Spencer, J.
This is an original disciplinary proceeding brought in the name of the State of Nebraska on relation of the Nebraska State Bar Association against Marvin L. Holscher, a lawyer duly admitted and licensed to practice his profession in this state.
Respondent was charged with the violation of Rules DR 7-102(A) (3) and (5), and DR 8-101(A) (2) of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The referee appointed herein has filed a report recommending censure or reprimand. Relator has filed exceptions to that report. We disagree with some of the conclusions [731]*731of the referee, but accept his recommendations as to penalty.
Respondent was elected county attorney of Scotts Bluff County in the general election held in November 1970. At the time he took office there were in excess of 400 outstanding tax sale certificates left from previous administrations. He was also faced with the prosecution of a large number of criminal cases resulting from a drug investigation which had been going on in Scotts Bluff County for the previous 3 months. Because of a statutory requirement that felony cases must be tried within 6 months of the filing of the information, respondent devoted his time and attention to the criminal cases, paying little attention to the tax foreclosure problems, although the county commissioners were putting pressure on him to commence action on them. Respondent, at the time of his election, had never handled a tax foreclosure case and was unfamiliar with the necessary legal procedures.
The 1971 Legislature passed L.B. 743, which amended section 77-1918, R. R. S. 1943. It became effective May 22, 1971. Prior to this amendment, section 77-1918, R. R. S. 1943, provided that it was the duty of the county attorney to commence action to foreclose the lien of delinquent taxes when ordered by the county board, and to promptly foreclose any tax sale certificates issued by the county. No fee in addition to his regular salary was authorized. As amended, the section provided: “The county board shall have authority to direct the county attorney to commence foreclosure of such liens or certificates, or it may designate another attorney to commence such actions, and is authorized to pay any reasonable fee for such foreclosures, to be assessed as costs, but in the event the county attorney is designated to bring the action the fee shall be fifty dollars for each cause of action in addition to his salary, to be retained by him, but it shall not be paid to the [732]*732county attorney until the decree is entered and the property sold pursuant to such decree.”
The referee specifically found that respondent was aware the Legislature had passed a bill changing existing law to permit county attorneys foreclosing tax sale certificates to be paid a $50 fee for each certificate, and had discussed the change with other county attorneys, but he did not know the bill was designated as L.B. 743, nor had he ever read or analyzed the bill after it was passed, tie discussed fees for the foreclosure of tax sale certificates with the county commissioners, and in May of 1971, made an oral agreement with them providing for payment of a $50 attorney’s fee and $30 for abstracting on each tax certificate. There was no discussion as to when payment would be due.
Respondent thereafter investigated the tax certificate situation and found that the 5-year statute of limitations on 36 certificates would expire on June 1, 1971. He asked for and received from the county commissioners permission to employ another attorney to work with him on these foreclosures. No additional fee was allowed for this attorney. Respondent made his own arrangement with him.
The 36 tax sale certificates on which the statute of limitations was about to become applicable were consolidated into 7 cases and filed June 1, 1971. On November 8, 1971, respondent filed a claim for $1,440 with the county for payment for his services on these certificates. Nothing had been done in processing the foreclosures by that date except the filing of the petitions. Twenty-three of the certificates in the first four cases were redeemed. From June 1, 1971, to March 1972, no further action was taken by respondent on tax foreclosures. In March 1972, he prepared and submitted to the commissioners a written resolution to replace the oral one authorizing him to proceed with tax fore¡dosures. This resolution was passed by the commis[733]*733sioners on March 20, 1972. Thereafter several additional tax foreclosures were filed.
Claims for services were filed by respondent in all cases prior to publication, entry of a decree, and confirmation of sale. As to some of the certificates, the property was redeemed after the filing of the foreclosure and no sale resulted. In some instances respondent actually filed his claim for services after the petitions had been prepared in his office but before the date the petitions were actually filed in the District Court. In all the claims filed with the county board, respondent used the terminology “Foreclosure of tax sale certificates,” and then certified the authenticity of the claim.
