NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0315-24
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
DANDEL M. GRIMSLEY, a/k/a MARQUIS DAVIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Submitted February 23, 2026 – Decided March 26, 2026
Before Judges Natali and Bergman.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Indictment Nos. 19-06-1661 and 19-06-1662.
Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Rebecca Van Voorhees, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the briefs).
Theodore N. Stephens II, Essex County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Shep A. Gerszberg, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM After a six-day trial, a jury convicted defendant Dandel M. Grimsley of
multiple criminal offenses including conspiracy to commit robbery, N.J.S.A.
2C:5-2; three counts of first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1; aggravated
assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(6); receiving stolen property, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7(a);
unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b); possession of hollow
nose bullets, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(f); eluding, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(b); and possession
of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a). The charges
resulting in these convictions stemmed from a series of armed robberies and
high-speed pursuits by law enforcement. Defendant challenges his convictions,
alleging prosecutorial misconduct during summations, erroneous jury
instructions on flight, and the cumulative effect of these alleged errors require a
new trial. We affirm.
I.
The facts and procedural history that follow are derived from the trial
record. On July 19, 2018, at approximately 11:30 p.m., Acqwel Kendal-Davis
was attempting to park near her residence in Newark, when a white van reversed
into her, hitting her car and pinning her in. Thereafter, a man exited from the
passenger side of the van, approached her while pointing a black handgun at her,
and ordered her to hand over money and to exit her vehicle. She could not see
A-0315-24 2 the man's face because it was covered by a black and white bandana, but she
described him as a Black man, approximately in his forties, with an average
build. The man ultimately searched the front passenger compartment of her
vehicle, took her cellphone, and drove off. Kendal-Davis then called the police
from her partner's cellphone and was able to provide a partial license plate of
"8EKE" from the van.
Approximately five minutes later, at approximately 11:35 p.m., Cristie
Choice was leaving her friend's house on Poe Street in Newark and while
entering her car a white van approached her. A male passenger from the van
exited with a gun and struck her on the knee. She described the man as wearing
a red and white bandana covering just below his eyelids down his face wearing
a dark shirt. She described the driver as a Black man wearing a black and white
bandana also covering his face. She recalled the passenger placing a gun to her
chest and demanding money. She reached into her pocket and handed the man
twenty dollars. Afterwards, the man insisted she had more, reached into her
blouse, took additional money, her debit card, and her keys. When police
responded and arrived at the scene, they discovered her keys down the block.
During cross-examination, Choice described the white van as "U-Haul"
displayed on it. On redirect, she clarified she was not positive the van had "U -
A-0315-24 3 Haul" written on it but only believed it did. Police investigations into the
incidents revealed an abandoned and disabled white Ford Econoline van, bearing
registration "8EKE40" at Norwood Place and Halstead Street. The van had body
damage on the driver's side, consistent with Kendal-Davis' report. Further, at
this same location a white Ford Econoline van was stolen with Bethlehem Judah
Church decals and New Jersey registration "L58AKM."
A little over one hour after the first two robberies, at approximately 1:00
a.m., Luis Baez testified he was working as a cook in a food truck when he
observed a "church bus" arrive. Baez clarified the "church bus" was not as big
as a New Jersey Transit or school bus, but similar to a Ford van. He recalled a
man exiting the passenger side of the church bus and putting a gun to his chest.
Baez was unable to describe the features of the man because he was wearing a
"handkerchief." As the man held the gun to Baez's chest, he took Baez's wallet
and threw his phone to the ground. After taking Baez's belongings, the man got
into the passenger side of the van and left. As the van was driving away, Baez
took a picture of the license plate on his phone. Baez's picture revealed the
license plate of the van matched the Bethlehem Judah Church van that was
stolen.
A-0315-24 4 Approximately thirty minutes after Baez was robbed, at around 1:36 a.m.,
Maplewood Police Officer William Isetts was on patrol when he observed a Ford
Econoline moving about five blocks away from him. At some point earlier, he
was notified by central dispatch about numerous armed robberies in Newark, the
last one with a Ford Econoline with the registration "L58AKM." Officer Isetts
then reached the vehicle and noticed that the license plate of the van matched
the description given by central dispatch and recalled the van had markings on
it that indicated it belonged to a church. While monitoring the van, he advised
central dispatch of his location, called for backup, and attempted to conduct a
felony motor vehicle stop. When Officer Isetts activated his lights and sirens,
he stated the van "took off at a high rate of speed" and he engaged in motor
vehicle pursuit. During the pursuit, Officer Isetts recalled the van was driving
extremely recklessly, trying to elude him at "any and all costs." The pursuit
concluded when the van collided with a New Jersey Transit bus.
