Burgettstown-Smith Township Joint Sewage Authority v. Langeloth Townsite Co.

588 A.2d 43, 403 Pa. Super. 84, 1991 Pa. Super. LEXIS 660
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedMarch 20, 1991
Docket922 Pittsburgh 1990
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 588 A.2d 43 (Burgettstown-Smith Township Joint Sewage Authority v. Langeloth Townsite Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Burgettstown-Smith Township Joint Sewage Authority v. Langeloth Townsite Co., 588 A.2d 43, 403 Pa. Super. 84, 1991 Pa. Super. LEXIS 660 (Pa. Ct. App. 1991).

Opinion

POPOVICH, Judge:

This is an appeal from a judgment entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County in favor of Burgettstown-Smith Township Joint Sewage Authority (the appellee) and against Langeloth Townsite Company (the appellant) in the amount of $10,821.19. While both parties have presented compelling arguments, we are persuaded that Langeloth’s position here is the correct one. Thus, we reverse and vacate the judgment against it.

In material respect, both Langeloth and the Sewage Authority offer similar versions of the statement of this case. We adopt Langeloth’s recitation of the factual and procedural history for purposes of this appeal.

This action commenced on or about July 1, 1987, with the filing of a Complaint upon a cause of action for unjust enrichment by appellee Burgettstown-Smith Township Joint Sewage Authority (the “Authority”) against appellant Langeloth Townsite Company (“Langeloth”). The Authority’s Complaint alleged that Langeloth was responsible for a portion of the costs incurred by the Authority in complying with a Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources (“DER”) directive requiring the Authority to conduct studies and prepare plans with respect to the sewage systems within its jurisdiction. The Authority demanded judgment against Langeloth in the amount of $10,700.00 plus interest and costs.
Following the filing of Langeloth’s Answer to the Authority’s Complaint, a non-jury trial was held on November 9, 1988, before the Honorable Thomas J. Terputac. At the conclusion of the non-jury trial, Judge Terputac issued an Order dated November 9,1988, requiring the Authority to submit its Memorandum of Law within twenty (20) days and requiring Langeloth to submit its Memorandum of Law ten (10) days after receipt of the Authority’s Memo *87 randum of Law. Langeloth received the Authority’s Memorandum of Law on December 19, 1988, and Langeloth filed its Memorandum of Law on December 29, 1988. By Memorandum Opinion and Decision dated January 25, 1989 ..., the Court, by the Honorable Thomas J. Terputae, found in favor of the Authority and ordered Langeloth to pay the Authority in damages the sum of $9,074.82 plus the costs of an application fee which the Authority allegedly filed with the DER. On February 6, 1989, Langeloth filed its Motion for Post-Trial Relief and requested that the Motion be heard by the Court en banc. The Honorable Thomas D. Gladden, John F. Bell, and Thomas J. Terputac heard argument on the Motion for Post-Trial Relief on November 27, 1989. On February 18, 1990, the Court en banc issued its Opinion and Order ..., dismissing the motion and setting the amount of damages at $10,821.19. Judgment was entered against Langeloth on June 17, 1990. Notice of appeal was filed with the lower court on June 20, 1990.

Appellant’s brief, at 4-5. Langeloth has preserved three issues for our review:

1. Whether [it] has been unjustly enriched by [the Sewage Authority’s] compliance with the Department of Environmental Resources’ directives.
2. Whether [its] equal protection guarantees under the United States Constitution have been violated by compelling [it] to reimburse [the Sewage Authority] for an alleged proportional share of the cost of the study.
3. Whether [its] alleged portion of the cost of the study was proved with a reasonable degree of certainty.

Appellant’s brief, at 3. Because we agree with Langeloth’s assertion that the trial court erred in determining that Langeloth was unjustly enriched as a result of the Sewage Authority’s study, we find it unnecessary to address Langeloth’s two remaining claims. See State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Jim Bowe & Sons, Inc., 372 Pa.Super. 186, 189, 539 A.2d 391, 392 (1988) (“[o]n review of a case tried by a judge sitting without a jury, we must *88 accept the factual findings of the trial court, although we are not bound by the trial court’s legal conclusions drawn from those facts.”); see also Torchia on Behalf of Torchia v. Torchia, 346 Pa.Super. 229, 499 A.2d 581 (1985).

Before we embark on our discussion, we note, sua sponte, that this appeal is properly before us. Although this case involves a suit by the Sewage Authority against a landowner, the gravaman of the Sewage Authority’s complaint was that Langeloth was unjustly enriched as a result of an engineering study conducted by the Sewage Authority pursuant to a DER directive. Thus, since we are not asked to interpret, apply or enforce a statute regulating the affairs of a political subdivision, but rather are asked to consider an appeal based on the theory of unjust enrichment, we see no reason to transfer this case to Commonwealth Court. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 762(a)(4).

In Wolf v. Wolf, 356 Pa.Super. 365, 514 A.2d 901 (1986), this Court set forth the elements of unjust enrichment. Neither party challenges the legal proposition contained in Wolf; to wit:

[The] [e]ssential elements of “unjust enrichment” are benefits conferred on defendant by plaintiff, appreciation of such benefits by defendant, and acceptance and retention of such benefits under such circumstances that it would be inequitable for defendant to retain the benefit without payment of value.

Wolf, 356 Pa.Super. at 374, 514 A.2d at 905-06. As the en banc court in the instant case further notes,

The doctrine of unjust enrichment is equitable in nature____ This doctrine permits recovery where the claimant [can ] show that a benefit was wrongfully secured or passively received, and that it would be unconscionable for the party receiving the benefit to retain it without payment. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Jim Bowe & Sons, Inc., et al., 372 Pa.Super. 186, 539 A.2d 391, 393 (1988) citing Meehan v. Cheltenham Twp., 410 Pa. 446, 189 A.2d 593 (1963) and Roman Mosaic and Tile, Inc. v. Vollrath, 226 Pa.Super. 215, 218, *89 313 A.2d 305, 307 (1973). The most significant requirement for recovery is that the enrichment is unjust. Myers-Macomber Engineers v. M.L.W. Construction Corp., 271 Pa.Super. 484, 414 A.2d 357, 360 (1979). We must focus not on the intention of the parties but on the extent [to which] the enrichment is unjust. Gee v. Eberle, 279 Pa.Super. 101, 420 A.2d 1050 (1980).

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Bluebook (online)
588 A.2d 43, 403 Pa. Super. 84, 1991 Pa. Super. LEXIS 660, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/burgettstown-smith-township-joint-sewage-authority-v-langeloth-townsite-pasuperct-1991.