State ex rel. Eldridge v. Kilbane

2025 Ohio 5053

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: October 31, 2025
• Docket: 115338
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State ex rel. Eldridge v. Kilbane, 2025-Ohio-5053.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE EX REL., : SORETHA MARIE ELDRIDGE, : Relator, : No. 115338 v. : JUDGE ASHLEY KILBANE, : Respondent.

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: WRITS DISMISSED DATED: October 31, 2025

Writs of Mandamus and Prohibition Motion No. 587190 Order No. 589033

Appearances:

Soretha Eldridge, pro se.

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Nora E. Poore, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondent.

MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J.:

On July 17, 2025, the relator Soretha Eldridge commenced this

mandamus and prohibition action against the respondent, Judge Ashley Kilbane, to dismiss the underlying action, William Eldridge, Jr. v. Soretha Eldridge, Cuyahoga

C.P. No. CV-23-980910, on the priority of jurisdiction principle and disqualification

of the judge for judicial bias. The relator also sought a stay of the July 8, 2025

hearing and relief from appearing before Judge Kilbane. On August 19, 2025, the

respondent judge moved to dismiss. On September 8, 2025, Eldridge filed her brief

in opposition but did not address the judge’s arguments. Rather, she stated that she

wanted findings of fact and conclusions of law for a preliminary injunction and to

vacate the preliminary injunction because the judge did not accept proper

documentary evidence and did not resolve contradictory evidence. Eldridge also

claimed that her attorney did not receive proper notice and that she was prohibited

from presenting evidence. In this brief in opposition, Eldridge acknowledged that

her writ petition contained citation errors and hallucinated cases because she “relied

on assistance that proved inadequate” and requested leave to amend her petition

with correct legal authority.1 The judge filed a reply brief on September 15, 2025.

For the following reasons, this court grants the respondent’s motion to dismiss.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

As gleaned from the docket and filings of the underlying cases,

William Eldridge is the father of relator Soretha Eldridge, and this dispute concerns

the home on Mannering Rd. in Cleveland. On April 10, 2023, Soretha commenced

a forcible entry and detainer action against her father, Eldridge v. Eldridge,

1 A “hallucinated case” is a made-up, fictitious case generated by “artificial intelligence, AI.” Cleveland M.C. No. 2023-CVG003855. She averred that she owns the property

pursuant to deeds executed in 2018 and 2019, and that she had terminated the

month-to-month lease. By June 2, 2023, she had obtained an eviction order.

In response, on June 13, 2023, William commenced the underlying

action against Soretha. He averred that a 2018 quitclaim deed that purported to

transfer the Mannering property from himself to Soretha was a forged and

fraudulent deed. His complaint included claims for negligence, unjust enrichment,

fraud, misrepresentation, conversion, constructive trust, slander of title, declaratory

judgment to declare the quitclaim deed void, quiet title, and injunctive relief.

On June 15, Soretha and her father entered into an agreed judgment

entry in which the scheduled eviction in the Cleveland Municipal Court would be

stayed until further order of the common pleas court and a preliminary injunction

hearing was scheduled for June 29, 2023. On June 30 after the hearing, the

respondent judge granted the father’s motion for preliminary injunction staying the

eviction until further order or final judgment in this matter.

In early May 2024, in the Cleveland Municipal Court, Soretha moved

to evict her father, who filed a motion to show cause in the common pleas court case

why Soretha should not be held in contempt for violating the preliminary injunction.

After an emergency hearing on the motion on May 20, 2024, the respondent judge

in a May 22, 2024 journal entry noted that the preliminary injunction was pursuant

to an agreement between the parties to stay the eviction and submit to the

jurisdiction of the common pleas court. The judge further noted that she had granted Soretha multiple continuances because the parties had agreed to stay the

eviction.

In early January 2025, William and Soretha reached a settlement: the

2018 and 2019 deeds would be void and title to the property would vest solely in

William, who would not encumber the property during his life and then pass it onto

his grandchildren upon his death. As part the settlement Soretha asserted that she

had not encumbered the property; the parties would conduct a title search prior to

the final judgment.

However, by July 2025, the title search found liens that ran afoul of

the January 2025 settlement order. The respondent judge ordered the parties to

produce documents evidencing the liens and when they were incurred. Soretha then

commenced this writ action.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

The requisites for mandamus are well established: (1) the relator

must have a clear legal right to the requested relief, (2) the respondent must have a

clear legal duty to perform the requested relief, and (3) there must be no adequate

remedy at law. Additionally, although mandamus may be used to compel a court to

exercise judgment or to discharge a function, it may not control judicial discretion,

even if that discretion is grossly abused. State ex rel. Ney v. Niehaus, 33 Ohio St.3d

118 (1987). Furthermore, mandamus is not a substitute for appeal. State ex rel.

