Warren v. County of San Diego

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: August 4, 2025
• Docket: 3:25-cv-01866
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 CLARE ELAINE WARREN; J.F., a Case No.: 25-CV-1866 TWR (KSC) minor by and through his Guardian ad 12 Litem ALAN MARK HARARI; and R.F., ORDER (1) DENYING MOTION 13 a minor by and through her Guardian ad FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING Litem ALAN MARK HARARI, ORDER, (2) GRANTING MOTION 14 TO APPOINT GUARDIAN AD Plaintiffs, 15 LITEM, (3) DENYING WITHOUT v. PREJUDICE APPLICATION TO 16 FILE UNDER SEAL, (4) GRANTING COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO; SAN 17 MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND EXCESS PAGES, AND (5) DENYING 18 HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY; MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE POLINSKY CHILDREN’S CENTER; 19 REPLY BRIEF RADY CHILDREN’S HOSPITAL;

20 ALEJANDRA GUTIERREZ; (ECF Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 22) CHRISTINE MORSE; M.D. SHALON 21 NIENOW; and DOES 1-50 Inclusive, 22 Defendants. 23

24 Presently before the Court are Plaintiffs J.F, a minor by and through his guardian ad 25 litem Alan Mark Harari; R.F., a minor by and through her guardian ad litem Alan Mark 26 Harari; and Clare Elaine Warren’s Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order 27 (“TRO Mot.,” ECF No. 7), as well as Defendant County of San Diego’s (“County”) 28 / / / 1 Response in Opposition to the TRO Motion (“Opp’n,” ECF No. 20), Defendant Rady 2 Children’s Hospital’s Joinder in Defendant County’s Opposition (“Joinder,” ECF No. 21). 3 Also before the Court are Plaintiffs’ Motion to Appoint Guardian ad Litem (ECF 4 No. 3), Application to File Exhibits Under Seal (ECF No. 4), Amended Application to File 5 Exhibits Under Seal (ECF No. 5), Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages (ECF No. 6), and 6 Motion for Leave to File Reply Brief (ECF No. 22), as well as Defendant County’s 7 Response in Opposition to the Amended Application to File Exhibits Under Seal (ECF No. 8 19). 9 For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Motion to Appoint 10 Guardian ad Litem (ECF No. 3), GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File Excess 11 Pages (ECF No. 6), DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File Reply Brief (ECF No. 12 22); DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiffs’ original (ECF No. 4) and Amended 13 (ECF No. 5) Applications to File Exhibits Under Seal, and DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion for 14 Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 7) in its entirety. 15 BACKGROUND1 16 Plaintiff Clare Elaine Warren is the mother and sole legal custodian of Plaintiffs J.F. 17 and R.F., both of whom are minor children. (ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”) ¶ 1.) Plaintiffs allege 18 that from 2022 to 2023, Joseph Franco—J.F. and R.F.’s biological father—threatened, 19 assaulted, and stalked Ms. Warren and her children. (Id. ¶¶ 29–30.) Although Plaintiffs 20 obtained criminal protective orders, the abuse displaced the family; Ms. Warren and her 21 children bounced between domestic violence shelters before permanently relocating to Los 22 Angeles County. (Id. ¶¶ 29, 31, 38–39.) 23 / / / 24 25 1 Without assuming their veracity, all facts are taken from the Complaint for the purposes of the 26 factual background. See Int’l Molders’ & Allied Workers’ Loc. Union No. 164 v. Nelson, 799 F.2d 547 (9th Cir. 1986) (“In deciding a motion for a preliminary injunction, the district court ‘is not bound to 27 decide doubtful and difficult questions of law or disputed questions of fact.’” (quoting Dymo Indus., Inc. v. Tapewriter, Inc., 326 F.2d 141, 143 (9th Cir. 1964))). 28 1 On May 30, 2025, Plaintiffs traveled to San Diego County to meet with the San 2 Diego District Attorney’s Office to discuss protective services in light of Mr. Franco’s 3 release from prison. (Id. ¶ 41.) After the meeting, Ms. Warren and her children visited 4 Ms. Warren’s San Diego storage unit. (Id. ¶ 43.) Around 10:00 p.m. that evening, police 5 officers responded to a security threat at the storage facility and encountered Ms. Warren 6 and her children inside Ms. Warren’s storage unit.2 (Id. ¶¶ 46–47.) 