State of New York v. State of Connecticut Et Al.

4 U.S. 1, 1 L. Ed. 715, 4 Dall. 1, 1799 U.S. LEXIS 243
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedAugust 17, 1799
StatusPublished
Cited by56 cases

This text of 4 U.S. 1 (State of New York v. State of Connecticut Et Al.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State of New York v. State of Connecticut Et Al., 4 U.S. 1, 1 L. Ed. 715, 4 Dall. 1, 1799 U.S. LEXIS 243 (1799).

Opinion

The opinion of the Court was delivered by the Chief Justice.

Ellsworth, Chief Justice.

*Same Cause.

The bill in this case contained an historical account of the title of New York, to the soil and jurisdiction of the tract of land in dispute ; set forth an agreement of the 28th of November 1883, between the two states, on the subject; and prayed a discovery, relief and injunctior to stay the proceeding in the Connecticut ejectments. 3 Dali. 411. As the state had not appeared, the question of injunction was the only one now argued.

Hoffman (the Attorney-General of New York), in support of the prayer for an injunction, and the general merits of the bill, urged various points, *3 with great force and ability. 1st. It is necessary to execa .e the special agreement between the states: it is a principle of equity, that wherever there is an agreement as to a right, whether it is a mere franchise, or a right of soil, it shall be enforced and rendered conclusive upon the parties, by the interposition of the court. The agreement admits that the tract of land belonged to New York ; and the bill states, that notwithstanding this admission, Connecticut has since undertaken to grant a part of it to the plaintiffs in the ejectments. Hence, it became necessary (or the bill would have been incomplete) to make those plaintiffs parties to the present suit. The agreement, indeed, only gives the equitable title to New York; while the plaintiffs below possess the legal title, and must, of course, recover in the ejectments. A specific performance of the agreement being decreed against Connecticut, would not be an adequate and complete remedy; and all parties in interest, however remote, must be brought before the court, or they cannot be affected by its proceedings. 2d. It will prevent a multiplicity of suits. The bill is emphatically a bill of peace ; since, considering the character of the parties to the principal controversy, without this remedy, the consequences upon the public tranquillity can hardly be conjectured. It is true, however, that the right of the state of New York cannot be affected by a decision in the circuit court; but until that right is lawfully settled, the number of suits, by individuals, must be indefinitely great; and merely to avoid a multiplicity of suits, to cut off, by one decision, various sources of strife and litigation, is a substantive ground for the exercise of a chancery jurisdiction. 1 Atk. 282; 2 Ibid. 484. 3d. It is a bill for the discovery of title, which parties in interest, as well as parties in possession, may certainly maintain. 1 Ves. 249. (a) 4th. It is a bill to settle a question *of boundary be- p tween two states. Of this question, the court can, incontestably, take L cognisance ; and it will not allow the decision of the principal matter to be interrupted or prevented by collateral considerations; particularly, when the decision of the principal, will settle all the inferior matters in dispute. In Penn v. Baltimore, 1 Ves. 454, the bill was sustained upon similar principles; and the jurisdiction there assumed, upon principle, in a case of contested provincial boundary, may surely be exercised here under the additional sanction of the constitution. 2 Dall. 442, 415, 419; 3 Ibid. 1, 412. But it is not simply a bill to settle a question of boundary between two states ; it involves the right of soil, which, in relation to a great part of New York, results from the right of jurisdiction ; so that, deciding the latter, is virtually a decision of the former. In this respect, New York is, perhaps, distinguished from her sister states, whose claims of territory are, generally, founded upon positive grant; while her claim of soil is a mere incident of the sovereignty and jurisdiction with which the revolution invested her. (b)

*4 Ingersoll, against granting the prayer for an injunction. — In the suits below, the state of New York is not a party, and cannot be affected oy their decision ; while the defendants below are not parties to the present bill, though they are the persons most likely to be injured by those suits. But no part of the bill states that any of the land belongs to New York ; so non constat that she is interested in the question of soil; and the question of state boundary cannot be decided, as between the states, in the circuit court, (a) There is no instance of the interposition of a court of ““equity,'by way of injunction, unless upon the application of a party immediately interested in the subject of the common-law suits, or there is property likely to be withdrawn. 1 Ch. Prec. 186-7 ; Gilb. Ch. 19 ; 2 Dall. 402 ; 5 Bot. Car. Cane. 439 ; Hind. Ch. 585. Besides, there is a regular course, in which the judgment of this court, independent of its equity character, may be obtained ; as, by a writ of error, on a demurrer to evidence, the construction and effect of the alleged agreement between the states might here be revised, and authoritatively declared ; and “'suits in equity cannot be sustained in any court of the United States, in any case where plain, adequate and complete remedy may be had at law.” (b) (1 U. S. Stat. 82, § 16). Cowp. 216-6 ; 2 H. Black. 187. An eventual responsibility cannot constitute a party to the suits below. The several states should, in justice, refund the price of the confiscated estates, if those, who have now brought suits against the purchasers under their respective laws, should succeed ; and Pennsylvania was bound, in honor, to compensate General Irwine for the loss of Montour’s Island, on the failure of the title derived from her grant (3 Dall. 425) ; but surely, such considerations will not constitute parties to a judicial proceeding. As to a discovery of title, by whom and *5 against whom is it sought ? One party to the suit does not require it from another, but a third person requires it, in a suit to which he is not a party, and the decision in which cannot affect his right, whatever it may be.

Lewis, for the complainant, in reply. — The difficulties of the case are obvious to all; and unless the present remedy is applied, the difficulties will dangerously increase. If the lands are not in Connecticut, the ejectments are coram non judies: if they are not in New York, suits there would be equally objectionable.

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4 U.S. 1, 1 L. Ed. 715, 4 Dall. 1, 1799 U.S. LEXIS 243, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-of-new-york-v-state-of-connecticut-et-al-scotus-1799.