State of Missouri v. Eugene P. Hampton

• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals
• Decided: March 7, 2023
• Docket: ED110252
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District DIVISION THREE

STATE OF MISSOURI, ) No. ED110252 ) Respondent, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of the City of St. Louis v. ) Cause No. 1822-CR3371-01 ) EUGENE P. HAMPTON, ) Honorable Michael K. Mullen ) Appellant. ) Filed: March 7, 2023

Introduction

A trial jury convicted Eugene Hampton of murder in the first degree and armed criminal

action. On appeal, Hampton challenges the trial court’s denial of his request to represent himself

at trial and his motion to suppress evidence and the admission of that evidence at trial. We affirm

the judgment of the trial court.

Factual and Procedural Background

Evidence at Trial

On the evening of September 26, 2018, Rodrick Pitts received a phone call from Eugene

Hampton. Hampton was at home at 827 Elias with his fiancé Bernetta Lee and her grandson,

Troy Fowler. During the phone call, Hampton told Pitts to come over and pick up the money

Hampton owed him. After getting off the phone with Pitts, Hampton stated, “I’m going to kill

this MF.” Pitts drove with his cousin and his nephew, Davyion Perry, to Hampton’s house and

parked his van across the street. 1 Pitts got out of the van and told Perry he would be back. Pitts

then went to the house, where Hampton let him in. Inside the house, Lee and Fowler witnessed

Hampton and Pitts engage in a conversation, but they could not hear what was said. They then

saw Hampton pull a gun and shoot Pitts several times.

As Pitts ran from the house, Hampton chased him. Perry, still in Pitts’s van, saw Pitts

jump off the front porch and run from the house, while Hampton chased and shot at him. Perry

saw Pitts grab at his body as if he was hurt. After Perry lost sight of Pitts, Hampton came back to

the van. Hampton pointed a gun at Pitts’s cousin, and the cousin ran away. Hampton then re-

entered the house at 827 Elias.

Perry left the van to find Pitts. He found Pitts lying face down in the yard of 836 Elias

with blood gushing from his head. At trial, Perry identified Hampton as the shooter.

When Hampton returned to the house, he told Lee and Fowler, “We got to go.” The three

went to Lee’s granddaughter’s house, but left after Lee’s granddaughter refused to have

Hampton in her house.

When police officers arrived at the scene, they were informed that Hampton had gone

back into his house at 827 Elias. The officers waited outside until a SWAT unit deemed the

house safe to enter. When police officers entered the house, they did so without a search warrant

or consent to search. At trial, Detective Tom Walsh testified that, though blood was found on the

front porch, police found no crime scene inside the house and most of the items found inside

“turned out not to be significant to this crime.” Those items included a shotgun, which “probably

had nothing to do with this particular crime,” and a box containing marijuana and packaging

1 Pitts’s cousin was not identified by name at trial.

2 supplies, which also “was not significant to the crime scene.” Police ultimately decided there was

no crime scene inside the house.

Outside, police found a trail of blood later confirmed to be that of Pitts. The trail led from

the stoop of the house, through Hampton’s yard, across the street to Pitts’s van, to where Pitts lay

dead. The medical examiner confirmed that Pitts suffered multiple gunshot wounds to the head,

cheek, abdomen, and forearm. Pitts’s cause of death was a gunshot wound to the head.

When police later interviewed Fowler and showed him a photo array, Fowler identified

Hampton as the shooter. Police arrested Hampton for the murder of Pitts.

Pre-Trial Procedure

Hampton was charged with murder in the first degree and armed criminal action, and was

appointed counsel.

On March 8, 2019, Hampton filed the first of at least four pro se motions for appointment

of new counsel. Hampton accused his counsel of walking out of a meeting, cutting a meeting

short to see other clients, showing favoritism to the prosecutor, and conspiring against him. On

April 18, 2019, the trial court denied Hampton’s motion.

In a motion filed on June 26, 2019, Hampton’s counsel moved to suppress all evidence

found in Hampton’s residence. The evidence included interior photographs, a shotgun,

marijuana, sandwich bags, and an electronic scale.

