FINCH, Chief Justice.
This case, written on reassignment, is an original proceeding in prohibition. Rela-tors seek to prohibit respondent judge from enforcing his peremptory writ of mandamus wherein he ordered an at large election in a junior college district to elect two trustees, who, according to the writ of mandamus, were required to be residents of what we shall refer to as the rural component district. We must decide herein whether, in so doing, respondent exceeded his jurisdiction and authority, but we also must rule on the underlying question of whether that portion of the Junior College District Act (§§ 178.770-178.890, V.A. M.S.) held unconstitutional in Hadley v. Junior College District, 397 U.S. 50, 90 S.Ct. 791, 25 L.Ed.2d 45, is separable from the remainder of the Act so as to leave standing a complete and enforceable statute. We conclude that the portion of the statute held unconstitutional is separable and that respondent judge did exceed his jurisdiction and authority. Accordingly, our provisional rule in prohibition should be made absolute.
In 1961 the General Assembly enacted the Junior College District Act, referred to [79]*79above. It authorized the formation of junior college districts in Missouri, and in § 178.820 specified how and whence trustees were to be elected.1 As will be noted, this section commences with the provision that six trustees shall be elected at large. This direction is followed by provisos which state that if the junior college district contains a school district (or districts) wherein certain specified percentages of the total school enumeration are located, the trustees are to be elected from specified component districts rather than at large. The section also provides that “Candidates for the office of trustee shall be citizens of the United States, at least thirty years of age who have been resident taxpayers of the proposed district for at least one whole year preceding the election,” but then goes on to provide additionally that if trustees are to be elected other than at large, they must be resident taxpayers of the election district in which they are to run.2
In 1965 the Missouri Western Junior College District was formed. It included the St. Joseph School District plus certain additional outlying areas. The St. Joseph School District contained approximately eighty per cent of the total school enumeration in the proposed Junior College District, and consequently, pursuant to § 178.-820, four trustees were elected from the St. Joseph School District and the two remaining trustees were elected from the remainder of the district, which we refer to as the rural component district. It was determined by lot that the trustees elected from the St. Joseph School District should serve terms of two and four years, respectively, and that William W. Schneider and John W. Newhart, the trustees elected from the rural component district, should serve [80]*80six year terms. Thus, their terms ran from 1965 to 1971, at which time they filed declarations of intent to be candidates to succeed themselves as trustees from the rural component district.
Meanwhile, on February 24, 1970, in Hadley v. Junior College District, supra, the Supreme Court of the United States, in a case involving the election of trustees in a junior college district in the Kansas City area, considered whether the component district plan in the Missouri Junior College Act violated the so-called “one man, one vote” principal. In ruling upon that question, the Supreme Court said of § 178.820 as follows, 397 U.S. l. c. 56, 90 S.Ct. l. c. 795:
“Although the statutory scheme reflects to some extent a principle of equal voting power, it does so in a way that does not comport with constitutional requirements. This is so because the Act necessarily results in a systematic discrimination against voters in the more populous school districts. This discrimination occurs because whenever a large district’s percentage of the total enumeration falls within a certain percentage range it is always allocated the number of trustees corresponding to the bottom of that range. Unless a particular large district has exactly 331/$ %, 50% or 66⅜% of the total enumeration it will always have proportionally fewer trustees than the small districts. As has been pointed out, in the case of the Kansas City School District approximately 60% of the total enumeration entitles that district to only 50% of the trustees. Thus while voters in large school districts may frequently have less effective voting power than residents of small districts, they can never have more. Such built-in discrimination against voters in large districts cannot be sustained as a sufficient compliance with the constitutional mandate that each person’s vote count as much as another’s, as far as practicable. Consequently Missouri cannot allocate the junior college trustees according to the statutory formula employed in this case.”
On March 5, 1971, Schneider and New-hart filed their declarations as candidates to succeed themselves as trustees from the rural component district. A dispute- arose as to whether an election should be held in 1971 or 1972 3 and the board did not order such election. As a result, Schneider and Newhart on March 12, 1971, filed in the Circuit Court of Buchanan County a petition for writ of mandamus requesting that an election be ordered in the rural component district.
