Adams, J.
Counties are civil and political divisions of the State created and organized for the more convenient administration of government, and are invested with such powers as are essential to the welfare and protection of the public within their boundaries. They are not
regarded as municipal corporations in the strict legal sense (although referred to under this title in Article YII of the Constitution), but as instrumentalities of the State; and in the exercise of ordinary governmental functions they are subject practically to the unlimited control of the Legislature, unless restricted by constitutional provision.
Mills v. Williams,
33 N. C., 558;
White v. Comrs.,
90 N. C., 437;
Comrs. v. Comrs.,
95 N. C., 190;
Comrs. v. Comrs.,
157 N. C., 515.
With respect to the institutions and finances of a county, Article YII has the following provisions:
Section 1. In each county there shall be elected biennially by the qualified voters thereof, as provided for the election of members of the General Assembly, the following officers: a treasurer, register of deeds, surveyor and five commissioners.
Sec. 2. It shall be the duty of the commissioners to exercise a general supervision and control of the penal and charitable institutions, schools, roads, bridges, levying of taxes'and finances of the county, as may be prescribed by law. The register of deeds shall be, ex-officio, clerk of the board of commissioners.
Sec. 14. The General Assembly shall have full power by statute to modify, change, or abrogate any and all of the provisions of this article, and substitute others in their place, except sections 7, 9, and 13.
Instances in which the legislative power defined in section 14 has been exercised appear in many of our decisions, among which are the following:
Harriss v. Wright,
121 N. C., 172;
Audit Co. v. McKenzie,
147 N. C., 462;
Trustees v. Webb,
155 N. C., 379;
Comrs. v. Comrs.,
165 N. C., 632;
Woodall v. Highway Com.,
176 N. C., 377.
It is settled by the decisions as well as the cited sections of the Constitution that the plaintiffs had no vested property or contract right to the office to which they had been elected of which they could not be deprived by the Legislature.
Mial v. Ellington,
134 N. C., 131, overruling
Hohe v. Henderson,
15 N. C., .1. The complaint, it is true, assails the statute in question on the ground that the plaintiffs occupied a constitutional office which the Legislature could not abolish, but counsel for the appellees admitted in their argument here that the office is one which may be abolished at the legislative will, and that the officers may be removed and their duties delegated to others.
Admitting this, the plaintiffs say, however, that the act vested in the board of managers all the powers theretofore possessed by the board of commissioners, and that it is void because, as admitted, it was not passed in compliance with Article II, sec. 14, of the Constitution. This section is as' follows:
Sec. 14. No law shall be passed to raise money on the credit of the State, or to pledge the faith of the State, directly or indirectly, for the
payment of any debt, or to impose any tax upon tbe people of tbe State, or allow tbe counties, cities, or towns to do so, unless tbe bill for tbe purpose shall have been read three several times in each bouse of tbe General Assembly and passed three several readings, which readings shall have been on three different days, and agreed to by each house respectively, and unless the yeas and nays on the second and third readings of the bill shall have been entered on the journal. ■
More particularly stated, the argument of the plaintiffs is based on the proposition that the
object
of the act is to raise revenue for the county; that, while the word “taxes” does not appear in the act, the commissioners were given power to levy, in like manner with the State taxes, all necessary taxes for county purposes (C. S., 1291 (2), Revenue Act, sec. 2; and that the managers for the county, succeeding to the duties of the commissioners, are necessarily invested with like power. This position raises the question whether the power of taxation was bestowed upon the board of commissioners as an original corporate entity, or whether it was vested in the county as a body politic and corporate to be exercised by the board of commissioners as a county agency or instrumentality provided by legislative enactment. If the latter is the correct position a mere change in the taxing instrumentality would not necessarily impair or affect the original grant of the power to tax; and if the power to tax remains unimpaired in the county the act in question providing for a mere change of the instrumentality need not have been passed in compliance with the formalities prescribed by Article II, sec. 14, of the Constitution. This seems to be evident from the article itself. It provides, as, we have seen, that no law shall be passed to
impose any tax
or allow the counties, cities, or towns to do so unless the specified conditions are complied with; but it has no reference to the officers who impose the tax. The abolition of one board by whom the tax is to be levied and the substitution of another who is to perform the identical office is not the imposition of a tax within the meaning of this section. See
Colton Mills v. Waxhaw,
130 N. C., 293;
Lutterloh v. Fayetteville,
149 N. C., 65.
There is no suggestion that the body of our statute law (Consolidated Statutes, including the Revenue Act) was not enacted in conformity with the Constitution. As, therefore, the power of taxation cannot be impeached, it is material to determine where such power resides— whether in the county or in the board of commissioners.