7 After the officers searched Ms. Warren’s vehicle and found ammunition, a gun not 8 registered to Ms. Warren, and “broken pipes,” the officers took Ms. Warren into custody. 9 (Id. ¶¶ 48–49.) Because the officers could not locate an adult who was available to take 10 custody of J.F. and R.F., the officers took the children to Polinsky Children’s Center 11 (“PCC”) while Ms. Warren was booked and released from the police station. (Id. 12 ¶¶ 40–51.) PCC staff transported J.F. and R.F. to Rady Children’s Hospital, where medical 13 staff allegedly examined the children without Ms. Warren’s knowledge or consent. (Id. 14 ¶¶ 55, 62.) 15 After her release from custody, Ms. Warren attempted to collect J.F. and R.F. from 16 PCC, but PCC staff refused Ms. Warren access to her children. (Id. ¶¶ 56–57.) Ms. 17 Warren’s partner, Mark Harari, arrived at PCC to help Ms. Warren retrieve her children, 18 and Ms. Warren summoned law enforcement officers to assist her as well. (Id. ¶ 69.) 19 Nevertheless, Ms. Warren was unable to reunite with her children. (Id. ¶¶ 70–71, 79–80.) 20 Meanwhile, county officials initiated juvenile proceedings regarding J.F. and R.F.’s 21 custody in PCC. (Opp’n at 6:19–20;3 ECF No. 20-1 (“Fellman Decl.”) ¶ 2.) 22 On July 23, 2025, Plaintiffs brought this action, in which they assert nine causes of 23 action for violation of federal civil rights, violation of state civil rights, and judicial 24

25 26 2 The security threat was unrelated to Plaintiffs’ presence at the storage facility; the facility’s security staff reported an individual unassociated with Ms. Warren or her children. (Compl. ¶ 46.) 27 3 All page-specific citations refer to the page numbers generated by the electronic case filing 28 1 deception. (See generally Compl.) Four days later, Plaintiffs moved for a temporary 2 restraining order. (See TRO Mot.) The Court ordered Plaintiffs to serve the Complaint 3 and the TRO Motion on Defendants and ordered Defendants to respond to the TRO Motion. 4 (ECF No. 9.) Defendant County filed its Opposition to the TRO Motion on August 1, 5 2025, (see Opp’n), and Defendant Rady Children’s Hospital filed a Joinder in Defendant 6 County’s Opposition, (see Joinder). 7 MOTION TO APPOINT GUARDIAN AD LITEM 8 Plaintiffs move to appoint Alan Mark Harari as guardian ad litem for Plaintiffs J.F. 9 and R.F., both of whom are minors. (See ECF No. 3.) “District courts have a special duty, 10 derived from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c), to safeguard the interests of litigants 11 who are minors.” Robidoux v. Rosengren, 638 F.3d 1177, 1181 (9th Cir. 2011); see also 12 Davis v. Walker, 745 F.3d 1303, 1310 (9th Cir. 2014). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13 17(c) requires a court to appoint a guardian ad litem or take “whatever measures it deems 14 proper to protect [a minor] during litigation.” United States v. 30.64 Acres of Land, 795 15 F.2d 796, 805 (9th Cir. 1986). To protect the interests of J.F. and R.F., the Court GRANTS 16 Plaintiffs’ Motion to Appoint Guardian ad Litem (ECF No. 3) and APPOINTS Alan Mark 17 Harari as guardian ad litem for J.F. and R.F for the purposes of this action. 18 MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE EXCESS PAGES 19 In conjunction with their TRO Motion, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Leave to File 20 Excess Pages. (See ECF No. 6.) Specifically, Plaintiffs request leave to file a forty-five- 21 page memorandum of points and authorities—twenty pages more than the page limit—in 22 support of the TRO Motion. (Id. at 1:20–25.) Defendant County objects, contending that 23 Plaintiffs have not demonstrated good cause to exceed the page limit and that Defendants 24 are prejudiced by Plaintiffs’ overlength brief. (Opp’n at 8:14–9:5.) 