The opinion of the court was delivered by
Fatzer, J.:
This is an original proceeding in mandamus brought by the attorney general to determine the constitutionality of acts of the legislature establishing a state emergency fund, making appropriations thereto, and creating a state finance council. The prayer of the amended petition is that the state treasurer and the controller be commanded to transfer all moneys in the state emer[654]*654gency fund,' consisting of $948,748, to the general revenue fund in the state treasury and to malee appropriate record of such transfer.
The allegations of the amended petition and amended answer will not be summarized. Suffice it to say it is alleged in the ameñded petition and denied in the amended answer that the acts in question, G. S. 1955 Supp. 75-3708 to 75-3714, inclusive, hereafter referred to as the state finance council act, and §§22 and 34 of Ch. 2, and Ch. 34, Budget Session Laws 1956, hereafter referred to as the appropriation acts, violate the constitution of Kansas for reasons asserted, and are therefore unconstitutional and void.
Before considering the statutes alleged to be invalid, a brief history of preceding acts leading up to their enactment will be helpful. In 1943 the legislature established a state war emergency fund, created a state war emergency fund board (Ch. 207, Laws 1943), and transferred out of the retail sales tax fund the sum of $500,000 to such fund (Ch. 310, Laws 1943) for the use and purposes of such board as provided in Ch. 207, Laws 1943. Sec. 2 of the last mentioned act created the state war emergency fund board and provided that its six members consist of the governor, lieutenant governor, auditor of state, speaker of the house of representatives and chairman of the committee on ways and means of the senate and of the house of representatives. Sec. 3 set forth the powers and authorities of such board and provided that while the United States was engaged in hostilities with any foreign nation and no longer, such board, by unanimous vote of all its members, was authorized and empowered to make allocations to and authorize expenditures by various state agencies from the state war emergency fund for two purposes, i. e., (1) preservation of the public health and protection of persons and property from extraordinary conditions arising out of the war and which were not foreseen at the time appropriations were made by the regular session of 1943; (2) repair or temporarily replace buildings or equipment owned by the state and destroyed or damaged by sabotage, fire, wind, tornado or act of God if such building or equipment was absolutely necessary to the continued functions of the particular state agency using the same.
In 1945 the regular session of the legislature (Ch. 66, Laws 1945) appropriated all moneys credited to the state war emergency fund to the state war emergency fund board for the purposes specified in Ch. 207, Laws 1943, and directed that any unexpended balance [655]*655existing on April 2, 1947, be transferred to tihe retail sales tax fund. In addition it appropriated the sum of $79,732.20 from the general revenue fund of the state to the state war emergency fund board for the use and purposes provided in Ch. 207, Laws 1943. The pleadings admit that during the fiscal years 1943 to 1947, inclusive, the state war emergency fund board made allocations of the total sum of $381,751.12 out of the state war emergency fund and authorized the expenditure of such amount by various state agencies for the purposes specified.
The 1947 regular session of the legislature repealed all laws relating to the state war emergency fund and the state war emergency fund board, and created in lieu thereof a state emergency fund and a state emergency fund board (Ch. 402, Laws 1947) and directed that all unencumbered and unexpended balances in the state war emergency fund be transferred to the state emergency fund created by such act. In addition there was appropriated out of the general revenue fund of the state the sum of $294,018.92 to the state emergency fund for the use of the state emergency board (Ch. 403, Laws 1947). At the same regular session (Ch. 404, Laws 1947) there was created a state school emergency fund and the state emergency fund board was authorized to make allocations to and authorize expenditures by various state educational institutions for the purpose of paying increased costs of operating said institutions subsequent to the passage of the act. $1,200,000 was appropriated out of the general revenue fund of the state for this purpose.
In both the 1949 and 1951 regular sessions of the legislature all unencumbered and unexpended balances in the state emergency fund were appropriated and made available to the state emergency fund board for the use and purposes provided in Ch. 407, Laws 1947, and in addition, a total of $783,986.95 was appropriated from the general revenue fund of the state to the state emergency fund (Ch. 55, 56, Laws 1949; Ch. 33, 34, 35, Laws 1951).