When officers approached the van, they found defendant in the driver's
seat and a man identified as Matin Malik in the passenger seat. Nicolas
Santorella, a patrol officer for the Essex County Sheriff's Office, entered the van
through the rear door, which was already broken, approached the front of the
van, and observed a firearm on the driver's lap. Additionally, a "black and red
A-0315-24 5 cloth," was found on defendant's person described as a "face covering of some
sort." The officer testified "[i]t goes over your head and covers everything
except for your eyes so you can see out and conceal your face." Further, a
Santander Bank debit card was recovered with Choice's name on it.
Newark Police Detective Sergeant Willmorgs Velasquez was assigned to
the robbery investigation. Sergeant Velasquez searched the church van that had
been impounded. During the search, he discovered a red bag on the front
passenger's floorboard which contained a firearm with a defaced serial number,
9mm hollow-point bullets, and a black and white bandana.
In June 2019, a grand jury returned two indictments charging defendant
with second degree conspiracy to commit robbery; three counts of first-degree
robbery; eight counts of second-degree aggravated assault; third-degree
receiving stolen property; two counts of second-degree unlawful possession of
a weapon; fourth-degree possession of hollow nose bullets; fourth-degree
possession of a defaced firearm, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(d); third-degree possession
of a stolen weapon; second-degree eluding; two counts of second-degree
possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose; and first-degree certain persons
to not have a gun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(j).
A-0315-24 6 The jury found defendant guilty of conspiracy, all three robbery counts,
four counts of aggravated assault, receiving stolen property, both counts of
unlawful gun possession, possession of hollow nose bullets, eluding, and both
counts of possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose. 1 After the jury
returned its verdict, defendant pled guilty to second-degree certain persons not
to have a weapon contained in the second indictment. On September 20, 2024,
the court sentenced defendant to an aggregate twenty-year term of imprisonment
on the first indictment, with eighty-five percent parole ineligibility under the No
Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. The trial court sentenced defendant to
a five-year prison term on the certain persons conviction running concurrently
with his sentence on the first indictment.
Defendant raises the following points for the first time on appeal:
POINT I
MR. GRIMSLEY WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS AND A FAIR TRIAL WHEN THE PROSECUTOR REPEATEDLY IMPLIED THAT MR. GRIMSLEY WAS A CAREER CRIMINAL AND INAPPROPRIATELY VOUCHED FOR THE INVESTIGATING POLICE OFFICER'S CREDIBILITY.
1 Four aggravated assault counts, possession of a defaced firearm, and possession of a stolen weapon were dismissed by the State. A-0315-24 7 A. IT WAS PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT TO REPEATEDLY SUGGEST TO THE JURY THAT MR. GRIMSLEY WAS AN EXPERIENCED CRIMINAL.
B. IT WAS PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT TO VOUCH FOR THE CREDIBILITY OF A KEY POLICE WITNESS.
C. THE MISCONDUCT WAS PLAIN ERROR NECESSITATING A NEW TRIAL.
POINT II
MR. GRIMSLEY WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS AND A FAIR TRIAL WHEN THE TRIAL COURT READ THE JURY THE WRONG MODEL INSTRUCTION ON FLIGHT.
POINT III
THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE ERRORS REQUIRES REVERSAL.
II.
We review an issue not preserved for appeal at the trial court level for
plain error. R. 2:10-2. This court "must disregard any unchallenged errors or
omissions unless they are 'clearly capable of producing an unjust result.'" State
v. Santamaria, 236 N.J. 390, 404 (2019) (quoting R. 2:10-2). "Plain error is a
high bar and constitutes 'error not properly preserved for appeal but of a
magnitude dictating appellate consideration.'" Ibid. (quoting State v. Bueso, 225
N.J. 193, 202 (2016)). The plain error's "high standard" "provides a strong
A-0315-24 8 incentive for counsel to interpose a timely objection, enabling the trial court to
forestall or correct a potential error." Ibid. (quoting Bueso, 225 N.J. at 203).
