Dusch v. Davis

387 U.S. 112, 87 S. Ct. 1554, 18 L. Ed. 2d 656, 1967 U.S. LEXIS 1399
Supreme Court of the United States·Decided May 22, 1967·No. 724·Published·Cited by 207 cases

Opinion

Mr. Justice Douglas

delivered the opinion of the Court.

In 1963 the City of Virginia Beach, Virginia, consolidated with adjoining Princess Anne County, which was both rural and urban; and a borough form of government was adopted. There are seven boroughs, one corresponding to the boundaries of the former city and six corresponding to the boundaries of the six magisterial districts. The consolidation plan was effected pursuant to Virginia law 1 and the charter embodied in the plan was approved by the legislature. 2

Three boroughs — Bayside, Kempsville, and Lynn-haven — are primarily urban. Three — Blackwater, Princess Anne, and Pungo — are primarily rural. The borough of Virginia Beach, centering around its famous ocean beach and bay, is primarily tourist.

Electors of five boroughs, having exhausted attempts to obtain relief in the state courts, 3 instituted this suit against local and state officials claiming that the consolidation plan in its distribution of voting rights violated the principle of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, and *114 asking for the convening of a three-judge court. The three-judge court held that its jurisdiction had not been established because the issue was local in character and transferred the cause to the District Court.

The District Court held the original allocation invalid as denying voter equality and stayed further proceedings to allow the city an opportunity to seek a charter amendment at the 1966 session of the State Legislature. The charter was amended to provide for the Seven-Four Plan now being challenged. 4 Under the amended charter, the council is composed of 11 members. Four members are elected at large without regard to residence. Seven are elected by the voters of the entire city, one being required to reside in each of the seven boroughs. Pursuant to leave of the District Court, appellees filed an amended complaint challenging the validity of the Seven-Four Plan. The District Court approved this plan. The Court of Appeals reversed, 361 F. 2d 495. The case is here on appeal (28 U. S. C. § 1254 (2)) and we postponed the question of jurisdiction to the merits. 385 U. S. 999.

For the reasons stated in Moody v. Flowers, ante, p. 97, the case is not one for a three-judge court, the charter being local only and not of statewide application.

In Sailors v. Board of Education, ante, p. 105, we reserved the question whether the apportionment of municipal or county legislative agencies is governed by Reynolds v. Sims. But though we assume arguendo that it is, we reverse the Court of Appeals. It felt that Reynolds v. Sims required “that each legislator, State or municipal, represent a reasonably like number in population,” 361 F. 2d, at 497, pointing out that Blackwater, where 733 people live, will have the same representation as Lynnhaven with 23,731 and Bayside with 29,048 and Kempsville with 13,900. The Court of Appeals reaffirmed *115 what it had decided in Ellis v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 352 F. 2d 123, 128, that “the fundamental principle of representative government in this country is one of equal representation for equal numbers of people, without regard to race, sex, economic status, or place of residence within a State.” And the court held that the provision for four city-wide members “does not remedy or in any way affect the disproportion of representation of the 7 borough members.” 361 F. 2d, at 497.

The Seven-Four Plan makes no distinction on the basis of race, creed, or economic status or location. Each of the 11 councilmen is elected by a vote of all the electors in the city. The fact that each of the seven councilmen must be a resident of the borough from which he is elected, is not fatal. In upholding a residence requirement for the election of state senators from a multi-district county we said in Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433, 438:

“It is not accurate to treat a senator from a multi-district county as the representative of only that district within the county wherein he resides. The statute uses districts in multi-district counties merely as the basis of residence for candidates, not for voting or representation. Each district’s senator must be a resident of that district, but since his tenure depends upon the county-wide electorate he must be vigilant to serve the interests of all the people in the county, and not merely those of people in his home district; thus in fact he is the county’s and not merely the district’s senator.”

By analogy the present consolidation plan uses boroughs in the city “merely as the basis of residence for candidates, not for voting or representation.” He is nonetheless the city’s, not the borough’s, councilman. In Fortson there was substantial equality of population in *116 the senatorial districts, while here the population of the boroughs varies widely. If a borough’s resident on the council represented in fact only the borough, residence being only a front, different conclusions might follow. But on the assumption that Reynolds v. Sims controls, the constitutional test under the Equal Protection Clause is whether there is an “invidious” discrimination. 377 U. S., at 561. As stated by the District Court:

“The principal and adequate reason for providing for the election of one councilman from each borough is to assure that there will be members of the City Council with some general knowledge of rural problems to the end that this heterogeneous city will be able to give due consideration to questions presented throughout the entire area.

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Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S. 112, 87 S. Ct. 1554, 18 L. Ed. 2d 656, 1967 U.S. LEXIS 1399 (1967).

387 U.S. 112 (Dusch v. Davis) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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