On July 9, 2019, Hampton’s counsel requested a mental health evaluation of Hampton

because counsel had “good cause to believe defendant is not competent to proceed to trial based

upon his observations and attempted consultations with the defendant.” The trial court ordered

the evaluation, and Hampton was found competent to stand trial.

3 In a letter of October 11, 2019, Hampton informed the trial court that his counsel was

biased in claiming that Hampton had mental health issues and accused counsel of concealing

page two of his discovery. Hampton also filed a second pro se motion for appointment of new

counsel.

In a March 25, 2020 letter to the trial court, Hampton accused his counsel of insulting

him, misleading the court regarding Hampton’s mental health, and providing him incomplete

discovery. For the third time, Hampton asked for “an exchange of attorney for an attorney whom

[sic] would afford me the opportunity to have fair legal representation.” If he had to keep his

existing counsel, Hampton requested that counsel file a motion for the grand jury transcript and a

bill of particulars, and provide all his discovery. Hampton insisted he wanted “to be afforded the

right to proper legal counsel.”

Finally, on August 31, 2020, Hampton filed another pro se motion for appointment of

new counsel.

Evidence at Suppression Hearing

On April 16, 2021, the trial court held a hearing on Hampton’s motion to suppress

evidence, at which Detective Walsh was the only witness.

When Detective Walsh arrived at 827 Elias, uniformed officers surrounded the house.

Pitts lay in a yard across the street. Police had been informed that the suspect had run back into

the house. Believing someone was potentially barricading the house or holding hostages, police

requested a SWAT unit.

When the SWAT unit arrived at 8:39 p.m., officers attempted to persuade anyone in the

house to exit, but received no response. The SWAT unit then sent a robot into the house. When

the robot was unable to fully enter the house, SWAT officers entered the house. At 12:33 a.m.,

4 the SWAT unit determined that no one was in the house and returned custody of the scene to the

investigating officers.

When they went to the front door, police officers saw blood on the front porch trailing

from Pitts’s body. Without a search warrant or consent, the officers entered Hampton’s house to

determine if there was a crime scene or victims inside. An evidence technician took photographs

of the interior of the house and items therein. On a coffee table in the living room, police officers

found a bag of marijuana, a scale, and sandwich bags. They also found a shotgun in one of the

bedrooms. Detective Walsh testified that the items found in Hampton’s house ultimately did not

contribute to the investigation of Pitts’s murder.

The trial court denied Hampton’s motion to suppress evidence without elaboration.

Pre-Trial Conference

On June 4, 2021, the Friday immediately preceding the Monday, June 7 trial setting, the

trial court held a pre-trial conference. The court heard argument regarding Hampton’s motions in

limine and reiterated its denial of Hampton’s motion to suppress evidence. Hampton then

interjected.

HAMPTON: Another thing is I’d like to, you know represent this Court myself.

COURT: You want to not have Mr. Barron with you, you want to represent yourself; is that right?

HAMPTON: Yes, sir.

COURT: Okay. I’m going to deny that request.

HAMPTON: [A]s long as Mr. Barron is going to be honest and try to help me prove my case, I don’t mind him, you know. But if he don’t do like I ask him to do – because he’s trying to get down to the bottom of this with asking what happened.

The trial court asked whether there were specific things Hampton wanted his counsel to

do that he did not do. Hampton complained that, after his counsel provided him with discovery,

5 Hampton spilled juice on page two, and counsel did not replace it. In response to the court’s

inquiries, Hampton repeatedly denied that counsel failed to provide him with any other

discovery. Hampton assured the court that counsel had reviewed all the evidence with him and

they had discussed the case. Defense counsel confirmed that he provided all discovery to

Hampton and informed the court that page two of the discovery was blank. The court then

continued its colloquy with Hampton.

COURT: Okay. So I’m going to deny your request to go to trial without Mr. Barron. I’m going to leave Mr. Barron on as your trial counsel.