25 Although the Court agrees with Defendant County that the length of Plaintiffs’ 26 memorandum prejudiced Defendants—especially considering the expedited nature of the 27 TRO Motion—the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages 28 / / / 1 (ECF No. 6.) Plaintiffs are warned, however, that they must make every effort to comply 2 with the Court’s page limits when filing any additional pleadings in this case. 3 MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE REPLY BRIEF 4 After Defendant County filed its Opposition, (see Opp’n), in which Defendant Rady 5 Children’s Hospital joined, (see Joinder), Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Leave to File a Reply 6 Brief (ECF No. 22). The Court declines to accept additional briefing from the Parties at 7 this time. Each Party stated its respective position, and additional briefing would 8 unnecessarily delay the Court’s ruling on Plaintiffs’ request for emergency relief. 9 Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File Reply Brief (ECF 10 No. 22). 11 APPLICATIONS TO FILE EXHIBITS UNDER SEAL 12 In support of the TRO Motion, Plaintiffs filed an Application to File Exhibits Under 13 Seal (ECF No. 4), as well as an Amended Application to File Exhibits Under Seal (ECF 14 No. 5) (together, the “Sealing Applications”). Through the Sealing Applications, Plaintiffs 15 seek leave to file under seal 158 exhibits pertaining to, among other things, J.F. and R.F.’s 16 homeschooling program, Joseph Franco’s criminal history, J.F. and R.F.’s detention and 17 treatment at PCC, and the ongoing juvenile dependency proceedings in state court. (See 18 ECF Nos. 4-1; 5-1.) As part of their request, Plaintiffs ask the Court to address the state 19 court’s ruling that Plaintiffs may not file J.F. and R.F.’s juvenile court records in federal 20 court. (See ECF No. 5 at 2:15–20, 5:5–8.) 21 For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE 22 Plaintiffs’ Sealing Applications (ECF Nos. 4, 5), and the Court also clarifies that it cannot 23 disturb the state court’s ruling and cannot direct the state court to allow Plaintiffs to file 24 juvenile court records in federal court. 25 I. Motions to Seal 26 Plaintiffs have not lodged with the Court copies of the exhibits to be sealed. (See 27 generally Docket.) Nevertheless, Plaintiffs argue that the Court should seal the exhibits 28 “because they contain confidential information relating to minor children, including 1 medical, psychological, educational, law enforcement, and dependency records, as well as 2 photographs, video, and other evidence protected from public disclosure by federal and 3 state law.” (ECF No. 5 at 6:11–18 (first citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2(a), 26(c); then citing 4 S.D. Cal. CivLR 79.2; then citing Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 827).) 5 The decision to seal documents is “one best left to the sound discretion of the trial 6 court” upon consideration of “the relevant facts and circumstances of the particular case.” 7 Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 599 (1978). Because the underlying 8 motion—Plaintiffs’ TRO Motion—is “more than tangentially related to the merits of the 9 case,” Plaintiffs must demonstrate a “compelling reason” to seal the exhibits. Ctr. for Auto 10 Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1096–98, 1102 (9th Cir. 2016). 11 Undoubtedly, the exhibits described in the Sealing Applications contain sensitive 12 and confidential information relating to J.F. and R.F., two minor children. But because 13 Plaintiffs have not lodged the proposed sealed exhibits, the Court cannot determine whether 14 there exists a compelling reason to seal the entirety of all 158 exhibits. (See Civil Standing 15 Order III.C.4; CM/ECF Manual 2.j.) For example, the Court cannot consider whether 16 redactions or partial sealing would adequately protect the children’s privacy. 17 Accordingly, the Court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiffs’ 18 Applications to File Exhibits Under Seal (ECF Nos. 4, 5). 19 II. The State Court’s Ruling 20 Pursuant to California Welfare and Institutions Code § 827,4 Plaintiffs petitioned the 21 state court for permission to file “some of the pages from the Detention and Jurisdiction 22 report” under seal in federal court. (ECF No. 5 at 2:1–6.) The state court denied the 23 petition and warned Plaintiffs’ counsel that “any use of information from dependency court 24 in violation of Welfare and Institutions Code § 827 could result in criminal charges and 25 26 27 4 Under Section 827, only certain parties may view juvenile court records; however, parents can petition the state court for leave to disclose their child’s records to a party not enumerated in the statute. 