STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A25-0382
State of Minnesota, Respondent,
vs.
Tommy Eastman, Appellant.
Filed December 1, 2025 Affirmed Wheelock, Judge
Anoka County District Court File No. 02-CR-22-4786
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Brad Johnson, Anoka County Attorney, Wendy O. Sanchez, Kelsey R. Kelley, Assistant County Attorneys, Anoka, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sean Michael McGuire, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Bentley, Presiding Judge; Wheelock, Judge; and Larson,
Judge.
SYLLABUS
The 2023 amendment to Minnesota Statutes section 609.14, subdivision 1(a), does
not create a new or heightened standard that requires a district court, before it may revoke
a defendant’s probation, to make any findings that rehabilitation has failed additional to or
different from those currently required by existing caselaw. OPINION
WHEELOCK, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s order revoking his probation, arguing that
the district court abused its discretion by (1) violating his constitutional right to an impartial
judge when it conflated his case with another defendant’s criminal case, (2) failing to
properly consider the Austin 1 factors when revoking his probation, and (3) failing to find
that all attempts at rehabilitation had failed before revoking probation in violation of
Minnesota Statutes section 609.14, subdivision 1(a) (2024). We affirm.
FACTS
In August 2022, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Tommy Eastman
with criminal sexual conduct in the first degree in violation of Minnesota Statutes
section 609.342, subdivision 1a(e) (2020), for sexually assaulting a 12-year-old child,
Child A.
Eastman pleaded guilty to the offense. At the plea hearing, Eastman admitted that
he used Snapchat to coordinate with another adult male, D.B., to give D.B. a ride “to go
see [D.B.’s] girl,” Child A, and bring them all back to D.B.’s residence. Eastman admitted
that, once he and D.B. picked up Child A, they returned to D.B.’s residence and the men
took turns penetrating her. Later, at the sentencing hearing in August 2023, counsel for the
1 The district court must make three findings before it may revoke a defendant’s probation following a violation. See State v. Austin, 295 N.W.2d 248, 250 (Minn. 1980). “[T]he court must 1) designate the specific condition or conditions that were violated; 2) find that the violation was intentional or inexcusable; and 3) find that [the] need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation.” Id.
2 state noted that Eastman participated in the penetration of Child A as “payment” for giving
Child A and D.B. a ride to D.B.’s home. The district court granted Eastman’s motion for
a downward dispositional departure and imposed a sentence of 144 months’ imprisonment
stayed for 30 years of supervised probation with conditions.
In September 2024, Eastman’s probation officer began receiving reports that
Eastman was violating his probation conditions by using an unapproved cell phone, using
Snapchat, residing at an unapproved address, and having unapproved contact with minors.
The district court held a probation-violation hearing at which Eastman admitted each of the
alleged violations.
After Eastman admitted the allegations, counsel for the state argued for execution
of the imposed sentence. Counsel for the state reminded the district court of the details of
Eastman’s offense, including Eastman’s use of Snapchat to arrange to pick up Child A
from her home and his subsequent “penetration of this 12-year-old with another adult male
present.” Counsel for the state also asserted that Eastman had been “lying to [his probation
officer] and hiding information” since the start of his probation, including by using
Snapchat to reach out to “many, many females” for dating purposes and saving to his
Snapchat account a photo of Eastman and a female who appeared to be a minor of similar
age to Child A.
Eastman’s counsel requested an intermediate sanction and pointed out that it was
Eastman’s first violation, he was “only 23 years old,” and he “does not have [an] extensive
criminal history.” Eastman’s counsel said that Eastman understood the “severity of his
mistakes” and would provide value to the community if granted an intermediate sanction.
3 After hearing arguments from each party, the district court made an oral finding on
the record that the need for confinement outweighed the policies favoring probation.
Specifically, the district court observed that Eastman was in violation of the most
significant of his probation conditions: “use of chat lines, [not] maintaining his residence,
[and] having unauthorized cell phones.” The district court executed Eastman’s 144-month
sentence.
Eastman appeals.
ISSUES
I. Did the district court violate Eastman’s due-process right to an impartial judge by considering, when revoking Eastman’s probation, the actions of another defendant in committing a different offense?
II. Did the district court abuse its discretion by determining that the need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation?