HAMPTON: You know, it’s not going to work. It’s a conflict of interest. Let me ask you a question, Your Honor: If you had a lawyer representing you and you and your attorney get into an argument and your attorney tells you, says, “I don’t like you,” would you want that attorney to represent you as your lawyer after he made a statement saying that he don’t like you?

COURT: Is that the basis of why you want Mr. Barron off your case?

HAMPTON: That and . . . that he is not an honest man. He is lying to you right to your face saying that page two is blank. It wasn’t blank when he gave it to me.

COURT: Okay. Nothing you have told me is changing my mind about whether or not Mr. Barron is going to be your lawyer for your case next week.

HAMPTON: It’s a violation of my rights for due process. . . . [I]f Mr. Barron is sitting next to me and [co-counsel] Mr. Mahaffey is sitting next to me, I’m going to speak as I please because I have the right to aid and assist in my own defense.

Shortly thereafter, the pre-trial conference turned to other issues.

Trial Procedure

On the next business day, June 7, 2021, Hampton’s trial began. At no point during trial

did Hampton request to proceed without counsel or to represent himself.

During the State’s case, Hampton’s counsel renewed his motion to suppress testimony

regarding the search of the interior scene. He objected on the same basis to the admission of

exhibits 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, five photographs that depicted the inside of 827 Elias and the shotgun,

6 marijuana, and paraphernalia found inside the house. The trial court overruled the objections, and

the photographs were admitted into evidence.

In its closing and rebuttal arguments, the State made no mention of the shotgun,

marijuana, or paraphernalia found in Hampton’s house. Hampton’s counsel, on the other hand,

argued that Pitts came to Hampton’s house to collect his “drug debt,” and referred to the shotgun

and the marijuana found in the house.

During deliberations, the jury asked only for a copy of the ballistics expert’s testimony

and the call logs of Hampton, Pitts, and Bernetta Lee. The jury unanimously found Hampton

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of both murder in the first degree and armed criminal action.

On June 23, 2021, Hampton’s counsel filed a motion for judgment of acquittal

notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative, for new trial. Hampton’s counsel argued the

trial court erred in denying Hampton’s request to represent himself at trial, and erred in denying

his motion to suppress evidence and admitting that evidence at trial. The trial court denied

Hampton’s motion and entered judgment in accordance with the jury’s verdict on December 28,

2021.

Hampton appeals.

Discussion

Point I — Self-Representation

Hampton first asserts the trial court erred in denying his request to represent himself at

trial because he timely and unequivocally invoked his right to self-representation. The State

responds that Hampton’s request was neither timely nor unequivocal. We deny Hampton’s Point

I because his request was equivocal.

7 Standard of Review

Denial of a defendant’s right to self-representation is considered structural error. State v.

Black, 223 S.W.3d 149, 153 (Mo. banc 2007). Structural error necessarily renders a criminal trial

fundamentally unfair or an unreliable vehicle for determining guilt or innocence. Washington v.

Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 218 (2006). “Since the right of self-representation is a right that when

exercised usually increases the likelihood of a trial outcome unfavorable to the defendant, its

denial is not amenable to ‘harmless error’ analysis. The right is either respected or denied; its

deprivation cannot be harmless.” McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8 (1984). The trial

court has no discretion to force an attorney upon a competent defendant who makes a timely,

unequivocal, voluntary, and informed waiver of the right to counsel. Black, 223 S.W.3d at 153

(citing State v. Hampton, 959 S.W.2d 444, 447 (Mo. banc 1997)).

Analysis

A criminal defendant’s right to represent himself is implied by the structure of the Sixth

Amendment to the United States Constitution. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975).