28 1 arrest.” (Id. at 2:8–9; ECF No. 7-2 (“Goldberg Decl.”) ¶ 4.) Plaintiffs indicate that they 2 will not lodge the proposed sealed exhibits in federal court unless the Court addresses the 3 state court’s denial of Plaintiffs’ § 827 petition. (ECF No. 5 at 2:1–3:9.) 4 Although the Court is authorized to seal the juvenile court records,5 the Court 5 cautions Plaintiffs that doing so would have no effect on the state court’s enforcement of 6 Section 827. Furthermore, to the extent that Plaintiffs seek an order commanding the state 7 court to allow Plaintiffs to file juvenile court records in federal court, the Court lacks the 8 authority to disturb the state court’s ruling or to direct the state court’s application of state 9 law. Although Plaintiffs are understandably concerned about the state court’s admonition, 10 this Court may not properly overrule the state court’s denial of Plaintiffs’ Section 827 11 petition, nor can it properly enter an order allowing Plaintiffs’ counsel to disregard an order 12 issued by the state court. 13 In sum, the Court can seal juvenile court records if they are properly lodged, but the 14 Court has no authority or control over the consequences that Plaintiffs may face in state 15 court for filing those juvenile court records in federal court. 16 / / / 17 / / / 18 / / / 19

20 21 5 As Plaintiffs correctly note, federal courts are not bound by Section 827 when applying federal law, such as when settling discovery disputes under federal common law. See Gonzalez v. Spencer, 336 22 F.3d 832, 835 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (recognizing that “the district court could have ordered disclosure notwithstanding state law”), abrogated on other grounds by Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377 23 (2012); see also Gatlin v. Contra Costa Cnty., No. 21-CV-00370-SI, 2025 WL 1070758, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2025) (“[A] federal court may order the disclosure of a California juvenile case file during the 24 course of discovery in federal litigation, notwithstanding California’s statutory limits on the release of 25 these files.”); K.W. v. Cnty. of Riverside, No. 5:21-CV-01216-JWH-SHK, 2024 WL 5274617, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2024) (“[S]tate laws, including WIC Section 827, do not prohibit this Court from ordering 26 the disclosure of [juvenile case records.]”); D.C. ex rel. Garter v. Cnty. of San Diego, No. 3:15-CV-01868 MMA (NLS), 2016 WL 11621269, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2016) (“[T]he Court agrees with Plaintiff that 27 it is not bound by state law and that it has the authority to order disclosure of information from the juvenile case files.”) Because federal common law governs the sealing procedure in federal court, see Nixon, 435 28 1 MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 2 Plaintiffs moved for a Temporary Restraining Order and request the following 3 injunctive relief: 4 1. An order that the children be immediately released to mother or in the alternative to Mark Harari[;] 5

6 2. An [o]rder th[at] HHSA [] transfer the case up to Los Angeles where the children reside and that Ashley Gutierrez & Polinsky Center is not 7 to have any further contact with the children or involvement with the 8 case;

9 3. [An o]rder that the HHSA is enjoined from allowing the children to be 10 detained in the physical custody of either paternal uncle[;]

11 4. All interviews, conversations, or court proceedings with the children by 12 any defendant, a party to this suit, are to be recorded and submitted under seal to this court upon request, including an order directing 13 defendants to preserve all video and camera evidence from Polinsky 14 from the time the children have been detained there[;]

15 5. No further medical care of their children is to take place without 16 mother’s consent and her physical presence[; and]

