GOODWIN, J.
This is a state highway condemnation case. The jury awarded the landowner substantially less than the landowner had sought. The trial court, believing that the jury had been incorrectly instructed, granted a new trial. The commission now appeals from the [414]*414order setting aside the verdict and granting a new trial.
The first question is whether or not, at the time it allowed the landowner’s motion for a new trial, the trial court had jurisdiction of the motion. If the time during which the court lawfully could act had expired, then the order granting a new trial would be void and it would not be necessary to consider other issues tendered in this appeal.
The verdict was received on November 9, 1963. Judgment was not immediately entered because the amount of attorneys’ fees had not yet been decided. On December 9, 1963, the landowner moved to set aside the. judgment, even though it had not yet been reduced to a sum certain or signed by the judge, and moved for a new trial. On December 23, 1963, a form of judgment was presented to the court, and was thereupon signed in open court. The landowner then filed a second motion for a new trial. On December 23, therefore, the record consisted of a judgment order, signed by the judge but not yet entered in the clerk’s journal, and a motion to set aside the judgment and grant a new trial. Four days later, on December 27, 1963, the county clerk entered the judgment in the journal.
ORS 17.615 provides that a motion for a new trial shall be “filed” within 10 days after the “filing” of the judgment, or such further time as the court may allow, and that the motion shall be heard and determined by the court within 55 days from the time of the “entry” of the judgment.
On February 20, 1964, the trial court signed the order setting aside the judgment and granting the new trial. February 20 was the fifty-fifth day after the judgment was entered in the journal, but it was [415]*415the fifty-ninth day after the judge signed the judgment. There is no record that the judgment was ever “filed,” apart from the notation upon its face that it was “entered” on December 27, 1963.
The commission now says that the 55 days mentioned in ORS 17.615 began to run on the date the judgment was signed in open court. The commission says that the judgment was deemed “filed” the day it was signed. If the commission is right, then the order granting a new trial was signed four days after the trial court lost jurisdiction to make such an order. If the commission is wrong, then the order was timely.
There is some doubt whether in the relevant statutes the “filing” of a judgment is intended to mean the same as the “entry” of a judgment. In ORS 17.615 the context in which the words appear does not disclose whether a separate meaning is intended. In ORS 18.030 and 18.040, the clerk of the court is required to “enter” the judgment in the journal. It would appear from the context of ORS 18.030 et seq. that the word “enter” in such statutes has a technical meaning which describes the mechanical act of the clerk in making the judgment a part of the journal of the court. It would also appear that the legislature has, from time to time, used the word “enter” as synonymous with filing. See, e.g., ORS 3.070, which, referring to judgments, says, “They shall be filed and entered upon receipt thereof and shall become effective from the date of filing.”
In the past, this court has held that the critical act, which gives life to the judgment as a judgment, and from which time is to be counted, is the delivery of the judgment to the clerk of the court with the intent that it be filed, or, as provided in ORS 18.030, entered. Clark v. Auto Wholesale Co., Inc., 237 Or [416]*416446, 448, 391 P2d 754 (1964), and cases collected therein. In the case at bar, the record does not reveal when the judgment was delivered to the clerk for entry in the journal. It is possible, however, to learn from the judgment itself when it was “entered.” There is no evidence to rebut the presumption that the clerk performed his statutory duty and entered the judgment the day it was delivered to his custody for that purpose. It is therefore to be presumed that the judgment was not delivered to the clerk until December 27, 1963. OES 41.360(15). Accordingly, we hold: (1) that the time began to run on the day that the judgment was delivered to the clerk for entry in the journal; and (2) that whether or not the clerk actually entered the judgment on that day, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary it will be presumed as a matter of law that the date upon which the clerk took custody of the judgment was the date shown as the date of its entry in the journal. Accordingly, the trial judge signed the order within the 55 days permitted him to do-so.
The commission next contends that even if the order granting the new trial was allowed within the time permitted by OES 17.615, the order was defective for another reason. The commission says the motion asking for the new trial was filed too soon. It will be recalled that the motion was filed on the day the trial judge signed the judgment, which was four days before the record shows the entry of the judgment in the journal. The record, as noted, does not show when the judgment was “filed,” or delivered to the clerk. However, OES 17.615 requires a motion of the kind before us to be filed within ten days after the “filing” of the judgment. The commission says that á motion for a new trial filed before the entry of the judgment [417]*417is void because there is no final judgment for the motion to challenge.
We will assume, for the purposes of ORS 17.615, that the legislature intended the time in which a motion for a new trial could be filed and the time in which the court must rule upon such a motion to be measured from the same date. Since we have held that the date of delivery to the clerk is the critical date for the 55-day period, and since the clerk must enter a judgment the day it is delivered to him, there would be no purpose in treating “filing” and “entry” as endowed with substantive differences for the purposes of this case.
The more important question is whether a motion for a new trial filed before a judgment is entered in the journal can be a viable motion, or whether, as some courts have held, it is void because there is no final judgment from which the motion, like the mistletoe on the oak tree, can draw sustenance. See cases collected in 66 CJS 340, New Trial § 123. We see no useful reason for holding such a motion to be void. A motion for a new trial is simply a formal request for the court to perform a judicial act.
