IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 85795-9-I Respondent, DIVISION ONE v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION VINCENT EDWARD HUFF, Jr.,
Appellant.
COBURN, J. — Vincent Huff, Jr. challenges his 2018 plea agreement because he
was not informed that the trial court had the discretion to impose a term of community
custody for the offense of assault in the second degree. The record demonstrates that
Huff was informed that the court could order community custody and he was not
affirmatively misled about a consequence of his plea. As there is no grounds to
withdraw his plea, we affirm the conviction but remand to strike the legal financial
obligations from his judgment and sentence.
FACTS
In May 2018, the State charged Huff with one count of rape of a child in the first
degree and one count of child molestation in the first degree. The parties “carefully
negotiated” a plea agreement in which Huff agreed to plead guilty pursuant to North 85795-9-I/2
Carolina v. Alford 1 to one count of assault in the second degree and pursuant to In re
Barr 2 and State v. Zhao 3 to one count of assault in the third degree. In exchange, the
State agreed to recommend a sentence of seven months of incarceration on each count
to be served concurrently.
At the plea hearing, Huff confirmed that he had read the plea agreement on his
own and with his attorney. During the colloquy, Huff expressed questions and confusion
about several issues which were addressed in private conversations with his counsel.
Huff stated that he understood the charges, the associated standard ranges and
maximum sentences, and that the judge was not required to accept the recommended
sentence. The trial court found that, based on Huff’s written statement and his answers
during the colloquy, the plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made, Huff
understood the consequences of the plea, and there was a factual basis for the plea.
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed the agreed recommendation of
seven months of confinement which amounted to his time already served in the King
County jail. In addition, the trial court noted that assault in the second degree “is a
violent crime . . . and does make Mr. Huff eligible for community custody for a period of
up to 12 months,” and exercised its discretion to impose this term of community
custody. The Department of Corrections subsequently determined that Huff was
ineligible for supervision and he was released from community custody in November
2018.
Huff filed a notice of appeal in August 2023. The appeal was untimely, but a
1 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970). 2 In re Pers. Restraint of Barr, 102 Wn.2d 265, 684 P.2d 712 (1984). 3 State v. Zhao, 157 Wn.2d 188, 137 P.3d 835 (2006).
2 85795-9-I/3
commissioner of this court granted his motion to enlarge time to file the appeal.
DISCUSSION
Huff challenges his plea agreement, a community custody condition, and legal
financial obligations imposed at the time of his sentencing.
Withdrawal of Plea
Huff asserts that his guilty plea was invalid because he was affirmatively misled
about the community custody consequences of his plea. We disagree.
“Due process requires that a defendant’s guilty plea be knowing, voluntary, and
intelligent.” State v. Mendoza, 157 Wn.2d 582, 587, 141 P.3d 49 (2006). The defendant
must be informed of all direct consequences of the plea. State v. Gregg, 196 Wn.2d
473, 483, 474 P.3d 539 (2020). “[A] guilty plea may be deemed involuntary when based
on misinformation regarding a direct consequence on the plea.” 4 Mendoza, 157 Wn.2d
at 591. “Absent a showing that the defendant was correctly informed of all of the direct
consequences of his guilty plea, the defendant may move to withdraw the plea.” Id.
Here, Huff contends that he was affirmatively misled about the applicability of
community custody because the paragraphs pertaining to community custody were
crossed out in his guilty plea statement and he acknowledged that the paragraphs did
not apply to him. Huff is correct that section 6(f) concerning community custody was
struck from his guilt plea statement. The provision states, “[i]n addition to confinement, if
4 Both parties cite to State v. Ross, 129 Wn.2d 279, 280, 916 P.2d 405 (1996), which held that “mandatory community placement constitutes a direct consequence of a guilty plea and failure to so inform a defendant renders that plea invalid.” However, in this case, the term of community custody was discretionary under RCW 9.94A.702(c) rather than mandatory. Neither party discusses whether community custody imposed pursuant to the trial court’s discretion is a direct or collateral consequence of a plea and we make no determination as to whether Ross applies equally to discretionary terms of community custody. Rather, we resolve the merits of Huff’s claim on the factual argument provided by the parties. 3 85795-9-I/4
the total period of confinement ordered is more than 12 months, the judge will sentence
me to the following period of community custody, unless the judge finds substantial and
compelling reasons to do otherwise.” However, any standard range sentence imposed
by the trial court would not have met the parameters for community custody outlined in
6(f). Huff’s standard range sentence was six to 12 months of incarceration and the
agreed recommended sentence was seven months. During the plea colloquy, Huff
acknowledged that section (f) did not apply to him. Thus, the record does not support
Huff’s claim that the deletion of section 6(f) affirmatively misled him as to a direct
consequence of the plea agreement.
