counsel withdrew the challenge to the domestic violence designation. As a result, the trial court found beyond a
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reasonable doubt that Hinds was guilty of the assault charge with the domestic violence designation. Thus, at the end of the bench trial after all of defense counsel’s concessions, the only contested charge was count 1, possession of a stolen motor vehicle.
The trial court entered a brief written verdict, stating that it found Hinds guilty of all three charged offenses after considering the reports filed and the arguments of the parties. B. Sentencing At the sentencing hearing, after the prosecutor and defense counsel spoke, the court asked Hinds’ counsel if “there’s . . . anybody else who needs to be heard for sentencing[?]” 1 VRP 29. Hinds’ counsel replied, “I don’t think so.” Id. The trial court did not invite Hinds to speak to the court prior to sentencing him. Hinds did not object to sentencing without allocution. At the recommendation of the State, the trial court sentenced Hinds to a prison-based drug offender sentencing alternative. CP 185; VRP 21.
III. WRITTEN FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW To comply with CrR 6.1(d), the trial court later entered findings of fact and conclusions of law. The findings of fact and conclusions of law primarily addressed count 1, which was the count that was contested at the bench trial.
The introduction to the findings and conclusions stated:
The Defendant, Walter Hinds, faced a stipulated facts bench trial on October 25, 2024 having been remanded out of Jefferson County Drug Court for repeated violations of Drug Court requirements. The Defendant was found guilty of the following offenses: Count 1) Possession of a Stolen Vehicle, Count 2) Felony Domestic Violence No-Contact Order Violation (Third or Subsequent Offense), and Count 3) Gross Misdemeanor Assault in the Fourth Degree–Domestic Violence.”
CP at 185.
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The trial court then found that Hinds “conceded there was sufficient evidence to find [him]
guilty of Count 2 and Count 3.” CP at 186 (Finding of Fact (FF) 3); see also CP at 188 (FF 6, 9). The trial court next recited the evidence supporting the contested finding that Hinds was guilty of count 1, possession of a stolen motor vehicle, and entered more detailed findings to support its finding of guilt on count 1. These findings included facts supporting the element that Hinds knew the vehicle was stolen; the findings stated that Hinds admitted that items in the vehicle were his, that he drove the vehicle, that he constructively possessed the key to the vehicle, and that he admitted to lying to officers and hiding the key.
The trial court also recited the facts supporting the domestic violence designation for the assault charge. The facts supporting the domestic violence designation on count 3 were that “[t]he Defendant assaulted an individual by the name of Charles,” that “[t]he Defendant had been living with Charles for approximately one year at the time of the assault,” and that “[t]he Defendant and Charles are both listed as residing at the same address.” CP at 188 (FF 8).
Although the conclusions of law were recitations of the relevant law, including the elements of the contested charge (possession of a stolen motor vehicle), the trial court opened the findings and conclusions with the statement that it found Hinds guilty of all three charges recited above.
Hinds appeals his convictions of counts 2 and 3 and his sentence.
ANALYSIS
I. INVITED ERROR DOCTRINE Hinds first argues that the trial court’s finding that Hinds conceded that the evidence was sufficient to support guilt on counts 2 and 3 was inadequate to support the conclusion that he was
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guilty on both counts. The State responds that we should reject this argument because Hinds conceded the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions of counts 2 and 3 and thus any error was invited. We agree with the State.
Invited error “‘prohibits a party from setting up error in the trial court and then complaining of it on appeal.’” State v. Rushworth,12 Wn. App. 2d 466, 477, 458 P.3d 1192 (2020) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Armstrong, 69 Wn. App. 430, 434, 848 P.2d 1322 (1993)). The rule functions to “preclude[] a criminal defendant from seeking appellate review of an error [they] helped create, even when the alleged error involves constitutional rights.” State v. Carson, 179 Wn. App. 961, 973, 320 P.3d 185 (2014).
The doctrine is limited, applying “only where the defendant engaged in some affirmative action by which [they] knowingly and voluntarily set up the error” or where the defendant otherwise affirmatively assented to the error, materially contributed to the error it, or benefitted from the error. State v. Phelps, 113 Wn. App. 347, 353, 57 P.3d 624 (2002); In re Dependency of A.L.K., 196 Wn.2d 686, 695, 478 P.3d 63 (2020).
But invited error has been applied to concessions. For example, in In re Detention of Rushton, Division Three held that without the State’s concession in the trial court as to certain facts, the parties and the trial court would have addressed those factual issues. 190 Wn. App. 358, 372-73, 359 P.3d 935 (2015). Thus, for purposes of appeal, Division Three treated the State’s concession as true. Id. at 373.
Similarly, in State v. Ellison, we held that “irrespective” of statutory or procedural requirements for the State, a stipulation made by a criminal defendant constituted an invited error that the defendant could not then raise on appeal. 172 Wn. App. 710, 716, 291 P.3d 921 (2013). A
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defendant is “bound by . . . stipulation[s] [made] at trial and the invited error doctrine bars [a defendant] from now challenging facts [the defendant] stipulated to at trial.” Id.