A.
We initially address defendant's contention that during summation, the
prosecutor committed misconduct by repeatedly suggesting to the jury that
defendant was an experienced career criminal and by vouching for a key
investigating police officer's credibility by stating that the officer had no motive
to lie and would face special consequences if he did.
Defendant specifically points to the prosecutor stating: "It's [defendant's]
and Mr. Malik's MO. It's what they do. It's what they were doing that night."
Defendant asserts that prosecutor's statement is an example of exactly what our
Supreme Court condemned in State v. Pennington, 119 N.J. 547 (1990). "The
prosecutor implied that defendant had committed other robberies." Id. at 572.
Defendant further argues that the impact of this error was compounded by the
prosecutor's repeated suggestion that defendant was knowledgeable and
experienced in the criminal justice system when stating:
[Defendant's] date of birth is March 30, 1974. A grown man, right. This wasn't a kid who was in a stolen car and sees some lights and he's never been pulled over and gets spooked and goes on a several minutes long high-speed car chase, running stop signs and red lights . . . up the wrong way on a one way, going through
A-0315-24 9 intersections with cars coming, crashing into a bus, hurting several people, right. This is a guy who knew that he did something serious and if he got caught, there were going to be serious consequences, right. This guy was running for his life. This wasn't someone who just has never been there before, a child -- a 19-year-old, 18-year-old, doesn't know what he's doing, gets scared and starts running away, right, if it was just a stolen car.
[(Emphasis added).]
Moreover, defendant also points to the prosecutor's statements that
"[t]hese people knew we've got to get rid of this stuff. We can't hold onto it too
long" and "these are people who understand that they should be trying to get rid
of the evidence" when throwing items out of the van. Defendant asserts these
statements were suggestions of criminal history and claiming they were
extremely prejudicial because of the risk of the jury using them for propensity
purposes in violation of N.J.R.E. 404(b). Defendant contends that the
prosecutor's summation was "because it was defendant's 'MO' to commit
robberies, he must be guilty of these robberies" serving no other purpose other
than propensity.
Further, defendant contends the prejudice surrounding these statements
was great because the other evidence connecting him to the three robberies was
"far from overwhelming." He points out that (1) none of the victims could
identify their assailant because of face covering, (2) there is conflicting
A-0315-24 10 testimony as to the descriptions of the vans involved in the robberies, and (3)
there was no photo or video evidence capturing the robberies. He additionally
highlights (1) the police never searched GPS data on his phone, (2) one of the
vans described was never searched for evidence, and (3) absent repeated
arguments that he was an experienced criminal by the prosecutor, the jury could
have found the State did not prove their case.
It has long been held that "prosecutorial misconduct is not grounds for
reversal of a criminal conviction unless the conduct was so egregious as to
deprive [the] defendant of a fair trial." State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515,
575 (1999). "Every prosecutorial misstep [in summation] will not warrant a new
trial." State v. R.A.M., 482 N.J. Super. 439, 453 (App. Div. 2025) (alteration in
original) (quoting State v. Garcia, 245 N.J. 412, 436 (2021)). "Prosecutors are
afforded considerable leeway in closing arguments as long as their comments
are reasonably related to the scope of the evidence presented." Id. at 452
(quoting State v. Clark, 251 N.J. 266, 289-90 (2022)).
"In determining whether a prosecutor's misconduct was sufficiently
egregious, an appellate court must take into account the tenor of the trial and
degree of responsiveness of both counsel and the court to improprieties when
they occurred." State v. R.B., 183 N.J. 308, 332-33 (2005). Reviewing courts
A-0315-24 11 specifically consider: "(1) whether defense counsel made timely and proper
objections to the improper remarks; (2) whether the remarks were withdrawn
promptly; and (3) whether the court ordered the remarks stricken from the record
and instructed the jury to disregard them." Id. at 333 (quoting State v. Frost,
158 N.J. 76, 83 (1999)). "If defense counsel fails to object contemporaneously
to the prosecutor's comments, 'the reviewing court may infer that counsel did
not consider the remarks to be inappropriate.'" Clark, 251 N.J. at 290 (quoting
State v. Vasquez, 265 N.J. Super. 528, 560 (App. Div. 1993)).