Pressley v. Indus. Comm. of Ohio, 11 Ohio St.2d 141 (1967), paragraph three of the

syllabus. Thus, mandamus does not lie to correct errors and procedural irregularities in the course of a case. State ex rel. Wilmore v. Hayes, 2013-Ohio-

4716, ¶ 6 (8th Dist.). Furthermore, if the relator had an adequate remedy, regardless

of whether it was used, relief in mandamus is precluded. State ex rel. Tran v.

McGrath, 1997-Ohio-245. Moreover, mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that is

to be exercised with caution and only when the right is clear. It should not issue in

doubtful cases. State ex rel. Taylor v. Glasser, 50 Ohio St.2d 165 (1977); State ex

rel. Connole v. Cleveland Bd. of Edn., 87 Ohio App.3d 43 (8th Dist. 1993).

Although mandamus should be used with caution, the court has

discretion in issuing it. In State ex rel. Pressley v. Indus. Comm. of Ohio, 11 Ohio

St.2d 141 (1967), paragraph seven of the syllabus, the Supreme Court of Ohio ruled

that “in considering the allowance or denial of the writ of mandamus on the merits,

[the court] will exercise sound, legal and judicial discretion based upon all the facts

and circumstances in the individual case and the justice to be done.” The Court

elaborated that in exercising that discretion the court should consider

the exigency which calls for the exercise of such discretion, the nature and extent of the wrong or injury which would follow a refusal of the writ, and other facts which have a bearing on the particular case.

...

Among the facts and circumstances which the court will consider are the applicant’s rights, the interests of third persons, the importance or unimportance of the case, the applicant’s conduct, the equity and justice of the relator’s case, public policy and the public’s interest, whether the performance of the act by the respondent would give the relator any effective relief, and whether such act would be impossible, illegal, or useless.

Id. at 161-162. State ex rel. Bennett v. Lime, 55 Ohio St.2d 62 (1978). Similarly, the principles governing prohibition are well established.

Its requisites are (1) the respondent against whom it is sought is about to exercise

judicial power, (2) the exercise of such power is unauthorized by law, and (3) there

is no adequate remedy at law. State ex rel. Largent v. Fisher, 43 Ohio St.3d 160

(1989). Furthermore, if a petitioner had an adequate remedy, relief in prohibition

is precluded, even if the remedy was not used. State ex rel. Lesher v. Kainrad, 65

Ohio St.2d 68 (1981). Prohibition will not lie unless it clearly appears that the court

has no jurisdiction of the cause that it is attempting to adjudicate or the court is

about to exceed its jurisdiction. State ex rel. Ellis v. McCabe, 138 Ohio St. 417 (1941),

paragraph three of the syllabus. “The writ will not issue to prevent an erroneous

judgment, or to serve the purpose of appeal, or to correct mistakes of the lower court

in deciding questions within its jurisdiction.” State ex rel. Sparto v. Juvenile Court

of Darke Cty., 153 Ohio St. 64, 65 (1950). Furthermore, it should be used with great

caution and not issue in a doubtful case. State ex rel. Merion v. Tuscarawas Cty.

Court of Common Pleas, 137 Ohio St. 273 (1940). Nevertheless, when a court is

patently and unambiguously without jurisdiction to act whatsoever, the availability

or adequacy of a remedy is immaterial to the issuance of a writ of prohibition. State

ex rel. Tilford v. Crush, 39 Ohio St.3d 174 (1988); and State ex rel. Csank v. Jaffe,

107 Ohio App.3d 387 (8th Dist. 1995). However, absent such a patent and

unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a court having general jurisdiction of the subject

matter of an action has authority to determine its own jurisdiction. A party

challenging the court’s jurisdiction has an adequate remedy at law via an appeal from the court’s holding that it has jurisdiction. State ex rel. Rootstown Local

School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Portage Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 78 Ohio St.3d 489

(1997). Moreover, this court has discretion in issuing the writ of prohibition. State

ex rel. Gilligan v. Hoddinott, 36 Ohio St.2d 127 (1973).

Soretha’s first argument is that pursuant to priority of jurisdiction

principles, Cleveland Municipal Court has jurisdiction over the matter, rather than

the common pleas court, and the underlying case should be dismissed for lack of

jurisdiction.

