State of Louisiana v. Christopher Vincent
Opinion
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
13-538
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VERSUS CHRISTOPHER VINCENT
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APPEAL FROM THE
FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF CALCASIEU, NO. 18125-10 HONORABLE DAVID KENT SAVOIE, DISTRICT JUDGE
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ULYSSES GENE THIBODEAUX
CHIEF JUDGE
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Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, John D. Saunders, and Phyllis M. Keaty, Judges.
AFFIRMED.
John Foster DeRosier District Attorney – 14th Judicial District Court Karen C. McLellan Assistant District Attorney – 14th Judicial District Court P. O. Box 3206 Lake Charles, LA 70602-3206 Telephone: (337) 437-3400 COUNSEL FOR:
Plaintiff/Appellee - State of Louisiana
Paula Corley Marx Louisiana Appellate Project P. O. Box 80006 Lafayette, LA 70598-0006 Telephone: (337) 991-9757 COUNSEL FOR:
Defendant/Appellant - Christopher Vincent
THIBODEAUX, Chief Judge.
Defendant, Christopher Vincent, entered a plea pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160 (1970) to two counts of indecent behavior with a juvenile, violations of La.R.S. 14:81(H)(2). He was initially indicted by a grand jury with two counts of aggravated rape and two counts of sexual battery.
He appeals his consecutive twenty years at hard labor sentences, with ten years to be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, as excessive. We affirm.
ISSUE
We shall consider whether the sentences imposed on this twenty-two-
year-old first-time offender are excessive.
LAW AND DISCUSSION
Excessiveness of Sentences Defendant was originally charged with two counts of aggravated rape of a juvenile, which carry mandatory sentences of life imprisonment at hard labor, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, and two counts of sexual battery on a minor, which carry sentences of twenty-five to ninety-nine years, with at least twenty-five years served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. See La.R.S. 14:42(D)(2)(b) and La.R.S. 14:43.1(C)(2). However, Defendant pled guilty to two counts of indecent behavior with a juvenile, which carry sentences of two to twenty-five years at hard labor, with at
least two years to be served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. See La.R.S. 14:81(H)(2).
At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, which included testimony by the father of the minor victims, the court sentenced Defendant to twenty years at hard labor on each count, to be served consecutively, with ten years of each sentence to be served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. Defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence, in which he claimed that he was twenty-two years old and had no prior adult convictions at the time of the offenses. He also alleged that he “has a substantial possibility of becoming a responsible adult by the end of his twenties” and that the sentences imposed are “cruel.” The trial court denied the motion without written reasons. Defendant repeats these claims on appeal and also contends that, as noted by the trial court, he “had limited educational understanding” and “had gotten through maybe the 8 th grade.” Defendant argues the length and consecutive nature of the sentences make them excessive and constitute a “defacto [sic] life sentence.”
In evaluating excessive sentence claims, this court has previously stated, in State v. Whatley, 03-1275, pp. 5-6 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/3/04), 867 So.2d 955, 958-59:
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and La. Const. art. I, § 20 prohibit the imposition of cruel or excessive punishment. “ „[T]he excessiveness of a sentence becomes a question of law reviewable under the appellate jurisdiction of this court.‟ ” State v. Dorthey, 623 So.2d 1276, 1280 (La.1993)
(quoting State v. Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762, 764 (La.1979)). Still, the trial court is given wide discretion in imposing a sentence, and, absent a manifest abuse of that discretion, we will not deem as excessive a sentence imposed within statutory limits. State v. Pyke, 95-919 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/6/96), 670 So.2d 713. However, “[m]aximum sentences are reserved for the most serious
violations and the worst offenders.” State v. Farhood, 02-490, p. 11 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/25/03), 844 So.2d 217, 225. The only relevant question for us to consider on review is not whether another sentence would be more appropriate, but whether the trial court abused its broad discretion in sentencing a defendant. State v. Cook, 95-
2784 (La.5/31/96), 674 So.2d 957, cert. denied, 519 U.S.
1043, 117 S.Ct. 615, 136 L.Ed.2d 539 (1996).
The fifth circuit, in State v. Lisotta, 98-648 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/16/98), 726 So.2d 57, stated that the reviewing court should consider three factors in reviewing the trial court‟s sentencing discretion:
1. The nature of the crime,
2. The nature and background of the offender, and
3. The sentence imposed for similar crimes by the same court and other courts.
During sentencing, the trial judge stated that he considered the presentence investigation report (PSI), as well as an abstract of Defendant‟s juvenile record. The latter indicated that Defendant had previously been adjudicated for sex offenses and that the “nature of the charges are sexual battery and forcible rape.” The judge also noted that, in the instant case, the original charges of aggravated rape “would have been entirely appropriate.” Defendant does not contest the trial court‟s characterization of information contained in the PSI. Finally, the trial judge noted Defendant‟s limited educational background and the fact that the victims in this case were small children before sentencing Defendant to twenty years on each count of indecent behavior with a juvenile, to run consecutively, with ten years to be served without probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. Specific details of the offenses committed against the children in the current case are not listed in the record and were not described by either the State or trial court.
While Defendant cited his youth and lack of education as mitigating factors warranting concurrent sentences, the State noted that the offenses involved two separate, very young victims. Consecutive sentences are warranted when the offenses committed do not arise out of the same course of conduct or were not part of a common scheme. See La.Code Crim.P. art. 883 and State v. Pierre, 02-277 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/11/03), 854 So.2d 945, writ denied, 03-2042 (La. 1/16/04), 864 So.2d 626. Further, the State noted that Defendant was facing possible sentences of life imprisonment, plus lengthy additional terms, and benefitted substantially from the plea.
Sentences of similar length for indecent behavior with a juvenile have been routinely upheld on review. As found in Whatley, 867 So.2d at 958:
See State v. Delgado, 03-46 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/30/03), 845 So.2d 581 (upholding a near-maximum sentence where a twenty-one-year-old second felony offender was found naked in bed with a thirteen-year-old victim); State v.
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