III. Did the legislature’s 2023 amendment to Minnesota Statutes section 609.14, subdivision 1(a), create a new standard for probation-violation proceedings that requires a district court to determine that all possible options for rehabilitation have been exhausted before it may revoke probation?
ANALYSIS
I. The district court did not violate Eastman’s procedural due-process right to an impartial judge by considering, when revoking Eastman’s probation, the actions of another defendant in committing a different offense.
Eastman argues that his constitutional right to due process was violated because the
district court exhibited bias when it considered the underlying offense of another defendant
as a basis for revoking Eastman’s probation. Eastman contends that he was thus “deprived
4 of a neutral and detached decision maker.” Eastman did not raise this issue at the
probation-violation hearing. 2
To conform with standards of procedural due process, a defendant on probation has
a constitutional right to a hearing before their probation can be revoked. Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973) (determining that the due-process procedure outlined
for parolees in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972), also applies to
probationers). At such a hearing, the issue of revocation must be determined by a “neutral
and detached” decisionmaker. Pearson v. State, 241 N.W.2d 490, 492 (Minn. 1976)
(quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489).
To succeed on this claim, Eastman must prove that “a reasonable examiner [with
full knowledge of the facts and circumstances] would question the judge’s impartiality.”
State v. Cleary, 882 N.W.2d 899, 904 (Minn. App. 2016) (stating that whether a judge is
biased during a probation-violation hearing is not based on whether the judge was actually
biased, but whether a reasonable examiner would question the judge’s impartiality); see
also State v. Lopez, 988 N.W.2d 107, 117 (Minn. 2023) (discussing three distinct types of
bias that may exist when a district court acts as fact-finder and stating that emergent-bias
concerns arise when “the trier of fact is not actually biased, but during the [proceeding],
something happens that transforms it into a partial trier of fact”). When a district court sits
as a finder of fact, it is obligated to set aside personal knowledge and decide cases based
2 We need not determine whether plain-error review applies to this issue because we conclude that there was no error at all, given that the district court’s statements did not reflect either actual bias or the appearance of bias against Eastman.
5 solely on the merits of the evidence presented in the proceeding before it. Lopez,
988 N.W.2d at 119-21; see also State v. Dorsey, 701 N.W.2d 238, 250 (Minn. 2005)
(establishing that, if the record demonstrates that a district court conducted independent
investigation of information outside of the record to decide the case, the court’s impartiality
would reasonably be questioned). We review “whether a district court deprived a
defendant of [the] right to a fair trial and an impartial fact-finder de novo.” Lopez,
988 N.W.2d at 120.
Eastman asserts that the district court exhibited bias when it considered the “actions
of another individual,” pointing out that the district court mentioned Eastman’s use of
Snapchat and that it then relied on information outside of the record. Eastman claims that
he “was not involved with using Snapchat to solicit minors” and that, therefore, the judge
must have confused his case with another defendant’s case or “used her knowledge of
[another defendant’s] case to inform her decision” to revoke probation. But the district
court’s statements at the hearing do not demonstrate that the district court considered any
use of Snapchat in making its probation-revocation decision other than that to which
Eastman admitted during his plea.
During the hearing, counsel for the state properly recited the facts of Eastman’s
offense, specifically that Eastman used Snapchat to coordinate the assault of Child A:
“[W]hat Mr. Eastman was convicted of included using Snapchat, using social media to
arrange for pickup of this 12-year-old where he was engaging in penetration of this
12-year-old with another adult male present.” While Eastman suggests that the district
court conflated his case with that of another defendant charged with assaulting Child A,
6 there is no indication in the record that the district court relied on evidence of events outside
Eastman’s underlying offense and probation violations when it revoked his probation. The
district court properly considered arguments from the state and Eastman, testimony from
the probation officer, and the factual basis for Eastman’s plea and found that the need for
Eastman’s confinement outweighed the policies favoring probation.
To support his argument, Eastman relies on Cleary, in which we determined it was
error for the judge who presided over Cleary’s case in drug court to also preside over his
probation-violation hearing in district court. 882 N.W.2d at 901-02. We reasoned that the
participation of the judge in both proceedings could risk injustice to the parties and
undermine public confidence in the judicial process. Id. at 908. But Eastman’s reliance is
misguided because Cleary is factually distinguishable.