At the regular 1953 session of the legislature all laws relating to the state emergency fund and the state emergency fund board were repealed and the state department of administration and the state department of post-audit were created (Ch. 375, Laws 1953, now G. S. 1955 Supp. 75-3701 to 75-3904). The act, insofar as it relates to the state department of administration, established a budget division, an accounts and reports division, a purchasing division, [656]*656a personnel division and the state finance council to insure a-uniform system'of budgeting, accounting, disbursing and auditing of state funds. The various sections of the 1953 act creating the state finance council now appear as G. S. 1955 Supp. 75-3708 to 75-3714, inclusive, and have not been amended except 75-3713 commented upon below. These statutes are quoted and summarized as follows: G. S. 1955 Supp. 75-3708 reads:
“Members of finance council; chairman; secretary. There is hereby created the state finance council consisting of six members. The members of the finance council shall be (1) the governor, (2) the lieutenant governor, (3) the president pro tern of the senate, (4) the speaker of the house of representatives, (5) the chairman of the senate committee on ways and means, and (6) the chairman of the house of representatives committee on ways and means. The governor shall be tire chairman and the executive director shall be the secretary of the council but shall not be a member of such council.”
G. S. 1955 Supp. 75-3709 relates to vacancies in the office of the members of the state finance council and provides for the filling of such vacancies under certain conditions.
G. S. 1955 Supp. 75-3710 relates to meetings of the finance council and provides that,
“. . . The legislative members of the council, and the lieutenant governor, shall be compensated for the time spent in attendance at meetings of the council at the rate of twenty dollars ($20) per day, and actual traveling and necessary expenses incurred while attending the meetings. . . .”
G. S. 1955 Supp. 75-3711 prescribes the powers and duties of the state finance council, which are quoted and summarized: (1) Advise in the preparation of state budgets and may appoint a member or members to be present during the preparation of such budgets and hearings thereon; (2) hear and determine appeals by any state agency from final acts of the executive director (director of the department of administration); (3) approve or disapprove rules and regulations submitted by the executive director; (4) “Make allocations to, and approve expenditures by a state agency, from any appropriations to the finance council for that purpose, of funds for unanticipated and unbudgeted needs, under conditions and limitations prescribed by the legislature”; (5) provide for independent investigations and make findings, recommendations and reports thereon as may be determined necessary and publish the same for consideration by the governor, the legislative council and the legislature; and (6) perform duties as required by G. S. 1955 Supp. 75-3747 and 75-3748 with respect to the Civil Service law and such other duties as required by law.
[657]*657G. S. 1955 Supp. 75-3712 reads:
“State emergency fund. The state emergency fund created by section 74-4105 of the General Statutes of 1949 is hereby continued in the office of the treasurer of state for the use of the state finance council created by section 8 [75-3708] of this act for the purposes and within the limitations prescribed by sections 13 [75-3713] and 14 [75-3714] of this act.”
G. S. 1955 Supp. 75-3713 reads:
“Same; authorization of expenditures; purposes. The state finance council, by unanimous vote of all its members, is hereby authorized and empowered to make allocations to, and authorize expenditures by, state agencies from the state emergency fund for the following purposes, subject to the limitations hereinafter prescribed: (1) Preservation of the public health and the protection of persons and property from extraordinary conditions arising after, or which were not foreseen at the time, appropriations were made by the preceding regular legislative session. (2) Repair or temporary replacement of any building or equipment owned by the state which has been destroyed or damaged by sabotage, fire, flood, wind, tornado, catastrophe or act of God if such building or equipment is absolutely necessary for carrying out the function of the state agency using such building or equipment. (3) Supplementation of a fund or account of any state agency for the remainder of the current fiscal year after the adjournment of a regular budget session of the legislature held in an even-numbered year: Provided, Such supplementation is specifically recommended in the governor’s budget report to such legislative session: Provided further, Such supplementation shall not have been provided for, in whole or in part, by the legislative budget session at which said supplementation is so recommended.”
The 1955 regular session of the legislature amended G. S. 1951 Supp.
75-3713 (Ch. 372, Laws 1955) by adding thereto subsection (3) quoted above as G. S. 1955 Supp. 75-3713.
G. S. 1955 Supp. 75-3714 provides that the secretary of the finance council shall keep minutes of its proceedings which shall be signed by each member of the council present, which shall be open to public inspection during regular office hours.