Shortly after October 16, 1972, respondent learned that objections were being made to his claim. On October 27, he discussed the matter with the Attorney General of Nebraska. The referee found that this was the first time respondent thoroughly examined the provisions of L.B. 743, and realized that he had erroneously filed claims for his services in foreclosing tax sale certificates. On October 31, 1972, respondent received a county warrant in payment of a $2,000 claim which he immediately marked “Returned for cancellation,” and delivered it to the county clerk. The total amount of the balance of claims improperly filed and paid was $12,640. Respondent, by means of a bank loan, repaid this amount to the county. The three commissioners of Scotts Bluff County cosigned his note.
In November 1972, charges were filed against respondent with the Committee on Inquiry for the Seventeenth Judicial District. Hearing was held by the committee in January 1972. The record was thereafter referred to the Advisory Committee of the Nebraska State Bar Association. That committee concluded that probable cause existed for disciplinary action against respondent, and this proceeding was filed.
The provisions of the Code of Professional Respon[734]*734sibility alleged to have been violated are as follows:
DR 7-102(A) (3): “Conceal or knowingly fail to disclose that which he is required by law to reveal.”
DR 7-102(A) (5): “Knowingly make a false statement of law or fact.”
DR 8-101 (A) (2): “Use his public position to influence, or attempt to influence, a tribunal to act in favor of himself or of a client.”
L.B. 743, § 3, specifically states it was attempting to provide adequate compensation for county attorneys and that it desired the act to be effective as soon as it could become operative under the Constitution of the State of Nebraska. The respondent was then the duly qualified and acting county attorney of Scotts Bluff County, having served 5 months into his term. Article III, section 19, Constitution of Nebraska provides, so far as material herein: “* * * nor shall the compensation of any public officer * * * be increased or diminished during his term of office.” Ignoring the question of whether the respondent could have accepted payment for the foreclosures even after he completed them, by filing his claims he was in violation of the provisions of section 77-1918, R. R. S. 1943.
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Spencer, J.
This is an original disciplinary proceeding brought in the name of the State of Nebraska on relation of the Nebraska State Bar Association against Marvin L. Holscher, a lawyer duly admitted and licensed to practice his profession in this state.
Respondent was charged with the violation of Rules DR 7-102(A) (3) and (5), and DR 8-101(A) (2) of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The referee appointed herein has filed a report recommending censure or reprimand. Relator has filed exceptions to that report. We disagree with some of the conclusions [731]*731of the referee, but accept his recommendations as to penalty.
Respondent was elected county attorney of Scotts Bluff County in the general election held in November 1970. At the time he took office there were in excess of 400 outstanding tax sale certificates left from previous administrations. He was also faced with the prosecution of a large number of criminal cases resulting from a drug investigation which had been going on in Scotts Bluff County for the previous 3 months. Because of a statutory requirement that felony cases must be tried within 6 months of the filing of the information, respondent devoted his time and attention to the criminal cases, paying little attention to the tax foreclosure problems, although the county commissioners were putting pressure on him to commence action on them. Respondent, at the time of his election, had never handled a tax foreclosure case and was unfamiliar with the necessary legal procedures.
The 1971 Legislature passed L.B. 743, which amended section 77-1918, R. R. S. 1943. It became effective May 22, 1971. Prior to this amendment, section 77-1918, R. R. S. 1943, provided that it was the duty of the county attorney to commence action to foreclose the lien of delinquent taxes when ordered by the county board, and to promptly foreclose any tax sale certificates issued by the county. No fee in addition to his regular salary was authorized. As amended, the section provided: “The county board shall have authority to direct the county attorney to commence foreclosure of such liens or certificates, or it may designate another attorney to commence such actions, and is authorized to pay any reasonable fee for such foreclosures, to be assessed as costs, but in the event the county attorney is designated to bring the action the fee shall be fifty dollars for each cause of action in addition to his salary, to be retained by him, but it shall not be paid to the [732]*732county attorney until the decree is entered and the property sold pursuant to such decree.”