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GOODWIN, J.
This is a state highway condemnation case. The jury awarded the landowner substantially less than the landowner had sought. The trial court, believing that the jury had been incorrectly instructed, granted a new trial. The commission now appeals from the [414]*414order setting aside the verdict and granting a new trial.
The first question is whether or not, at the time it allowed the landowner’s motion for a new trial, the trial court had jurisdiction of the motion. If the time during which the court lawfully could act had expired, then the order granting a new trial would be void and it would not be necessary to consider other issues tendered in this appeal.
The verdict was received on November 9, 1963. Judgment was not immediately entered because the amount of attorneys’ fees had not yet been decided. On December 9, 1963, the landowner moved to set aside the. judgment, even though it had not yet been reduced to a sum certain or signed by the judge, and moved for a new trial. On December 23, 1963, a form of judgment was presented to the court, and was thereupon signed in open court. The landowner then filed a second motion for a new trial. On December 23, therefore, the record consisted of a judgment order, signed by the judge but not yet entered in the clerk’s journal, and a motion to set aside the judgment and grant a new trial. Four days later, on December 27, 1963, the county clerk entered the judgment in the journal.
ORS 17.615 provides that a motion for a new trial shall be “filed” within 10 days after the “filing” of the judgment, or such further time as the court may allow, and that the motion shall be heard and determined by the court within 55 days from the time of the “entry” of the judgment.
On February 20, 1964, the trial court signed the order setting aside the judgment and granting the new trial. February 20 was the fifty-fifth day after the judgment was entered in the journal, but it was [415]*415the fifty-ninth day after the judge signed the judgment. There is no record that the judgment was ever “filed,” apart from the notation upon its face that it was “entered” on December 27, 1963.
The commission now says that the 55 days mentioned in ORS 17.615 began to run on the date the judgment was signed in open court. The commission says that the judgment was deemed “filed” the day it was signed. If the commission is right, then the order granting a new trial was signed four days after the trial court lost jurisdiction to make such an order. If the commission is wrong, then the order was timely.
There is some doubt whether in the relevant statutes the “filing” of a judgment is intended to mean the same as the “entry” of a judgment. In ORS 17.615 the context in which the words appear does not disclose whether a separate meaning is intended. In ORS 18.030 and 18.040, the clerk of the court is required to “enter” the judgment in the journal. It would appear from the context of ORS 18.030 et seq. that the word “enter” in such statutes has a technical meaning which describes the mechanical act of the clerk in making the judgment a part of the journal of the court. It would also appear that the legislature has, from time to time, used the word “enter” as synonymous with filing. See, e.g., ORS 3.070, which, referring to judgments, says, “They shall be filed and entered upon receipt thereof and shall become effective from the date of filing.”
In the past, this court has held that the critical act, which gives life to the judgment as a judgment, and from which time is to be counted, is the delivery of the judgment to the clerk of the court with the intent that it be filed, or, as provided in ORS 18.030, entered. Clark v. Auto Wholesale Co., Inc., 237 Or [416]*416446, 448, 391 P2d 754 (1964), and cases collected therein. In the case at bar, the record does not reveal when the judgment was delivered to the clerk for entry in the journal. It is possible, however, to learn from the judgment itself when it was “entered.” There is no evidence to rebut the presumption that the clerk performed his statutory duty and entered the judgment the day it was delivered to his custody for that purpose. It is therefore to be presumed that the judgment was not delivered to the clerk until December 27, 1963. OES 41.360(15). Accordingly, we hold: (1) that the time began to run on the day that the judgment was delivered to the clerk for entry in the journal; and (2) that whether or not the clerk actually entered the judgment on that day, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary it will be presumed as a matter of law that the date upon which the clerk took custody of the judgment was the date shown as the date of its entry in the journal. Accordingly, the trial judge signed the order within the 55 days permitted him to do-so.
The commission next contends that even if the order granting the new trial was allowed within the time permitted by OES 17.615, the order was defective for another reason. The commission says the motion asking for the new trial was filed too soon. It will be recalled that the motion was filed on the day the trial judge signed the judgment, which was four days before the record shows the entry of the judgment in the journal. The record, as noted, does not show when the judgment was “filed,” or delivered to the clerk. However, OES 17.615 requires a motion of the kind before us to be filed within ten days after the “filing” of the judgment. The commission says that á motion for a new trial filed before the entry of the judgment [417]*417is void because there is no final judgment for the motion to challenge.
We will assume, for the purposes of ORS 17.615, that the legislature intended the time in which a motion for a new trial could be filed and the time in which the court must rule upon such a motion to be measured from the same date. Since we have held that the date of delivery to the clerk is the critical date for the 55-day period, and since the clerk must enter a judgment the day it is delivered to him, there would be no purpose in treating “filing” and “entry” as endowed with substantive differences for the purposes of this case.