The record discloses that for the fiscal years 1947 to 1953 the state emergency fund board allocated to certain state agencies and authorized the expenditure of $863,578.66; that- for the fiscal years 1954 to 1956 the state finance council allocated to various state agencies and authorized the expenditure of $449,255.87, and that total sums allocated and expenditures authorized for the fiscal years 1947 to 1956, inclusive, was $1,312,834.53. Although the question is not before the court, we note in passing that some of the items of authorized expenditures from the emergency fund do not appear to be for purposes authorized by 1955 Supp. 75-3713.
As indicated previously, the emergency fund appropriation acts [658]*658here under attack are §§22 and 34 of Ch. 2, and Ch. 34, Budget Session Laws 1956. Ch. 2 is an act making appropriations for fiscal year 1957, and § 22 thereof reads:
“There is hereby appropriated out of the following special revenue funds . for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1957, all monies now on deposit with the state treasurer to the credit of, or as may hereafter be collected by, or for, to each of the following officers, departments, boards, commissions, institutions, agencies and other activities of the state as set forth in section 23 to section 53, both inclusive, of this act, as now provided by law or as may hereafter be provided by law, to the extent actually collected and available, to be used as provided by law, but not to exceed the amounts set forth in such sections.”
Sec. 34, insofar as it relates to the state emergency fund, reads:
“To the
DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION
“State emergency fund ......................................No limit
Ch. 34 authorized and directed the state treasurer to transfer the sum of $22,382 out of the general revenue fund of the state and credit the same to the state emergency fund. Sec. 2 thereof reads:
“That said sum of $22,382.00 so authorized to be transferred by section I of this act is hereby appropriated and made available to the state finance council for the use and purposes and with the limitations imposed and prescribed by section 75-3713 of the General Statutes Supplement of 1955.”
Upon publication, May 10, 1956, of the Budget Session Laws, there was a fund balance of $948,748 in the state emergency fund resulting from appropriations and reappropriations, including the amount appropriated by Ch. 34, subject to allocation by the state finance council for use and purposes provided in G. S. 1955 Supp. 75-3712 and 75-3713. This is the fund which plaintiff seeks the aid of this court to compel the defendants to transfer to the general revenue fund of the state.
The amended petition alleges that the finance council act and the emergency fund appropriation acts are unconstitutional and void for the reason that said acts violate the provisions of Art. 2, § 24 of the constitution of the state of Kansas, which reads:
“No money shall be drawn from the treasury, except in pursuance of a specific appropriation made by law, and no appropriation shall be for a longer term than two years.”
As preliminary to a consideration of the contentions of the plaintiff, we refer to long and well-established rules of this jurisdiction to the effect that the constitutionality of a statute is presumed and [659]*659that all doubts must be resolved in favor of its legality and before the statute may be stricken down it must clearly appear the statute violates the constitution (Carolene Products Co. v. Mohler, 152 Kan. 2, 102 P. 2d 1044; Board of County Comm'rs v. Robb, 166 Kan. 122, 199 P. 2d 530; State, ex rel., v. Board of Regents, 167 Kan. 587, 207 P. 2d 373); that it is the court’s duty to uphold the legislation rather than defeat it and if there is any reasonable way to construe the legislation as constitutionally valid, that should be done (Marks v. Frantz, 179 Kan. 638, 298 P. 2d 316); that, at the threshold of the inquiry of validity of a statute, courts start with the presumption the lawmakers intended to enact a valid law and to enact it for the accomplishment of a needful purpose (State, ex rel., v. Board of Education, 137 Kan. 451, 453, 21 P. 2d 295); that courts do- not strike down legislative enactments upon the mere ground they fail to conform with a strictly legalistic definition or technically correct interpretation of constitutional provisions; rather, the test is whether the legislation conforms with the common understanding, the true intention, of the people at the time they adopted the constitutional provision and the presumption is in favor of the natural and popular meaning in which the words are usually understood by the people who adopted them (Hunt v. Eddy, 150 Kan. 1, 90 P. 2d 747); and, that one of the established principles which has become cardinal and elementary in the field of constitutional law is that the propriety, wisdom, necessity and expedience of legislation are exclusively matters for legislative determination and courts will not invalidate laws, otherwise constitutional, because the members of the court do not consider the statute in the public interest of the state, since, necessarily, what the views of members of the court may be upon the subject is wholly immaterial and it is not the province nor the right of courts to determine the wisdom of legislation touching the public interest as that is a legislative function with which courts cannot interfere (State, ex rel., v. State Highway Comm., 163 Kan. 187, 182 P. 2d 127).