The statement on plea of guilty discloses that the trial court may impose
community custody. The provision 6(e), immediately above the struck language,
outlines aspects of sentencing other than confinement, including “[t]he judge may also
order that I pay a fine, court costs, attorney fees, and other costs and fees, and place
other restrictions and requirements upon me. Furthermore, the judge may place me on
community custody.” While Huff did not explicitly acknowledge that the judge could
order community custody, he confirmed his understanding that the court could impose
fines, costs and fees as detailed in the same provision of his guilty plea statement.
The possibility that the judge could place him on community custody was
included in the guilty plea statement that Huff acknowledged having reviewed by himself
and with his attorney. Moreover, when the court imposed community custody, Huff did
not express any confusion or objection. The record supports that Huff was informed that
the court could impose community custody as a consequence of his plea. As such, Huff
has not established a basis to withdraw his guilty plea.
4 85795-9-I/5
Community Custody Condition
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 85795-9-I Respondent, DIVISION ONE v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION VINCENT EDWARD HUFF, Jr.,
Appellant.
COBURN, J. — Vincent Huff, Jr. challenges his 2018 plea agreement because he
was not informed that the trial court had the discretion to impose a term of community
custody for the offense of assault in the second degree. The record demonstrates that
Huff was informed that the court could order community custody and he was not
affirmatively misled about a consequence of his plea. As there is no grounds to
withdraw his plea, we affirm the conviction but remand to strike the legal financial
obligations from his judgment and sentence.
FACTS
In May 2018, the State charged Huff with one count of rape of a child in the first
degree and one count of child molestation in the first degree. The parties “carefully
negotiated” a plea agreement in which Huff agreed to plead guilty pursuant to North 85795-9-I/2
Carolina v. Alford 1 to one count of assault in the second degree and pursuant to In re
Barr 2 and State v. Zhao 3 to one count of assault in the third degree. In exchange, the
State agreed to recommend a sentence of seven months of incarceration on each count
to be served concurrently.
At the plea hearing, Huff confirmed that he had read the plea agreement on his
own and with his attorney. During the colloquy, Huff expressed questions and confusion
about several issues which were addressed in private conversations with his counsel.
Huff stated that he understood the charges, the associated standard ranges and
maximum sentences, and that the judge was not required to accept the recommended
sentence. The trial court found that, based on Huff’s written statement and his answers
during the colloquy, the plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made, Huff
understood the consequences of the plea, and there was a factual basis for the plea.
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed the agreed recommendation of
seven months of confinement which amounted to his time already served in the King
County jail. In addition, the trial court noted that assault in the second degree “is a
violent crime . . . and does make Mr. Huff eligible for community custody for a period of
up to 12 months,” and exercised its discretion to impose this term of community
custody. The Department of Corrections subsequently determined that Huff was
ineligible for supervision and he was released from community custody in November
2018.
Huff filed a notice of appeal in August 2023. The appeal was untimely, but a
1 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970). 2 In re Pers. Restraint of Barr, 102 Wn.2d 265, 684 P.2d 712 (1984). 3 State v. Zhao, 157 Wn.2d 188, 137 P.3d 835 (2006).
2 85795-9-I/3
commissioner of this court granted his motion to enlarge time to file the appeal.
DISCUSSION
Huff challenges his plea agreement, a community custody condition, and legal
financial obligations imposed at the time of his sentencing.
Withdrawal of Plea
Huff asserts that his guilty plea was invalid because he was affirmatively misled
about the community custody consequences of his plea. We disagree.
“Due process requires that a defendant’s guilty plea be knowing, voluntary, and
intelligent.” State v. Mendoza, 157 Wn.2d 582, 587, 141 P.3d 49 (2006). The defendant
must be informed of all direct consequences of the plea. State v. Gregg, 196 Wn.2d
473, 483, 474 P.3d 539 (2020). “[A] guilty plea may be deemed involuntary when based
on misinformation regarding a direct consequence on the plea.” 4 Mendoza, 157 Wn.2d
at 591. “Absent a showing that the defendant was correctly informed of all of the direct
consequences of his guilty plea, the defendant may move to withdraw the plea.” Id.
Here, Huff contends that he was affirmatively misled about the applicability of
community custody because the paragraphs pertaining to community custody were
crossed out in his guilty plea statement and he acknowledged that the paragraphs did
not apply to him. Huff is correct that section 6(f) concerning community custody was
struck from his guilt plea statement. The provision states, “[i]n addition to confinement, if
4 Both parties cite to State v. Ross, 129 Wn.2d 279, 280, 916 P.2d 405 (1996), which held that “mandatory community placement constitutes a direct consequence of a guilty plea and failure to so inform a defendant renders that plea invalid.” However, in this case, the term of community custody was discretionary under RCW 9.94A.702(c) rather than mandatory. Neither party discusses whether community custody imposed pursuant to the trial court’s discretion is a direct or collateral consequence of a plea and we make no determination as to whether Ross applies equally to discretionary terms of community custody. Rather, we resolve the merits of Huff’s claim on the factual argument provided by the parties. 3 85795-9-I/4
the total period of confinement ordered is more than 12 months, the judge will sentence
me to the following period of community custody, unless the judge finds substantial and
compelling reasons to do otherwise.” However, any standard range sentence imposed
by the trial court would not have met the parameters for community custody outlined in
6(f). Huff’s standard range sentence was six to 12 months of incarceration and the
agreed recommended sentence was seven months. During the plea colloquy, Huff
acknowledged that section (f) did not apply to him. Thus, the record does not support
Huff’s claim that the deletion of section 6(f) affirmatively misled him as to a direct
consequence of the plea agreement.
