State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Jim Bowe & Sons, Inc.

539 A.2d 391, 372 Pa. Super. 186, 1988 Pa. Super. LEXIS 823
CourtSupreme Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedMarch 21, 1988
Docket3361
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 539 A.2d 391 (State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Jim Bowe & Sons, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Jim Bowe & Sons, Inc., 539 A.2d 391, 372 Pa. Super. 186, 1988 Pa. Super. LEXIS 823 (Pa. 1988).

Opinion

ROWLEY, Judge:

This is an appeal from a judgment entered in favor of appellee, Jim Bowe & Sons (Bowe) and against appellant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (State Farm), and in favor of appellee Plymouth Township Police (Montgomery County) in a replevin action.

State Farm, the insurer of a car which had been reported stolen to the Philadelphia Police, paid its insured the value of the car and obtained record title to the car in August, 1981. On July 8, 1982, Bowe, pursuant to an agreement with the Plymouth Township Police, towed the stolen vehicle to his place of business. The Plymouth Township Police immediately notified the Philadelphia Police that the stolen car had been found. In July, 1983, State Farm demanded delivery of the car from Bowe, but Bowe refused to relinquish it until the towing charge and approximately one year’s storage fee were paid. State Farm was willing to pay the towing charge and a reasonable storage fee, but denied that it was responsible for an entire year’s storage fee.

In October, 1983, State Farm filed an action in replevin against both Bowe and Plymouth Township Police. At the same time, State Farm filed a Motion for a Writ of Seizure. Bowe filed an answer, new matter and counterclaim asserting a common law garageman’s lien for the year’s storage fee. Plymouth Township Police filed an answer denying that they owed any duty to State Farm to inform it when the car was found. In December, 1983, a writ of seizure was issued. Subsequently, the case was tried without a jury, and the court found in favor of Bowe for $5,005 on its counterclaim, and in favor of Plymouth Township Police. The amount of the judgment represented a storage fee for 496 days, i.e., from the day the car was towed by Bowe until it was seized pursuant to the writ of seizure. Appellant’s post trial motions were denied, judgment was entered on the verdict, and State Farm has appealed. We affirm the judgment in part, vacate the judgment in part, and remand for further proceedings.

*189 On review of a case tried by a judge sitting without a jury, we must accept the factual findings of the trial court, although we are not bound by the trial court’s legal conclusions drawn from those facts. Lawner v. Engelbach, 433 Pa. 311, 249 A.2d 295 (1969). In this case the trial court concluded as a matter of law that Bowe had no affirmative duty to notify State Farm that it was storing the vehicle. As a result, the trial court found that Bowe was entitled to recover the storage fee for the time from when Bowe towed the vehicle until State Farm demanded possession of it on a quasi-contract theory of unjust enrichment. The trial court reasoned that State Farm passively received the benefit of the storage of the vehicle, and that it would be unconscionable for State Farm to retain this benefit without payment for it. The trial court also determined that State Farm would have to pay for the storage of the vehicle from the time it requested the return of the car until the date the car was actually returned pursuant to the writ of seizure (1) because the storage fee charged for the period prior to State Farm’s demand for the car was reasonable, (2) because Bowe had no duty to release the car upon State Farm’s demand therefor without being paid a storage fee for the period from the date Bowe towed the vehicle until the date State Farm demanded possession of the car, and (3) because State Farm continued to receive the benefit of the storage after it had demanded possession of the vehicle, but Bowe had refused to release it. The trial court found that the Plymouth Township Police were not responsible for contacting State Farm about the recovery of the vehicle because it interpreted 75 Pa.C.S. § 7113(b) to impose the obligation on the police department which initially received the report of the theft of the car to notify the owner of a stolen car of its recovery.

On appeal, State Farm argues that quasi-contract and unjust enrichment are equitable theories, and that equity requires it to be responsible, at most, for the storage fees for a reasonable period in which Bowe could have contacted it. State Farm also argues that the Plymouth Township Police were required to notify it within 48 hours of recover *190 ing the car, and their failure to do so makes the Plymouth Township Police liable for any storage fee for a period in excess of 48 hours. Finally, State Farm argues that it should not be held liable for the storage fees for the period after it requested the return of the vehicle because Bowe was in “unlawful and illegal possession” of the car during that period.

I. LIABILITY OF STATE FARM

A. Storage Fee Prior To Demand For Car

The doctrine of unjust enrichment is an equitable one, Wolf v. Wolf 356 Pa.Super. 365, 514 A.2d 901 (1986), which permits recovery where the claimant can show that a benefit was wrongly secured or passively received, and that it would be unconscionable for the party receiving the benefit to retain it without payment. Meehan v. Cheltenham Township, 410 Pa. 446, 189 A.2d 593 (1963); Roman Mosaic and Tile Co., Inc. v. Vollrath, 226 Pa.Super. 215, 218, 313 A.2d 305, 307 (1973). However, the most significant requirement for recovery is that the enrichment is unjust, Myers-Macomber Engineers v. M.L.W. Construction Corp. and HNC Mortgage and Realty Investors, 271 Pa.Super. 484, 414 A.2d 357 (1979). Therefore, we must focus not on the intention of the parties but on the extent to which the enrichment is unjust. Gee v. Eberle, 279 Pa.Super. 101, 420 A.2d 1050 (1980).

In this case, there is no dispute that State Farm passively enjoyed the benefit of Bowe’s storage of the car. However, the receipt of this benefit, under the unique facts of this case, was not unjust, so as to give rise in equity to an obligation by State Farm to pay for the storage. Bowe had no statutory or legal obligation to notify State Farm that he was storing the vehicle. However, Bowe himself testified that it was his customary practice to notify the owners of towed vehicles within 30 to 90 days of the date the vehicle was towed that the vehicle had been towed. Furthermore, Bowe testified that he was able to ascertain that State Farm was the owner of the particular vehicle in *191 question simply by making one telephone call to the local police.

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Bluebook (online)
539 A.2d 391, 372 Pa. Super. 186, 1988 Pa. Super. LEXIS 823, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-farm-mutual-automobile-insurance-v-jim-bowe-sons-inc-pa-1988.