State Ex Rel. Oliver v. USA Waste of Ohio, Unpublished Decision (6-27-2006)

2006 Ohio 3264
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedJune 27, 2006
DocketNo. 05AP-666.
StatusUnpublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 2006 Ohio 3264 (State Ex Rel. Oliver v. USA Waste of Ohio, Unpublished Decision (6-27-2006)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State Ex Rel. Oliver v. USA Waste of Ohio, Unpublished Decision (6-27-2006), 2006 Ohio 3264 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006).

Opinion

DECISION
{¶ 1} Relator, Lloyd Oliver, filed this original action requesting a writ of mandamus ordering respondent, Industrial Commission of Ohio ("commission"), to vacate its order denying his application for permanent total disability ("PTD") compensation, and to enter an ordering granting that compensation.

{¶ 2} This court referred this matter to a magistrate pursuant to Civ.R. 53(C) and Loc.R. 12(M) of the Tenth District Court of Appeals. The magistrate issued a decision, including findings of fact and conclusions of law, recommending that this court grant the requested writ. (Attached as Appendix A.) The commission has filed objections to the magistrate's decision.

{¶ 3} The commission has not objected to the magistrate's findings of fact, and we adopt those findings as our own. In brief, relator filed an application for PTD compensation. In denying relator's application, the commission addressed both medical and non-medical factors. The non-medical factors included relator's age (relator was 68 years old at the time), educational background (relator completed the fifth grade), and work history. Based on the medical and non-medical factors at issue, the commission concluded that relator's disability was not total, he is capable of engaging in sustained remunerative employment, and he is capable of being retrained to engage in other sustained remunerative employment.

{¶ 4} The magistrate found the commission's analysis of relator's age and education to be "seriously flawed" and ordered a remand to the commission for a proper analysis of those factors. The commission filed objections to the magistrate's decision, arguing that the commission's analysis of the age and education factors was adequate, and the requested writ should be denied. We begin with the commission's discussion of relator's education.

{¶ 5} The commission found that relator's fifth grade education appeared, at first blush, to be a negative vocational factor, but ultimately determined that it was a neutral factor given relator's work history and apparent ability to learn new jobs throughout his life. The magistrate found this discussion of relator's education to be flawed because nothing in relator's work history changed the fact that relator has a marginal education, which the commission should have concluded was a negative factor notwithstanding relator's work history.

{¶ 6} We begin with the principle that the commission is the expert on vocational matters and may draw its own conclusions from the vocational information presented. State ex rel. Jacksonv. Indus. Comm. (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 266, 267; State ex rel.Ewart v. Indus. Comm. (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 139, 141; State exrel. Pence v. Indus. Comm., Franklin App. No. 04AP-124,2004-Ohio-7052, affd., 107 Ohio St.3d 286, 2005-Ohio-6507. The commission is also the exclusive evaluator of the weight and credibility of the evidence. State ex rel. LTV Steel Co. v.Indus. Comm. (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 284, 287.

{¶ 7} Here, while acknowledging relator's educational limitations, the commission assessed relator's abilities in light of his work history, which the commission detailed at length. That history demonstrates relator's ability, despite his limited formal education, to learn new skills and jobs "through on-the-job training and through self-teaching." Having made such determinations, and having discussed them at length, the commission properly found "the overall educational factor to be neutral." Therefore, we sustain the commission's objection in that respect, and we find that the commission properly analyzed relator's education.

{¶ 8} As to relator's age, the commission found that relator was 68 years old at the time of the hearing and simply concluded: "Such age is a vocationally neutral factor. While some employers prefer younger employees with more work-life remaining over the course of employment, other employers prefer more mature employees with past work and life experience." Here, we agree with the magistrate that the commission did not "discuss age in conjunction with the other aspects of the claimant's individual profile that may lessen or magnify age's effects[,]" as State exrel. Moss v. Indus. Comm. (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 414, 417, requires and, therefore, that the commission's discussion of relator's age was inadequate.

{¶ 9} We further find, however, that the commission's inadequate discussion of relator's age does not necessarily result in an order for further consideration. The absence of an age discussion is not necessarily a fatal flaw, nor does it, in some cases, even compel a return of the cause. State ex rel.Blue v. Indus. Comm. (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 466, 469-470; Stateex rel. Rothkegel v. Westlake (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 409,411-412; State ex rel. McBride v. United Home Care, Franklin App. No. 04AP-114, 2004-Ohio-6614. Where a claimant's other vocational factors are split between favorable and potentially unfavorable consideration, the claimant's PTD disability is not inevitable, and further consideration by the commission is proper. State ex rel. Mobley v. Indus. Comm. (1997),78 Ohio St.3d 579, 586. However, where a claimant's other vocational factors are all positive, age alone will not support PTD compensation, and further consideration would be improper.Rothkegel.

{¶ 10} Here, the commission found, and relator does not dispute, that his medical impairment from the allowed conditions does not preclude employment. The commission also found, and we have affirmed, that relator's education is a neutral factor, and it does not preclude employment. And the commission found that relator's employment history is "a slightly positive re-employment factor." Thus, even if, upon further consideration, the commission were to conclude that relator's age is a negative, rather than a neutral, factor, relator's age would stand as the only factor potentially precluding employment. Precedent is quite clear, however, that a "claimant may not be granted permanent total disability compensation due solely to his age. Therefore, even in the absence of detailed discussion on the effects of claimant's age, the commission's explanation satisfies [State exrel. Noll v. Indus. Comm. (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 203]." Blue at 469-470. See, also, Mobley; State ex rel. Gokey v. Indus.Comm., Franklin App. No. 05AP-65, 2005-Ohio-6759; State ex rel.Yancey v. Columbus Maint. Serv. Co., Franklin App. No. 04AP-1357, 2005-Ohio-5325. Therefore, the commission's inadequate discussion of relator's age does not compel further consideration by the commission.

{¶ 11}

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Related

State ex rel. Oliver v. USA Waste of Ohio, Inc.
850 N.E.2d 1217 (Ohio Supreme Court, 2006)

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Bluebook (online)
2006 Ohio 3264, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-oliver-v-usa-waste-of-ohio-unpublished-decision-6-27-2006-ohioctapp-2006.