State ex rel. Wells v. Marston

6 Kan. 524
CourtSupreme Court of Kansas
DecidedJuly 15, 1870
StatusPublished
Cited by31 cases

This text of 6 Kan. 524 (State ex rel. Wells v. Marston) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Kansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State ex rel. Wells v. Marston, 6 Kan. 524 (kan 1870).

Opinion

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Valeíitine, J.:

This is an application for a peremptory writ of mandamus to compel the defendants, who are the County Commissioners of Neosho County, to hold their offices at the town of Erie, which is claimed to be the county-seat of said county.

i. maudajiks, title to action ; I. The title of this action under our present code, (that of 1868) is probably wrong. It should be Joseph A. Wells plaintiff, instead of The State of Kansas, on the relation of Joseph A. Wells, plaintiff.” The remedy of mandamus is now wholly under the code of civil procedure — chapter 80, art. 33, Gen. Stat. of 1868. Under said code there is but one form of action, called a “ civil action;” (§ 10.) “ The party complaining shall be known as the plaintiff, and the adverse party shall be known as the defendant;” (§ 11.) “ Every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest, except as otherwise provided,” etc.; (§ 26.) The statutes do not anywhere otherwise provide; that is, they do not anywhere provide that an action of mandamus [533]*533may be prosecuted in the name of the State when prosecuted by a private individual. The party prosecuting in such an action is always called the “ plaintiff ” in said code, and never the relator; (§§695, 697.) The adverse party in such an action is always called the “ defendant” in said code, and never the respondent: (§§ 690, 693, 695.) After the writ and answer in an action of mandamus, the other proceedings are conducted in the same manner as any other civil action; (§ 696.) And, “ if judgment be given for the plaintiff he shall recover the damages which he shall have sustained, to be ascertained by the court or jury, or by referees, as in other civil actions, and costs;” (§697.) But, as no question has been raised on' this point, we will pass it without further consideration.

II. The main object of this action is to have the court determine whether the town of Erie, or the town of Osage Mission, is the county-scat of Neosho county. At the commencement of this action an alternative writ was issued; afterwards the defendants answered, and the action was then tried upon the said writ and answer. Many questions were raised in this case which we do not consider of sufficient importance to notice in this opinion — some being raised during the trial, and some before the trial.

The plaintiff founds his claim that Erie is the county-seat of Neosho county, upon a certain election held in said county on the 28th day of December, 1869. The returns of their election were duly canvassed by the then board of county commissioners on the 1st day of January, 1870 ; and as a result of said canvass the commissioners declared that Erie was the county-seat. According to that canvass, Erie received 2,587 votes; Osage Mission, 1,965 votes; total, 4,552 votes — the majority for Erie [534]*534being 622 votes. The present board of commissioners of said county refuse to recognize the validity of said election, and also claim that even if said election was valid, Osage Mission received a majority of the legal votes.

It is in evidence before us, that at the time of said election the whole number of legal voters in Neosho county was only about 1700 — 887 voters less than are said to have voted for Erie — 265 voters less than are said to have voted for Osage Mission, and but little more than one-third as many as are said to have voted for both places; and showing that there were about 2,852 illegal votes cast at that election. The principal frauds were perpetrated at Erie and Osage Mission, and in Lincoln township, or rather in Lincoln township. After the election, and before the canvass of the voters, the poll-books were tampered with, and many new names were fraudulently added to the list of voters in said poll-books.