17 6. A private social worker has immediate access to the children for a full 18 evaluation and the Court to pick from three social workers provided by the mother. 19 20 (ECF No 7-1 (“Pls.’ Mem.”) at 48:7–49:4.) Defendant County argues that (1) the domestic 21 relations exception bars the relief that Plaintiffs seek; (2) the Court lacks subject-matter 22 jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; (3) the Court should abstain pursuant 23 to the Younger abstention doctrine; and (4) the Plaintiffs have not met the standard for the 24 issuance of a temporary restraining order. (See generally Opp’n.) For the reasons set forth 25 below, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. 26 I. Legal Standard 27 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 authorizes a trial judge to grant a temporary 28 restraining order under certain circumstances “to preserve the status quo and the rights of 1 the parties until a final judgment issues in the cause.” See U.S. Philips Corp. v. KBC Bank 2 N.V., 590 F.3d 1091, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010). “The standard for issuing a temporary 3 restraining order is identical to the standard for issuing a preliminary injunction.” 4 Lockheed Missile & Space Co. v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 887 F. Supp. 1320, 1323 (N.D. Cal. 5 1995). 6 A temporary restraining order “is not a preliminary adjudication on the merits but 7 rather a device for preserving the status quo and preventing the irreparable loss of rights 8 before judgment.” See Sierra On-Line, Inc. v. Phx. Software, Inc., 739 F.2d 1415, 1422 9 (9th Cir. 1984)). The status quo in this context “refers not simply to any situation before 10 the filing of a lawsuit, but instead to ‘the last uncontested status which preceded the pending 11 controversy[.]’” See GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1210 (9th Cir. 12 2000) (quoting Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd. v. Avis, Inc., 316 F.2d 804, 809 (9th Cir. 1963)). 13 A party seeking a temporary restraining order “must meet one of two variants of the 14 same standard.” See All. for Wild Rockies v. Pena, 865 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2017)). 15 Under the original standard, a plaintiff seeking a temporary restraining order “must 16 establish (1) that he is likely to succeed on the merits, (2) that he is likely to suffer 17 irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, (3) that the balance of equities tips in 18 his favor, and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest.” Fraihat v. U.S. Immigr. & 19 Customs Enf’t, 16 F.4th 613, 635 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting City & Cnty. of San Francisco 20 v. U. S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 944 F.3d 773, 788–89 (9th Cir. 2019)). The Ninth 21 Circuit also employs an alternative approach, known as the “serious questions” standard or 22 the “sliding scale approach.” All. for Wild Rockies, 865 F.3d at 1131–32. “Under this 23 approach, the elements of the preliminary injunction test are balanced, so that a stronger 24 showing of one element may offset a weaker showing of another.” Id. at 1131. As a result, 25 a temporary restraining order can issue “where the likelihood of success is such that 26 “serious questions going to the merits were raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply 27 in plaintiff's favor.” See id. Under either standard, the third and fourth “factors merge 28 / / / 1 when the Government is the opposing party.” See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 2 (2009). 3 When deciding whether to grant a temporary restraining order, “the district court ‘is 4 not bound to decide doubtful and difficult questions of law or disputed questions of fact.’” 5 See Int’l Molders’ & Allied Workers’ Loc. Union No. 164, 799 F.2d at 551 (quoting Dymo 6 Indus., Inc., 326 F.2d at 143). If the Court issues a temporary restraining order, the 7 temporary restraining order “must: (A) state the reasons why it issued; (B) state its terms 8 specifically; and (C) describe in reasonable detail—and not by referring to the complaint 9 or other document—the act or acts restrained or required.