State Ex Rel. Woodward v. Lee

155 So. 138, 114 Fla. 855
CourtSupreme Court of Florida
DecidedDecember 22, 1933
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 155 So. 138 (State Ex Rel. Woodward v. Lee) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State Ex Rel. Woodward v. Lee, 155 So. 138, 114 Fla. 855 (Fla. 1933).

Opinions

The State of Florida upon the relation of F. P. Woodward procured a writ of mandamus directed to J. M. Lee, as Comptroller of the State, to compel him to "draw and issue to relator, F. P. Woodward, warrant or warrants on the State Treasurer in the aggregate sum of one thousand, four hundred and seventy-one dollars and eighty cents ($1,471.80) in payment of the salary of said F. P. Woodward as 'Assistant Engineer' for the period from January 18th, 1933, to July 1st, 1933."

The allegations of the alternative writ, aside from those matters alleged of which the Court will take judicial knowledge, are in substance that the relator was employed by the "Railway Assessing Board" in July, 1932, as "Assistant Engineer" for a period of two years from that date at a salary of $270.00 per month; that relator entered upon the duties of such "position and continued to perform them until January 17, 1933, "when he was prevented and restrained from performing the same by the unauthorized action of J. M. Lee, Comptroller" of the State; that the respondent Comptroller on that date assumed and undertook to discharge the relator and required him to turn over the books, papers and documents in his possession and to vacate the office in which the work of the "Railway Assessing Board" was carried on; that such action of the Comptroller was taken without the "advice, consent or acquiescence of the *Page 857 Attorney General and State Treasurer or either of them," and that neither of them has ever taken any action toward the termination of the employment of the relator, and that no action has ever been taken by the three officers constituting the Railway Assessment Board collectively or a majority of them to terminate the relator's employment; that the Comptroller has not since January 17, 1933, issued to relator a warrant in payment of the salary due to relator, although demand has been made upon him to do so; that the Comptroller did issue to relator a warrant in payment of relator's salary from January 1, to January 17, 1933, but has refused to issue to relator any warrant in payment of the salary due to him since that time; that relator has at all times been ready and willing to perform the duties required of him as "Assistant Engineer."

The Comptroller, by Messrs. Oxford and Cutts, his attorneys, demurred to the alternative writ and moved also to quash the writ. There was also a motion for compulsory amendment to the alternative writ. The case came on for oral argument on October 23rd. The motions were made on August 1st; brief for respondent was filed later, and brief for relator October 14th.

The motion for compulsory amendment sought to require the relator to set forth a copy of the minutes of the Board of July, 1932, reciting the fact of relator's employment, and to attach a copy of an alleged letter addressed "To WHOM IT MAY CONCERN" and dated January 6, 1933, in which the Comptroller announced that he had appointed the relator, Mr. Woodward, as " 'Assistant Engineer, representing' " the Comptroller's office and that the " 'appointment may be terminated at the will of the Comptroller,' " which letter the motion recites bore the endorsement of the relator in the following words: " 'F. P. Woodward, Assistant Engineer.' " *Page 858

The motion for compulsory amendment is denied. The allegation of the alternative writ concerning Mr. Woodward's employment by the so-called "Railway Assessment Board" are sufficiently clear and certain that the three officials comprising that board did by resolution employ the relator in July, 1932, for a period of two years and that such resolution was entered upon the minutes of the board's transactions.

The command of the writ was correctly framed. A copy of the alleged resolution of employment is mere matter of evidence and that evidence is presumably in the custody of the three officials constituting the board. If the allegation is denied and the existence of a recorded resolution should be material to prove the employment the relator would be required to produce it or establish it by secondary evidence. There is no provision in the statutes requiring the three officials, the Comptroller, Attorney General and State Treasurer, to preserve, as a board or some State agency, minutes of their transactions. The officials named are required individually by virtue of their official positions to perform a certain duty contingent upon the performance or nonperformance of certain duties required of railroad and telegraph companies in the matter of the assessment of their properties for taxation. That duty of the three State officials is of such nature that individually and severally they must procure the information to enable them to perform it. That after procuring the information they may meet and discuss the result, which is to become a composite action of the three to be reflected in subsequent actions of the Comptroller, does not of itself constitute of the three officials a board, conclave or council, invested with the powers of a separate and distinct administrative agency.

Whatever minutes of the activities of the three officers *Page 859 may be kept in writing for their convenience is at best semi-official and not required to be preserved. The point is the law requires of them severally, individually, to procure the "best information they can obtain" concerning the data upon which they are required to assess the railroad and telegraph properties for taxation. If any record is required to be made at all by the three officers as a board or committee, it would be only as to the particular assessment, but the result of such activities, whether in the form of a formal resolution or memoranda relating to each case, passes into the hands and into the control of the Comptroller, who is by statute required to apportion the assessment as the law directs.

It is a matter of general information of which the court may take judicial knowledge that "locomotives, engines, passenger, sleeping, freight, parlor, platform construction and other cars and appurtenances" of railroad companies in this State, as well as the properties of telegraph companies, constitute a very large and widely scattered class of property subject to taxation. Such property is not a fixture in the sense that it is attached to the soil and is permanently located, but on the contrary is constantly on the move. It, or some of it, may be in one place today and another tomorrow. It is capable of such manipulation or maneuvering that would produce the maximum of uncertainty, the highest degree of error in the listing and valuation of such properties for taxation, which would render it unwise for the State to intrust entirely the listing and valuation of it to the respective owners.

So the Act requires the three officials severally to procure the information concerning such properties that will lead to a fair and just valuation of it for taxable purposes which composite judgment on such matter will afford a proper *Page 860 basis for action by the Comptroller in its apportionment "pro rata to each mile of main track, branch, switch, spur track and side track."

The work necessary to obtain such information adequate to a just and fair valuation for taxable purposes is difficult in the highest degree, requiring almost constant contact with, at least observation of, the location of such properties, the number of items and valuation. To impose such labor personally upon the officials would be to require of them severally to devote all or the greater part of their time to it.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Sullivan v. Mayo
121 So. 2d 424 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1960)
Wilkes v. Pittman
92 So. 2d 822 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1957)
Seaboard Air Line R. v. Gay
74 So. 2d 569 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1954)
King v. Seamon
59 So. 2d 859 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1952)
State Ex Rel. Franklin County v. Lee
188 So. 775 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1939)
State Ex Rel. Woodward v. Lee
156 So. 691 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1934)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
155 So. 138, 114 Fla. 855, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-woodward-v-lee-fla-1933.