The referee specifically found that respondent was aware the Legislature had passed a bill changing existing law to permit county attorneys foreclosing tax sale certificates to be paid a $50 fee for each certificate, and had discussed the change with other county attorneys, but he did not know the bill was designated as L.B. 743, nor had he ever read or analyzed the bill after it was passed, tie discussed fees for the foreclosure of tax sale certificates with the county commissioners, and in May of 1971, made an oral agreement with them providing for payment of a $50 attorney’s fee and $30 for abstracting on each tax certificate. There was no discussion as to when payment would be due.
Respondent thereafter investigated the tax certificate situation and found that the 5-year statute of limitations on 36 certificates would expire on June 1, 1971. He asked for and received from the county commissioners permission to employ another attorney to work with him on these foreclosures. No additional fee was allowed for this attorney. Respondent made his own arrangement with him.
The 36 tax sale certificates on which the statute of limitations was about to become applicable were consolidated into 7 cases and filed June 1, 1971. On November 8, 1971, respondent filed a claim for $1,440 with the county for payment for his services on these certificates. Nothing had been done in processing the foreclosures by that date except the filing of the petitions. Twenty-three of the certificates in the first four cases were redeemed. From June 1, 1971, to March 1972, no further action was taken by respondent on tax foreclosures. In March 1972, he prepared and submitted to the commissioners a written resolution to replace the oral one authorizing him to proceed with tax fore¡dosures. This resolution was passed by the commis[733]*733sioners on March 20, 1972. Thereafter several additional tax foreclosures were filed.
Claims for services were filed by respondent in all cases prior to publication, entry of a decree, and confirmation of sale. As to some of the certificates, the property was redeemed after the filing of the foreclosure and no sale resulted. In some instances respondent actually filed his claim for services after the petitions had been prepared in his office but before the date the petitions were actually filed in the District Court. In all the claims filed with the county board, respondent used the terminology “Foreclosure of tax sale certificates,” and then certified the authenticity of the claim.
Shortly after October 16, 1972, respondent learned that objections were being made to his claim. On October 27, he discussed the matter with the Attorney General of Nebraska. The referee found that this was the first time respondent thoroughly examined the provisions of L.B. 743, and realized that he had erroneously filed claims for his services in foreclosing tax sale certificates. On October 31, 1972, respondent received a county warrant in payment of a $2,000 claim which he immediately marked “Returned for cancellation,” and delivered it to the county clerk. The total amount of the balance of claims improperly filed and paid was $12,640. Respondent, by means of a bank loan, repaid this amount to the county. The three commissioners of Scotts Bluff County cosigned his note.
In November 1972, charges were filed against respondent with the Committee on Inquiry for the Seventeenth Judicial District. Hearing was held by the committee in January 1972. The record was thereafter referred to the Advisory Committee of the Nebraska State Bar Association. That committee concluded that probable cause existed for disciplinary action against respondent, and this proceeding was filed.
The provisions of the Code of Professional Respon[734]*734sibility alleged to have been violated are as follows:
DR 7-102(A) (3): “Conceal or knowingly fail to disclose that which he is required by law to reveal.”
DR 7-102(A) (5): “Knowingly make a false statement of law or fact.”
DR 8-101 (A) (2): “Use his public position to influence, or attempt to influence, a tribunal to act in favor of himself or of a client.”
L.B. 743, § 3, specifically states it was attempting to provide adequate compensation for county attorneys and that it desired the act to be effective as soon as it could become operative under the Constitution of the State of Nebraska. The respondent was then the duly qualified and acting county attorney of Scotts Bluff County, having served 5 months into his term. Article III, section 19, Constitution of Nebraska provides, so far as material herein: “* * * nor shall the compensation of any public officer * * * be increased or diminished during his term of office.” Ignoring the question of whether the respondent could have accepted payment for the foreclosures even after he completed them, by filing his claims he was in violation of the provisions of section 77-1918, R. R. S. 1943. The statute specifically provides the fee shall not be paid to the county attorney until the decree is entered and the property sold pursuant to such decree.