After our review of the record, we conclude that defendant's claims of
prosecutorial misconduct lack merit and do not satisfy the plain error standard.
We are not persuaded by defendant's argument that the prosecutor engaged in
statements that attempted to suggest past criminal history or make a propensity
argument in violation of N.J.R.E. 404(b). Statements defendant points to
including, "[i]t's their MO. It's what they do. It's what they were doing that
night," and "[t]hese people knew we've got to get rid of this stuff. We can't hold
onto it too long," and "these are people who understand that they should be
trying to get rid of the evidence," when read in context, were limited to the
robberies that occurred that night and not to any past criminal history. The
evidence at trial established that the three robberies occurred within hours of
A-0315-24 12 each other and involved the assailants discarding stolen items in vicinity of the
area where the robbery occurred. Therefore, the prosecutor's comments were
not improper when read in the context of the record showing three separate
robberies that night.
We next turn to the prosecutor's statement that "[t]his wasn't someone who
just has never been there before, a child – a 19-year-old, 18-year-old, doesn't
know what he's doing, gets scared and starts running away." After our review
of the entire trial record, we conclude this statement appropriately addresses the
severity and extent of defendant's flight from law enforcement. Body camera
footage presented at trial documented a pursuit that was close to ten minutes in
length and involved a high-speed chase which concluded by the defendants
colliding with a bus. We conclude that when reading this statement in context
to the evidence, the prosecutor was arguing the flight by defendant, an adult who
should understand the gravity of such, was not excusable unlike a teenager that
may panic and flee. We conclude this statement was relevant to the evidence at
trial related to defendant's eluding charges and was not capable of producing an
unjust result satisfying the plain error standard.
Lastly, defendant argues a new trial is warranted because the prosecutor
improperly vouched for a key witness's credibility by stating:
A-0315-24 13 [L]et's go over Sergeant Velasquez . . . [h]e's 24 years on the job. The guy's going to retire soon and get a pension. Is he really the kind of guy who's going to start fabricating things, jeopardizing his career? No. . . .
This black and white handkerchief, which, by the way, Velasquez found [] when they were processing the church van. [] He told you who took the photos. It was . . . one of the crime scene guys, right. So this isn't like a rogue officer who's . . . trying to plant things. You've got another guy too who's taking the photos. So now . . . if this is really some conspiracy, [] you got multiple people in on it, right[?] Jeopardizing their careers? to do with that.
We note that a prosecutor is entitled to respond to defense counsel's
credibility arguments. See State v. Bradshaw, 392 N.J. Super. 425, 437 (App.
Div. 2007). "A prosecutor is not forced to idly sit as a defense attorney attacks
the credibility of the State's witnesses; a response is permitted." State v. Hawk,
327 N.J. Super. 276, 284 (App. Div. 2000); see also State v. Engel, 249 N.J.
Super. 336, 379 (App. Div. 1991) (explaining a prosecutor may respond in
summation to defense counsel's insinuation that the State's witnesses had lied
and framed defendant).
Accordingly, the statements by the prosecutor were in response to themes
articulated by defense counsel at trial at in summations. As we stated in Engel,
A-0315-24 14 "[w]hile we do not endorse the prosecutor's allusion [that] his investigators . . .
would not 'jeopardize their careers' . . . the issue is not the State's license to make
improper arguments, but whether the prosecutor's invited response, taken in
context, unfairly prejudiced defendants." 249 N.J. Super at 379. Here, we
conclude in the context of the evidence adduced at trial and the defendant's
arguments, the prosecutor's statements did not unfairly prejudice defendant nor
did they not rise to the level of plain error.
B.
Defendant next contends he was denied due process and a fair trial when
the trial court utilized the wrong jury instruction on flight. He asserts he argued
he evaded police, not because he committed any armed robberies, but because
he was driving a stolen van. Therefore, defendant claims the court improperly
instructed the jury that defendant "denied" he fled, instead of his alternative
explanation for flight. After reviewing the record, we conclude defendant's
contention lacks merit and does not rise to the level of plain error.