In Cleary, we explained that the “unique structure” and purpose of drug court
changes the relationship between judge and defendant and is different than that in other
courts. Id. at 906. Drug court judges interact with defendants on a much more personal
level than is typical in other court settings. Id. at 905. As part of the drug court program,
Cleary submitted a journal that detailed his feelings and personal life once a week to the
judge; the drug court team also celebrated Cleary with a party when he reached one year
of sobriety. Id. In addition, there is no “formal record” for drug court, so there is no
“reviewable record” for many of the interactions between the judge and a defendant
regarding the defendant’s participation in the program. Id. at 906. For those reasons, we
concluded that there was opportunity for the appearance of partiality if a drug court judge
7 presided over a probation-violation hearing for a defendant the judge oversaw in drug
court. Id. at 908.
Unlike in Cleary, the record here does not suggest a relationship between Eastman
and the district court judge that would show any appearance of partiality; indeed, there is
no assertion of any relationship between them at all. Furthermore, we see no indication
that the judge relied on personal knowledge or information outside of the record to revoke
Eastman’s probation. During the probation-violation hearing, the district court recalled
Eastman’s sentencing as part of a “very egregious case with a number of young men that
were all involved in transporting basically by Uber, if I remember correctly—paying for
an Uber to get a young girl to various residences where the men had sex with her.” We are
not persuaded that this reference shows the district court conflated Eastman’s case with
that of another defendant because, while the use of an Uber was not present in Eastman’s
case, Eastman admitted at his plea hearing that he gave Child A and D.B. a ride to D.B.’s
residence and that D.B. and Eastman took turns having sexual intercourse with Child A.
We thus conclude that any reasonable examiner with full knowledge of the facts and
circumstances of the case would not question the judge’s impartiality.
Eastman has not shown that the district court relied on facts outside the record, and
therefore, we discern no bias.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the need for Eastman’s confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation.
Eastman argues that the district court abused its discretion when it revoked his
probation by (1) failing to analyze the Modtland subfactors and (2) improperly weighing
8 the significance of his violations based on evidence from another defendant’s case. We
address each argument in turn.
“The [district] court has broad discretion in determining if there is sufficient
evidence to revoke probation and should be reversed only if there is a clear abuse of that
discretion.” Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 249-50. But whether the district court made the
required findings to revoke probation is a question of law that we review de novo. State v.
Modtland, 695 N.W.2d 602, 605 (Minn. 2005). To revoke probation, a district court must
make specific findings on what are known as the Austin factors. Austin, 295 N.W.2d at
250. The court must (1) identify the specific condition of probation violated, (2) determine
that the violation was intentional or inexcusable, and (3) assess whether the need for
confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation. Id. When analyzing the third
Austin factor, the district court must further consider three subfactors known as the
Modtland subfactors and must make findings as to whether
(i) confinement is necessary to protect the public from further criminal activity by the offender; or (ii) the offender is in need of correctional treatment which can most effectively be provided if [they are] confined; or (iii) it would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the violation if probation were not revoked.
Modtland, 695 N.W.2d at 607 (quotation omitted). A district court needs to find only one
Modtland subfactor to support a finding favoring confinement on the third Austin factor.
State v. Smith, 994 N.W.2d 317, 320 (Minn. App. 2023), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 27,
2023).
9 The decision to revoke probation “cannot be a reflexive reaction to an accumulation
of technical violations but requires a showing that the offender’s behavior demonstrates
that he or she cannot be counted on to avoid antisocial activity.” Austin, 295 N.W.2d at
251 (quotations omitted). District courts must make “thorough, fact-specific records” and
“seek to convey their substantive reasons for revocation and the evidence relied upon.”
Modtland, 695 N.W.2d at 608.
Eastman argues that the district court did not make any findings pursuant to the
Modtland subfactors and that, therefore, its finding on the third Austin factor—whether the
need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation—was not supported. The
record belies Eastman’s assertion.
Eastman admitted to multiple probation violations, including (1) possessing an
unapproved cell phone, (2) using Snapchat, (3) residing at a location where he was not
registered, and (4) having contact with minors without prior approval. On the first
Modtland subfactor, the district court found that, due to the seriousness of his underlying
offense and number of significant probation violations, Eastman was not amenable to
probation and his confinement was necessary to protect the public from further criminal
activity.
