State of Texas v. Gleannloch Commerical Development, LP

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedMarch 8, 2018
Docket14-16-00037-CV
StatusPublished

This text of State of Texas v. Gleannloch Commerical Development, LP (State of Texas v. Gleannloch Commerical Development, LP) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State of Texas v. Gleannloch Commerical Development, LP, (Tex. Ct. App. 2018).

Opinion

Motion for Rehearing Denied; Motion for En Banc Reconsideration Denied as Moot; Affirmed and Substitute Opinion filed March 8, 2018.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-16-00037-CV

STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant

V.

GLEANNLOCH COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT, LP, Appellee

On Appeal from County Court at Law No. 2 Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 1042631

MEMORANDUM OPINION

We issued our opinion in this case on December 21, 2017. Thereafter, the State of Texas filed a motion for rehearing and motion for en banc reconsideration. Appellee Gleannloch Commercial Development, LP, filed a response to which the State replied. We withdraw our previous opinion, vacate our previous judgment, and issue this substitute opinion and judgment. We deny the State’s motion for rehearing and deny as moot the State’s motion for en banc reconsideration.

The State brings this appeal from a judgment entered upon the jury’s verdict in favor of Gleannloch for $13,190,562. The State raises threes issues: (1) sufficiency of the evidence, both legal and factual, to support the amount of the jury’s award; (2) the admission of evidence; and (3) application of the project influence rule. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

Gleannloch owned a 25.33-acre tract on Boudreaux Road, near the city of Tomball, in Harris County, Texas. In a condemnation proceeding filed January 10, 2014, the State acquired approximately 14.42 acres1 of Gleannloch’s property for the construction of a portion of Segment F-2 of State Highway 99 (“the Grand Parkway”). The 14.42 acres acquired by the State is the only portion of its property for which Gleannloch sought compensation.

A hearing was held August 5, 2014, by the appointed special commissioners and they awarded Gleannloch $4,867,946. Gleannloch objected. The commissioners’ award was deposited into the registry of the court on September 3, 2014, and Gleannloch withdrew those funds.

A jury trial was then conducted in September 2015 on the question of compensation to Gleannloch for the 14.42 acres (the “subject property”). The jury’s verdict valued the subject property at $13,190,562, which equates to $21 per square foot. The trial court entered judgment in accordance with the verdict. The State timely filed a motion for new trial, which was overruled by operation of law. From the trial court’s judgment, the State timely filed this appeal. The State complains:

1 The exact figure is 14.4197 acres, or 628,122 square feet.

2  The evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the jury’s verdict;

 The trial court erred in admitting evidence; and

 The trial court improperly applied the project-influence rule.

We address each issue in turn.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

In its first issue, the State contends the evidence was both legally and factually insufficient to support the jury’s award. The State makes a single argument in support of its assertion that there was no evidence, or not enough evidence, to support the verdict — that the jury’s award is greater than the highest amount adopted by an expert witness. Accordingly, we address whether the record contains evidence from which a jury could value the subject property higher than did the expert witnesses.

A. Standard of Review

We review the entire record to determine whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support the judgment, crediting favorable evidence if reasonable jurors could and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005). If they reasonably could do so, we assume that jurors decided questions of credibility or conflicting evidence in favor of the verdict. Id. at 819, 820. Evidence is legally sufficient to support the verdict if it would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions. Id. at 822. If the evidence falls within this zone of reasonable disagreement, we do not substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact. Id. When reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we examine the entire record, considering all the evidence both in favor of and contrary to the challenged finding. Cain

3 v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986). We will overturn a finding only when it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986). The fact finder is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the witnesses’ testimony and we may not substitute our judgment for that of the jury simply because we might reach a different conclusion. Vast Constr., LLC v. CTC Contractors, LLC, 526 S.W.3d 709, 723 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.).

A jury is not bound to accept valuation expert testimony. Preston Reserve, L.L.C. v. Compass Bank, 373 S.W.3d 652, 666 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (citing Callejo v. Brazos Elec. Power Co-op., Inc., 755 S.W.2d 73, 75 (Tex. 1988)). However, this does not permit the jury to “leap entirely outside of the evidence in answering” a valuation question. Callejo, 755 S.W.2d at 75. The jury may not substitute its own knowledge and experience for a party’s evidence on value. Id. But the jury may “set the value at any amount between the lowest and highest values by the evidence.” Preston Reserve, 373 S.W.3d at 666 (citing State v. Huffstutler, 871 S.W.2d 955, 959 (Tex. App.—Austin 1994, no writ). Only if the jury’s verdict lies outside the range of testimony will we find there is no evidence to support the verdict. Callejo, 755 S.W.2d at 75.

B. The Evidence

The record shows Gleannloch Farms is a twenty-one acre master-planned development in northwest Harris County north of Beltway 8 and west of Interstate 45 (“I-45”). The primary component of the development is more than 2,300 single- family residences with amenities such as a 27-hole golf course, lakes, parks, hike and bike trails, equestrian center, recreation centers, playground, swimming pool and tennis courts. Gleannloch Farms has two commercial reserves, one on the south

4 end and one on the north end. The southern end of Gleannloch Farms is bordered by Spring Cypress Road.

The subject property is part of the northern commercial reserve. The commercial reserve is restricted for commercial development and architectural controls have been placed upon it. The subject property fronts Boudreaux to the south. On its western side is Champion Forest, which passes through Gleannloch Farms. On its eastern side, Crescent Clover was supposed to intersect Boudreaux and provide a second point of access through Gleannloch Farms but it was stopped short. The City of Houston has designated both Boudreaux and Champion Forest, as well as Spring Cypress, as major thoroughfares. An access way, about eighty-five feet wide, connects the western part of the subject property to the eastern part so that both commercial portions of the subject property are connected and have cross- access.

Three expert witnesses testified to their opinions of the subject property’s market value as of the date of taking, September 3, 2014. One of Gleannloch’s experts, Matthew Deal, was the first to testify.

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