State of Iowa v. Amber Rene Wilson

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: December 20, 2023
• Docket: 22-1867
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 22-1867 Filed December 20, 2023

STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

AMBER RENE WILSON, Defendant-Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Jones County, Ian K. Thornhill,

Judge.

The defendant appeals the sentences imposed following her convictions for

first-degree theft, drug tax stamp violation, and conspiracy to commit a forcible

felony. AFFIRMED.

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Nan Jennisch, Assistant

Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Nicholas E. Siefert, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered by Greer, P.J., and Ahlers and Buller, JJ. 2

GREER, Presiding Judge.

Amber Wilson appeals the sentences imposed following her convictions for

first-degree theft, drug tax stamp violation, and conspiracy to commit a forcible

felony. She argues that the sentencing court abused its discretion in accepting

and considering the victim impact statements from jail staff. Because we find that

the jail staff suffered emotional harm as a result of the conspiracy to break out of

the jail and, thus, were victims, we affirm.

I. Background Facts and Prior Proceedings.

Wilson committed a burglary in Wisconsin with her then-boyfriend, Joshua

Humbach. They stole a vehicle, several firearms, and firearm-related items from

Humbach’s cousin and his wife. The next day, while in Iowa, law enforcement

learned Wilson was driving a stolen vehicle in Anamosa, and, after executing a

search warrant, law enforcement confirmed the vehicle was indeed stolen and it

contained the stolen firearms, a large amount of cash ($1333), and a clear plastic

baggie of methamphetamine. Wilson was charged with possession with intent to

deliver methamphetamine while in possession or control of a firearm, a class “B”

felony, in violation of Iowa Code sections 124.401(1)(b)(7) and .401(1)(e) (2022);

first-degree theft, a class “C” felony, in violation of sections 714.1(4) and .2(1); and

operating a motor vehicle without owner’s consent, an aggravated misdemeanor,

in violation of section 714.7.1 Because of the discovery of the drugs, the trial

information was amended to add a drug tax stamp violation, a class “D” felony in

violation of sections 453B.1(3)(1) and .3.

1 Case FECR008757. 3

After the arrest and while the case was pending, Wilson was held at the

Jones County Jail on these charges; Humbach was also held there. While in jail,

in July 2022, Wilson joined a three-way phone call with Humbach and her sister,

who was not in custody. On the phone call, Wilson hatched a plan to break out of

jail the next morning. She explained that she had been watching and knew “who

comes, who goes” from the jail each day. She said, “I watch these guys every day,

babe. I’ve been thinking about this every day.” She attempted to persuade

Humbach to grab the belt of “whoever does the cleaning cart—grab their belt.”

After that, she told her boyfriend to “[b]eat the fuck out of them. Knock them

motherfuckers out. I don’t care if you smash their heads into the fucking toilet, you

fuck ‘em up.” At the end of the call, she made Humbach confirm that he understood

and intended to go through with the plan. Colton Utley, the jailer, intercepted the

phone call, and Wilson and Humbach never completed the plot.

After this incident and following a motion to consolidate the cases involving

Wilson and Humbach, the State charged Wilson in a second case with conspiracy

to commit a forcible felony, a class “C” felony, in violation of sections 706.1(1)(a),

.1(3), and .3(1) based on Wilson’s actions plotting escape from custody.2 In

September 2022, on the day that the first case was set to go to trial, Wilson entered

into a plea agreement with the State, whereby she would enter an Alford plea3 to

first-degree theft and the drug tax stamp violation; she also pled guilty to the

conspiracy to commit a forcible felony charge. In exchange, the State dismissed

the other two charges in FECR008757.

2 Case FECR008839. 3 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970). 4

The sentencing court held a sentencing hearing for both cases in

October 2022. At the hearing, the sentencing court accepted written victim

statements from Utley along with Laxmi Basnet and Ryan Lovejoy, who are other

staff at the jail. It also heard oral statements by two other jail staff members, Jill

Wernimont and Sarah Tate, at the hearing. Prior to the sentencing hearing, Wilson

filed an objection to the Utley victim impact statement. Then, at the hearing, Wilson

objected to the district court’s consideration of the jail staff’s statements. She

argued that as the conspiracy was stopped, the jail staff members could not have

suffered any physical, emotional, or financial harm as a result of the offense, so

the jail staff did not fall under the statutory definition of victim. The State responded

that the jail staff had in fact suffered emotional harm. The district court overruled

the objection, finding that “anybody who was a jail staff can be considered a victim

of this offense . . . knowing that this could have happened and the realization that

they might have been victimized, even though the weren’t.”

In her statement, Basnet explained that she “was shocked” at the thought

of the planned attack and “it would have been detrimental for my family to have

had me severely injured or lose me completely.” Lovejoy wrote that he found “the

potential of a violent escape attempt sickening.” Wernimont stated that “as jailers

we were the—we are the ones who are responsible for keeping things safe. Even

this event gave me higher awareness of my surrounding[s] and never to let my

guard down any time or anywhere.” Tate said, “There is not a single jail staff

member that hasn’t thought that could have been me. I thought that. That could

have been me. . . . Though this horrendous act did not happen, it has and will

continue to have a lasting impact on every member of this jail staff.” The 5

sentencing court also considered exhibits, which included nine letters from friends

and family of Wilson as well as her pastor, in mitigation.