The more important question is whether a motion for a new trial filed before a judgment is entered in the journal can be a viable motion, or whether, as some courts have held, it is void because there is no final judgment from which the motion, like the mistletoe on the oak tree, can draw sustenance. See cases collected in 66 CJS 340, New Trial § 123. We see no useful reason for holding such a motion to be void. A motion for a new trial is simply a formal request for the court to perform a judicial act. If a party deems that some substantive right has been prejudiced by the filing of a motion for a new trial before the judgment has been entered by the clerk in the journal, such an irregularity can be called to the attention of the court and counsel, and suitable repairs can be made. If no objection is taken by the adversary, the irregularity presumably is harmless and should be deemed waived.
We construe ORS 17.615 as setting a ten-day limit after which a motion for a new trial cannot be filed without leave of the court. The statute does not [418]*418set a beginning date before which such a motion is void if filed. Those cases which hold that a motion for a new trial cannot be filed before the judgment is entered in the journal do not appear to further the purpose of such motions and appear, on the contrary, to make a jurisdictional fact out of a ministerial act of a clerk that is unrelated to the substantive rights of the parties. We hold that “within” as used in the statute under consideration means “not later than.” For the same rule applied to an analogous statute, see Dibble v. Hodes Co., 132 Or 596, 277 P 820, 286 P 554 (1930). The motion was not void. Since there was no objection, we hold that it was. timely.
An order of a trial court granting a new trial will be sustained if it can be sustained upon any ground contained in the motion, but if there is no proper ground in the motion the order will be reversed. Baden v. Sunset Fuel Co., 225 Or 116,121, 357 P2d 410 (1960).
The motion for a new trial in the case at bar challenged the trial court’s instruction that the jury could consider testimony about comparable sales as probative evidence of the value of the property taken, as well as evidence bearing upon the witness’s qualifications to testify as a value expert. The landowner contends that this instruction was erroneous, and that the testimony of the expert concerning comparable sales should have been limited. The landowner had requested an instruction that the jury could consider the comparable sales only for their bearing upon the foundation laid by the witness to express Ms opinion of the value of the property taken.
In Highway Com. v. Parker et al, 225 Or 143, 164, 357 P2d 548 (1960), we held that a value witness may testify concerning comparable sales if the sales are [419]*419recent and voluntary, and that such testimony may be received both on direct and on cross examination.
In the Parker case, the issue was whether the testimony was admissible for any purpose. We were not called upon to decide whether the expert’s testimony is admissible as substantive evidence of value. Accordingly, we held only that the testimony which the expert gave as to other sales is “admissible as a foundation of his opinion.” 225 Or at 165.
The Parker case makes it clear, however, that the evidence of the prices at which other similar properties were sold should be admitted as subsantive evidence of value. Indeed, the price of neighboring land is cogent evidence of the fair cash market value of comparable property. 225 Or at 147. Also see County of Los Angeles v. Faus, 48 Cal2d 672, 812 P2d 680 (1957); 2 Wigmore, Evidence 503, § 463 (3d ed 1940); Note, 31 So Calif L Rev 204 (1958); Note, 49 Ky L J 132,136 (1960).
It is sometimes observed that such evidence is hearsay. The expert witness ordinarily learns the facts by consulting records or other persons. It is the kind of hearsay, however, that is seldom challenged. The price of land sold is relatively easy to document, and the testimony is subject to contradiction if untrue. As a practical matter, both sides in cases of this kind ordinarily rely upon such testimony without ever raising the hearsay question. In the case at bar, evidence of a number of comparable sales came in as part of the landowner’s direct examination of its witnesses. There was no effort by either party to challenge or limit such evidence. Later in the trial, when the commission presented its value evidence, the commission’s witnesses testified about most of the same compara[420]*420ble sales relied upon by the landowner’s experts. The issue, with reference to the testimony, was whether the sales were, in fact, comparable. We hold that if the sales are recent, voluntary, and comparable the evidence is admissible as value evidence. It follows that an objection to it as irrelevant would not have been well taken. It was for the jury to decide what weight to give the testimony. There was no error, therefore, in instructing the jury that the evidence of comparable sales could be considered by the jury as evidence of value. Consequently, there was no basis for granting a new trial. The error occurred when the court set aside the verdict.
Voluntary sales are clearly distinguished from offers to buy or sell comparable property. Accordingly, we do not question the rule stated in Highway Com. v. Morehouse Holding Co., 225 Or 62, 357 P2d 266 (1960), and State of Oregon v. Cerruti et al., 188 Or 103, 115, 214 P2d 346, 351, 16 ALR2d 1105 (1950), that testimony about offers which did not ripen into sales is inadmissible. See State Highway Com. v. Central Paving Co., decided March 17, 1965. Neither do we question the rule stated in City of Portland v. Holmes, 232 Or 505, 376 P2d 120 (1962), that prices paid under the threat of condemnation are irrelevant because they are not bargained for between a willing buyer and a willing seller.
We have considered other reasons assigned by the landowner in support of the trial court’s exercise of discretion in granting a new trial, but none justified setting aside the verdict of the jury and ordering a new trial in this case.
Reversed and remanded with instructions to reinstate the verdict and the judgment entered thereon.
[421]*421J. Robert Patterson, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause for appellant on rehearing. With him on the brief were Robert Y. Thornton, Attorney General, and G. E. Rohde, Assistant Attorney General, Salem.