The principles of the jurisdictional priority rule are well established.

This rule provides that “[a]s between [state] courts of concurrent jurisdiction, the

tribunal whose power is firsts invoked by the institution of proper proceedings

acquires jurisdiction, to the exclusion of all tribunals, to adjudicate upon the whole

issue and to settle the rights of the parties.” State ex rel. Dannaher v. Crawford, 78

Ohio St.3d 391, 393 (1997); quoting State ex rel. Racing Guild of Ohio v. Morgan,

17 Ohio St.3d 54, 56 (1985); and State ex rel. Phillips v. Polcar, 50 Ohio St.2d 279

(1977), syllabus. Furthermore, “it is a condition of the operation of the state

jurisdictional priority rule that the claims or cases of action be the same in both

cases, and ‘[i]f the second case is not for the same cause of action, nor between the

same parties, the former suit will not prevent the latter.’” Crawford at 393, quoting

State ex rel. Sellers v. Gerken, 1995-Ohio-247, and State ex rel. Judson v. Spahr, 33

Ohio St.3d 111, 113 (1987). Nonetheless, the rule may apply even if the causes of

action and requested relief are not identical. Sellers and State ex rel. Otten v. Henderson, 2011-Ohio-4082. That is, if the claims in both cases are such that each

of the actions comprise part of the “whole issue” that is within the exclusive

jurisdiction of the court whose power is legally first invoked, the priority of

jurisdiction principles may be applicable.

However, in the present matter, the causes of action are different, and

priority of jurisdiction rule does not apply. Although municipal courts have

jurisdiction to adjudicate forcible entry and detainer actions, they cannot hear quiet

title matters. Disher v. Bannick, 2021-Ohio-1331 (2d Dist.); and Brown v. Arnolt,

2016-Ohio-5741 (5th Dist.). Ohio courts have repeatedly declined to apply the rule

when one case is a forcible entry and detainer case and the other case involves such

claims as breach of contract, promissory estoppel, tortious interference with

business relations, declaratory judgment, quiet title, ejectment, and fraud. State ex

rel. Tri Eagle Fuels, L.L.C. v. Dawson, 2019-Ohio-2011; State ex rel. Brady v.

Pianka, 2005-Ohio-4105; State ex rel. Weiss v. Hoover, 84 Ohio St.3d 530 (1999);

Haas v. Gerski, 175 Ohio St. 327 (1963); CS/RW Westlake Indoor Storage, L.L.C. v.

Russo, 2016-Ohio-2845 (8th Dist.); and State ex rel. The Portaro Group, Inc. v.

Parma Mun. Court, 2023-Ohio-937 (8th Dist.).

Eldridge’s next argument is that the respondent judge engaged in

unprofessional behavior, such as screaming at Eldridge, which deprives her of

jurisdiction and should absolve Eldridge from appearing in court. However,

“improper, biased, prejudiced, discourteous, undignified, impatient, and belligerent

conduct does not relate to a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction warranting a writ of prohibition.” Woodard v. Colaluca, 2014-Ohio-3824, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.); and

Jacobs v. Cuyahoga Cty. Ct. of Common Pleas, 2025-Ohio-2076 (8th Dist.).

Furthermore, Eldridge provided no authority for the proposition that such behavior

establishes a clear legal right to not appear before a court. Thus, she has not carried

her burden for this court to issue a writ of mandamus.

To the extent that she seeks a stay of the July 8, 2o25 hearing, that

issue became moot before she filed this writ action on July 17, 2025.

The court declines Eldridge’s suggestion that this court allow her to

amend her petition with correct legal authority. She did not proffer a proper motion

to amend, and the court doubts the efficacy of such efforts. State ex rel. Tri Eagle

Fuels, L.L.C. v. Dawson, 2018-Ohio-3054 (8th Dist.). Similarly, the court declines

to address the new claims she argues in her brief in opposition, such as that the

preliminary injunction is void because the judge did not issue findings of fact and

conclusions of law pursuant to Civ.R. 65, that mandamus should issue for proper

notice because she claims her attorney did not get notice of the hearing two years

ago, and that the trial judge made multiple evidentiary errors. These were not

proffered in a motion to amend but in a brief in opposition.

Accordingly, this court grants the respondent’s motion to dismiss this

writ action. Relator to pay costs. This court directs the clerk of courts to serve all

parties notice of the judgment and its date of entry upon the journal as required by

Civ.R. 58(B). Writs dismissed.

________________________ MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, JUDGE

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P.J., and DEENA R. CALABRESE, J., CONCUR