The statement on plea of guilty discloses that the trial court may impose
community custody. The provision 6(e), immediately above the struck language,
outlines aspects of sentencing other than confinement, including “[t]he judge may also
order that I pay a fine, court costs, attorney fees, and other costs and fees, and place
other restrictions and requirements upon me. Furthermore, the judge may place me on
community custody.” While Huff did not explicitly acknowledge that the judge could
order community custody, he confirmed his understanding that the court could impose
fines, costs and fees as detailed in the same provision of his guilty plea statement.
The possibility that the judge could place him on community custody was
included in the guilty plea statement that Huff acknowledged having reviewed by himself
and with his attorney. Moreover, when the court imposed community custody, Huff did
not express any confusion or objection. The record supports that Huff was informed that
the court could impose community custody as a consequence of his plea. As such, Huff
has not established a basis to withdraw his guilty plea.
4 85795-9-I/5
Community Custody Condition
Huff challenges one of the conditions imposed during his short time in community
custody. He contends that Condition 9, which ordered him to “[r]emain within
geographic boundaries, as set forth in writing by the Department of Corrections Officer
or as set forth with SODA order,” is unconstitutionally vague.
Huff is not currently subject to this community custody condition and has not
been subject to it since he was found ineligible for supervision and released in
November 2018. As a result, this court cannot provide effective relief and Huff’s
challenge to the condition is moot. See State v. Hunley, 175 Wn.2d 901, 907, 287 P.3d
584 (2012). We may retain and decide an appeal that is technically moot if it involves
matters of continuing and substantial public interest and is likely to evade review. In re
Pers. Restraint of Erickson, 146 Wn. App. 576, 582, 191 P.3d 917 (2008). The issue will
not evade review, as this court has previously considered the constitutionality of the
same geographic restriction and will review the issue in other pending cases. 5
Therefore, we decline to consider the merits of this moot claim.
Legal Financial Obligations (LFOs)
During Huff’s sentencing in 2018, the trial court noted that he was indigent but
imposed the mandatory Victim Penalty Assessment (VPA) of $500 pursuant to former
RCW 7.68.035(1) (2022) and the $100 DNA collection fee pursuant to former RCW
43.43.7541 (2022). Since that time, the Washington legislature has amended the
statutes to prohibit the imposition of the VPA when the defendant is indigent and
5 State v. Weeden, No. 85648-1, slip op. at 3-5 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2025) (unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/856481.pdf. State v. Johnson, No. 86004-6-I (hearing set for April 16, 2025); State v. Brown, No. 86224-3-I (notice of appeal filed Jan. 12, 2024). 5 85795-9-I/6
eliminate the DNA collection fee. RCW 7.68.035; RCW 43.43.7541; State v. Ellis, 27
Wn. App. 2d 1, 16-17, 530 P.3d 1048 (2023). Huff requests that we remand to strike the
VPA and DNA fee from his judgment and sentence. The State does not object to this
request. Therefore, we remand to the trial court solely for the ministerial purpose of
striking the VPA and DNA fee.
Statement of Additional Grounds
Finally, Huff submitted a statement of additional grounds for review attacking his
plea. He states that he was released pursuant to his Alford plea but was still convicted
of the assault charges which appear on his record. He also notes that the plea “makes it
seem like I got accused and blamed everything on someone else which I don’t see how
that’s possible. I did not say that at all.” Huff appears to suggest on appeal that he did
not understand the plea agreement.
The record demonstrates that the plea hearing included a comprehensive
colloquy in which Huff expressed that he understood the charges against him. Huff
paused the proceedings multiple times in order to speak with his attorney and, each
time, represented that his question had been answered. The State read aloud the Alford
plea statement where Huff asserted that he was not guilty of the crime charged but
“reviewed the case with my attorney and I believe that there is a substantial likelihood
that I could be found guilty. I wish to plead guilty to take advantage of the State’s offer.”
The State also read the Zhao plea statement which included the statement, “I believe
that if this matter proceeded to trial on the original charge, there’s a substantial
likelihood I would be convicted of the original charge,” and a wish to plead guilty to the
amended charges for the benefit of the plea offer. Huff acknowledged that he agreed to
6 85795-9-I/7
the statements. The court confirmed that Huff understood the two types of pleas he was
entering and had no remaining questions about the procedures. The court found the
plea to be entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. The record before us
supports that conclusion and there is no grounds to withdraw the plea.
Affirmed but remanded to strike LFOs from the judgment and sentence.
WE CONCUR: