STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN SUPREME COURT
A22-0829
Court of Appeals McKeig, J. Took no part, Procaccini, Hennesy, JJ. Nicholas W. Sterry,
Respondent,
vs. Filed: June 20, 2024 Office of Appellate Courts Minnesota Department of Corrections (DOC),
Appellant,
and
Correctional Officer Ashley Youngberg, in her individual and official capacities,
Defendant.
________________________
Zorislav R. Leyderman, The Law Office of Zorislav R. Leyderman, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for respondent.
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Liz Kramer, Solicitor General, Anna Veit-Carter, Assistant Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for appellant.
Paul A. Merwin, Patricia Y. Beety, League of Minnesota Cities, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for amici curiae League of Minnesota Cities and Minnesota School Boards Association.
Bradford Colbert, Elena Basill, Certified Student Practitioner, Legal Assistance to Minnesota Prisoners Clinic at Mitchell Hamline Law School, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for amicus curiae Legal Assistance to Minnesota Prisoners Clinic at Mitchell Hamline School of Law.
Jennifer E. Olson, TSR Injury Law, Bloomington, Minnesota; and
1 Charles A. Bird, Grant M. Borgen, Matthew B. De Jong, Bird, Stevens & Borgen, P.C., Rochester, Minnesota, for amicus curiae Minnesota Association for Justice.
Katharine Hannaher, Minnesota Coalition Against Sexual Assault, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for amicus curiae Minnesota Coalition against Sexual Assault. ___________________
SYLLABUS
1. For a state employer to be held vicariously liable for an employee’s
intentional tort under the Minnesota State Tort Claims Act, Minnesota Statutes section
3.736 (2022), the tort must: (1) be related to the duties of the employee; and (2) occur
within work-related limits of time and place—consistent with the common law standard
under which the employer, if a private person, would be vicariously liability.
2. The district court erred when dismissing a complaint against the Minnesota
Department of Corrections for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
because the facts alleged in the complaint—including a state employee’s perpetration of a
sexual assault and sexual harassment—could allow a jury to find that the state employee
was acting within the scope of office or employment under circumstances where the
Department would be liable under the common law for vicarious liability.
Affirmed.
OPINION
MCKEIG, Justice.
This appeal requires us to interpret the Minnesota State Tort Claims Act (the Act),
part of which allows for a state employer to be held vicariously liable for the tortious acts
or omissions of an employee if those acts or omissions occur while the employee is acting
2 within the scope of office or employment under circumstances where a private employer
would be vicariously liable. Minn. Stat. § 3.736, subd. 1 (2022). Respondent Nicholas
Sterry brought an action against appellant Minnesota Department of Corrections (the
Department) for claims of battery, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress,
and negligence for an alleged sexual assault and sexual harassment by one of its
correctional officers. The district court dismissed Sterry’s claims for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, concluding that the state employer was immune from the
suit under the Act because the correctional officer was not acting within the scope of her
employment when the alleged assault occurred. The court of appeals reversed, finding the
Act consistent with common law principles of vicarious liability applicable to private
employers, and therefore, that Sterry’s complaint alleged sufficient facts to survive the
motion to dismiss. Because a state employer’s exposure to vicarious liability is consistent
with that of a private employer under the common law, and because Sterry alleged
sufficient facts to survive the Department’s motion to dismiss, we affirm.
FACTS
Because we are reviewing a dismissal for failure to state a claim, we must accept
the allegations in Sterry’s complaint as true. See Cocchiarella v. Driggs, 884 N.W.2d 621,
624 (Minn. 2016). The following facts have been taken directly from the complaint.
In early 2018, Sterry was incarcerated at the Moose Lake Correctional Facility and
worked in the prison kitchen. Officer Ashley Youngberg was employed by the prison as a
correctional officer during that period, and she was known to sexually harass and intimidate
the inmates on a regular basis. The Department—the state government agency that
3 operates the Moose Lake facility—was aware of Youngberg’s history of harassment, but
there is no record of discipline prior to the incidents that form the basis of Sterry’s claims.
From February through May of 2018, on a near-daily basis, Youngberg would engage in
conduct or make comments which included directing sexually suggestive faces and poses
toward Sterry, telling Sterry that it would be fun for him to be with her, and making
comments such as “[y]ou’re cute,” “[y]ou’re sexy,” and “I bet you look good.”
This behavior culminated in an incident that occurred in late April 2018. Youngberg
was supervising Sterry in the prison kitchen when she ordered him into a supply room to
conduct inventory. While Sterry conducted the inventory, Youngberg reached inside his
pants and fondled his penis without consent. Sterry was unsure if he was being sexually
assaulted or being subjected to an authorized search, but he ultimately stepped away and
informed Youngberg that he was not interested in sexual contact with her. At that point,
Youngberg told Sterry that if he told anyone else about the encounter, she would claim that
he sexually assaulted her—which would subject him to administrative and criminal
discipline. This was the only sexual contact, though Youngberg’s other conduct and
comments continued until May 2018.
In March 2021, Sterry filed a civil action against the Department for battery,
intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and negligence and negligence
per se, under a theory of vicarious liability. 1 The district court dismissed the vicarious
1 The action also contained defendants not relevant to the issue before us. The State of Minnesota and the Commissioner of the Department of Corrections were initially included as parties but were dismissed as improper defendants by the district court.
4 liability claims against the Department, finding that the State was immune from liability
under the Act.
Sterry appealed the dismissal of the vicarious liability tort claims against the
Department. The court of appeals reversed, finding that Sterry’s complaint alleged
sufficient facts that could allow a factfinder to determine that Youngberg had been acting
within the scope of employment, which would allow the Department to be held liable under
the Act. Sterry v. Minn. Dep’t of Corr., 986 N.W.2d 715, 723–25 (Minn. App. 2023). In
so holding, the court of appeals concluded that a state employer’s liability for the
intentional torts of its employees was consistent with that of a private employer’s liability
under the common law. Id. at 723. We granted the Department’s petition for review.
ANALYSIS
This case presents two questions. First, under what circumstances would a state
employer face vicarious liability for an intentional tort under the Minnesota State Tort
Claims Act? 2 Second, did Sterry allege facts sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss,
Youngberg was also included in the action, though there is no indication that she was ever served with a copy of the summons and complaint. Sterry voluntarily dismissed Youngberg as a party. Also not relevant to our analysis are additional claims including civil rights violations, public services discrimination, and negligent retention and supervision. The civil rights and public services discrimination claims were dismissed by the district court— a decision which was not appealed—and in a separate filing, the negligent retention and supervision claims were dismissed by stipulation of the parties. 2 Note that the Minnesota State Tort Claims Act, referred in this opinion as “the Act,” is specific to Minnesota Statutes section 3.736 (2022). It does not include Minnesota Statutes section 3.732 (2022), which is also analyzed here. 5 showing that the Department may be held vicariously liable for Youngberg’s alleged sexual
assault and harassment? We address these questions in turn.
I.
The State of Minnesota had historically been immune from tort liability under the
doctrine of sovereign immunity until we abolished the common law doctrine in 1975. See
Nieting v. Blondell, 235 N.W.2d 597, 601 (Minn. 1975). In Nieting we recognized that
“[i]f the state is properly to serve the public interest, it must strive, through its laws, to . . .
[provide people] with adequate remedies for injuries wrongfully inflicted upon them.” Id.
at 603. Speaking directly to the Legislature, we prospectively abolished the tort immunity
of the State of Minnesota for cases “arising on or after August 1, 1976, subject to any
appropriate action taken by the legislature.” Id. The Legislature responded by passing the
Act—which was passed and took effect on the date of this court’s deadline—and clarified
the circumstances under which the State may be held vicariously liable. Act of Apr. 20,
1976, ch. 331, § 33, 1976 Minn. Laws 1282, 1293-97 (codified at Minn. Stat. § 3.736
(1976)). The State may now be held vicariously liable for certain acts or omissions of its
employees under the Act, which reads, in relevant part:
The state will pay compensation for injury to or loss of property or personal injury or death caused by an act or omission of an employee of the state while acting within the scope of office or employment . . . under circumstances where the state, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant, whether arising out of a governmental or proprietary function.
Minn. Stat. § 3.736, subd. 1 (2022).
To determine the circumstances under which a state employer faces vicarious
liability for an intentional tort under the Act, we must first analyze the statutory definition
6 of “scope of office or employment,” and then the circumstances where a private employer
would be vicariously liable. 3 This is a question of statutory interpretation which we review
de novo. State v. Velisek, 986 N.W.2d 696, 699 (Minn. 2023).
A.
Sterry claims, albeit implicitly, that Youngberg was acting within the scope of her
office or employment when she allegedly sexually assaulted him, which, among other
factors discussed below, is a necessary precondition to subjecting the Department to
liability under the Act. What falls within the “scope of office or employment” is explicitly
defined in a separate statutory section within the same subchapter:
“Scope of office or employment” means that the employee was acting on behalf of the state in the performance of duties or tasks lawfully assigned.
Minn. Stat. § 3.732, subd. 1(3) (2022). 4 “Scope of office or employment” is therefore
statutorily defined as consisting of two constituent parts: 1) “acting on behalf of the state;”
and 2) “in the performance of duties or tasks lawfully assigned by competent authority.”
Id.
Turning to the first part, to act “on behalf of” something means to act “as the agent
or representative of” that person or entity. Bryan Garner, A Dictionary of Modern
3 The Municipal Tort Claims Act gives municipal employers immunity from liability “if the same claim would be excluded under section 3.736, if brought against the state.” Minn. Stat. § 466.03, subd. 15 (2022). Thus, this interpretation of the Act has implications beyond the application here to state employers. 4 Minnesota Statutes section 3.732, subd. 1, is explicit that the meaning of “the terms defined in this section”—which includes the definition of “[s]cope of office or employment”—applies to the use of those terms “in this section and section 3.736.” (Emphasis added.) 7 American Usage 78 (1998); see also The American Heritage Dictionary of the English
Language 167 (3d ed. 1992) (defining “on behalf of” as “[a]s the agent of”). Neither Sterry
nor the Department dispute that this is the plain meaning of “on behalf of.”
With respect to the second part—“the performance of duties or tasks lawfully
assigned by competent authority,” Minn. Stat. § 3.732, subd. 1(3)—the Department claims
this phrase means that the tortious act or omission giving rise to liability must have been
lawfully assigned by competent authority. This, however, is contrary to the plain language
and ignores the rules of grammar. The language modified by “lawfully assigned by
competent authority” is clearly the preceding phrase “the performance of duties or tasks”—
not the tortious act or omission described in section 3.736, subdivision 1, of the Act itself
as suggested by the Department. Such a transposition would wrongly impute the
requirement of lawful assignment not to the employee’s duties or tasks, but to the injury-
causing act or omission found in a different statute altogether. Instead, the phrase
“performance of duties or tasks lawfully assigned by competent authority” unambiguously
describes an employee doing their job as assigned by their supervisors, with the caveat that
the tasks assigned to the employee must be lawful.
With this analysis, we do not redefine the phrase “scope of office or employment”
as defined by the Legislature in section 3.732, but rather state what that definition means.
Accordingly, the “scope of office or employment,” as defined by the Legislature, means
that a state employee was working as an agent or representative of the state and performing
duties or tasks assigned to them lawfully by their supervisor.
8 B.
With that interpretation in mind, we must now examine the relationship between the
scope of office or employment and an employee’s tortious act or omission as described in
section 3.736, subdivision 1, which again, states in relevant part:
The state will pay compensation for injury to or loss of property or personal injury or death caused by an act or omission of an employee of the state while acting within the scope of office or employment . . . under circumstances where the state, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant, whether arising out of a governmental or proprietary function.
When scrutinizing the language in the Act that exposes a state employer to vicarious
liability, our goal is to “effectuate the intent of the Legislature.” State v. Powers, 962
N.W.2d 853, 858 (Minn. 2021) (citing Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2020)). We analyze whether
language is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation. See State v. Abdus-Salam,
1 N.W.3d 871, 876–77 (Minn. 2024). If we find no ambiguity, we need not look to the
canons of construction, instead interpreting the statute according to its plain language. See
Velisek, 986 N.W.2d at 700–01.
The Department claims that because Youngberg’s sexual contact with Sterry was
criminal, 5 she could not have been “acting on behalf of the state in the performance of
duties or tasks lawfully assigned.” Minn. Stat. § 3.732, subd. 1(3). Under the Department’s
interpretation, if an employee commits an intentional tort, that employee could not, by
5 At the time of the alleged assault, Youngberg’s sexual contact with Sterry would have been fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minn. Stat. § 609.345, subd. 1(m) (2020) (“A person who engages in sexual contact with another person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the fourth degree if . . . the actor is an employee . . . of a . . . correctional system . . . and the complainant is a resident of a facility or under supervision of the correctional system. Consent by the complainant is not a defense.”). 9 definition, be operating within the scope of their office or employment. This, however, is
contrary to the common law for vicarious liability. The common law doctrine of vicarious
liability as interpreted in Minnesota states that “an employer may be held liable for even
the intentional misconduct of its employees when (1) the source of the attack is related to
the duties of the employee, and (2) the assault occurs within work-related limits of time
and place.” Fahrendorff ex rel. Fahrendorff v. N. Homes, Inc., 597 N.W.2d 905, 910
(Minn. 1999) (quoting Lange v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 211 N.W.2d 783, 786 (Minn. 1973))
(internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). Under this common law standard,
the court has held that fact issues can exist under which a sexual assault by an employee
could be found to be related to the duties of the employee’s employment and to have
occurred within work-related limits of time and place. See id. at 910–13.
Thus, the primary dispute between the parties is whether the standards for state
employer vicarious liability under section 3.736, subdivision 1, are to be interpreted
consistent with those of the common law for private employers. Interpreting the State’s
liability under section 3.736, subdivision 1 to be consistent with common law principles of
vicarious liability for private employers initially appears reasonable because an intentional
tort committed “while acting within the scope of office or employment”—i.e., while an
employee is “acting on behalf of the state in the performance of duties or task lawfully
assigned,” Minn. Stat. § 3.732, subd. 1(3)—is functionally consistent with an intentional
tort “related to the duties of the employee . . . occur[ring] within work related limits of time
and place,” Fahrendorff, 597 N.W.2d at 910.
10 The Department, however, contends that by defining “scope of office or
employment,” the Legislature expressly rejected the common law standard of vicarious
liability. We disagree. The Department bases this claim on our statement in State v.
Schmid, 859 N.W.2d 816, 820 (Minn. 2015), where we stated that “[w]e do not turn to the
common law definition of a word if the statute provides its own definition.” But that
statement does not stand for the proposition that, if the Legislature has provided a
definition, the phrase cannot be consistent with the common law. After all, we have also
stated that “[w]e presume that statutes are consistent with the common law, and we do not
presume that the legislature intended to abrogate or modify a rule of the common law on
the subject any further than that which is expressly declared or clearly indicated.” Jepsen
ex rel. Dean v. Cnty. of Pope, 966 N.W.2d 472, 484 (Minn. 2021) (quoting Getz v. Peace,
934 N.W.2d 347, 354 (Minn. 2019)) (internal quotation marks omitted). There is plainly
no express declaration or clear indication in the statutory definition of “scope of office or
employment” to suggest that the Legislature intended to abrogate the common law as to
vicarious liability over private employers.