The right of self-representation is applicable to the states by way of the Due Process Clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment, and prevents a state from forcing upon a defendant unwanted

counsel. Black, 223 S.W.3d at 153 (citing Faretta, 422 U.S. at 836). This right also is explicitly

guaranteed under the Constitution of Missouri and the Rules of Criminal Procedure. Mo. Const.

art. I, § 18(a); Rule 31.02(a). 2

Hampton complains that the trial court erred in denying his request to forego counsel and

represent himself “without making any inquiry as to whether it was a knowing and intelligent

waiver of counsel.” But before a trial court must determine whether a defendant knowingly and

2 All Rule references are to the Missouri Supreme Court Rules (2021) unless otherwise indicated.

8 intelligently waived the right to counsel, the defendant must timely and unequivocally invoke the

right to proceed without counsel and to represent himself. See Black, 223 S.W.3d at 153. A

defendant’s request to represent himself must be unequivocal because it “involves two mutually

exclusive constitutional rights: the right to be represented by an attorney, and the right not to be

represented by an attorney.” Hampton, 959 S.W.2d at 447. As our Supreme Court has

emphasized more than once, “The probability that a defendant will appeal either decision of the

trial judge underscores the importance of requiring a defendant who wishes to waive his right to

counsel to do so explicitly and unequivocally.” Black, 223 S.W.3d at 153 (quoting Hampton, 959

S.W.2d at 447).

All of that said, Hampton offers only the bare assertion in his appellate brief that his

request “was certainly unequivocal.” He is incorrect for several reasons.

First, Hampton’s request was conditional: “[A]s long as Mr. Barron is going to be honest

and try to help me prove my case, I don’t mind him, you know. But if he don’t do like I ask him

to do . . ..” He later added, “[I]f Mr. Barron is sitting next to me . . . I’m going to speak as I

please because I have the right to aid and assist in my own defense.” That is, Hampton’s request

to represent himself was contingent on counsel’s not being honest, not trying to help Hampton

prove his case, and not doing what Hampton asked him to do. Otherwise, Hampton not only

would not waive counsel, but would “aid and assist” counsel in his defense. Apparently, these

contingencies did not materialize, as Hampton never renewed his request and instead proceeded

to trial with his counsel. See, e.g., State v. Parker, 890 S.W.2d 312, 316 (Mo. App. S.D. 1994)

(emphasizing the defendant’s use of “if” in holding his request to proceed pro se was equivocal

and conditional).

9 Second, Hampton interposed his conditional request only after the trial court again denied

Hampton’s motion to suppress evidence at the pre-trial conference. A motion to proceed pro se

made “without deliberation” or “on the spur of the moment” generally is not considered

unequivocal. See State v. Garrison, 928 S.W.2d 359, 362 (Mo. App. S.D. 1996) (citing State v.

Gomez, 836 S.W.2d 652, 657 (Mo. App. W.D. 1993)). Before he interjected at the pre-trial

conference, Hampton had never expressed a desire to forego counsel altogether or to represent

himself without the benefit of counsel. To the contrary, what Hampton incessantly demanded in

his multiple letters and pro se motions was appointment of new counsel, “an exchange of

attorney,” “fair legal representation,” and “the right to proper legal counsel.” See State v.

Hamilton, 791 S.W.2d 789, 796 (Mo. App. E.D. 1990) (“Such a request is not considered

unequivocal where the defendant merely states that he would prefer to represent himself rather

than accept the aid of his appointed attorney, but would like another attorney appointed who

meets his standards.”).

Because Hampton’s request was equivocal, his Point I is denied.

Point II — Warrantless Search and Seizure of Evidence

Hampton next avers the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence and

admitting that evidence at trial. The State responds alternatively that exigent circumstances

rendered the search reasonable, the exclusionary rule does not apply, and any error was not

material or prejudicial.

Because Hampton fails to show that any error was material or prejudicial, we deny Point

II. See Rule 84.13(b).

Standard of Review

This Court will affirm the trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence unless it is

clearly erroneous. State v. Burton, 649 S.W.3d 389, 392 (Mo. App. E.D. 2022). We view the

10 facts in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and disregard contrary evidence and

inferences. Id. We consider all evidence presented at both the suppression hearing and at trial. Id.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 15 of the

Constitution of Missouri provide equal guarantees against unreasonable searches and seizures.

State v. Little, 604 S.W.3d 708, 720 (Mo. App. E.D. 2020). As a general rule, warrantless

searches and seizures inside a home are presumptively unreasonable and unconstitutional. Id.