When a defendant fails to object to a given jury charge, review is under
the plain-error standard. State v. Singleton, 211 N.J. 157, 182 (2012). Plain
error applied to a jury instruction "requires demonstration of 'legal impropriety
in the charge prejudicially affecting the substantial rights of the defendant and
A-0315-24 15 sufficiently grievous to justify notice by the reviewing court and to convince the
court that of itself the error possessed a clear capacity to bring about an unjust
result.'" State v. Chapland, 187 N.J. 275, 289 (2006) (quoting State v. Hock, 54
N.J. 526, 538 (1969)).
The alleged error "must be considered in light of the entire charge and
must be evaluated in light 'of the overall strength of the State's case.'" State v.
Walker, 203 N.J. 73, 90 (2010) (quoting Chapland, 187 N.J. at 289). "If the
defendant does not object to the charge at the time it is given, there is a
presumption that the charge was not error and was unlikely to prejudice the
defendant's case." Singleton, 211 N.J. at 182.
However, "[a]ppropriate and proper charges are essential to a fair trial."
State v. Reddish, 181 N.J. 553, 613 (2004) (quoting State v. Green, 86 N.J. 281,
287 (1994)). Therefore, "erroneous instructions on material points are presumed
to be reversible error." State v. Martin, 119 N.J. 2, 15 (1990).
The pertinent excerpt of the trial record of the exchange between the
parties and the court regarding the flight jury charge follows.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Okay. About the flight charge, obviously, the second part does not apply but –
A-0315-24 16 THE COURT: Well, yeah. I think it's the -- where we start at ["]or["], in bold.2
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Yes.
THE COURT: That comes out, . . . ["]set forth the explanation by the defense["], and then the first sentence on the following page, page 2, also comes out.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Yes, agreed.
THE COURT: I think then it picks up at ["]if, after a consideration of all the evidence["] -- that's sort of the wrap-up of it. That remains.
THE COURT: Do you agree?
2 The full portion of the missing flight charge argued by defendant states: There has been some testimony in the case from which you may infer that the defendant fled shortly after the alleged commission of the crime. The defense has suggested the following explanation:
(SET FORTH EXPLANATION SUGGESTED BY DEFENSE)
If you find the defendant’s explanation credible, you should not draw any inference of the defendant’s consciousness of guilt from the defendant’s departure.
Model Jury Charges (Criminal), "Flight" (rev. May 10, 2010).
A-0315-24 17 THE COURT: All right. Okay. Mr. [Prosecutor], did you have any additional –
PROSECUTOR: No, Judge . . . .
We determine this exchange demonstrates that defense counsel was aware
of, and consented to, the deletion of the "explanation" portion of the flight
charge and the form of charge that was presented to the jury. Further, defense
counsel did not object to the court's instruction during the charge conference or
while it was being read to the jury. Although defendant asserts his counsel
submitted an alternative motive for flight, the record reflects this "alternative
explanation" was provided during summation and was not requested to be
included in the jury charge. In addition, no direct evidence was adduced at trial
supporting defendant's argument on appeal that he was fleeing because he stole
the vehicle rather than the robberies.
Further, as the record reveals, the court instructed the jury that
"[a]rguments, statements, remarks, openings and summations of counsel are not
evidence and must not be treated as evidence." Model Jury Charge (Criminal),
"Final Charge" (rev. Sept. 1, 2022). Based on the foregoing, we conclude the
trial court did not provide the jury with an erroneous jury instruction on flight
because defense counsel consented to the charge and did not provide the
"explanation" as required in the charge nor was any direct evidence offered at
A-0315-24 18 trial to factually support the charge defendant claims should have been included.
Here, defendant did not overcome the presumption of correctness to the charge
provided by the court nor was the instruction plain error because we conclude it
did not have a clear capacity to bring about an unjust result, especially since
defense counsel argued the explanation in her summation.
Turning to the defendant's argument of cumulative error, because we have
determined there was no prosecutorial misconduct nor was the court's jury
instruction on flight erroneous, we conclude the cumulative effect surrounding
defendant's contention of prejudicial error lacks merit and were insufficient to
satisfy the plain error standard.
To the extent we have not addressed any of defendant's remaining
arguments, we conclude those arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant
discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
A-0315-24 19