Rather, the Act makes clear that vicarious liability for the State is to be consistent
with common law principles for vicarious liability over private employers. The Act is
explicit in creating liability for state employers “under circumstances where the state, if a
private person, would be liable to the claimant.” Minn. Stat. § 3.736, subd. 1 (emphasis
added). Sterry argues that the inclusion of the “private person” language shows that the
Legislature intended the Act to be read as consistent with the common law, and we agree.
If a state employer is to be treated the same as a private person—a class that would include
11 a private employer—then doing so requires treating the state employer consistent with the
common law of vicarious liability as it applies to private employers.
The Department’s argument that if an employee commits an intentional tort, that
employee could not, by definition, be operating within the scope of their office or
employment also ignores the plain language of section 3.736, subdivision 1. We often
look to dictionary definitions when determining the plain meaning of undefined words in
the context of a statute. Anoka Cnty. v. L. Enf't Lab. Servs., Inc., 3 N.W.3d 586, 594 (Minn.
2024). The Act assigns liability to the state employer if the employee commits an injury-
causing act or omission, “while acting within the scope of office or employment.” Minn.
Stat. § 3.736, subd. 1 (emphasis added). The italicized word “while” is defined as “during
the time that.” Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1342 (10th ed. 2001). Thus, the
limitation under the Act is on whether the employee’s tortious act or omission occurs
during the time that the employee was acting within the scope of office or employment. It
does not categorically preclude an intentional tort from being committed while an
employee acts “within the scope of office or employment,” as the Department maintains.
The Department’s other arguments that the State cannot be held vicariously liable
for an employee’s intentional torts likewise fall short. The Department claims that
language found in the indemnification provision in the Act supports its position. The
indemnification provision states, in relevant part:
The state shall defend, save harmless, and indemnify any employee of the state . . . in connection with any tort . . . arising out of an alleged act or omission . . . if the employee was acting within the scope of employment. . . . This subdivision does not apply in case of malfeasance in office or willful or wanton actions or neglect of duty.
12 Minn. Stat. § 3.736, subd. 9 (2022) (emphasis added). The Department claims that by not
requiring a state employer to defend or indemnify an employee for the listed behaviors of
“malfeasance . . . willful or wanton actions or neglect of duty,” a requirement to pay for
that same employee’s intentional torts would be “nonsensical.” But these two provisions
are not at odds with one another and serve distinct purposes. The Legislature, as shown
here, may choose to provide compensation for potential plaintiffs for the misconduct of a
state employee, but at the same time not require the state employer to reimburse that
employee for any liability the employee incurs due to their intentional misconduct.
In fact, the language of the indemnification provision suggests precisely the
opposite of what the Department claims because, under the canon against surplusage, we
avoid statutory interpretations that make words or phrases superfluous, void, or
insignificant. State v. Allison, 999 N.W.2d 835, 839 (Minn. 2024). If malfeasance, willful
or wanton actions, or neglect of duty are enough to per se place an employee outside the
scope of office or employment, listing those behaviors would have been completely
unnecessary because the indemnification provision only applies to employees acting within
the scope or office of their employment. The inclusion of the listed behaviors shows that
under the Act, a state employee may act within the scope of office or employment while at
the same time exhibiting malfeasance, willful or wanton actions, or neglect of duty.
More generally, and contrary to what the Department claims, the Act contains no
language that precludes state employer liability for an intentional tort, and we decline to
read that into the statute. If the Legislature had intended to prohibit state employer
vicarious liability for the intentional torts of its employees, it would be reasonable to expect
13 it would have done so in the language of the statute. 6 See Buzzell v. Walz, 974 N.W.2d
256, 264 (Minn. 2022) (rejecting an interpretation of a statute by reasoning that, had the
Legislature intended such an interpretation, “one would reasonably expect” it to have
included the critical words in the text of the statute). To hold that a state employer is never
liable for the intentional tort of its employee would ignore the plain language of the statute
and come to the curious conclusion that an employee is only capable of doing one thing at
a time—either committing an intentional tort or performing lawfully assigned duties and
tasks.