The Circuit Court issued its alternative writ of mandamus ordering an election in the rural component district and publication for such election was started. Thereafter, after a hearing, but without any amendment of the petition for writ of mandamus by Schneider and Newhart, the respondent judge issued his peremptory writ of mandamus ordering an at large election in the entire junior college district but directing that the two trustees to be elected must be residents of the rural component district. Respondent in his Findings and Conclusions recognized that under Hadley he could not order an election in the rural component district as he had sought to do in his alternative writ of mandamus. However, citing and relying on Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S. 112, 87 S.Ct. 1554, 18 L.Ed.2d 656, respondent directed that candidates in the election must be residents of the rural component district.
Relators thereupon filed their petition for writ of prohibition and on March 31, 1971, our provisional rule in prohibition was ordered to issue.
[81]*81The first question for determination is whether that part of the Act held unconstitutional in Hadley is severable from the rest of the Act, or whether the decision in Hadley necessarily means that the entire Act must fall.
The general rule applicable in Missouri was stated in State ex rel. Audrain County v. Hackmann, 275 Mo. 534, 205 S.W. 12, 14, as follows:
“The test of the right to uphold a law, some portions of which may be invalid, is whether or not in do doing, after separating that which is invalid, a law in all respects complete and susceptible of constitutional enforcement is left, which the Legislature would have enacted if it had known that the exscinded portions were invalid.”
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FINCH, Chief Justice.
This case, written on reassignment, is an original proceeding in prohibition. Rela-tors seek to prohibit respondent judge from enforcing his peremptory writ of mandamus wherein he ordered an at large election in a junior college district to elect two trustees, who, according to the writ of mandamus, were required to be residents of what we shall refer to as the rural component district. We must decide herein whether, in so doing, respondent exceeded his jurisdiction and authority, but we also must rule on the underlying question of whether that portion of the Junior College District Act (§§ 178.770-178.890, V.A. M.S.) held unconstitutional in Hadley v. Junior College District, 397 U.S. 50, 90 S.Ct. 791, 25 L.Ed.2d 45, is separable from the remainder of the Act so as to leave standing a complete and enforceable statute. We conclude that the portion of the statute held unconstitutional is separable and that respondent judge did exceed his jurisdiction and authority. Accordingly, our provisional rule in prohibition should be made absolute.
In 1961 the General Assembly enacted the Junior College District Act, referred to [79]*79above. It authorized the formation of junior college districts in Missouri, and in § 178.820 specified how and whence trustees were to be elected.1 As will be noted, this section commences with the provision that six trustees shall be elected at large. This direction is followed by provisos which state that if the junior college district contains a school district (or districts) wherein certain specified percentages of the total school enumeration are located, the trustees are to be elected from specified component districts rather than at large. The section also provides that “Candidates for the office of trustee shall be citizens of the United States, at least thirty years of age who have been resident taxpayers of the proposed district for at least one whole year preceding the election,” but then goes on to provide additionally that if trustees are to be elected other than at large, they must be resident taxpayers of the election district in which they are to run.2
In 1965 the Missouri Western Junior College District was formed. It included the St. Joseph School District plus certain additional outlying areas. The St. Joseph School District contained approximately eighty per cent of the total school enumeration in the proposed Junior College District, and consequently, pursuant to § 178.-820, four trustees were elected from the St. Joseph School District and the two remaining trustees were elected from the remainder of the district, which we refer to as the rural component district. It was determined by lot that the trustees elected from the St. Joseph School District should serve terms of two and four years, respectively, and that William W. Schneider and John W. Newhart, the trustees elected from the rural component district, should serve [80]*80six year terms. Thus, their terms ran from 1965 to 1971, at which time they filed declarations of intent to be candidates to succeed themselves as trustees from the rural component district.