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(1). 10 II. Analysis 11 Through the TRO Motion, Plaintiffs primarily seek an order directing PCC to 12 immediately release J.F. and R.F. into the custody of Ms. Warren or Mark Harari. (See, 13 e.g., Pls.’ Mem. at 47:18–22, 48:7–11.) Plaintiffs also, however, request several other 14 forms of relief related to the ongoing juvenile dependency proceedings.6 (Pls.’ Mem. at 15 48:12–49:4.) 16 Defendants County and Rady Children’s Hospital argue, among other things, that 17 the Court must deny Plaintiffs’ requested emergency relief pursuant to the domestic 18 relations exception and the Younger abstention doctrine. (Opp’n at 9:6–10:3, 11:1–13:9.) 19 Plaintiffs contend that the Younger does not apply and maintain that, even if it does, the 20 case falls within the exceptional circumstances exception. (Pls.’s Mem. at 44:24–47:12.) 21 For the following reasons, the Court agrees with Defendants. 22 / / / 23

24 25 6 Plaintiffs claim that they are requesting prohibitory injunctive relief rather than mandatory injunctive relief. (Pls.’ Mem. at 34:21–26.) Mandatory injunctive relief “is particularly disfavored.” 26 Anderson v. United States, 612 F.2d 1112, 1114 (9th Cir. 1979). Although some of Plaintiffs’ requested relief is prohibitory and would preserve the status quo, e.g., prohibiting Defendant HHSA from placing 27 J.F. and R.F. in the physical custody of either paternal uncle, the Court finds that most of Plaintiffs’ requested relief is mandatory. Regardless, the distinction is irrelevant because, as described infra, the 28 1 A. Domestic Relations Exception 2 The domestic relations exception “divests the federal courts of power to issue 3 divorce, alimony, or child custody decrees.” Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 4 U.S. 1, 12–13 (2004) (quoting Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689 (1992)), abrogated 5 on other grounds by Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 6 (2014). Pursuant to the exception, “federal courts traditionally decline to exercise 7 jurisdiction in domestic relations cases when the core issue involves the status of parent 8 and child[.]” Coats v. Woods, 819 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1987); Peterson v. Babbitt, 708 F.2d 9 465, 466 (9th Cir. 1983) (“[T]he whole subject of domestic relations and particularly child 10 custody problems is generally considered a state law matter. . . . There is no subject matter 11 jurisdiction over these types of domestic disputes.”). Even if a case raises constitutional 12 issues, the domestic relations exception strips the federal court of jurisdiction when the 13 core of the case is a child custody dispute. Coats, 819 F.2d at 237; Alcala v. Murphy, No. 14 2:19-CV-00969-KJM-CKD PS, 2020 WL 2039056, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2020). 15 The present case, “while raising constitutional issues, is at its core a child custody 16 dispute.” See Coats, 819 F.2d at 237. Plaintiffs request that the Court issue emergency 17 injunctive relief related to the care, custody, and control of J.F. and R.F., notwithstanding 18 ongoing juvenile dependency proceedings. (Pls.’ Mem. at 48:7–49:4.) The requested relief 19 would interfere with the parallel state court proceedings—including by terminating the 20 juvenile court case, which is scheduled to proceed to trial on August 5, 2025. (Fellman 21 Decl. ¶¶ 2–6.) Although some forms of requested relief would interfere with the state court 22 proceedings more substantially than would others, all requested injunctive relief implicates 23 “[t]he strong state interest in domestic relations matters, the superior competence of state 24 courts in settling family disputes . . . , and the possibility of incompatible federal and state 25 court decrees[.]” See Peterson, 708 F.2d 465, (9th Cir. 1983). 26 The state court is competent to adjudicate the issues raised by the TRO Motion, 27 including those related to Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims. See Coats, 819 F.2d at 237. 28 Given the state court’s strong interest in deciding child custody cases and their attendant 1 disputes, the domestic relations exception divests the Court of the ability to properly issue 2 Plaintiffs’ requested emergency relief. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion 3 for Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 7) in its entirety. 4 B. Younger Abstention Doctrine 5 Notwithstanding the Court’s finding that the domestic relations exception applies, 6 the Court separately considers the applicability of the Younger abstention doctrine. The 7 Younger abstention doctrine “forbids federal courts from staying or enjoining pending state 8 court proceedings.” AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Roden, 495 F.3d 1143, (9th Cir. 2007) 9 (alterations adopted) (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971)). “For civil cases, 10 ‘Younger abstention is appropriate only when the state proceedings: (1) are ongoing, (2) 11 are quasi-criminal enforcement actions or involve a state’s interest in enforcing the orders 12 and judgments of its courts, (3) implicate an important state interest, and (4) allow litigants 13 to raise federal challenges.’” Yelp Inc. v. Paxton, 137 F.4th 944, 950–51 (9th Cir. 2025) 14 (quoting ReadyLink Healthcare, Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 754 F.3d 754, 759 (9th Cir. 15 2014)). 16 The Ninth Circuit has held that the Younger abstention elements are met when a 17 plaintiff requests that a federal court intervene in ongoing state custody proceedings. H.C. 18 ex rel. Gordon v. Koppel, 203 F.3d 610, 613 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that Younger 19 abstention required dismissal of federal action because plaintiffs requested that federal 20 court “vacat[e] existing interlocutory [state court] orders” and issue “a federal injunction 21 directing the future course of the state litigation”). Here, as in H.C., Plaintiffs “desire 22 wholesale federal intervention into an ongoing state domestic dispute.” Id. at 613. As a 23 result, “[t]his is precisely the type of case suited to Younger abstention.” See id. 24 In response, Plaintiffs appeal to the exceptional circumstances exception to the 25 Younger abstention doctrine. (Pls.’ Mem. at 46:4–47:12.) To demonstrate that the 26 exceptional circumstances exception applies, Plaintiffs must make a “showing of bad faith, 27 harassment, or some other extraordinary circumstance that would make abstention 28 inappropriate[.]” Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 1 (1982). Plaintiffs have not made such a showing. Although Plaintiffs allege that 2 || Defendants presented fabricated evidence in the juvenile dependency proceedings, (Pls.’s 3 ||Mem. at 19:10—24:24), the state court is competent to adjudicate such evidentiary disputes. 4 Furthermore, Plaintiffs’ allegation that “there is no adequate recourse for [] Plaintiffs to 5 ||defend their [c]onstitutional rights in the juvenile dependency court,” (Pls.” Mem. at 6 || 45:17—20), is conclusory and unfounded. A disagreeable ruling does not create exceptional 7 || circumstances—Plaintiffs must pursue an appropriate remedy within the state court 8 || system. 9 The requested emergency injunctive relief would interfere with the ongoing juvenile 10 ||dependency proceedings. Because “[t]his is not the proper business of the federal 11 |/judiciary[,]. . . Younger abstention is appropriate[.]” H.C., 203 F.3d at 613-14. 12 || Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion for Temporary Restraining Order 13 || ECF No. 7) in its entirety on this second, independent basis. 14 CONCLUSION 15 In light of the foregoing, the Court 16 (1) GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Motion to Appoint Guardian ad Litem (ECF No. 3); 17 (2) DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiffs’ Application to File Exhibits 18 Under Seal (ECF No. 4) and Amended Application to File Exhibits Under 19 (ECF No. 5); 20 (3) GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages (ECF No. 6); 21 (4) DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 7) in 22 its entirety; and 23 (5) DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File Reply Brief (ECF No. 22). 24 IT IS SO ORDERED. 25 ||Dated: August 4, 2025 26 [ 59) (2 D re 17 Honorable Todd W. Robinson United States District Judge 28