State Ex Rel. Department of Human Services v. A. C.

209 P.3d 328, 228 Or. App. 403, 2009 Ore. App. LEXIS 708
CourtCourt of Appeals of Oregon
DecidedMay 20, 2009
DocketJ060447 06135JTM, A139628
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 209 P.3d 328 (State Ex Rel. Department of Human Services v. A. C.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State Ex Rel. Department of Human Services v. A. C., 209 P.3d 328, 228 Or. App. 403, 2009 Ore. App. LEXIS 708 (Or. Ct. App. 2009).

Opinion

*405 EDMONDS, P. J.

The state appeals a judgment dismissing its petition to terminate mother’s parental rights to her two-year-old son, who has been in foster care since his birth, on the basis of unfitness under ORS 419B.504. On de novo review, we affirm.

The outcome of this case turns on whether the circumstances that the state relies on to prove the statutory elements of ORS 419B.504 as of the date of the hearing in this case (March 17-18, 2008, and May 7,2008) are established by clear and convincing evidence. ORS 419B.521(1). “Clear and convincing evidence” is evidence that makes a fact in issue “highly probable.” Riley Hill General Contractor, Inc. v. Tandy Corp., 303 Or 390, 402, 737 P2d 595 (1987). ORS 419B.504 provides, in part:

“The rights of the parent or parents may be terminated as provided in ORS 419B.500 if the court finds that the parent or parents are unfit by reason of conduct or condition seriously detrimental to the child or ward and integration of the child or ward into the home of the parent or parents is improbable within a reasonable time due to conduct or conditions not likely to change. In determining such conduct and conditions, the court shall consider but is not limited to the following:
“(5) Lack of effort of the parent to adjust the circumstances of the parent, conduct, or conditions to make it possible for the child or ward to safely return home within a reasonable time or failure of the parent to effect a lasting adjustment after reasonable efforts by available social agencies for such extended duration of time that it appears reasonable that no lasting adjustment can be effected.”

That statute sets out a two-step analysis for a court to apply in determining whether to terminate parental rights. First, a court must consider whether the parent has engaged in conduct or is characterized by a condition and whether the conduct or condition is seriously detrimental to the child. Second, if the parent is unfit, the court must determine whether the “integration of the child into the home of the parent or parents is improbable within a reasonable time due to *406 conduct or conditions not likely to change.” State ex rel Dept. of Human Services v. Smith, 338 Or 58, 80-81, 106 P3d 627 (2005); State ex rel SOSCF v. Stillman, 333 Or 135, 145-46, 36 P3d 490 (2001).

After hearing the evidence, the trial court concluded that

“[t]his mother is not perfect and still has progress to make before her child can be safely returned to her. However, she has made substantial progress in ameliorating the conditions that caused the previous termination [of her parental rights to another child]. To the extent that she has not yet fully ameliorated those conditions, they do not remain at such a level as to justify termination of parental rights.”

(Underlining in original.) The court explained:

“If the sole standard of proof in this case were what is in the best interests of the child, the decision would be clear—termination of parental rights and placement in a permanent adoptive home would be in the child’s best interests. However, that is not the standard. The state must prove that the parent is unfit and is not likely to remedy that unfit condition in a reasonable time as well as that adoption is in the child’s best interests. In this case, because mother has made substantial progress in the past year and continues to be committed to progress, the court cannot find that she remains unfit and is not capable of remedying her unfitness.”

On appeal, the state agrees that, although mother has not used methamphetamine since December 2006 and has made “some progress in dealing with her anger issues,” her failure to obtain her GED as required in order for her to graduate from drug court; her recent marriage to a person with an extensive criminal history, including sex offenses involving minors; her failure to participate in an anger management class; and her role in an angry dispute with her husband at the courthouse are all indicators of why there is clear and convincing evidence that she continues to be an unfit parent. There is evidence in the record to support the state’s argument as well as countervailing evidence. In what follows, we discuss some of the evidence that we find most probative regarding the issues before us. Essentially, those *407 issues focus on mother’s history of drug addiction and her marriage to her current husband.

When asked if mother currently has the parenting skills “to safely parent [her child],” mother’s caseworker testified, “You know, I think she does at times fairly well for her visitation, but when I think about 24/7 for this little guy, I am very concerned about that.” When asked about the basis of her concern, the witness replied, “The anger that I still see, the lack of control as far as impulses.” But later in her testimony, the caseworker agreed that “up until [mother’s new husband] came into the picture,” she was “relatively satisfied with [mother’s] progress to the point that [she] supported the termination case being continued for a few months.”

Mother offered evidence at the hearing of her progress since completing a residential treatment program for drug addiction in February 2007. Included among the witnesses who testified on her behalf was the circuit court judge who had supervised mother’s participation in his drug court program since June 2006. The judge testified:

“[Mother is] like a blossoming flower, I mean she really is. Her attitude changed and she looked at things differently. And as I say, she’s been clean now for 491 days, and you know, she’s well on her way. She’s really made a significant and miraculous change.”

In the same vein, mother’s drug and alcohol counselor testified that

“[Mother has] shown significant improvement. When she first started the program, she had a lot of criminal thinking, difficulty accurately reporting regarding her drug use. Initially, had several positive UA’s for amphetamine and methamphetamine, difficulty reporting her use, not working to create a clean and sober social network for herself that would support her efforts, not practicing good, pro-social skills in treatment. So she had a bumpy road early on in treatment.
“She was agreeable to residential [treatment] when we recommended that and she entered the ARC program and successfully completed that. And when she returned to the program following her completion in spring of last year, she demonstrated kind of a higher skill level about her recovery *408

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
209 P.3d 328, 228 Or. App. 403, 2009 Ore. App. LEXIS 708, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-department-of-human-services-v-a-c-orctapp-2009.