As a general rule, the existence of a county may be reg'arded as continual or perpetual, notwithstanding any change in the officers by whom its corporate functions are to be exercised. Indeed, its functions can be performed only by some kind of agency or instrumentality, as the business of all corporations is conducted by its officers or agents. Every
county is a body politic and corporate, and bas the powers prescribed by statute and those necessarily implied by law, and no others; and these powers are exercised by the board of commissioners, or in pursuance of a resolution adopted by them. C. S., 1290. The board of commissioners, then, is an instrumentality’ or
quasi
agency appointed to supervise and control the institutions and finances of the county in which as a body corporate the original grant of power resides. This seems to be apparent from the statutes defining its powers. It may borrow money for necessary expenses, but the debt is that of the county; with the approval of the General Assembly it may submit to a vote of the qualified electors a proposition to loan the credit of the county; it may make orders respecting county property; and it.may provide for the maintenance of the poor at the expense of the county.
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Adams, J.
Counties are civil and political divisions of the State created and organized for the more convenient administration of government, and are invested with such powers as are essential to the welfare and protection of the public within their boundaries. They are not
regarded as municipal corporations in the strict legal sense (although referred to under this title in Article YII of the Constitution), but as instrumentalities of the State; and in the exercise of ordinary governmental functions they are subject practically to the unlimited control of the Legislature, unless restricted by constitutional provision.
Mills v. Williams,
33 N. C., 558;
White v. Comrs.,
90 N. C., 437;
Comrs. v. Comrs.,
95 N. C., 190;
Comrs. v. Comrs.,
157 N. C., 515.
With respect to the institutions and finances of a county, Article YII has the following provisions:
Section 1. In each county there shall be elected biennially by the qualified voters thereof, as provided for the election of members of the General Assembly, the following officers: a treasurer, register of deeds, surveyor and five commissioners.
Sec. 2. It shall be the duty of the commissioners to exercise a general supervision and control of the penal and charitable institutions, schools, roads, bridges, levying of taxes'and finances of the county, as may be prescribed by law. The register of deeds shall be, ex-officio, clerk of the board of commissioners.
Sec. 14. The General Assembly shall have full power by statute to modify, change, or abrogate any and all of the provisions of this article, and substitute others in their place, except sections 7, 9, and 13.
Instances in which the legislative power defined in section 14 has been exercised appear in many of our decisions, among which are the following:
Harriss v. Wright,
121 N. C., 172;
Audit Co. v. McKenzie,
147 N. C., 462;
Trustees v. Webb,
155 N. C., 379;
Comrs. v. Comrs.,
165 N. C., 632;
Woodall v. Highway Com.,
176 N. C., 377.
It is settled by the decisions as well as the cited sections of the Constitution that the plaintiffs had no vested property or contract right to the office to which they had been elected of which they could not be deprived by the Legislature.
Mial v. Ellington,
134 N. C., 131, overruling
Hohe v. Henderson,
15 N. C., .1. The complaint, it is true, assails the statute in question on the ground that the plaintiffs occupied a constitutional office which the Legislature could not abolish, but counsel for the appellees admitted in their argument here that the office is one which may be abolished at the legislative will, and that the officers may be removed and their duties delegated to others.
Admitting this, the plaintiffs say, however, that the act vested in the board of managers all the powers theretofore possessed by the board of commissioners, and that it is void because, as admitted, it was not passed in compliance with Article II, sec. 14, of the Constitution. This section is as' follows:
Sec. 14. No law shall be passed to raise money on the credit of the State, or to pledge the faith of the State, directly or indirectly, for the
payment of any debt, or to impose any tax upon tbe people of tbe State, or allow tbe counties, cities, or towns to do so, unless tbe bill for tbe purpose shall have been read three several times in each bouse of tbe General Assembly and passed three several readings, which readings shall have been on three different days, and agreed to by each house respectively, and unless the yeas and nays on the second and third readings of the bill shall have been entered on the journal. ■
More particularly stated, the argument of the plaintiffs is based on the proposition that the
object
of the act is to raise revenue for the county; that, while the word “taxes” does not appear in the act, the commissioners were given power to levy, in like manner with the State taxes, all necessary taxes for county purposes (C. S., 1291 (2), Revenue Act, sec. 2; and that the managers for the county, succeeding to the duties of the commissioners, are necessarily invested with like power. This position raises the question whether the power of taxation was bestowed upon the board of commissioners as an original corporate entity, or whether it was vested in the county as a body politic and corporate to be exercised by the board of commissioners as a county agency or instrumentality provided by legislative enactment. If the latter is the correct position a mere change in the taxing instrumentality would not necessarily impair or affect the original grant of the power to tax; and if the power to tax remains unimpaired in the county the act in question providing for a mere change of the instrumentality need not have been passed in compliance with the formalities prescribed by Article II, sec. 14, of the Constitution. This seems to be evident from the article itself. It provides, as, we have seen, that no law shall be passed to
impose any tax
or allow the counties, cities, or towns to do so unless the specified conditions are complied with; but it has no reference to the officers who impose the tax. The abolition of one board by whom the tax is to be levied and the substitution of another who is to perform the identical office is not the imposition of a tax within the meaning of this section. See