2. canvass or votes — minisSlr110tju' [535]*5353. Contest ot elecd°mus“aAÍtof constmec. [534]*534The first question that we shall consider is, whether this court has the power under the law, to go behind the said canvass of the county commissioners, and u 1 allow these frauds to be shown. It will be admitted by the plaintiff, that the action of the county commissioners in canvassing said election returns was purely ministerial, and not judicial: (2 Ind., 23; 14 Mich. 362; 14 Barb., 259; 30 id., 588; 8 N. Y. 67; 15 Ill., 492; 1 Dutch., (N. J.,) 354; 4 Wis., 420, 567; 7 Iowa, 186, 390; 10 Mo., 629;) and therefore that their action is not final or conclusive, but may be inquired into directly or collaterally, unless chapter 27 of the laws of 1869, (page 101,) prohibits the same from being done. Before the passage of that act, the power of the supremo court [535]*535was ample in the premises; but by its passage it is contended, that said power was taken away; not by express words however, but indirectly, as is claimed ^ ' ** 7 hy plaintiff's counsel. Their reasoning upon question jg substantially as follows : First : in an action of mandamus neither party can set up any claim or defense for which he has another plain and adequate remedy; second, the defendants in this case are electors of said Neosho county; third, said act gives to any elector of the county, for the space of twenty days after the election, a right to contest any county-seat election; therefore, these defendants had another “plain and adequate remedy,” and therefore they cannot set up the defense of fraud in this election, but must abide the result of the canvass. This reasoning is defective in several particulars. First: The proposition that neither party can set up any claim or defense, for which he has another plain and adequate remedy, does not apply with the same force to the defendants in an action of mandamus, as it does to the plaintiff. Second: The defendants in this case are not sued simply as electors, but are sued as, county commissioners; it is asked to compel them to perform an act, not as individual electors, but as public officers, representing all classes of the community, whether such classes are electors or not. Third: The said act gives only twenty days in which to commence the proceeding to contest the election; and if the election has been carried by fraud, and the fraud not discovered for more than twenty days, or if the election is invalid for any other"reason, and the cause of invalidity has not been discovered for more than twenty days, the party desiring to show the invalidity has really never had any adequate remedy under the statute; and after [536]*536the twenty days have elapsed, no person, whether he be an elector or not, has any remedy of any kind under the statute. With respect to the second proposition, we may further remark, that said chapter 27 * gives to the county commissioners a right to contest a county-seat- election; and from this fact it is inferred that said act takes away the right of such elector to question the validity of such an election in any other manner. But this reasoning fails when it comes to be applied to such persons as are not electors of the county; for instance, persons owning real estate in the county, or otherwise interested in the county, and who are beneficially interested in a particular place being the county-seat, but who are women, or minors, or persons disqualified from voting under section two (as amended,) of article five of the constitution, or perhaps arc - non-residents of the county.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Ruppenthal v. Maag
113 P.2d 101 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1941)
Citizens Utilities Co. v. City of Goodland
69 P.2d 318 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1937)
Board of Education v. Powers
51 P.2d 421 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1935)
State ex rel. Smith v. Board of County Commissioners
299 P. 965 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1931)
Kansas & Oklahoma Railway Co. v. City of Liberal
196 P. 1067 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1921)
Kolster v. American Gas Co.
186 P. 738 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1920)
State ex rel. Wheeler v. Bentley
150 P. 218 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1915)
City of Emporia v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co.
147 P. 1095 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1915)
People Ex Rel. Sill v. Murphy
129 P. 603 (California Court of Appeal, 1912)
State ex rel. Jackson v. Prather
112 P. 829 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1911)
Stearns v. State Ex Rel. Biggers
1909 OK 69 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1909)
State ex rel. Hathorn v. United States Express Co.
104 N.W. 556 (Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1905)
United States, Ex Rel. v. C., O. G. R. R. Co.
1895 OK 83 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1895)
United States ex rel. Search v. Choctaw, Oklahoma & Gulf Railroad
3 Okla. 404 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1895)
Hendee v. Hayden
60 N.W. 1034 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1894)
Parmeter v. Bourne
35 P. 586 (Washington Supreme Court, 1894)
Rosenthal v. State Board of Canvassers
50 Kan. 129 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1893)
Rice v. Board of Canvassers
50 Kan. 149 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1893)
Albert v. Twohig
53 N.W. 582 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1892)
State ex rel. Dakota Hail Ass'n v. Carey
49 N.W. 164 (North Dakota Supreme Court, 1891)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
6 Kan. 524, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-wells-v-marston-kan-1870.