State ex rel. Wellford v. Williams

110 Tenn. 549
CourtTennessee Supreme Court
DecidedApril 15, 1903
StatusPublished
Cited by34 cases

This text of 110 Tenn. 549 (State ex rel. Wellford v. Williams) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Tennessee Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State ex rel. Wellford v. Williams, 110 Tenn. 549 (Tenn. 1903).

Opinion

Mr. -Justice Neil

delivered the opinion of the court-.

This was a proceeding instituted in the chancery court .of Shelby county for a mandamus upon the defendant, as mayor of the city of Memphis, to compel him to allow the relator to examine the corporation books of the said city of Memphis with an expert accountant. An alternative writ was issued by the chancellor, to which the defendant responded. Thereupon the relator demanded the peremptory writ on the pleadings as they then stood. The chancellor denied the relief sought, and complainant has appealed and assigned errors.

In order to fully understand the scope of the litiga[556]*556tion, it will be necessary to set out the substance of the bill or petition, and of the defendant’s-response or answer to the alternative writ.

Before doing this, in order to properly understand the legal effect of the allegations and averments in the pleadings referred to, it is necessary to state certain rules, applicable thereto. In Harris v. State, ex rel., 96 Tenn., 496-513, 34 S. W., 1017, it is said: “The power to issue mandamus, and the practice under it, is to some extent regulated in this State by statute. Code, 1858, sec. 3567 et seq.; State v. Marks, 6 Lea, 12. By these provisions; the return to the writ is made traversable, and the aver-ments of the petition may be put in issue by a denial in the return or answer, in which event the case will be determined by the court, or tried by the jury on evidence. With these exceptions, the proceeding, is one largely controlled by the rules of pleading established by the common law. Among these rules, we think the follow ing are well established: (1) Whenever it appears, that the return fails to answer the important facts alleged in the petition, every intendment will be made against it. High on Ex. Leg. Rem., sec. 461. (2) The allegations not denied, nor confessed and avoided, are-taken to be true. Merrill on Mandamus, sec. 274. (3) If the relator moves for a peremptory writ upon the pleadings, this motion is equivalent to a demurrer to the return for not stating facts sufficient to constitute a defense. High on Ex. Leg. Rem., secs. 521, 523; State v. Marks, supra.”

[557]*557With these principles in view, we shall now endeavor to ascertain the facts, as contained in the pleadings.

The petition contains the following allegations: That the relator is a resident citizen and taxpayer of the city of Memphis, and as such one of the incorporators of the city, which is a municipal corporation under and by virtue of chapter 11 of the Acts of 1879 and the acts amendatory thereof; that the defendant is the mayor and chief executive of the said municipality; that as such mayor and chief executive he has' the custody of the books of the said city, on which are kept the receipts and expenditures of the funds of the said city; that in the said receipts and expenditures the relator, as a taxpayer and citizen, has a direct interest; that some time before the petition was filed the relator, uninvited, attended a meeting of two hundred invited citizens, called by the mayor, for the purpose of devising ways and means to assist the city administration to pave, repair, and “round up,” more or less, the streets of the city, and, being interested in the material prosperity of the city, he afterwards attended the meeting of a committee of fifteen appointed at the aforesaid meeting of citizens; that the relator, having the interest of a corporator and . taxpayer (the financial condition of the city showing the necessity for the providing of additional means for the purposes aforesaid and the tax rate being already very high and very burdensome), thought that business men, in the conduct of their own affairs, ought to know the sources of the revenue of the city and the items of ex[558]*558penditure of that revenue, and thereupon the relator proposed to the said committee to provide for an examination of the books of the city, for the sole purpose of ascertaining the exact financial condition of the city, the sources from which it was received, and for what it had been paid out; that afterwards a subcommittee of five was appointed from the said committee of fifteen; that this subcommittee undertook to make such investigation as was practicable of a superficial character, and, having called upon the defendant for such information as would enable the members thereof to have a conception of the amount of revenue received, the sources from which it had been received, and the accounts to which it had been appropriated, the defendant, as mayor, furnished the committee with certain figures, which are exhibited with the bill and marked “A”; that the proposition of the relator for the examination of the city books by experts resulted in a declination by the chairman of the committee of two hundred before referred to; and that thereupon the relator demanded of defendant the right to make an examination of the books, records, papers, and vouchers in his possession, claiming, as a cor-porator and taxpayer in and of the city, the right to make a general inspection of the public records of the city, and to make copies of its public documents and records, under such rules and regulations as would insure their safety — the relator stating at the time that the books would be examined with the least possible inconvenience to the mayor and to the other officers of the city govern[559]*559ment, and that be trusted that tbe examination might be made without any bard feelings between any officers of tbe city government and himself, but that this demand was ignored and refused, and treated with contempt and derision.

Tbe 'petition then proceeds: “Tbe relator is advised by counsel that tbe books of tbe city of Memphis are public records, and that as a corporator and taxpayer of said city of Memphis be has tbe right to inspect them, to make copies of them.under such rules and restrictions as will preserve their safety; and be is entitled, to this end, to tbe benefit of agents and employees, and to tbe right of a general inspection. That tbe relator is informed and believes, and upon information of a public character avers tbe fact to be, that tbe refusal to grant him tbe right- be claims by tbe defendant is not based upon any abuse or inconvenience likely to arise by inspection, examination, and making note of tbe records, or any damage or loss that is likely to ensue by reason of such examination of tbe records, but is predicated wholly upon tbe assumed and unwarranted claim of tbe defendant that the examination sought by tbe relator and demanded as of right is predicated of political animosity, which tbe relator says is ill-founded in fact; be claiming tbe right purely because of bis interest as a cor-porator and taxpayer, and making tbe demands to tbe end that be may know that which be has be right to know —the exact status financially of tbe corporation of which he is a member, and what has become of its funds.”

[560]*560The prayer of the bill was for an alternative man-damns and for ultimate relief in accord with the substance thereof.

An alternative writ was issued in accordance with the prayer of the petition or bill, and thereupon the defendant filed his answer.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Jennifer Benke Bottorff v. Christian Todd Bottorff
Court of Appeals of Tennessee, 2020
Bradley Jetmore v. City of Memphis
Court of Appeals of Tennessee, 2019
Teresa Kocher v. Laua Bearden
Court of Appeals of Tennessee, 2018
Jones v. City of Memphis
852 F. Supp. 2d 1002 (W.D. Tennessee, 2012)
Schneider v. City of Jackson
226 S.W.3d 332 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 2007)
Swift v. Campbell
159 S.W.3d 565 (Court of Appeals of Tennessee, 2004)
United States v. Gotti
322 F. Supp. 2d 230 (E.D. New York, 2004)
State ex rel. Cole v. Francisco
643 S.W.2d 105 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1982)
Espinosa v. State
653 S.W.2d 446 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1982)
City of Kenai v. Kenai Peninsula Newspapers, Inc.
642 P.2d 1316 (Alaska Supreme Court, 1982)
United States v. Mitchell
551 F.2d 1252 (D.C. Circuit, 1976)
State ex rel. Martin v. City of Memphis
452 S.W.2d 346 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1970)
Chamberlain v. Brown
442 S.W.2d 248 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1969)
State Ex Rel. Donahue v. Holbrook
73 A.2d 924 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1950)
Taxpayers Association v. City of Cape May
64 A.2d 453 (New Jersey Superior Court App Division, 1949)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
110 Tenn. 549, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-wellford-v-williams-tenn-1903.