In sum, if a state employee committed an intentional tort “while acting within the
scope of office or employment,” vicarious liability exists if the circumstances are such that
“the state, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant.” This means that for state
employer liability to attach—consistent with the common law of vicarious liability—an
employee’s intentional tort must (1) “be related to the duties of the employee;” and (2)
“occur[] within work-related limits of time and place.” 7 Fahrendorff, 597 N.W.2d at 910.
6 For example, the Federal Tort Claims Act explicitly immunizes federal employers from vicarious liability for many intentional torts committed by its employees, whether the employee was acting within the scope of their employment or not. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (stating that a federal government employer cannot be held liable for the acts or omissions of its employee for “[a]ny claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights”). 7 That is not to say there exists a bright-line test for when a state employee is definitively acting within the scope of their office or employment or how far removed their actions must be to determine that they are no longer acting within that scope. We find persuasive our refusal in Lange to base a common law vicarious liability analysis on the “arbitrary determination of when, and at what point” the employee’s behavior “leave[s] the
14 This does not mean that every intentional tort committed while an employee is “on the
clock” or on the employer’s premises is subject to vicarious liability. Instead, our common
law on vicarious liability holds that whether an intentional tort is “related to the duties of
the employee” presents “a question of fact whether the employee’s acts were foreseeable,
related to, and connected with acts otherwise within the scope of his employment.” Id. at
911. The same standard applies here.
Lastly, before moving on to whether Sterry’s complaint should survive a motion to
dismiss, we must address another concern raised by the Department. Worried about a
potential tidal wave of vicarious liability suits, the Department and its amicus also argue
that public policy considerations support narrowing the scope of vicarious liability for state
employers because the Legislature intended to “protect the fiscal integrity and stability of
the state government.” We have recognized that protecting a sovereign’s fiscal integrity is
a “legitimate public purpose.” Rowe v. St. Paul Ramsey Med. Ctr., 472 N.W.2d 640, 643
(Minn. 1991). But we only consider “the purpose of the statute and the policy issue to be
remedied . . . if we determine that the statutory text is unclear.” State v. Khalil, 956 N.W.2d
627, 640 n.10 (Minn. 2010) (citing Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2020)). Here, we not only find
the text unambiguous, but we find no words in the text of the statute that limit a state
employer’s liability in the way the Department suggests, and we will not add those words
sphere of the employer’s business and become[s] motivated by personal [desires].” Lange v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 211 N.W.2d 783, 785 (Minn. 1973). The question of whether an employee was acting within the scope of their employment while committing an intentional tort is best left to the factfinder. See Reetz v. City of St. Paul, 956 N.W.2d 238, 247 (Minn. 2021) (“And when determining the vicarious liability of an employer, the issue of whether an employee was acting within the scope of their employment is also a question of fact.”). 15 for the sake of policy. See Gen. Mills, Inc. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 931 N.W.2d 791, 800
(Minn. 2019) (“We do not, however, add words to the plain language of a statute to fit with
an identifiable policy.”). To the extent that the Department and its amicus believe this
interpretation represents an unfavorable public policy, “those issues are best directed to the
Legislature.” Shefa v. Ellison, 968 N.W.2d 818, 822 n.4 (Minn. 2022).
II.
Having clarified the governing standard for vicarious liability under the Act, we
now address whether Sterry’s complaint survives a motion to dismiss under Minn. R. Civ.
P 12.02(e) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Here, the district
court granted the Department’s motion to dismiss because it found that Youngberg was not
acting within the scope of employment when she sexually assaulted Sterry. The court
reasoned that “the precise language of [the Act] narrows the scope of employment for
government employees more than the general scope that would apply under the common
law,” so “statutory immunity applies, [and] the specific tort claims Sterry has raised against
the [Department] are barred.”