Although plaintiff states in its brief that it questions the advisability of the form of the appropriation of Ch. 2, § 34, Budget Session Laws 1956, it does not contend the appropriation, because of the “no limit” amount contained therein, violates Art. 2, § 24, nor that such provision is violated when unexpended fund balances of a state agency are reappropriated to it by the legislature for the ensuing fiscal year, in which the amount of such reappropriation is not specifically fixed. In conformity with the general rule of law, [660]*660this court will not consider or pass upon this question since questions of constitutionality of a statute not duly raised nor insisted upon and adequately argued are not properly before it (Missionary Baptist Convention v. Wimberly Chapel Baptist Church, 170 Kan. 684, 228 P. 2d 540; State, ex rel., v. Richardson, 174 Kan. 382, 256 P. 2d 135).
Plaintiff asserts that the emergency fund appropriation acts are not “specific appropriations made by law” as required by Art. 2, § 24 of the constitution when applied to the use and purposes provided in G. S. 1955 Supp. 75-3713, and are unconstitutional and void; the contention being that the term as used in Art. 2, § 24 means an appropriation must contain three basic elements, i: e., (1) that it be made by an act of the legislature; (2) that it be specific in amount; and (3) that such amount be set aside for a specific purpose, conceding, however, that an act appropriating money for one specific purpose without detailed itemization is constitutional; and,- it is argued that an appropriation of a lump sum for the multiple purposes prescribed in G. S. 1955 Supp. 75-3713 is not specific since it does not specifically fix the amount for each of the three purposes set forth, and, therefore, is not specific in amount or specific in purpose within the purview of Art. 2, § 24.
In view of the contention made our first inquiry is to ascertain what is meant by the term “specific appropriation made by law” as contained in Art. 2, § 24 of our constitution. In 96 years of statehood this court has not previously been called upon to answer this specific question, nor do the Proceedings and Debates of the Wyandotte Constitutional Convention of 1859 throw light upon the meaning of this term except to indicate that this section was modeled after Art. 2, § 22 of the Ohio state constitution of 1851 and was, word for word, with that Ohio section. (Proceedings and Debates, Wyandotte Constitution Convention, 1859, pp. 666-683.)
Counsel for both the plaintiff and the defendant cite many cases from other jurisdictions construing the term “specific appropriation made by law.” We do not deem it necessary to review these authorities since the constitutional provision of tire states in which those cases were decided vary in terms and meaning from the language used in Art. 2, § 24 of our constitution.
The power to appropriate the money of the state is a legislative power (81 C. J. S., States, § 161, p. 1203), and, except as is restricted by the provisions of Art. 2, § 24, the legislature has the exclusive power to decide how, when and for what purposes the [661]*661public funds shall be applied in carrying on the state government. The term “specific appropriation made by law” may be defined as an authority of the legislature, given at the proper time and in legal form to the proper officials, to apply a distinctly specified sum from out of the state treasury, in a given period, for a specified objective or demand against the state. In general terms a “specific appropriation made by law” is the act of setting money apart formally or officially for a special use or purpose by the legislature in clear and unequivocal terms in a duly enacted law (42 Am. Jur. Public Funds, § 43, p. 747; 81 C. J. S., States, § 163, p. 1207, § 164b, p. 1215 and § 164c, p. 1217). Authorities in support of this statement are Martin v. Francis, Treasurer, 13 Kan. 220, 227, 228; Evans v. McCarthy, 42 Kan. 426, 429, 430, 22 Pac. 631; Henderson v. Hovey, 46 Kan. 691, 692, 27 Pac. 177; State ex rel., v. Stover, 47 Kan. 119, 121, 27 Pac. 850. See, also, State, ex. v. Defenbacher, 158 Ohio St., 268, 91 N. E. 2d 512. Giving the words used in Art. 2, § 24 of the constitution their common and ordinary meaning it seems reasonably clear to this court that money belonging to the state and rightfully in the state treasury and over which the legislature has the rightful control, cannot be withdrawn from the treasury' except in pursuance of an act passed by the legislature setting apart \ or assigning such money to a particular public use for a term not longer than two years which must be specific in- amount and specific in purpose to indicate, with reasonable exactness, to the public officials who are authorized to withdraw and use, within such period, the sum so appropriated or set apart to the objective, purpose or plan sought to be accomplished by the appropriation, and for no other purpose (Martin v. Francis, Treasurer, supra; Evans v. McCarthy, supra; Henderson v. Hovey, supra; State, ex rel., v. Stover, supra; State, ex. v. Defenbacher, supra).