Meanwhile, on February 24, 1970, in Hadley v. Junior College District, supra, the Supreme Court of the United States, in a case involving the election of trustees in a junior college district in the Kansas City area, considered whether the component district plan in the Missouri Junior College Act violated the so-called “one man, one vote” principal. In ruling upon that question, the Supreme Court said of § 178.820 as follows, 397 U.S. l. c. 56, 90 S.Ct. l. c. 795:
“Although the statutory scheme reflects to some extent a principle of equal voting power, it does so in a way that does not comport with constitutional requirements. This is so because the Act necessarily results in a systematic discrimination against voters in the more populous school districts. This discrimination occurs because whenever a large district’s percentage of the total enumeration falls within a certain percentage range it is always allocated the number of trustees corresponding to the bottom of that range. Unless a particular large district has exactly 331/$ %, 50% or 66⅜% of the total enumeration it will always have proportionally fewer trustees than the small districts. As has been pointed out, in the case of the Kansas City School District approximately 60% of the total enumeration entitles that district to only 50% of the trustees. Thus while voters in large school districts may frequently have less effective voting power than residents of small districts, they can never have more. Such built-in discrimination against voters in large districts cannot be sustained as a sufficient compliance with the constitutional mandate that each person’s vote count as much as another’s, as far as practicable. Consequently Missouri cannot allocate the junior college trustees according to the statutory formula employed in this case.”
On March 5, 1971, Schneider and New-hart filed their declarations as candidates to succeed themselves as trustees from the rural component district. A dispute- arose as to whether an election should be held in 1971 or 1972 3 and the board did not order such election. As a result, Schneider and Newhart on March 12, 1971, filed in the Circuit Court of Buchanan County a petition for writ of mandamus requesting that an election be ordered in the rural component district.
The Circuit Court issued its alternative writ of mandamus ordering an election in the rural component district and publication for such election was started. Thereafter, after a hearing, but without any amendment of the petition for writ of mandamus by Schneider and Newhart, the respondent judge issued his peremptory writ of mandamus ordering an at large election in the entire junior college district but directing that the two trustees to be elected must be residents of the rural component district. Respondent in his Findings and Conclusions recognized that under Hadley he could not order an election in the rural component district as he had sought to do in his alternative writ of mandamus. However, citing and relying on Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S. 112, 87 S.Ct. 1554, 18 L.Ed.2d 656, respondent directed that candidates in the election must be residents of the rural component district.
Relators thereupon filed their petition for writ of prohibition and on March 31, 1971, our provisional rule in prohibition was ordered to issue.
[81]*81The first question for determination is whether that part of the Act held unconstitutional in Hadley is severable from the rest of the Act, or whether the decision in Hadley necessarily means that the entire Act must fall.
The general rule applicable in Missouri was stated in State ex rel. Audrain County v. Hackmann, 275 Mo. 534, 205 S.W. 12, 14, as follows:
“The test of the right to uphold a law, some portions of which may be invalid, is whether or not in do doing, after separating that which is invalid, a law in all respects complete and susceptible of constitutional enforcement is left, which the Legislature would have enacted if it had known that the exscinded portions were invalid.”
The Hackmann case involved a question of whether an act to enable counties to establish and maintain public hospitals, levy a tax and issue bonds therefor violated Art. 10, § 12 of the Constitution of 1875. The constitutional provision authorized an increase of the rate of taxation for the purpose of erecting public buildings in counties, but made it mandatory to provide for the collection of a tax sufficient to pay interest and provide a sinking fund for the' retirement of principal within twenty years. The Hospital Act contained a provision limiting the rate of taxation to retire indebtedness at an amount not to exceed two mills on the dollar of property valuation in the county. This court held that insofar as the act purported to limit the maximum rate of taxation, it was inoperative to the extent that a county had to assess a higher rate to extinguish indebtedness within constitutional time limits. It concluded, however, that the mill limitation provision “ * * * was not an interdependent portion of the entire act providing for the establishment of a public hospital and the incurring of an indebtedness to that end * * *” (205 S.W. l. c. 13), relying upon the constructional rule above stated.
