Filed Washington State Court of Appeals Division Two
May 5, 2026
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 59781-1-II
Respondent,
v.
MICHAEL ALLEN MYERS, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant.
GLASGOW, J.—Police found three stolen vehicles at Michael Myers’ home, and after an
investigation they learned he also took items from a neighbor’s barn. The State charged Myers
with three counts of possession of a stolen motor vehicle, one count of second degree burglary for
entering the barn and stealing items, one count of third degree theft, and one count of third degree
malicious mischief for breaking the lock on the door of the barn.
At trial, the child of one of Myers’ friends testified that Myers took the child with him to
the barn to steal items the night before Myers was arrested. The barn’s owner testified that at least
one item was missing from the barn, and he said that a padlock on the barn door had been broken.
Text messages between Myers and a friend, also on the night before Myers was arrested, discussed
going back to the barn as well as breaking a car ignition. Three of the stolen vehicles on the
property had notable indications they had been stolen, such as fraudulent trip permits, missing
license plates, a stolen battery, and punched ignitions. No. 59781-1-II
A jury convicted Myers of all charges. Myers appeals. He argues that the evidence at trial
was insufficient to prove (1) he had knowledge that the vehicles were stolen; (2) the burglary,
theft, and malicious mischief occurred within the time period stated in the information and the to-
convict jury instructions; and (3) that specific items were stolen from the barn.
We hold that sufficient evidence supported Myers’ convictions for all six counts. We
affirm.
FACTS
On February 9, 2023, detectives visited Michael Myers’ mother’s home, where Myers was
staying, to follow up on an unrelated investigation. While there, a detective saw several cars on
the property, including a black 1997 Nissan pickup truck in the driveway. Police ran the license
plate for the 1997 Nissan truck and learned that the vehicle was stolen.
Detectives then left the property to obtain a warrant to search the property. When they
returned to the property, they saw a young child, TJ, sitting in the passenger seat of the black
Nissan truck. In the house were Myers, his mother, and Myers’ friend, Sonny Castro.
Detectives searched the property and found three stolen vehicles: the black 1997 Nissan
truck, a 1993 Nissan truck, and a 2012 Hyundai Elantra. The Hyundai was missing license plates,
its hood was open, the ignition was damaged, and it had a forged trip permit. The 1997 Nissan
truck had a damaged steering column and contained a screwdriver that Myers used to start the
truck. The 1993 Nissan was missing its battery. When questioned, Myers said that all three cars
belonged to his friend Castro. The detectives arrested Myers.
Myers had been driving TJ to and from school to help TJ’s parents. Detectives drove TJ
home. During this drive, TJ showed the detectives a barn on a nearby property where he would go
2 No. 59781-1-II
with Myers to take things. The property had fencing with no trespassing signs visible, and the
driveway was blocked by a chain.
When the property owner went to the barn with the detectives, he noted that his regular
padlock had been broken and replaced with a different lock. Detectives were able to open the new
padlock on the barn with a key they obtained from Myers’ key ring. The barn owner said that items
were missing from the barn, most notably, a tile cutter.
Police arrested Myers and recovered his cellphone. The phone contained text messages
between Myers and Castro from the night before Myers was arrested where they mentioned
loading up the truck at the barn and discussed how TJ wanted to go to the barn.
The State charged Myers with three counts of possession of a stolen motor vehicle, one
count of second degree burglary for breaking into the barn, one count of third degree theft for the
items stolen from the barn, and one count of third degree malicious mischief for the damage to the
lock made when entering the barn. All of the crimes had charging periods of “on or about”
February 8 or 9, the day before and the day of Myers’ arrest. Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 123-24.
II. JURY TRIAL
A. Trial Testimony
At trial, TJ testified that he and Myers would often go to the barn to steal items. To get in,
Myers cut the existing lock with bolt cutters and put on his own lock instead. TJ stated that the
night before the police arrived at Myers’ property, he and Myers had taken things from the barn
“like, a chair, some antique items, wooden, and a small, [] toy red trailer.” 17 Verbatim Rep. of
Proc. (VRP) at 359. TJ said, “[T]he day that it happened it was nighttime, and then the next day
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he got arrested after we went to the barn,” indicating that the theft took place on February 8 or 9
Id.
