FILED MARCH 9, 2021 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 37160-3-III ) (consolidated w/ Respondent, ) No. 37220-1-III) ) v. ) ) PUBLISHED OPINION CHRISTOPHER R. MORRELL, ) ) Appellant. )
PENNELL, C.J. — Informants are an important source of police intelligence.
But criminal informants are less reliable than citizen informants. When a criminal
informant implicates another person in a crime, law enforcement must be assured the
quality of information outweighs the informant’s motive to lie. If a criminal informant’s
tip is not inherently robust, independent corroboration is required before the police can
use the tip to infringe on a suspect’s constitutional rights.
Police stopped Christopher Morrell’s vehicle after a criminal informant fingered
him as her drug supplier. Although the informant was not anonymous and her information
technically included a statement against interest, the informant’s allegation was not Nos. 37160-3-III; 37220-1-III State v. Morrell
inherently credible. The informant did not confess to any criminal behavior beyond
what was obvious at the time of her arrest. In addition, her claim that Mr. Morrell was
her drug supplier was not readily amenable to verification or refutation. Given the
doubtful quality of the informant’s tip, the police needed corroboration before they could
rely on it to impinge Mr. Morrell’s right to be free from warrantless seizure and search.
Unfortunately, this did not occur. The police therefore lacked authority to execute an
investigatory stop of Mr. Morrell’s vehicle. All evidence tied to the stop must be
suppressed. This matter is reversed.
BACKGROUND
Late in the evening of August 9, 2017, Spokane Police Department officers,
including Officer Scott Lesser, arrested a woman named Ashley Ansbaugh on an
outstanding warrant. During a search incident to arrest, officers discovered
methamphetamine and heroin on Ms. Ansbaugh’s person. Unsolicited, Ms. Ansbaugh
told the officers she had just purchased the drugs from Christopher Morrell, who used
the nickname “Duffles.” Report of Proceedings (Jun. 13, 2019) at 8. Ms. Ansbaugh said
Mr. Morell drove a maroon Chevrolet Monte Carlo, he still had drugs on him, and he
would be driving to her hotel room with more drugs. Officer Lesser was familiar with
Mr. Morrell and his nickname from prior contacts, including a past drug investigation.
2 Nos. 37160-3-III; 37220-1-III State v. Morrell
Officer Lesser remained on patrol the morning after Ms. Ansbaugh’s arrest. At
some point, he saw Mr. Morrell driving a maroon Monte Carlo near a gas station. There is
no indication the gas station was near a hotel. Intending to investigate Ms. Ansbaugh’s
tip, Officer Lesser performed a traffic stop after following Mr. Morrell for several miles.
Officer Lesser ordered Mr. Morrell out of the vehicle and frisked him for weapons.
Mr. Morrell’s car door was left open during the traffic stop and frisk. Officer
Lesser was able to observe the interior of the car with the help of a flashlight. The officer
noticed several large air fresheners, which he knew were commonly used to mask the
smell of heroin. He also saw a crystal substance and sandwich bags. The sandwich bags
were similar to ones containing the drugs found in Ms. Ansbaugh’s possession. Finally,
Officer Lesser saw a blue case oddly placed underneath the passenger seat of the vehicle.
Officer Lesser obtained a search warrant for Mr. Morrell’s person and the Monte
Carlo. In Mr. Morrell’s pocket, Officer Lesser found $246 in cash. In the blue case, he
discovered additional sandwich bags containing methamphetamine and heroin. Two
scales with methamphetamine residue were found in the case and center console. The
quantities of methamphetamine and heroin recovered suggested drug trafficking. Officer
Lesser also seized two cell phones from the vehicle. Officer Lesser then released Mr.
Morrell in the hopes he would cooperate with the police in locating other drug dealers.
3 Nos. 37160-3-III; 37220-1-III State v. Morrell
Later that day, Officer Lesser obtained a search warrant for the two phones.
Execution of the warrant revealed Facebook and text messages implicating Mr. Morrell in
drug transactions. At some point, it appears a warrant was issued for Mr. Morrell’s arrest.