The sentencing court sentenced Wilson to an indeterminate term not to

exceed ten years on the first-degree-theft conviction, five years on the drug-tax-

stamp-violation conviction, and ten years on the conspiracy-to-commit-a-forcible-

felony conviction. The sentences for the first-degree theft and drug tax stamp

violation were to run concurrent to each other but consecutive to the sentence for

conspiracy to commit a forcible felony, for a total term of incarceration not to

exceed twenty years. While announcing the sentence, the sentencing court

explained that “what could have happened . . . has an impact in this matter, and

that is harm.” Wilson appeals.

II. Standard of Review.

We review sentences for correction of errors at law. State v. Damme, 944

N.W.2d 98, 103 (Iowa 2020). We reverse only if the sentencing court abused its

discretion or there was some defect in the sentencing procedure. Id. An abuse of

discretion occurs when “the district court exercises its discretion on grounds or for

reasons that were clearly untenable or unreasonable.” State v. Gordon, 921

N.W.2d 19, 24 (Iowa 2018). When the sentencing court abuses its discretion, the

defendant is entitled to a new sentencing hearing. State v. West Vangen, 975

N.W.2d 344, 355 (Iowa 2022). 6

III. Analysis.

Wilson renews her argument that the sentencing court erred in considering

the State’s five victim impact statements,4 specifically because they were from

persons she argues are not defined as victims under Iowa Code section 915.10(3).

She conceded to the district court that the jail staff “could have emotional

consequences,” but maintains considering them as victims would be an improper

expansion of what was contemplated by the statute. Iowa Code section 915.10(3)

defines a victim as either “a person who has suffered physical, emotional, or

financial harm as the result of a public offense or a delinquent act, other than a

simple misdemeanor, committed in this state” or “the immediate family members

of a victim who died or was rendered incompetent as a result of the offense or who

was under eighteen years of age at the time of the offense.” As Wilson’s offenses

did not lead to anyone being rendered incompetent or dying and did not involve

minors, a victim for the purposes of her sentencing hearing is limited to “a person

who has suffered physical, emotional, or financial harm as the result” of her

offenses.

We have generally adhered to an expansive definition of “victim” to

effectuate the purpose of the statute in recognition of our “responsibility to victims

and witnesses to ensure their equitable and fair treatment, protect them from

intimidation and further injury, [and] assist them in overcoming emotional and

4 Although Wilson pled guilty, because she is challenging the sentences imposed

and not the guilty plea, she has good cause for appeal. Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a)(3) (granting the right of appeal “where the defendant establishes good cause”); Damme, 944 N.W.2d at 105 (“We hold that good cause exists to appeal from a conviction following a guilty plea when the defendant challenges his or her sentence rather than the guilty plea.”). 7

economic hardships resulting from criminal acts.” State v. Lopez, 872

N.W.2d 159, 174 (Iowa 2015) (citation omitted). In taking this expansive approach,

we have interpreted section 915.10 to cover individuals directly harmed by the

offense, even if not the intended victim, at the time of the commission of the

offense. See State v. Tesch, 704 N.W.2d 440, 451 (Iowa 2005) (construing “victim”

broadly to include those who suffered “harm as a direct consequence of the

offense”). The question is whether the harm is the “result” of Wilson’s criminal act.

See id. (applying the common meaning of “result” which is “anything that comes

about as a consequence or outcome of some action”). Furthermore, the Supreme

Court has defined emotional harm as fright or anxiety. Consol. Rail Corp. v.

Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 544 (1994). The Supreme Court has also included being

tearful, angry, and suffering anguish as emotional injuries. Snyder v. Phelps, 562

U.S. 443, 450 (2011).

Here, the jail staff who submitted written statements and made in-person

statements at the sentencing hearing had suffered emotional harm that made them

victims under section 915.10(3). Any one of these staff members were at risk of

some injury had Wilson successfully completed her escape plan. To that point,

the district court noted, “I consider the emotional trauma that could cause them

knowing that this could have happened and the realization that they might have

been victimized, even though they weren’t. The emotional trauma that can cause

someone is real.” Utley suffered emotional harm contemporaneous to the

commission of the offense—conspiracy to commit a forcible felony—when he

intercepted the three-way phone call and listened to Wilson’s plot to physically

harm jail staff. The other jail staff suffered emotional harm when they later learned 8

of the three-way phone call and Wilson’s escape plot. They detailed how they felt

frightened or newly worried about the potential for a violent escape by an inmate.

After learning about Wilson’s plans with her boyfriend, the jail staff worried about

the injuries they could have suffered and the potential detriment to their friends

and families. Neither that the physical harm was hypothetical because Utley

intercepted the three-way phone call and Wilson was unable to carry out the

escape nor that the emotional harm occurred after the intended act was thwarted

prevents the jail staff from falling within the statutory definition of victims.

Therefore, we affirm the sentences imposed by the sentencing court.

IV. Conclusion.

Because the jail staff suffered emotional harm in the form of fear and

newfound awareness of the potential for a violent attack as a result of Wilson’s

conspiracy to commit a forcible felony, they were victims, and the district court did

not err in considering their victim impact statements. We affirm the sentences

imposed.

AFFIRMED.