The exclusionary rule precludes the admission of evidence obtained pursuant to an

unconstitutional search. State v. Bales, 630 S.W.3d 754, 763 (Mo. banc 2021); see also Little,

604 S.W.3d at 720.

Still, we review evidentiary rulings for prejudice, not mere error, and will reverse only if

the error was so prejudicial that it deprived the defendant of a fair trial. State v. Sinks, 652

S.W.3d 322, 346 (Mo. App. E.D. 2022); State v. Tettamble, 720 S.W.2d 741, 742 (Mo. App.

E.D. 1986). A defendant claiming error in the admission of evidence has the burden of showing

both error and prejudice. State v. Wright, 551 S.W.3d 608, 616 (Mo. App. E.D. 2018); Tettamble,

720 S.W.2d at 742.

“An accused is deprived of a fair trial and prejudice is established if the Court concludes

the erroneously admitted evidence improperly influenced the jury to a point at which there is a

reasonable probability that, but for the improperly admitted evidence, the jury would have

reached a different result.” State v. Hollowell, 643 S.W.3d 329, 337 (Mo. banc 2022). Error may

be harmless if other evidence of guilt is overwhelming, or if the improper evidence was

cumulative and not highlighted. State v. Olten, 428 S.W.3d 784, 788 (Mo. App. S.D. 2014); see

also State v. Thompson, 341 S.W.3d 723, 730 (Mo. App. E.D. 2011) (“Admission of improper

evidence is harmless if the other evidence of guilt is overwhelming.”); State v. Rutter, 93 S.W.3d 11 714, 728 (Mo. banc 2002) (concluding, despite State’s failure to establish exigent circumstances

and plain view exceptions, defendant failed to prove prejudice because evidence that defendant

killed victim was “overwhelming”).

Hampton has not shown that, but for the admission of the five photographs and limited

testimony of the evidence found in his house, the jury would have reached a different result. For

starters, Detective Walsh flatly conceded at trial that the shotgun, marijuana, and packaging

supplies ultimately were “not significant to the crime scene.” In other words, the jury heard from

the investigating detective that the evidence found in Hampton’s house was not “related to the

crime[s] for which he was ultimately charged.” See United States v. Houston, 920 F.3d 1168,

1173 (8th Cir. 2019) (holding any error from admission of evidence found on defendant pursuant

to unconstitutional search was harmless because none of the evidence was “related to the crime

for which he was ultimately charged—possessing the pistol found in the ravine.”). Further, the

State did not highlight, or even mention, that evidence in closing argument, nor did the jury

request it during deliberations. See Olten, 428 S.W.3d at 788.

Also, Hampton does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to convict him. The

evidence of Hampton’s guilt, independent of the evidence found in his house, not only was

sufficient but was overwhelming. See State v. Hughes, 563 S.W.3d 119, 127 (Mo. banc 2018)

(“As this evidence was sufficient to support the judgment, no prejudice could have resulted from

overruling the motion to suppress the actual physical evidence seized.”). The evidence included

the testimony of three eyewitnesses that Hampton shot Pitts as he fled from Hampton’s house.

One of those witnesses also testified to Hampton’s express intent “to kill this MF” shortly before

he did so. See United States v. Green, 835 F.3d 844, 853 (8th Cir. 2016) (holding any

erroneously admitted evidence was harmless because government introduced sufficient

12 independent evidence to support jury’s verdict); State v. Tims, 865 S.W.2d 881, 886 (Mo. App.

E.D. 1993) (finding evidence overwhelming where defendant was identified by victim and her

cousin); State v. Jimmerson, 891 S.W.2d 470, 473 (Mo. App. E.D. 1994) (finding evidence,

including incontrovertible eyewitness testimony, overwhelming).

For these reasons, Hampton has not established that any error in denying his motion to

suppress evidence and admitting that evidence at trial was material or prejudicial. Hampton’s

Point II is denied.

Conclusion

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Cristian M. Stevens, J.

Gary M. Gaertner, Jr., P.J., and John P. Torbitzky, J., concur.