The owner of the barn testified that he went to the property “maybe like once a week or
every other week” and that the only other person who was allowed there was his handyman. 15
VRP at 154. He stated that when he went to the barn with law enforcement, he noticed that a tile
cutter was missing. As far as other items, the barn owner said that he could not tell for sure what
else was stolen, but he remembered the tile cutter because it was valuable.
B. Text Messages
The trial court admitted text messages between Myers and Castro that were sent the night
of February 8 and in the very early morning hours of February 9, 2023. Myers texted Castro, “‘I
got the things from the abandoned barn,’” to which Castro responded, “[O]h, aren’t we going back
there tomorrow?” But Myers and Castro ultimately decided to go back that same night. 15 VRP
150. When discussing going to the barn, Myers messaged Castro:
“Well, I need to cut the chain across the driveway. I could drop you off and open things up with you. Then I could drive the truck to the barn and we can load it up really quick. And then I can pick you guys back up afterwards. The boy wants to go like really bad and he doesn’t have school tomorrow.”
15 VRP at 150-51. In these messages, Castro repeatedly referred to Myers as “Boss,” saying things
like, “‘Boss, I’m sorry, but you can just head back, ‘cause I broke the ignition already’” and “‘I’m
ready now, boss’”. 15 VRP at 148-49. The jury also heard testimony that Myers was arrested later
that same day.
The jury convicted Myers of all charges. Myers appeals his convictions.
4 No. 59781-1-II
ANALYSIS
I. SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE STANDARD
Myers argues there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to support each of his
convictions. When assessing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, “‘the relevant question
is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’”
State v. Green, 94 Wn.2d 216, 221, 616 P.2d 628 (1980) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979)). “A claim of insufficiency admits the truth of
the State’s evidence and all inferences that reasonably can be drawn therefrom.” State v. Salinas,
119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). Therefore, “inferences from the evidence must be
drawn in favor of the State and interpreted most strongly against the defendant.” Id.
“[I]nferences based on circumstantial evidence must be reasonable and cannot be based on
speculation.” State v. Vasquez, 178 Wn.2d 1, 16, 309 P.3d 318 (2013). But we do not reweigh
evidence or reassess credibility, instead deferring to the trier of fact. State v. Roberts, 5 Wn.3d
222, 234, 572 P.3d 1191 (2025). Circumstantial and direct evidence are equally reliable. State v.
Delmarter, 94 Wn.2d 634, 638, 618 P.2d 99 (1980).
II. POSSESSION OF A STOLEN MOTOR VEHICLE
Myers argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to convict him of possession of
a stolen motor vehicle, because there is no evidence that Myers knew that the vehicles were stolen.
We disagree.
5 No. 59781-1-II
A. Methods of Proving Knowledge
Under RCW 9A.56.068, “A person is guilty of possession of a stolen vehicle if he or she
possess [possesses] a stolen vehicle.” Washington courts apply the definition of “possessing stolen
property” found in RCW 9A.56.140(1) to the crime of possessing a stolen vehicle. State v. Jones,
13 Wn. App. 2d 386, 399, 463 P.3d 738 (2020); State v. Lakotiy, 151 Wn. App. 699, 714, 214 P.3d
181 (2009). That statute provides, “‘Possessing stolen property’ means knowingly to receive,
retain, possess, conceal, or dispose of stolen property knowing that it has been stolen and to
withhold or appropriate the same to the use of any person other than the true owner.” RCW
9A.56.140(1).
“Bare possession of stolen property is insufficient to justify a conviction.” State v. McPhee,
156 Wn. App. 44, 62, 230 P.3d 284 (2010). But “possession of recently stolen property combined
with slight corroborative evidence of other inculpatory circumstances tending to support guilt will
sustain a conviction for possession of stolen property.” Jones, 13 Wn. App. 2d at 401 (citing State
v. Portee, 25 Wn.2d 246, 253-54, 170 P.2d 326 (1946)).