Eastman was using Snapchat as a dating service to “contact more young women”
only eight months after he pleaded guilty to a criminal-sexual-conduct offense that
involved using Snapchat to facilitate his sexual assault of a 12-year-old child. At the
probation-violation hearing, Eastman admitted that he used his Snapchat account to find
people whom he wanted to date. But at his plea hearing, Eastman had admitted that he and
10 D.B. used Snapchat to communicate with each other to coordinate the retrieval of Child A
from her home and that, after he picked up D.B. and then Child A from her home and gave
them a ride to D.B.’s home, he sexually penetrated Child A. Snapchat played a substantial
role in Eastman’s assault of Child A.
The significant violation of using Snapchat as a dating service on an unapproved
cell phone supports the district court’s finding on the first Modtland subfactor. In support
of its finding, the district court stated:
The need for confinement at this point, in light of the seriousness of the underlying case for which he was given probation, and he was given probation over the State’s objection, and the violations here that have occurred, which is apparently having an unapproved cell phone and utilizing that cell phone to attempt to contact more young women, the Court finds that the need for confinement is outweighed by the policies favoring probation. There’s no indication that Mr. Eastman could be or can be supervised on probation since he was in violation of the most significant of conditions, that being no use of chat lines, maintaining his residence, having unauthorized cell phones.
As this was a clear violation of the probation condition prohibiting use of social
media, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Eastman’s violation was
significant and that the need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation
because it “is necessary to protect the public from further criminal activity” by Eastman.
See Modtland, 695 N.W.2d at 607.
Eastman also argues that the probation conditions he violated were given more
weight than they deserved because the district court conflated his case with that of another
defendant who committed a more severe offense. Eastman highlights the weight the
11 district court placed on his use of Snapchat while on probation as proof that it was
confusing his case with that of another defendant. The record, however, supports the state’s
recitation of the facts, and as previously discussed, the use of Snapchat played a significant
role in Eastman’s underlying offense. There is no evidence to support the assertion that
the district court considered the facts of another defendant’s case when weighing
Eastman’s probation violations.
Because the district court properly considered the first Modtland subfactor when
determining whether the need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation
in its decision to revoke Eastman’s probation, we discern no abuse of discretion that would
support a reversal of the district court’s revocation decision.
III. The 2023 amendment to Minnesota Statutes section 609.14, subdivision 1(a), does not create a new standard for the revocation of probation.
Eastman also challenges the district court’s order revoking his probation by arguing
that Minnesota Statutes section 609.14, subdivision 1(a) (2024), requires a district court to
find that all possible rehabilitation has failed before it may revoke probation. In 2023, the
Minnesota Legislature amended subdivision 1(a) to include the sentence, “Revocation shall
only be used as a last resort when rehabilitation has failed.” 2023 Minn. Laws ch. 52,
art. 17, § 32, at 1114. Eastman asserts that this amendment demonstrates the legislature’s
intention to establish a new standard for the revocation of probation distinct from that
established by Austin: that a district court must find that all possible attempts at
rehabilitation have failed before revoking probation. This argument requires us to interpret
the 2023 amendment to Minnesota Statutes section 609.14, subdivision 1(a).
12 Statutory interpretation is a question of law we review de novo. State v. Holl,
966 N.W.2d 803, 808 (Minn. 2021). “Our objective in statutory interpretation is to
effectuate the intent of the legislature.” State v. Riggs, 865 N.W.2d 679, 682 (Minn. 2015)
(quotation omitted). Our analysis begins by considering whether the statutory language at
issue is ambiguous. Roberts v. State, 945 N.W.2d 850, 853 (Minn. 2020). A statute is
ambiguous if it is “subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.” Id. “To determine
whether a statute is ambiguous, we first construe words and phrases in the statute according
to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage.” Fordyce v. State,
994 N.W.2d 893, 897 (Minn. 2023) (quotations omitted). If the language of the statute is
not ambiguous on its face, we apply its plain meaning. Id. If, however, the language of
the statute is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, we apply the canons
of construction to ascertain the statute’s meaning and “resolve the ambiguity.” State v.
Thonesavanh, 904 N.W.2d 432, 435 (Minn. 2017).
The language at issue here is the sentence, “Revocation shall only be used as a last
resort when rehabilitation has failed.” Minn. Stat. § 609.14, subd. 1(a). Eastman argues
that the plain language of the sentence requires a district court to maintain a defendant on
probation “unless all [possible] attempts to rehabilitate the defendant have failed.” In other
words, he argues, “[u]nless the probationer is so incorrigible that all attempts at
rehabilitation have failed, the court may not revoke probation.”
Based on the legislature’s use of the word “shall,” it is reasonable to construe the
amendment as imposing a mandatory duty on the district court. See Minn. Stat. § 645.44,
subd. 16 (2024) (“‘Shall’ is mandatory.”). And it is similarly reasonable to construe “when
13 rehabilitation has failed” as referring to a circumstance in which all avenues for
rehabilitation have been explored and have failed. Accordingly, it is reasonable to interpret
the amendment’s language as precluding the revocation of probation until this condition
precedent—the exhaustion of all possible attempts at rehabilitation—has been satisfied.
We conclude that it is also reasonable, however, to construe the phrase “when
rehabilitation has failed” as referring to a circumstance in which the nature of a defendant’s
conduct in violating probation demonstrates no reasonable probability of future reform
sufficient to outweigh either the risk to public safety as demonstrated by that conduct or
the need for the execution of the sentence as an appropriate consequence, even if other
rehabilitative opportunities remain available. Stated differently, if a defendant has been
afforded an opportunity for rehabilitation but violates probation in a manner that either
demonstrates an unacceptable risk to public safety or requires revocation as a proportional
consequence, a district court may conclude that rehabilitation has failed notwithstanding
that relevant rehabilitative programming may remain available in the community. Because
we conclude that the statutory language is susceptible to more than one reasonable
interpretation, it is ambiguous, and we therefore resort to the canons of statutory
construction to ascertain its meaning. See Thonesavanh, 904 N.W.2d at 436.
We conclude that the better interpretation of “when rehabilitation has failed” is that
“the offender’s behavior demonstrates that he or she cannot be counted on to avoid
antisocial activity” or “[t]he [defendant] has been offered treatment but has failed to take
advantage of the opportunity or to show a commitment to rehabilitation.” Austin,
295 N.W.2d at 251 (quotations omitted); see also Thonesavanh, 904 N.W.2d at 436
14 (discerning the meaning of a statute based on the “better interpretation”); State v. Hayes,
826 N.W.2d 799, 805 (Minn. 2013) (embracing the more reasonable of the two
interpretations of a statute); In re Est. of Butler, 803 N.W.2d 393, 397 (Minn. 2011)
(adopting the “better interpretation” of a statute). Such a definition is not merely
practicable on its face, but it also comports with a concept that Minnesota courts have
applied for the nearly 50 years since Austin was decided. Indeed, we conclude that the
intention of the legislature in amending subdivision 1(a) was not to supplant the district
courts’ reliance on the Austin analysis when revoking probation, but rather to mandate it.
We reach this conclusion for two reasons.
First, the language used in the amendment to subdivision 1(a) is substantially similar
to that used in Austin, in which the supreme court stated that “[t]he purpose of probation is
rehabilitation and revocation should be used only as a last resort when treatment has
failed.” 295 N.W.2d at 250 (emphasis added). As Eastman notes, the amendment uses
“shall” in lieu of “should” and “rehabilitation” in lieu of “treatment,” but we reject his
argument that these alterations indicate “a departure from Austin and its progeny” because
closer examination contradicts such a conclusion.
Although the supreme court in Austin used the permissive “should” in describing
the restraint to be exercised in revoking probation, it nevertheless implemented a
mandatory analysis that district courts must undertake in doing so. Shortly after using
“should,” the Austin court stated without qualification that the “decision to revoke . . .
requires a showing that the offender’s behavior demonstrates that he or she cannot be
counted on to avoid antisocial activity.” Id. at 251 (emphasis added) (quotations omitted).
15 And there is no indication that the supreme court in Austin intended to ascribe materially
distinct meanings to the terms “rehabilitation” and “treatment.” Because it first noted that
the “purpose of probation is rehabilitation,” its use of “treatment” in the following clause
suggests that it intended the words to be synonymous. Id. at 250. And nowhere else in the
opinion does the supreme court suggest that a revocation decision should focus more or
exclusively on the failure of treatment programming to the exclusion of the broader concept
of rehabilitation.