As the referee suggests, the payment of respondent’s claim required the combined action of the county attorney in filing the claim, the board' of commissioners in approving the same, and the county treasurer in issuing the warrant to pay it. It may be said that all parties concerned were concurrently negligent in the performance of their duties in this regard. Compounding the problem is the fact that the county attorney has the duty of advising all county officials as to the law. By his own admission he did not know the law and took no steps to ascertain what it was. Obviously, the county commissioners and the. treasurer assumed that the [735]*735county attorney knew what he was doing. Removal from office is the penalty imposed upon the county attorney, the treasurer, and any member of a county board who shall willfully fail, neglect, or refuse to perform his duties under section 77-1918, R. R. S. 1943. Here it appears the negligence was shared by all.
Section 23-135, R. R. S. 1943, provides that claims against a county must be filed with the county clerk within 90 days after materials are furnished or labor is performed. Section 23-135.01, R. R. S. 1943, is a penal statute prescribing punishment for filing a false claim. So far as material herein, it provides: “Whoever shall file any claim against any county as provided in section 23-135, knowing said claim to contain any false statement or representation as to a material fact or whoever shall obtain or receive any money or any war-rent for money from any county knowing that the claim therefor was based on a false statement or representation as to a material fact, if the amount claimed or money obtained or received, or if the face value of the warrant for money shall be one hundred dollars or more shall, upon conviction thereof, be imprisoned in the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex not more than five nor less than one year.”
Criminal sanctions may be imposed only if the claimant knew the claim contained a false statement or false representation or he received money or a warrant for money knowing the claim for which he received it was based on a false statement or representation. In other words, there must have been a criminal intent to defraud the county by the use of false statements or representations. Mere negligence on the part of the claimant is not enough to sustain a conviction under section 23-135.01, R. R. S. 1943, no matter how gross it might have been. This, however, is not a criminal prosecution. Respondent filed his claim for services prematurely, in some instances even before a tax foreclosure was even filed. We cannot believe that re[736]*736spondent would not know this was improper procedure. At the very least it would be conduct so carelessly and recklessly negligent that we would have to find respondent did it knowingly. Otherwise we might as well forget the Code of Professional Conduct. The referee found otherwise. We disagree and find the respondent in violation of DR 7-102(A) (5) in the certification to the claims filed.
Respondent seeks to excuse himself on the ground that he was ignorant of the provisions of section 77-1918, R. R. S. 1943, as amended. The amendment became effective on May 22, 1971, which was after he had taken office. As the referee suggests, respondent leans on a broken reed. He had served previously as a deputy county attorney and was an experienced lawyer in general practice prior to his election. He knew in advance of that election that the county commissioners were expecting the county attorney to foreclose all delinquent tax certificates, yet he made no effort to familiarize himself with the law governing that subject, with specific reference to fees, either before or after taking office.
Before he made his agreement with the county commissioners respondent knew that section 77-1918, R. R. S. 1943, had been amended by the Legislature and the law on foreclosure fees had been changed, yet he made no attempt to ascertain what the law was or how it had been changed by the amendment nor how it might affect him personally. He gave as a reason his preoccupation with the prosecution of a number of criminal cases on which the statute of limitations might run. This is very unpersuasive and his failure to check the statute is inexcusable.