Consistent with these statutory requirements, the trial court instructed the jury in relevant
part that the State had to prove “the defendant acted with knowledge that the motor vehicle had
been stolen.” CP at 165. The trial court further instructed the jury:
A person knows or acts knowingly or with knowledge with respect to a fact, circumstance, or result when he or she is aware of that fact, circumstance, or result.
If a person has information that would lead a reasonable person in the same situation to believe that a fact exists, the jury is permitted but not required to find that he or she acted with knowledge of that fact.
CP at 155 (emphasis added).
6 No. 59781-1-II
In Jones, the State relied on improperly completed trip permits, a missing license plate,
damage to the car’s steering wheel, a socket extension used to start the car, and shaved keys as
circumstantial evidence that a car was stolen. Jones, 13 Wn. App. 2d at 397. In addition, Jones
attempted to flee when a deputy passed Jones in his car. Id. at 391, 402. Although the defendant
claimed he did not know the car was stolen, Division Three held there was sufficient corroborative
evidence to satisfy the knowledge element. Jones, 13 Wn. App. 2d at 401-02.
B. Analysis
Here, the cars in question exhibited similar characteristics of having been stolen. Two of
the vehicles had a damaged steering column or ignition, and Myers was using a screwdriver to
start the 1997 Nissan truck. The 1993 Nissan truck was missing its battery. All of the vehicles had
been stolen within the prior three weeks. Drawing all inferences in the light most favorable to the
State, a reasonable person, knowing that the ignitions were damaged, the license plates were
missing, and the use of an invalid trip permit, could have inferred that the vehicles were stolen.
Myers argues in his reply brief that Jones is distinguishable because Jones attempted to
flee from police while Myers did not. However, Jones did not hold that flight is a necessary
element to establish knowledge for vehicle theft; Jones’ flight was treated as one of many factors
that the court considered as corroborating circumstances that supported the inference that Jones
had knowledge that the car was stolen. 13 Wn. App. 2d at 401. Rather than flight, there was other
evidence that Myers was aware of or involved in car thefts with Castro. The evidence included
texts between Myers and Castro that referred to Myers not needing to meet Castro after all because
Castro had “broke[n] the ignition already.” 15 VRP at 148. And in this text chain, Castro referred
to Myers as “Boss.” Id.
7 No. 59781-1-II
Myers similarly argues that he did not know that the cars were stolen because the cars
belonged to his friend, Castro. But again, we consider whether a rational trier of fact could have
found knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the State. The jury could have drawn an inference about Myers’ relationship with Castro from the
texts in which Castro referred to Myers as “‘boss.’” 15 VRP at 148. The jury was not required to
accept Myers’ explanation. State v. Couet, 71 Wn.2d 773, 776, 430 P.2d 974 (1967) (holding that
the jury was not required to accept the defendant’s explanation that he was just using the stolen
vehicle while a friend was on vacation). Moreover, the lack of a plausible explanation for why the
stolen vehicles were on the property was also a factor the jury could consider when evaluating
whether there was sufficient evidence of knowledge. Jones, 13 Wn. App. 2d at 401.
In sum, taking the State’s evidence as true, the jury could have drawn reasonable inferences
that Myers both possessed the three stolen vehicles and knew that they were stolen. Accordingly,
we hold there was sufficient evidence to support Myers’ three convictions for possession of a
stolen motor vehicle.
III. THIRD DEGREE THEFT AND SECOND DEGREE BURGLARY
Myers argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to convict him of third degree
theft because there is insufficient evidence that he in fact stole a tile cutter. He also asserts that
there was insufficient evidence to establish that the second degree burglary and third degree theft
occurred on or around February 8 or 9 as required in the jury instructions. We disagree.
A. Third Degree Theft and Second Degree Burglary
RCW 9A.56.050(1) provides: “A person is guilty of theft in the third degree if he or she
commits theft of property or services which (a) does not exceed seven hundred fifty dollars in
8 No. 59781-1-II
value.” The definition of “theft” under RCW 9A.56.020(1)(a) is “[t]o wrongfully obtain or exert
unauthorized control over the property or services of another or the value thereof, with intent to
deprive him or her of such property or services.”