Second, it is significant that the legislature declined to provide any guidance to
district courts in determining when “rehabilitation has failed.” Given that the amended
language so closely mirrors that of Austin’s own policy statement on the same topic, it is
reasonable to assume that the legislature was fully aware of the existing caselaw governing
probation-violation proceedings. See Sterry v. Minn. Dep’t of Corr., 8 N.W.3d 224, 232
(Minn. 2024) (stating that appellate courts “presume that statutes are consistent with the
common law, and [they] do not presume that the legislature intended to abrogate or modify
a rule of the common law on the subject any further than that which is expressly declared
or clearly indicated” (quoting Jepsen v. County of Pope, 966 N.W.2d 472, 484 (Minn.
2021))). And considering that the legislature made no attempt to establish a distinct
procedure for determining when rehabilitation has failed, it is likewise reasonable to
conclude that the legislature did not intend to abrogate Austin’s analysis with the
amendment, but to codify it.
This interpretation complies with the most relevant—and indeed dispositive—
canon of discerning legislative intent, that courts presume that “the legislature does not
16 intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution, or unreasonable.” Minn. Stat.
§ 645.17(1) (2024). When we apply this presumption, Eastman’s proposed interpretation
also fails.
First, an interpretation of “when rehabilitation has failed” that requires the failure
of “all [possible] attempts to rehabilitate the defendant” would be impossible to
consistently or uniformly apply. Because rehabilitation is fundamentally a subjective and
internal process, there is no practical means of determining when a defendant on probation
is truly beyond rehabilitation. So long as the imposed probationary term has not expired
and the defendant retains agency over their own decision-making, there is always the
possibility that continued probation will bring about the desired change in thinking and
behavior. Accordingly, the only way to comprehensively determine that “all attempts to
rehabilitate the defendant have failed” is to do so retrospectively—only once probation has
ended and the district court is no longer able to provide additional opportunities for
rehabilitation could one conclude that all such efforts had failed.
If there is indeed a point at which all hope of rehabilitation becomes lost for a
defendant prior to the expiration of probation, a district court will be unable to determine
with any specificity when exactly that point has been reached, particularly if the defendant
continues to profess a desire for change and an intention to take advantage of the
opportunities for doing so. Thus, any conclusion that “all attempts to rehabilitate the
defendant have failed” made before the termination of probation itself will necessarily
entail nothing more than a district court’s best guess at divining whether a defendant has
exhausted opportunities for continued correctional treatment in a community setting. And
17 considering that the current iteration of the statute provides no guidance to courts in how
to reach such a conclusion, it would be impractical to implement a standard for the
revocation of probation that turns entirely on a district court’s ability to accurately predict
future behavior.
Second, applying such a construction would lead to absurd and unreasonable results
because it would effectively insulate defendants from revocation—regardless of the
severity or frequency of their probation violations—so long as they can demonstrate any
potential for future reform. To require the exhaustion of any and all rehabilitative
opportunities before a district court may revoke probation would deprive district courts of
the ability to impose meaningful and proportional sanctions for violation behavior that
demonstrates an ongoing risk to public safety solely because the defendant might do better
next time. It would essentially nullify the relevance of the violating behavior itself in the
determination of whether the defendant should remain in the community. Such a result is
not only irrational as a matter of logic but is antithetical to Minnesota’s long-standing
perspective that the revocation of probation must involve “a balancing of the probationer’s
interest in freedom and the state’s interest in insuring his rehabilitation and the public
safety.” Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 251.
Accordingly, we hold that the 2023 amendment to Minnesota Statutes
section 609.14, subdivision 1(a), does not create a new or heightened standard that requires
a district court, before it may revoke a defendant’s probation, to make any findings that
rehabilitation has failed additional to or different from those currently required by existing
caselaw. In other words, a district court’s determination pursuant to Austin that the “need
18 for confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation” is sufficient to satisfy the
statutory requirement that the district court find that rehabilitation has failed before
revoking probation. 295 N.W.2d at 250.
DECISION
The district court did not act with bias or rely on information outside the record
during the probation-violation proceeding and did not abuse its discretion by determining
that the need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation and then revoking
Eastman’s probation. Furthermore, the 2023 amendment to Minnesota Statutes
section 609.14, subdivision 1(a), does not create a new or heightened standard that district
courts must apply when revoking probation.
Affirmed.