We have repeatedly recognized the ancient maxim that ignorance of the law is no excuse. It is a maxim sanctioned by centuries of experience. See Satterfield v. State (1961), 172 Neb. 275, 109 N. W. 2d 415. It applies with even greater emphasis to an attorney at [737]*737law who is expected to be learned in the law. It should be particularly applicable to a county attorney who should make himself fully conversant with the duties of his office. Misconduct of an attorney acting in an official capacity has been held to constitute a ground for his suspension or disbarment. State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Assn. v. Wiebusch (1951), 153 Neb. 583, 45 N. W. 2d 583. It is inexcusable for an attorney to attempt any legal procedure without ascertaining the law governing that procedure. Of all classes and professions the lawyer is most sacredly bound to understand and uphold the law. Respondent was guilty of extreme negligence in his failure to familiarize himself with section 77-1918, R. R. S. 1943, as amended. The fact that he was extremely busy with criminal prosecutions does not absolve him of this responsibility. It would have taken comparatively little time to have read the statute as amended.
It is equally hard for us to understand how any county attorney would believe that a county should pay for services before they were actually completed. We are equally unpersuaded by the contention that most of his work had been done by the time a petition was filed. Our own experience is otherwise. Unquestionably, respondent failed to discharge his duties in the proper manner.
Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A) (3) provides that a lawyer shall not intentionally conceal or knowingly fail to disclose that which he is required by law to reveal. The gravamen of DR 7-102(A) (3) therefore is the intentional concealment and failure to disclose. Giving the respondent the benefit of the doubt, the evidence in this case does not support a finding of an intentional concealment by respondent. On the record the allegations under DR 7-102(A) (3) are not proven and that charge should be dismissed.
Disciplinary Rule 8-101, providing, so far as material here: “(A) A lawyer who holds public office shall [738]*738not: * * * (2) Use his public position to influence, or attempt to influence, a tribunal to act in favor of himself or of a client,” has not been proved herein. The charge must be construed to be that respondent used his position as county attorney to influence the board of county commissioners of Scotts Bluff County to approve his claim for services in foreclosing the delinquent tax certificates. We hold that a county board is a tribunal embraced within the ambit of DR 8-101. While it was the duty of the county attorney to- advise the county board relative to the law involved, the question is, did he use his influence to get it to violate the law? There is no evidence that the respondent made any overt attempt to influence the county board to approve his claims for services or used his position as county attorney in any way to persuade or coerce the board to do so. The most that can be said is that the board assumed that respondent was acting properly and legally when he filed the claims. We agree with the referee, the evidence does not support the claim that the respondent used his position to influence the board, and dismiss the charge under DR 8-101.
We find the respondent guilty of a violation of DR 7-102(A) (5), but sustain the findings of the referee as to DR 7-102(A) (3) and DR 8-101(A) (2) of the Code of Professional Conduct. Respondent was not charged, as he should have been, with gross negligence and the lack of proper preparation. It would have been more appropriate herein to have included DR 6-101 (A) (2), which reads as follows: “A lawyer shall not: * * * (2) Handle a legal matter without preparation adequate in the circumstances.” It is more in line with respondent’s irresponsible conduct. Respondent clearly would have been in violation of this provision of the Code. He admits that he did not know the law. He knew the statute had been amended and made no attempt to ascertain its provisions. It is inexcusable for an attorney to attempt a legal procedure without en[739]*739deavoring to ascertain the law governing that procedure. DR 6-101 (A) (3) proscribes that type of conduct.
In fairness to respondent, we must observe that his predecessors in the county attorney’s office created his predicament at the time he took office. They ignored DR 6-101 (A) (3) which covers neglecting a legal matter entrusted to them. As a part of the duties of the office, delinquent taxes were to be foreclosed at the request of the county commissioners.
To respondent’s credit, we note that he conscientiously and promptly tried to rectify his mistake. Other than his conduct herein, he has been a sincere, honest, and aggressive public official. On the basis of respondent’s violation of DR 7-102(A) (5) he is subject to discipline. On the record before us, we determine that censure is an appropriate penalty. We feel what we have said herein is a sufficient censure, of respondent’s failure to fully live up to his responsibility as a lawyer. We, therefore censure respondent for his conduct, with the admonition that respondent thoroughly study the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Costs, including the fee of the referee, are taxed to the respondent.
Judgment of censure accordingly.