With respect to the emergency appropriation acts under consideration, the plaintiff directs our attention to G. S. 1955 Supp. 75-3712 and points out that the emergency fund is continued for the use of the finance council and for the purposes prescribed in G. S. 1955 Supp. 75-3713; that by the latter section, the finance council is authorized to allocate to state agencies from the emergency fund for the “purposes” enumerated, and contends that money appropriated for “purposes” is not for a “specific purpose” or a “specific sum” as required by Art. 2, § 24. We do not believe the contention is meritorious. While there is no specific recital in the statutes (G. S. 1955 Supp. 75-3712 and 75-3713; Ch. 2, §§ 22, 34; Ch. 34, Budget [662]*662Session Laws 1956) declaring an emergency to exist with respect to the conditions specified, we think when these acts are considered together and given their fair import, it is clear the legislature determined its policy and purpose to protect the state in the interim between sessions, from the evil effects due to contingencies or emergencies which might arise and which could not be provided for prior to their occurrence, or without the necessity of the governor calling the legislature into special session after they had occurred. The contingencies or emergencies which the legislature anticipated most likely to occur are specifically set forth in G. S. 1955 Supp. 75-3713, and the limitation placed on the power of the finance council was that only such sums as were necessary to remedy the mischief caused by them were to be allocated or expended. We think it may reasonably be said that the multiple purposes specified in G. S. 1955 Supp. 75-3713 are all embraced within the single specific purpose for which the appropriations were made, i. e., to meet and solve declared contingencies or emergencies which may arise in the state government after, or which were not foreseen when, the legislature was in session, or with respect to subsection (3), when the need to supplement an account of a state agency occurs after the adjournment of a budget session and such supplementation was recommended by the governor in his budget report to such session. While the appropriations constitute a lump sum and may, at the discretion of the finance council, be allocated to state agencies for purposes specified and the amounts so authorized to be expended are charged against the lump sum, this does not render the appropriation void. (Wells v. Childers, 196 Okla. 339, 165 P. 2d 358; Sibel v. State Board of Public Affairs, 206 Okla. 433, 244 P. 2d 307; 81 C. J. S. States, § 156, p. 1194.) The fact that the money set apart by the appropriation acts to the credit of the emergency fund may be allocated by the finance council to either or all of the purposes specified does not defeat the singleness or certainty of their purpose. On the contrary, each act is a specific appropriation to meet the contingencies or emergencies defined in the statute. We point out, however, that the statute authorizing the finance council to allocate and authorize the expenditure of the amounts appropriated requires that such contingencies or emergencies be restricted to those clearly enumerated, and does not contemplate or authorize the finance council to create at will contingencies or emergencies for which the emergency fund may be allocated and expended. We are of the opinion that the appropria[663]*663tion acts in question, when applied to the use and purposes prescribed in G. S. 1955 Supp. 75-3713, are specific appropriations made by law as above defined, and that they do not violate the provisions of Art. 2, § 24 as above construed and interpreted. The contention of the plaintiff cannot be sustained. '
The amended petition next alleges that G. S. 1955 Supp. 75-3711 (4) and 75-3713 (3) constitute an invalid attempt to delegate to a statutory board legislative power vested in the house of representatives and the senate of the state of Kansas by Art. 2, § 1 of the constitution, which reads: “The legislative power of this state shall be vested in a house of representatives and senate,” and further, that if the power vested in the finance council is determined to be administrative in character there are no standards fixed by these acts whereby discretion of the members of the finance council may be governed. In support of the contention plaintiff cites Oakland State Bank v. Bolin, 141 Kan. 126, 40 P. 2d 437; Langworthy v. Kadel, 141 Kan. 250, 29 P. 2d 443; Brown v. Illinois Bankers Life Assur. Co., 144 Kan. 670, 63 P. 2d 165; State, ex. rel., v. Jackson County Board of Social Welfare, 161 Kan. 672, 680, 171 P. 2d 651; State, ex rel., v. Hines, 163 Kan. 300, 182 P. 2d 865; Schechter Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 55 S. Ct. 837, 79 L. ed. p. 1570.