The Washington Supreme Court has held that value is not an essential element of third
degree theft because a theft of something of any value can constitute third degree theft. State v.
Tinker, 155 Wn.2d 219, 222, 118 P.3d 885 (2005). Therefore, the State does not have to prove the
actual value of what was stolen, just that anything of value was stolen. Id. Moreover, the fact finder
can rely on circumstantial evidence to support the conviction. State v. Britten, 46 Wn. App. 571,
574, 731 P.2d 508 (1986) (concluding the fact finder was entitled to rely on circumstantial
evidence that the defendant removed the tags from stolen clothes before taking them from a store).
Accordingly, the trial court instructed the jury on the elements of third degree theft
consistent with these requirements. In relevant part, the trial court instructed the jury,
To convict the defendant of the crime of theft in the third degree . . . , each of the following three elements of the crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) That on or about or between February 8[th] and February 9[th], 2023, the defendant wrongfully obtained or exerted unauthorized control over property of another or the value thereof.
CP at 169.
RCW 9A.52.030(1) provides that someone is guilty of second degree burglary “if, with
intent to commit a crime against a person or property therein, he or she enters or remains
unlawfully in a building other than a vehicle or a dwelling.” “‘[I]ntent to commit a crime may be
inferred if the defendant’s conduct and surrounding facts and circumstances plainly indicate such
an intent as a matter of logical probability.’” Vasquez, 178 Wn.2d at 8 (quoting State v. Woods, 63
Wn. App. 588, 591, 821 P.2d 1235 (1991)).
9 No. 59781-1-II
Consistent with these provisions, the trial court instructed the jury on the elements of
second degree burglary, in relevant part:
To convict the defendant of the crime of burglary in the second degree . . . , each of the following elements of the crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) That on or about or between February 8[th] and February 9[th], 2023, the defendant entered or remained unlawfully in a building;
(2) That the entering or remaining was with intent to commit a crime against a person or property therein.
CP at 168.
Myers relies on State v. Hickman for the principle that if a fact like dates is included in the
to-convict instruction, then the State has to prove that fact to the jury. 135 Wn.2d 97, 102, 954
P.2d 900 (1998). Even though, generally, the date of an offense is not an essential element of the
crime, State v. Brooks, 195 Wn.2d 91, 98, 455 P.3d 1151 (2020), the State acknowledges that
based on the jury instructions, it had to prove at trial that Myers executed the crimes related to the
theft from the barn on or about February 8 and 9.
B. Evidence of Theft
Through TJ’s testimony and the texts between Myers and Castro, the State presented
evidence to show that Myers broke into the barn and took a variety of items on the night before
Myers was arrested, including a chair and antique items. Myers focuses on the tile cutter
specifically. However, the jury was not required to find theft of the tile cutter because neither the
amended information nor the to-convict instruction for theft in the third degree specifically
mentioned the tile cutter, so the jury only had to find that Myers stole something of value on the
night in question. And TJ testified that they removed “a chair, some antique items, wooden, and a
10 No. 59781-1-II
small, [] toy red trailer” from the barn on the night before Myers was arrested. 17 VRP at 359.
Text messages between Myers and Castro sent on the same night corroborate TJ’s testimony.
Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a reasonable jury could find
that Myers wrongfully exerted unauthorized control over property of another when he took items
from the barn and that he intended to deprive the barn’s owner of the items. Because the State only
had to prove that Myers stole something of any value, the State did not have to prove that Myers
stole the tile cutter specifically.
C. Evidence of the Timing of the Burglary and Theft
Next, Myers argues that the State included in its second amended information and in the
jury instruction that the burglary and theft from the barn occurred “on or about or between February
8, 2023 and February 9, 2023.” Myers argues the State failed to prove the burglary and theft
occurred in this time period. CP at 129.
