State Ex Rel. Pence v. Indus. Comm., Unpublished Decision (12-23-2004)

2004 Ohio 7052
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedDecember 23, 2004
DocketCase No. 04AP-124.
StatusUnpublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 2004 Ohio 7052 (State Ex Rel. Pence v. Indus. Comm., Unpublished Decision (12-23-2004)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State Ex Rel. Pence v. Indus. Comm., Unpublished Decision (12-23-2004), 2004 Ohio 7052 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004).

Opinion

DECISION
ON OBJECTIONS TO MAGISTRATE'S DECISION
{¶ 1} Relator, Elizabeth A. Pence, filed this original action requesting that this court issue a writ of mandamus ordering respondent, Industrial Commission of Ohio ("commission"), to vacate its order which denied her application for permanent total disability ("PTD") compensation, and to enter an order granting said compensation.

{¶ 2} Pursuant to Civ.R. 53(C) and Loc.R. 12(M) of the Tenth District Court of Appeals, this matter was referred to a magistrate of this court. On July 30, 2004, the magistrate issued a decision including findings of fact and conclusions of law and therein recommended that this court grant relator's request for mandamus. (Attached as Appendix A.) The magistrate found the commission's denial of PTD was not supported by evidence in the record and was an abuse of discretion. Respondent, Jet Corr, Inc., ("respondent") and the commission each timely filed objections to the magistrate's decision, which objections are now before the court. Relator filed a reply to respondent and the commission's objections, arguing that since the commission's order was not supported by some evidence, a writ of mandamus must issue. For the reasons that follow, we sustain the objections of the commission and the respondent.

{¶ 3} Respondent and the commission's objections surround the vocational report of William H. Hyde, Ph.D., ("Hyde"). In their objections, respondent and the commission each contend that the magistrate's conclusions of law were contrary to State ex rel.Ewart v. Indus. Comm. (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 139, 141,666 N.E.2d 1125, as the commission may accept the findings in a vocational report and use its discretion to draw different conclusions. Specifically, respondent and the commission jointly argue that the magistrate improperly substituted his judgment as to the weight of the evidence regarding relator's non-medical disability factors on her employability. As such, the commission contends that the magistrate disregarded its expertise in vocational matters. State ex rel. Jackson v. Indus. Comm. (1997),79 Ohio St.3d 266, 27, 680 N.E.2d 1233. Respondent contends that the magistrate's conclusion that the commission's analysis is "suspect" is insufficient to support the writ of mandamus ordered. Further, respondent contends the determination of disputed facts regarding whether an injured worker is entitled to compensation is particularly within the authority and jurisdiction of the commission. State ex rel. Milburn v. Indus.Comm. (1986), 26 Ohio St.3d 119, 26 OBR 102, 498 N.E.2d 440.

{¶ 4} In its objections, the commission addressed the specific non-medical disability factors from Hyde's report considered by the magistrate in his decision. Regarding her age, the commission argues the staff hearing officer ("SHO") may properly rely upon the portion of Hyde's report, which states her age "would not preclude claimant from performing entry level work." (July 30, 2004 Decision at 8.) Further, the commission contends that it remains within its discretion in viewing relator's age as an overall neutral vocational factor. We agree, and find that regardless of Hyde's opinion of relator's physical capabilities, the commission, as the ultimate evaluator of non-medical vocational factors, was entitled to independently weigh the evidence and reach its own conclusion. Jackson at 270.

{¶ 5} The commission's contention regarding relator's education surrounds the magistrate's reliance on Hyde's finding that her education was "barely adequate" to meet the basic demands of most sedentary and many light duty occupations." (July 30, 2004 Decision at 8.) The commission asserts that the SHO's deletion of the modifier "barely" in finding that her education was a neutral vocational asset does not significantly alter the meaning of Hyde's findings regarding the relator's education. We agree with the commission's reliance on State ex rel.Consolidation Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm. 78 Ohio St. 3d 176,677 N.E.2d 338, in arguing that the magistrate may not substitute his judgment for the weight of the commission. As Supreme Court of Ohio opined in Consolidation Coal Co., "`[t]o go further and assess the credibility of the evidence would place this court in the role of a `super commission,' a role never envisioned by either the Ohio Constitution or the General Assembly.'" Id. citing State ex rel. Burley v. Coil Packing, Inc. (1987),31 Ohio St. 3d 18, 20, 31 Ohio B. Rep. 70, 72, 508 N.E.2d 936, 938.

{¶ 6} Finally, the commission argues it did not abuse his discretion in finding relator's work history to be a neutral vocational asset. Specifically, the commission asserts that the SHO properly relied upon Hyde's statement indicating relator has a "relatively stable work history" and has "performed some semi-skilled work." The commission contends that Hyde's statements demonstrate relator can learn to perform semi-skilled levels of employment. Further, the commission addresses the portion of Hyde's report, which states that following remediation, relator could bring her reasoning, math and language skills to the average level. The commission argues that the magistrate quoted portions of Hyde's report, which can be interpreted as limiting relator's employability. Relying onJackson and Ewart, the commission contends it has the discretion to review all aspects of a work history and to make the final determination regarding employability. We agree, and find the commission was entitled to weigh this evidence and conclude the relator's work history is a neutral vocational asset.

{¶ 7} In the present case, we find the commission did not abuse its discretion in its denial of relator's application for PTD compensation. The commission, not this court, is the exclusive evaluator of the weight and credibility of the evidence. State ex rel. LTV Steel Co. v. Indus. Comm. (2000),88 Ohio St.3d 284, 287, 725 N.E.2d 639. As the record contains some evidence to support the commission's findings, we must defer to its judgment. Id.

{¶ 8} Accordingly, we sustain the respondent and the commission's objections to the magistrate's decision. We adopt the magistrate's findings of fact, we reject the magistrate's conclusions of law, and we hereby deny relator's request for a writ of mandamus.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

State Ex Rel. Baker v. Formica, Unpublished Decision (12-1-2005)
2005 Ohio 6373 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 2005)
State ex rel. Pence v. Indus. Comm.
822 N.E.2d 807 (Ohio Supreme Court, 2005)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
2004 Ohio 7052, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-pence-v-indus-comm-unpublished-decision-12-23-2004-ohioctapp-2004.