Colton Mills v. Waxhaw,
130 N. C., 293;
Lutterloh v. Fayetteville,
149 N. C., 65.
There is no suggestion that the body of our statute law (Consolidated Statutes, including the Revenue Act) was not enacted in conformity with the Constitution. As, therefore, the power of taxation cannot be impeached, it is material to determine where such power resides— whether in the county or in the board of commissioners.
As a general rule, the existence of a county may be reg'arded as continual or perpetual, notwithstanding any change in the officers by whom its corporate functions are to be exercised. Indeed, its functions can be performed only by some kind of agency or instrumentality, as the business of all corporations is conducted by its officers or agents. Every
county is a body politic and corporate, and bas the powers prescribed by statute and those necessarily implied by law, and no others; and these powers are exercised by the board of commissioners, or in pursuance of a resolution adopted by them. C. S., 1290. The board of commissioners, then, is an instrumentality’ or
quasi
agency appointed to supervise and control the institutions and finances of the county in which as a body corporate the original grant of power resides. This seems to be apparent from the statutes defining its powers. It may borrow money for necessary expenses, but the debt is that of the county; with the approval of the General Assembly it may submit to a vote of the qualified electors a proposition to loan the credit of the county; it may make orders respecting county property; and it.may provide for the maintenance of the poor at the expense of the county. It may discharge a number of other statutory duties; but its powers are exercised on behalf of the county and its acts are the acts of the county. The provision in O. S., 1291, that “the boards of commissioners of the several counties shall have power ... to levy, in like manner with the State faxes, the necessary taxes for county purposes”; and the provision in the Eevenue Act, sec. 2, that “there shall be levied by the board of commissioners in each county a tax on each taxable poll,” must be construed in the light of the restriction set forth in Article VII, sec. 2, of the Constitution. The entire trend of legislation enacted in pursuance of this section of the Constitution indicates the exercise of powers delegated for specific purposes to an instrumentality or
quasi
agency of the county. The taxes thus authorized are really levied by the county through the instrumentality of the board of commissioners.
Fountain v. Pitt,
171 N. C., 113;
Wilson v. Holding,
170 N. C., 352;
Halford v. Benter,
169 N. C., 546;
Buck v. Comrs.,
159 N. C., 335;
Cotton Mills v. Comrs.,
108 N. C., 678; 15 C. J., 456 (102).
In our opinion, the logical conclusion is that- the board of managers was substituted for the board of commissioners by constitutional authority (Art. VII, sec. 14), and that the act under consideration is not invalidated by a failure to observe the formalities laid down in Art. II, sec. 14.
It was urged on behalf of the plaintiffs that the act considered most favorably for the defendants is a material amendment of the law conferring the original power to tax, and upon the admitted facts is, therefore, null and void. It is true that a material amendment to a statute authorizing the imposition of a tax must conform to the requirements of Article II, sec. .14, of the Constitution.
Road Com. v. Comrs.,
178 N. C., 61;
Guire v. Comrs.,
177 N. C., 516;
Claywell v. Comrs.,
173 N. C., 657;
Russell v. Troy,
159 N. C., 366. It is also true that an
amendment will not ordinarily be deemed material unless it purports to levy a tax or to create or increase a debt, or to change tbe rate of interest or tbe time' of payment, or otherwise to broaden the scope of the amended act, or materially to affect its financial features.
Glenn v. Wray,
126 N. C., 730;
Brown v. Stewart,
134 N. C., 357;
Comrs. v. Stafford,
138 N. C., 453;
Bank v. Lacy,
151 N. C., 3;
Gregg v. Comrs.,
162 N. C., 479;
Brown v. Comrs.,
173 N. C., 598;
Wagstaff v. Highway Comm., 177
N. C., 354. In our interpretation of the statutes, none of these provisions appears in or is directly or indirectly made a part of the act before us, but simply the substitution of a new board by whom authorized taxes may be levied.
The judgment of the Superior Court is
Reversed..