The statutes under- consideration belong to the well-known class in which the legislature enacts a law in general terms, confers on an officer or board executive power to enforce and apply the law, and, to accomplish that end, to ascertain the existence or nonexistence of some fact which the officer or board is required to ascertain. It is settled in this jurisdiction that statutes of this character do not confer legislative power (Schaake v. Dolley, 85 Kan. 598, 610, 118 Pac. 80; Balch v. Glenn, 85 Kan. 735, 748, 119 Pac. 67; In re McGee, Petitioner, 105 Kan. 574, 185 Pac. 14; City of Pittsburg v. Robb, 143 Kan. 1, 53 P. 2d 203; State, ex rel., v. Urban Renewal Agency of Kansas City, 179 Kan. 435, 296 P. 2d 656). In ascertaining and declaring the facts and conditions upon which the statute shall operate, the officer or board does not exercise legislative power, rather, the legislative power is exercised when the legislature enacts the law and declares that it shall operate upon the existence or nonexistence of some future fact, event or condition. The officer or board simply executes the act of the legislature, and in so doing, is merely an agent of the lawmaking department to ascertain and declare the facts upon which the expressed will of the legislature shall take effect (Schaake v. Dolley, supra; Field v. [664]*664Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 692; 12 S. Ct. 495; 36 L. ed. 294). However, the legislature must prescribe standards by which those vested with the power to make the statutes operate will do so in the manner intended. Standards are difficult to define because of their variable nature but have been referred to as conditions, restrictions, limitations, yardsticks, guides, rules, broad outlines and other similar expressions. Clearly, the legislature must declare the policy of the law and fix legal principles which are to control in given cases (11 Am. Jur. Constitutional Law, p. 956, § 240). Ordinarily, the test is whether the provisions of the statute purporting to impose the duty of administration upon an officer or board are sufficiently definite and certain to enable one to know his rights, obligations and limitations thereunder (State, ex rel., v. Hines, supra).
With respect to the statutes here under consideration the legislative power was exercised and terminated pursuant to the constitution when the legislature created the finance council and the emergency fund, and made appropriations to it to be allocated pursuant to conditions and limitations prescribed. . That was the only legislative power involved and it was exercised by file legislature. The duties imposed upon the finance council were administrative in character, i. e., to ascertain the facts and conditions upon which the statutes were declared to operate, and, when so ascertained, to allocate funds for the purposes specified: (1) The "preservation of the public health and the protection of persons and property from extraordinary conditions arising after, or which were not foreseen at the time, appropriations were made by the preceding regular legislative session”; (2) repair or temporarily replace any state building or equipment “destroyed or damaged by sabotage, fife, flood, wind, tornado, catastrophe or act of God if such building or equipment is absolutely necessary for carrying out the function of the state agency”; and (3) to supplement a fund or account of a state agency for the remainder of the current fiscal year after adjournment of a budget session if the same was recommended in the governor’s budget report to the budget session and not provided for by it.
The provisions of G. S. 1955 Supp. 75-3713 demonstrate the necessity that they operate upon the conditions specified; but, the plaintiff asserts they contain no standards. We do not agree. While the standards provided are general in terms, we believe they are sufficient.