Another case involving application of this principle was State ex rel. Harvey v. Wright, 251 Mo. 325, 158 S.W. 823. There, the circuit attorney of the City of St. Louis brought a quo warranto action against Wright to try the title by which the latter held office as a member of the board of election commissioners of the city. Wright was a member of the Progressive Party. The statute which conferred authority upon the Governor to appoint such commissioners provided in part: “Two of said election commissioners * * * shall be members of the leading party politically opposed to that to which the Governor belongs, and shall be chosen from six eligible citizens named by the state committee of the said leading party politically opposed to that to which the Governor belongs and the other two members of said board shall be selected from six eligible citizens named by the state committee of the political party to which the Governor belongs.” Plaintiff contended that since the Progressive Party was not “the leading party politically opposed” to that of the Governor, Wright held office in violation of the statute. An earlier decision had held unconstitutional that part of a predecessor statute which conferred upon the committee of a political party the privilege of suggesting eligible persons for appointment. Wright, inter alia, contended that the admitted invalidity of that clause invalidated the entire act. In rejecting that contention and holding the statute severable, the court said in part (158 S.W. l. c. 826):
“We need not cite numerous cases from other jurisdictions or load down this opinion from text-book excerpts in order to prove that part, a section, a sentence, or a clause of a statute may be constitutionally invalid and the remainder good. We may merely say that this is a rule wholly or well-nigh universal in all common-law jurisdictions, and one to which this court has lent its concurrence. Valliant, J., in the case of State [ex inf. Hadley] v. Washburn, 167 Mo. 680, loc. cit. 697, 67 S.W. 592, 596, 90 Am.St.Rep. 430, said: ‘The point is advanced that if the act of 1899 [82]*82is unconstitutional in the particular named, the whole act is void, and the incumbent has no title to the office. The power attempted to be conferred on the partisan committee is not an essential element in the whole act. Where the part of an act that is unconstitutional does not enter into the life of the act itself, and is not essential to its being, it may be disregarded, and the rest remain in force; that is this case.’
* * * * * *
“We cannot state the rule better or more briefly. We might state it in different language by saying that if, after cutting out and throwing away the bad parts of a statute, enough remains which is good to clearly show the legislative intent, and to furnish sufficient details of a working plan by which that intention may be made effectual, then we ought not, as a matter of law, to declare the whole statute bad. Cooley on Con.Lim. (7th Ed.) 247; State ex rel. [Tolerton] v. Gordon, 236 Mo. [142], loc. cit. 171, 139 S.W. 403; State ex rel. [Applegate] v. Taylor, 224 Mo. [393] loc.cit. 474, 123 S.W. 892; State v. Bockstruck, 136 Mo. 335, 38 S.W. 317.”
The trial court found that the remainder of the Act after excising that part invalidated in Hadley was severable and valid. We agree. Applying the principles enunciated in the Hackmann and Wright cases, we hold that after eliminating the alternate system for electing trustees from component districts under certain circumstances, “enough remains which is good to clearly show the legislative intent, and to furnish sufficient details of a working plan by which that intention may be made effectual * * State ex rel. Harvey v. Wright, supra 158 S.W. l.c. 826. The basic plan provided in the Junior College District Act is for at large election of trustees among persons residing anywhere in the district. That remains after deleting the alternative provisions which the General Assembly inserted to apply under certain specified circumstances. If we delete the part of the Act invalidated by Hadley, we still have an Act authorizing the creation of junior college districts with trustees to be elected at large among candidates residing anywhere in the district. They have exactly the same powers and authority to operate the district which trustees would have had if Hadley had not invalidated the component district provisions. The only change from the plan as enacted is that the alternative component district plan for electing trustees from within the borders of those districts is eliminated. We conclude that this is a complete, enforceable Act which the General Assembly would have enacted even if it had known that the alternative component plan would be invalidated in Hadley.4 Under the Act as it now stands, at large elections among candidates residing anywhere in the district should be held.
Respondent’s order directed an at large election among candidates who were required to live in the rural component district. There is no statutory authorization for such an election. The statute created two types of election. First, it provided for an at large election among candidates residing anywhere in the district. The alternative provision was for elections by component districts among residents of such districts. The latter has been invali[83]*83dated, but the former still stands. Respondent had no authority to take part of one and part of the other and direct an election which the General Assembly had not established. Hence, respondent exceeded his authority and jurisdiction in ordering the election which he did mandate. The case of Dusch v. Davis, supra, relied on by respondent, merely stands for the proposition that the Supreme Court of the United States held therein that such a plan would not violate the “one man, one vote” principle. It is not authority for directing such an election in this case in lieu of the type of election established by the General Assembly.
Accordingly, we make our provisional rule in prohibition absolute.
SEILER, HOLMAN and HENLEY, JJ, concur.
DONNELLY, J, dissents in separate dissenting opinion filed.
MORGAN and BARDGETT, JJ, dissent and concur in separate dissenting opinion of DONNELLY, J.