State ex rel. Department of Highways v. Gifford-Hill & Co.

158 So. 2d 448, 1963 La. App. LEXIS 2120
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedNovember 1, 1963
DocketNo. 9998
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 158 So. 2d 448 (State ex rel. Department of Highways v. Gifford-Hill & Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State ex rel. Department of Highways v. Gifford-Hill & Co., 158 So. 2d 448, 1963 La. App. LEXIS 2120 (La. Ct. App. 1963).

Opinion

BOLIN, Judge.

in the construction of a multiple-lane highway across North Louisiana, it was necessary for plaintiff to expropriate 36.-735 acres of land owned by defendant in Webster Parish. Being unable to purchase the property, plaintiff deposited the sum of $183,000 in the registry of the court and title to the land was transferred to plaintiff by an order of the court pursuant to LSA-R.S. 48:441 et seq. In due time the case was tried in the district court resulting in a judgment fixing the total valuation of the property taken and severance damages at $347,349.99. From such judgment defendant appeals, praying for an increase in the total award to $1,060,-000, and plaintiff has answered the appeal, asking that the award be reduced to $183,000.

The only question before the court is the compensation due defendant. The Constitutions of the United States and of Louisiana permit the taking of private property for public purposes only after payment of just and adequate compensation. The basis for an adequate award “shall be the value which the property possessed before the contemplated improvement was proposed.” (LSA-R.S. 19:9.) The value of property expropriated must be determined as of the time the estimated compensation was deposited in the court, but where the landowner has other property damaged by the taking he is entitled to be recompensed for such damages to be determined as of the date of trial. (LSA-R.S. 48:453.)

The landowner should be paid the true value, which is generally the market value of the property expropriated, as well as damages resulting to the remainder. Market value has been defined as the price that would be agreed upon at a sale between a willing seller and a willing purchaser. State Through Department of Highways v. Ragusa, 234 La. 51, 99 So.2d 20 (1958) and cases cited therein.

Where there have been no sales of comparable property the true value must be determined from other sources. In such cases the intrinsic value, or its worth to its owner, may be taken into consideration in arriving at a value. In other words, any evidence which throws light upon the true value of the property should be considered in order that the owner receive just and adequate compensation for his private property. See State Through Department of Highways v. Crockett (La.App. 2 Cir. 1963) 151 So.2d 496 (cert. denied 244 La. 397, 152 So.2d 63) and cases therein cited.

The record of this case reflects that prior to this litigation defendant owned several hundred acres of land upon which were located certain improvements consisting of an office building, repair shops, warehouse, a gravel and sand processing plant, a pipe plant, storage building, garage, railway spur tracks, access roads and various other improvements and machinery necessary for the operation of a sand and gravel plant and concrete manufacturing plant. For the convenience of writing this opinion, we have divided and classified the land owned by defendant as follows:

[450]*450Tract No. 1 — 412 acres owned in fee, from which defendant had previously removed and processed all of the sand and gravel. On this tract was located most of defendant’s buildings and manufacturing plants.

Tract No. 2 — 255 acres owned in fee and located about a mile and one-half north of the manufacturing plants. This property was being used primarily by defendant for the extraction of sand and gravel after which it was transported over defendant’s access roads to its processing plants.

Tract No. 3 — 400 acres near Tract No. 2 which defendant did not own in fee, but which it had under lease for the removal of sand and’gravel. Defendant had several more years remaining under the lease for the removal of the sand and gravel at the time of the expropriation.

In order to construct the highway, plaintiff expropriated a strip of land 300 feet wide across Tract No. 1. The highway known as 1-20 had limited, controlled access roads and the right-of-way was otherwise completely enclosed by a fence. It is conceded the effect of such a highway through defendant’s property completely isolated a portion of the property upon which is located its manufacturing plants from the source of raw materials on the remainder of the property. Such property being bounded on two sides by swampy land and on the third by a United States Government Ordnance Plant was rendered inaccessible by the construction of the fences along the right-of-way.

Since the only matter in controversy is the amount due defendant as just compensation for the land expropriated for the right-of-way and the severance damages to the remainder of its property, we shall break down such claims and discuss them separately.

The lower court fixed a value of $50 per acre for the 36.735 acres of unimproved land taken. As this award is reasonable and based on competent evidence, we see no reason to change it. Within the right-of-way were also located certain improvements in the form of spur tracks, warehouse, etc., but it is impossible to give these improvements a separate valuation from the manufacturing plant as a whole.

The lower court fixed a value of $320,-493.24 on all the improvements located on defendant’s property which went to make up the various manufacturing and processing plants previously mentioned herein. Most such improvements were not located on the land actually expropriated. Any award based on the valuation of property outside the right-of-way would properly be classified severance damages, while the improvements located within the right-of-way should be paid for on the basis of property expropriated. However, inasmuch as it is conceded the construction of the highway across defendant’s property would render worthless its manufacturing plants, we, as did the lower court, shall treat the buildings and improvements in one category regardless of location.

There were a number of experts who testified as to the value of the improvements. The two main witnesses for the plaintiff were expert appraisers who had appraised much of the property for plaintiff for the construction of 1-20 throughout the area. However, they both admitted they had never appraised any property similar to that in dispute. Defendant, on the other hand, tendered several experts in the field of sand and gravel. Taking such evidence into consideration the lower court fixed a value of $320,493.24 on the improvements that were either taken by plaintiff or totally damaged by the expropriation. We deem it unnecessary to review all the testimony of witnesses who testified as to this valuation. We have studied the record and have concluded the trial judge’s award on this item is [451]*451fair and reasonable and based on legal evidence. There were no comparable sales and the true value necessarily had to be determined from other competent evidence.

We next consider the claim for damages to land in Tract No. 1, remaining after the expropriation of the 36.735 acres. The major portion of the manufacturing plant was located on this property. In view of the fact this 375.5 acres has been rendered practically worthless by the construction of the highway defendant is entitled to an award for such damages. As all the sand and gravel had been mined and removed from under this land, the lower court fixed the damages on the basis of the land having a value of $50 per acre before the taking and $10 per acre after the taking or having been damaged at the rate of $40 per acre.

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33 Fla. Supp. 2d 33 (Florida Circuit Courts, 1989)
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State ex rel. Department of Highways v. Gifford-Hill & Co.
160 So. 2d 224 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1964)

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Bluebook (online)
158 So. 2d 448, 1963 La. App. LEXIS 2120, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-department-of-highways-v-gifford-hill-co-lactapp-1963.