The texts between Myers and Castro sent on the night of February 8 discussed visiting the
barn that night or the next day, February 9. TJ also testified about stealing items from the barn the
night before Myers was arrested, and Myers was arrested on February 9, 2023. Taking all of the
State’s evidence as true, a rational person could infer that Myers unlawfully entered the barn and
took something of value from the barn on February 8 or 9.1
Thus, we hold that there was sufficient evidence to support the challenged elements of
Myers’ third degree theft conviction and the burglary conviction.
1 Myers does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support any other element of Myers’ burglary conviction.
11 No. 59781-1-II
IV. THIRD DEGREE MALICIOUS MISCHIEF
Finally, Myers argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to convict him of third
degree malicious mischief. He asserts that unlike the burglary and theft, there is no evidence to
support that the breaking of the lock on the barn door, which was the basis for the malicious
mischief charge, occurred during February 8 or February 9, 2023. And because there is evidence
Myers put his own lock on the barn door, the evidence suggests the barn owner’s lock was broken
well before the night of the charged burglary. We disagree and conclude that the evidence of timing
was sufficient for this charge.
RCW 9A.48.090(1)(a) states that a person is guilty of third degree malicious mischief if
they “(a) [k]nowingly and maliciously cause[] physical damage to the property of another, under
circumstances not amounting to malicious mischief in the first or second degree.” For third degree
malicious mischief, there is no monetary element, so it is sufficient to show that some physical
damage occurred. State v. Timothy K., 107 Wn. App. 784, 790, 27 P.3d 1263 (2001). Accordingly,
the trial court instructed the jury in relevant part that to convict Myers of third degree malicious
mischief, the jury had to find beyond a reasonable doubt “[t]hat on or about or between February
8[th] and February 9[th], 2023, the defendant knowingly and maliciously caused physical damage
to the property of another.” CP at 170.
In State v. Sanchez, the defendant was convicted of multiple counts of violating a domestic
violence no-contact order and witness tampering. 31 Wn. App. 2d 372, 554 P.3d 373 (2024) review
denied, 4 Wn. 3d 1004, 561 P.3d 747 (2025). Division Three concluded that even with the date as
an added element in the jury instructions, the State only needed to “prove that the crimes occurred
around the time of the alleged date” to satisfy the “on or about” requirement. Sanchez, 31 Wn.
12 No. 59781-1-II
App. 2d at 380. In State v. Polk, Division Three used similar reasoning to approve wide range of
possible dates, stating that “[w]hile the date established by the testimony does not exactly match
the November 17 date alleged by the State,” testimony provided at trial that a particular act
(scanning an image) could have happened “prior to December 9 [was] sufficient to establish that
the offense occurred on or about November 17.” 187 Wn. App. 380, 395, 348 P.3d 1255 (2015).
Given this application of “on or about” in jury instructions, “on or about” can encompass weeks,
not just days, in some circumstances.
TJ’s testimony established that Myers went to a building he did not own and replaced the
original lock with one of his own. Texts between Myers and Castro corroborated TJ’s testimony.
And under Polk, “on or about” can extend to a wider date range up to within weeks of the dates
named in the jury instructions. 187 Wn. App. at 395.
The State emphasizes that even assuming Myers broke the barn owner’s lock before
February 8, there was still sufficient evidence that the malicious mischief happened within the
acceptable date range under Polk because the barn owner or his handyman went to the barn every
week or every other week. The owner or handyman would have noticed that Myers had broken
their padlock and installed his own had those events occurred before they last visited the barn.
This, along with the fact that Myers was still stealing property from the barn unnoticed, was
sufficient for the jury to infer that the malicious mischief of breaking the lock happened within a
week or two of February 8. Under Polk, this is enough to support the jury’s conclusion that the
malicious mischief occurred on or about February 8. Id.
13 No. 59781-1-II
Further, there was evidence that Myers physically damaged another’s property by breaking
the existing lock on the barn and replacing it with his own. Specifically, Myers had a key to the
new lock, and TJ testified that Myers chopped off the original padlock with bolt cutters.
In sum, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support Myers’ malicious
mischief conviction.
CONCLUSION
We affirm all of Myers’ convictions.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW
2.06.040, it is so ordered.
GLASGOW, J. We concur:
MAXA, J.
PRICE, A.C.J.