Hinds too is bound by his concession at trial—that there was sufficient evidence to support Hinds’ convictions of counts 2 and 3. Had Hinds not conceded this, the trial court’s detailed findings on count 1 suggest that it would have addressed the facts supporting these convictions below. Hinds is bound by his concession on appeal, and he cannot claim that it was error for the trial court to rely on that concession.
Hinds argues his concession that there were sufficient facts to support guilt on counts 2 and 3 was comparable to an Alford 1plea. He asserts that as a result, the trial court was required to independently make findings of fact to support his guilt. We disagree.
An Alford plea requires that the court find an independent factual basis because the defendant does not admit guilt and, therefore, does not put forth their own admissions. See State v. Scott, 150 Wn. App. 281, 295, 207 P.3d 495 (2009). In other words, an Alford plea requires that “‘the court must establish an entirely independent factual basis for the guilty plea, a basis which substitutes for an admission of guilt.’” Id. (quoting State v. D.T.M., 78 Wn. App. 216, 220, 896 P.2d 108 (1995)).
Here, in contrast, Hinds made factual concessions through his counsel that the State and the trial court were entitled to rely on. Hinds affirmatively conceded there was sufficient evidence to support his guilt on counts 2 and 3. The trial court then also concluded that the evidence was sufficient to find Hinds guilty of counts 2 and 3. In light of Hinds’ concession, the trial court was
1 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970).
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not required to separately recite the factual support for the verdict, and the invited error doctrine precludes Hinds from retracting his concession on appeal.
II. ALLOCUTION
Hinds next argues that the trial court erred when it did not permit him to speak on his own behalf at sentencing. Hinds claims that the trial court violated his statutory right to allocution. The State responds that Hinds waived this issue by failing to object below. See Br. of Resp’t at 10.2 We agree with the State.
By statute, “[b]efore imposing a sentence upon a defendant, the court shall conduct a sentencing hearing,” where the “court shall . . . allow arguments from the prosecutor, the defense counsel, the offender, the victim, the survivor of the victim, or a representative of the victim or survivor, and an investigative law enforcement officer as to the sentence to be imposed.” RCW 9.94A.500(1). The Washington Supreme Court has previously held that statutory allocution requirements should be “scrupulously follow[ed] . . . by directly addressing defendants during sentencing hearings, asking whether they wish to say anything to the court in mitigation of sentence, and allowing ‘arguments from . . . [the defendants] . . . as to the sentence to be imposed.’” In re Pers. Restraint of Echeverria, 141 Wn.2d 323, 336-37, 6 P.3d 573 (2000) (some alterations in original) (quoting former RCW 9.94A.110 (2000), which has been recodified as RCW 9.94A.500). This is because even “‘[t]he most persuasive counsel may not be able to speak for a defendant as the defendant might, with halting eloquence, speak for himself.’” State v. Canfield,
2 The State does not concede that the trial court failed to provide Hinds an opportunity to allocute. The State argues that the trial court inquired whether Hinds wished to speak by asking Hinds’ attorney if “‘anybody else’” needed to be heard prior to sentencing. Br. of Resp’t at 22 (quoting record). But because we conclude that allocution was waived by failure to expressly object, we need not address this issue.
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154 Wn.2d 698, 710, 116 P.3d 391 (2005) (alteration in original) (quoting Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 304, 81 S. Ct. 653, 5 L. Ed. 2d 670 (1961)).
Under RAP 2.5(a), “[t]he appellate court may refuse to review any claim of error which was not raised in the trial court.” But RAP 2.5 allows a party to raise a “manifest error affecting a constitutional right” for the first time on appeal. RAP 2.5(a)(3). An error is manifest if “either (1) it ‘results in actual prejudice to the defendant,’ or (2) the party has made a ‘plausible showing’ that the error had ‘practical and identifiable consequences’” In re Det. of Reyes, 176 Wn. App. 821, 842, 315 P.3d 532 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. WWJ Corp., 138 Wn.2d 595, 602-03, 980 P.2d 1257 (1999)).
Although we acknowledge that the better practice is for the court to directly invite the defendant to speak on their own behalf at sentencing, here, Hinds did not raise any objection below to being sentenced without allocution. The Washington Supreme Court, while declining to “impose any specific formal requirements for preserving the right of allocution,” has ruled that “the defendant must give the court some indication of his wish to plead for mercy or offer a statement in mitigation of his sentence.” Canfield, 154 Wn.2d at 707. In Canfield, the Supreme Court concluded that none of the defendants could raise the right of allocution for the first time on appeal “[s]ince none of the defendants . . . requested their right of allocution” prior to their appeal. Id.
The Washington Supreme Court has also recognized that, although there is a due process right to be heard at a revocation hearing, allocution at sentencing is a right that arises out of common law and statute, it is not a constitutional right. Id. at 703. Allocution is an important right,
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but it is not a constitutional right. It “is a common law right.” State v. Crider, 78 Wn. App. 849, 856, 899 P.2d 24 (1995).
Hinds’ statutory and common law right to allocution is not a constitutional issue that can be raised on appeal for the first time under RAP 2.5(a). The asserted error here is not a manifest error affecting a constitutional right. Thus, we decline to review Hinds’ sentence.
CONCLUSION
We affirm.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.
GLASGOW, J.
We concur:
PRICE, A.C.J.
CHE, J.