On September 28, 2017, Officer Lesser spotted Mr. Morrell driving a tan GMC
Yukon. Officer Lesser stopped the vehicle and arrested Mr. Morrell. During this process,
Officer Lesser saw a crystal substance on the driver’s seat of the vehicle. A narcotics dog
was summoned, which alerted the officers to the presence of narcotics in the vehicle.
Another search warrant was obtained. Upon executing the warrant, Officer Lesser
discovered methamphetamine, heroin, drug scales with drug residue, sandwich bags and
packaging, and $157 in cash. Mr. Morrell was then arrested for both the August and
September incidents.
The State charged Mr. Morrell with drug offenses associated with the two vehicle
searches. Mr. Morrell filed an unsuccessful motion to suppress. A jury subsequently
convicted Mr. Morrell of four counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent
to deliver. The trial court sentenced Mr. Morrell to 90 months in prison followed by a
year of community custody.
Mr. Morrell now appeals.
4 Nos. 37160-3-III; 37220-1-III State v. Morrell
ANALYSIS
The dispositive issue on appeal is whether Ms. Ansbaugh’s tip supplied reasonable
suspicion for an investigatory traffic stop. If it did not, all evidence seized by the State
during both traffic stops must be suppressed under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.
Our analysis of this issue is de novo. State v. McReynolds, 117 Wn. App. 309, 328, 71
P.3d 663 (2003) (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 134 L.
Ed. 2d 911 (1996)).
Article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution provides “[n]o person
shall be disturbed in [their] private affairs, or [their] home invaded, without authority of
law.” This provision is generally applied consistently with the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution in the context of investigatory stops. State v. Z.U.E., 183
Wn.2d 610, 617, 352 P.3d 796 (2015). “However, because article I, section 7 provides for
broader privacy protections than the Fourth Amendment, our state constitution generally
requires a stronger showing by the State.” Id. at 618. Warrantless seizures are presumed
to be unreasonable, and the State bears the burden of showing a warrantless seizure fell
into an exception to the warrant requirement. Id. at 617.
5 Nos. 37160-3-III; 37220-1-III State v. Morrell
An exception to the warrant requirement “is a brief investigatory detention . . .
known as a Terry[1] stop.” Id. “For a Terry stop to be permissible, the State must show
that the officer had a ‘reasonable suspicion’ that the detained person was, or was about to
be, involved in a crime.” Id. (quoting State v. Acrey, 148 Wn.2d 738, 747, 64 P.3d 594
(2003)).
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
FILED MARCH 9, 2021 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 37160-3-III ) (consolidated w/ Respondent, ) No. 37220-1-III) ) v. ) ) PUBLISHED OPINION CHRISTOPHER R. MORRELL, ) ) Appellant. )
PENNELL, C.J. — Informants are an important source of police intelligence.
But criminal informants are less reliable than citizen informants. When a criminal
informant implicates another person in a crime, law enforcement must be assured the
quality of information outweighs the informant’s motive to lie. If a criminal informant’s
tip is not inherently robust, independent corroboration is required before the police can
use the tip to infringe on a suspect’s constitutional rights.
Police stopped Christopher Morrell’s vehicle after a criminal informant fingered
him as her drug supplier. Although the informant was not anonymous and her information
technically included a statement against interest, the informant’s allegation was not Nos. 37160-3-III; 37220-1-III State v. Morrell
inherently credible. The informant did not confess to any criminal behavior beyond
what was obvious at the time of her arrest. In addition, her claim that Mr. Morrell was
her drug supplier was not readily amenable to verification or refutation. Given the
doubtful quality of the informant’s tip, the police needed corroboration before they could
rely on it to impinge Mr. Morrell’s right to be free from warrantless seizure and search.
Unfortunately, this did not occur. The police therefore lacked authority to execute an
investigatory stop of Mr. Morrell’s vehicle. All evidence tied to the stop must be
suppressed. This matter is reversed.