Our review of a grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is de novo,
and we must “determine whether the pleadings set forth a legally sufficient claim for
relief.” Abel v. Abbott Nw. Hosp., 947 N.W.2d 58, 68 (Minn. 2020). A claim survives a
Rule 12.02(e) motion to dismiss “if it is possible on any evidence which might be produced,
consistent with the pleader’s theory, to grant the relief demanded.” Walsh v. U.S. Bank,
N.A., 851 N.W.2d 598, 603 (Minn. 2014). A claim fails under Rule 12.02(e) when the
“complaint does not set forth a legally sufficient claim for relief.” Walmart Inc. v. Winona
16 Cnty., 963 N.W.2d 192, 196 (Minn. 2021) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted). When determining whether dismissal was appropriate, we “must consider only
the facts alleged in the complaint, accepting those facts as true and must construe all
reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Bodah v. Lakeville Motor Express,
Inc., 663 N.W.2d 550, 553 (Minn. 2003) (citing Marquette Nat’l Bank v. Norris, 270
N.W.2d 290, 292 (Minn. 1978)).
The question then becomes whether Sterry’s complaint alleged facts that, if
accepted as true, show that Youngberg’s assault and harassment of Sterry occurred while
she was acting within the scope of office or employment, consistent with the circumstances
under which a private employer would be held vicariously liable under the common law.
“Minnesota is a notice-pleading state . . . .” Walsh, 851 N.W.2d at 604–05. Under that
standard, a plaintiff may plead their case “by way of a broad general statement which may
express conclusions rather than, as was required under code pleading, by a statement of
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” N. States Power Co. v. Franklin, 122
N.W.2d 26, 29 (Minn. 1963). This standard does not require that every fact related to every
element of a cause of action be pleaded, but rather that a complaint give the adverse party
sufficient clarity of the pleader’s theory. Halva v. Minn. State Colls. & Univs., 953 N.W.2d
496, 503 (Minn. 2021).
Here, the complaint alleges that the sexual assault took place under the following
circumstances: 1) Youngberg was working as a correctional officer at Moose Lake and was
allowed contact with and supervision of inmates; 2) Youngberg used her position of
authority to order Sterry into the kitchen supply room to conduct inventory; and 3) Sterry
17 conducted inventory under her supervision. Additionally, the complaint alleges a pattern
of comments and conduct that included making verbal sexual overtures and nonverbal
sexually suggestive faces and poses directed toward Sterry.
We acknowledge that Sterry’s complaint could have been more straightforward in
how its facts correlated to the claims made within, or it could have used language from the
Act itself to clarify his theory. Yet that is not what notice pleading requires. “A claim is
sufficient against a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim if it is possible on any
evidence which might be produced, consistent with the pleader’s theory, to grant the relief
demanded.” Walsh, 851 N.W.2d at 603. Here, Sterry broadly alleged that Youngberg was
performing duties or tasks that she had presumably been assigned by her supervisor, and
“the question of whether a[] [state] employee was acting within the scope of their
employment is explicitly a question of fact.” Reetz v. City of St. Paul, 956 N.W.2d 238,
247 (Minn. 2021). Moreover, we have recognized that when an employee commits a
sexual assault within work-related limits of time and place, an employer’s vicarious
liability turns on “a question of fact whether the employee’s acts were foreseeable, related
to, and connected with acts otherwise within the scope of his employment,” such that the
assault was related to the duties of employment. See Fahrendorff, 597 N.W.2d at 910–13.
That same common law rule governs here. Accordingly, to now hold that Sterry’s claim
does not survive a Rule 12.02(e) motion to dismiss would all but foreclose state employer
vicarious liability for an employee’s intentional tort, which would contravene the plain
language of the Act and would be contrary to the common law of vicarious liability.
18 CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
PROCACCINI, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
HENNESY, J., not having been a member of this court at the time of submission,
took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.