BACKGROUND
Late in the evening of August 9, 2017, Spokane Police Department officers,
including Officer Scott Lesser, arrested a woman named Ashley Ansbaugh on an
outstanding warrant. During a search incident to arrest, officers discovered
methamphetamine and heroin on Ms. Ansbaugh’s person. Unsolicited, Ms. Ansbaugh
told the officers she had just purchased the drugs from Christopher Morrell, who used
the nickname “Duffles.” Report of Proceedings (Jun. 13, 2019) at 8. Ms. Ansbaugh said
Mr. Morell drove a maroon Chevrolet Monte Carlo, he still had drugs on him, and he
would be driving to her hotel room with more drugs. Officer Lesser was familiar with
Mr. Morrell and his nickname from prior contacts, including a past drug investigation.
2 Nos. 37160-3-III; 37220-1-III State v. Morrell
Officer Lesser remained on patrol the morning after Ms. Ansbaugh’s arrest. At
some point, he saw Mr. Morrell driving a maroon Monte Carlo near a gas station. There is
no indication the gas station was near a hotel. Intending to investigate Ms. Ansbaugh’s
tip, Officer Lesser performed a traffic stop after following Mr. Morrell for several miles.
Officer Lesser ordered Mr. Morrell out of the vehicle and frisked him for weapons.
Mr. Morrell’s car door was left open during the traffic stop and frisk. Officer
Lesser was able to observe the interior of the car with the help of a flashlight. The officer
noticed several large air fresheners, which he knew were commonly used to mask the
smell of heroin. He also saw a crystal substance and sandwich bags. The sandwich bags
were similar to ones containing the drugs found in Ms. Ansbaugh’s possession. Finally,
Officer Lesser saw a blue case oddly placed underneath the passenger seat of the vehicle.
Officer Lesser obtained a search warrant for Mr. Morrell’s person and the Monte
Carlo. In Mr. Morrell’s pocket, Officer Lesser found $246 in cash. In the blue case, he
discovered additional sandwich bags containing methamphetamine and heroin. Two
scales with methamphetamine residue were found in the case and center console. The
quantities of methamphetamine and heroin recovered suggested drug trafficking. Officer
Lesser also seized two cell phones from the vehicle. Officer Lesser then released Mr.
Morrell in the hopes he would cooperate with the police in locating other drug dealers.
3 Nos. 37160-3-III; 37220-1-III State v. Morrell
Later that day, Officer Lesser obtained a search warrant for the two phones.
Execution of the warrant revealed Facebook and text messages implicating Mr. Morrell in
drug transactions. At some point, it appears a warrant was issued for Mr. Morrell’s arrest.
On September 28, 2017, Officer Lesser spotted Mr. Morrell driving a tan GMC
Yukon. Officer Lesser stopped the vehicle and arrested Mr. Morrell. During this process,
Officer Lesser saw a crystal substance on the driver’s seat of the vehicle. A narcotics dog
was summoned, which alerted the officers to the presence of narcotics in the vehicle.
Another search warrant was obtained. Upon executing the warrant, Officer Lesser
discovered methamphetamine, heroin, drug scales with drug residue, sandwich bags and
packaging, and $157 in cash. Mr. Morrell was then arrested for both the August and
September incidents.
The State charged Mr. Morrell with drug offenses associated with the two vehicle
searches. Mr. Morrell filed an unsuccessful motion to suppress. A jury subsequently
convicted Mr. Morrell of four counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent
to deliver. The trial court sentenced Mr. Morrell to 90 months in prison followed by a
year of community custody.
Mr. Morrell now appeals.
4 Nos. 37160-3-III; 37220-1-III State v. Morrell
ANALYSIS
The dispositive issue on appeal is whether Ms. Ansbaugh’s tip supplied reasonable
suspicion for an investigatory traffic stop. If it did not, all evidence seized by the State
during both traffic stops must be suppressed under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.
Our analysis of this issue is de novo. State v. McReynolds, 117 Wn. App. 309, 328, 71
P.3d 663 (2003) (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 134 L.
Ed. 2d 911 (1996)).
Article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution provides “[n]o person
shall be disturbed in [their] private affairs, or [their] home invaded, without authority of
law.” This provision is generally applied consistently with the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution in the context of investigatory stops. State v. Z.U.E., 183
Wn.2d 610, 617, 352 P.3d 796 (2015). “However, because article I, section 7 provides for
broader privacy protections than the Fourth Amendment, our state constitution generally
requires a stronger showing by the State.” Id. at 618. Warrantless seizures are presumed
to be unreasonable, and the State bears the burden of showing a warrantless seizure fell
into an exception to the warrant requirement. Id. at 617.
5 Nos. 37160-3-III; 37220-1-III State v. Morrell
An exception to the warrant requirement “is a brief investigatory detention . . .
known as a Terry[1] stop.” Id. “For a Terry stop to be permissible, the State must show
that the officer had a ‘reasonable suspicion’ that the detained person was, or was about to
be, involved in a crime.” Id. (quoting State v. Acrey, 148 Wn.2d 738, 747, 64 P.3d 594
(2003)). Reasonable suspicion requires an investigating officer have “‘specific and
articulable facts’” based on the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 617 (quoting Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968); State v. Glover, 116 Wn.2d
509, 514, 806 P.2d 760 (1991) (quoting same).
Officer Lesser’s interaction with Mr. Morrell on the morning of August 10, 2017,
began as a warrantless Terry stop. It was based on the information supplied by Ms.
Ansbaugh, coupled with Officer Lesser’s independent confirmation of Mr. Morrell’s
nickname and vehicle type. The question we must decide, therefore, is whether this level
of information was sufficient to constitute reasonable suspicion.
Although reasonable suspicion requires less than probable cause for an arrest, an
informant’s tip alleging criminal activity is not always sufficient to satisfy reasonable
suspicion. Instead, the State must show the “tip bears some ‘indicia of reliability’ under
the totality of the circumstances.” Z.U.E., 183 Wn.2d at 618. “[T]here [must] either be
1 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968).
6 Nos. 37160-3-III; 37220-1-III State v. Morrell
(1) circumstances establishing the informant’s reliability or (2) some corroborative
observation, usually by the officers, that shows either (a) the presence of criminal activity
or (b) that the informer’s information was obtained in a reliable fashion.” Id.
An informant’s reliability turns on their credibility and basis of knowledge. In
some cases, one of the two factors is more important than the other. Here, there are no
questions about Ms. Ansbaugh’s basis of knowledge. Ms. Ansbaugh was not reporting
some sort of suspicious activity that might have been criminal; she claimed Mr. Morrell
sold her drugs. The only question is whether Ms. Ansbaugh was a credible source of
information.
Several factors can enhance an informant’s credibility. A named informant is
deemed more reliable than an anonymous one. The reasoning is that a named informant
risks criminal prosecution for supplying false information, but an anonymous informant
does not take this gamble. See id. at 621. Additionally, our case law holds an informant is
more credible if they make a statement against penal interest. State v. Jackson, 102 Wn.2d
432, 437, 688 P.2d 136 (1984). “Since one who admits criminal activity to a police officer
faces possible prosecution, it is generally held to be a reasonable inference that a
statement raising such a possibility is a credible one.” State v. Lair, 95 Wn.2d 706, 710,
630 P.2d 427 (1981).
7 Nos. 37160-3-III; 37220-1-III State v. Morrell
While Ms. Ansbaugh was a named informant and she made a statement
implicating her penal interests, her credibility remained suspect because she was a
criminal informant. Unlike a citizen informant calling 911, a criminal informant is not
presumed to be acting out of civic responsibility. See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE § 3.3 at 129 n.6 (6th ed. 2020) (quoting Michael A. Rebell, The Undisclosed
Informant and the Fourth Amendment: A Search for Meaningful Standards, 81 Yale L.J.
703, 712-13 (1972)). Instead, the criminal informant’s motives may “include offers of
immunity or sentence reduction in exchange for cooperation, promises of money
payments . . . and such perverse motives as revenge or the hope of eliminating criminal
competition.” 2 LAFAVE, supra. Experience and common sense dictate that a criminal
informant cannot be deemed equally credible as a citizen informant. Additional indicia
of veracity are required.
A statement against interest can help establish a criminal informant’s credibility,
but not always. “It must be remembered . . . that the admission against penal interest is
used to determine the trustworthiness of the informant’s information.” Lair, 95 Wn.2d at
711. Not all statements against interest are equal. The real question is not whether the
informant has technically made a statement against interest, but whether the statement
against interest was made under circumstances suggestive of reliability. See 2 LAFAVE,
8 Nos. 37160-3-III; 37220-1-III State v. Morrell
supra, § 3.3(c) at 167 (“Courts thus should not utilize the admission-against-penal-
interest concept in a blunderbuss fashion, but instead should assess in a more careful
fashion, preferably upon a full disclosure by the police of all relevant circumstances, what
the significance of that admission is in the context of the particular case.”). For example,
an informant’s statement to law enforcement that can be readily verified or refuted may
be deemed credible on the theory that lying would only deepen the informant’s criminal
troubles. State v. O’Connor, 39 Wn. App. 113, 121, 692 P.2d 208 (1984). But a statement
that largely defies the possibility of contradiction carries little weight. “For example, if
the police apprehended a person for possession of drugs and [they] were then to admit to
purchases from various named sources in the recent past, there would be cause for
skepticism.” 2 LAFAVE, supra, § 3.3(c) at 175.
Ms. Ansbaugh’s statement to police was not the type of statement against interest
that carried an aura of reliability. Given she was caught red-handed, Ms. Ansbaugh’s
willingness to admit to drug possession was not particularly impressive. In addition,
the information supplied by Ms. Ansbaugh was not amenable to being either refuted or
verified. Had Officer Lesser stopped Mr. Morrell and not found drugs, this would not
mean Ms. Ansbaugh was lying. As someone involved in drug activity, Ms. Ansbaugh
likely knew of various individuals involved in drugs. When caught, rather than give up
9 Nos. 37160-3-III; 37220-1-III State v. Morrell
the name of her true supplier, Ms. Ansbaugh could just as easily (if not more likely) have
thrown out the name of someone she believed was involved in drugs through rumor or
reputation.
Because Ms. Ansbaugh’s tip was not sufficiently robust to carry an aura of
reliability, law enforcement was required to corroborate her claims prior to conducting
a warrantless stop. Z.U.E., 183 Wn.2d at 618. “[C]orroborative observations do not need
to be of particularly blatant criminal activity, but they must corroborate more than just
innocuous facts, such as an individual’s appearance or clothing.” Z.U.E., 183 Wn.2d at
618-19.
The facts here do not show corroboration. The only information verified by police
was Ms. Ansbaugh’s knowledge of Mr. Morrell’s nickname and car and the general
allegation that he was involved with drugs. These are facts that would be known to
anyone familiar with Mr. Morrell through rumor or reputation. Jackson, 102 Wn.2d at
438. The police could have tried to corroborate Ms. Ansbaugh’s specific information by
following up on her claim that he would be returning to her hotel with drugs, but they did
not do so. Instead, Officer Lesser simply stopped Mr. Morrell after he saw him driving
near a gas station. At that point in time, Officer Lesser lacked sufficient basis for an
investigative stop.
10 Nos. 37160-3-III; 37220-1-III State v. Morrell
All the drug evidence used against Mr. Morrell at trial was proximately connected
to Officer Lesser’s initial traffic stop. This is obviously true for the search of the Monte
Carlo, which was based on contraband observed by Officer Lesser during the stop. But
the later stop and search of the Yukon also had a direct causal connection. That stop was
based on a warrant issued against Mr. Morrell for the drugs seized from the Monte Carlo.
No separate, unforeseeable act, severed the causal connection between Mr. Morrell’s
initial unlawful detention and the two vehicle searches. As a result, evidence seized in
the searches must be suppressed. State v. Mayfield, 192 Wn.2d 871, 898, 434 P.3d 58
(2019). 2
CONCLUSION
The judgments of conviction are reversed. This matter is remanded with
instructions to grant Mr. Morrell’s motion to suppress.
_________________________________ Pennell, C.J. WE CONCUR:
______________________________ Fearing, J. Lawrence-Berrey, J.
2 The scope of this ruling includes the cell phones seized from the Monte Carlo.