Although subsection (1) establishes no criterion as to what shall constitute preservation of the public health,, or what findings shall [665]*665be made to achieve this beneficial result, or how or in what manner persons or property shall be protected, or what shall constitute “extraordinary conditions,” it is evident that the legislature exercised the police power of the state in determining its policy that the public health and safety of persons and property should be preserved and protected from extraordinary conditions and deemed it impracticable, if not impossible, to define, with preciseness, fixed measures in advance by which this result could be accomplished. The term “public health” is not susceptible to accurate definition since it takes on new definitions when new conditions arise, but, generally speaking, it means the wholesome sanitary condition of the community at large (39 C. J. S. Health, p. 811, § 1). Among all the objects sought to be secured by government, none is more important than the preservation of the public health; and, an imperative obligation rests upon the state through its proper instrumentalities or agencies to take all necessary steps to accomplish this objective (25 Am. Jur. Health, p. 287, § 3). Statutes enacted for this purpose should be liberally construed and the most extensive power may be conferred on administrative boards, either state or local, to carry out such purpose (39 C. J. S. Health, pp. 811, 813, § 2). The guide set forth in subsection (1) is the preservation of the public health and the protection of persons and property from extraordinary conditions. Because of varied facts which might affect this policy, the legislature wisely did not undertake to enumerate them, but required them to be ascertained and applied by the finance council. We see nothing seriously wrong with this provision. A statute which confers discretion on an executive officer or board without establishing any standards is a delegation of legislative power and is unconstitutional; but, when the discretion to be exercised relates to a police regulation for the protection of the public morals, health, safety or general welfare, and it is impossible or impracticable to provide such standards, and to do so would defeat the legislative objective sought to be accomplished, legislation conferring such discretion may be valid and constitutional without such restrictions and limitations (In re McGee, Petitioner, supra; Matz v. Curtis Cartage Co., 132 Ohio St., 271, 7 N. E. (2d) 220; Weber v. Bd. of Health, 148 Ohio St., 389 74 N. E. (2d) 331; 25 Am. Jur. Health, pp. 288, 289, §5; 39 C. J. S. Health, p. 812, §2). For additional authorities see extensive annotations in 12 A. L. R. 1447; 54 A. L. R. 1110; and, 92 A. L. R. 410. Furthermore, when the statute is considered in its entirety, we think it may reasonably be said that the [666]*666term “extraordinary conditions” was intended to relate to the conditions specified in subsection (2), i.e., sabotage, fire, flood, wind, tornado, catastrophe or act of God, and as thus construed, the standards provided are sufficient.
We have no difficulty in concluding that subsection (2) contains an adequate standard. It requires a finding by the finance council, as a condition to allocating funds, that a building or equipment of a state agency has been destroyed or damaged by sabotage, fire, flood, wind, tornado, cátastrophe or act of God, and its repair or temporary replacement is essential to carrying on the function of the state agency. Not infrequently state buildings or equipment are destroyed or damaged by the elements enumerated, inflicting substantial loss to the propertj? rights of the state and with curtailment of functions of the state agency. The policy of this state in not insuring its public buildings against destruction or damage by these causes, demonstrates the wisdom of legislation of this character. The finance council may expeditiously allocate funds for the repair or temporary replacement of the buildings or equipment destroyed or damaged so the same may be restored with dispatch to the use of the state agency.
Pursuant to subsection (3) the finance council is required to ascertain that all specified conditions exist before it may supplement a fund or account of a state agency. It is unnecessary to enumerate these conditions since they are set forth in the statute. Viewed from this standpoint, the subsection contains adequate standards. Nor do we believe, as plaintiff contends, this subsection authorizes the finance council to amend an appropriation act to a state agency made by a previous regular session. Funds allocated by the finance council in no wise amend the prior appropriation act, nor increase, nor diminish the fund-spending limitation imposed by it. They are supplemental, or in addition, to those made available by the prior appropriation act, and we know of no constitutional restriction prohibiting this method of fiscal procedure.
In applying the provisions of G. S. 1955 Supp. 75-3713 the question confronting the finance council in any given situation is whether the specified conditions exist before it may carry out the legislative mandate and allocate funds for the purposes specified. This question is to be determined like any other question of fact: from a consideration of the conditions existing in the state agency or in the community concerned. The finance council has no discretion [667]*667over these conditions. It does not create them and cannot modify them. Its function is to ascertain and declare what they are and the statute dictates what shall be done. It is conceivable that any public trust may be abused but it must be assumed that state officials will act fairly and impartially and in accordance with their best judgment, and a statute allowing them to exercise discretion in such matters is not to be condemned as unconstitutional (Schaake v. Dolley, supra; Batch v. Glenn, supra).
The plaintiff contends that the duties imposed upon the finance council is an attempt by the legislature to create an administrative tribunal and authorize it to assume functions which the constitution of Kansas contemplates shall be considered by a special session of the legislature upon call of the governor, and, hence, an encroachment upon the power of the chief executive. We do not agree. The fact that the legislature has provided a method to combat harmful effects of contingencies or emergencies it deems most likely to occur when it is not in session, does not preclude the governor from exercising powers vested in him by Art. 1, § 5 of the constitution to convene the legislature into special session if he should chose to do so (Farrelly v. Cole, 60 Kan. 356, 56 Pac. 492; The State, ex rel., v. Howat, 107 Kan. 423, 430, 191 Pac. 585).
There is left for consideration plaintiff’s contention that the provisions of the finance council act appointing members of the legislature as members of the finance council violates the fundamental principle of the separation of powers inherent in our state constitution, i. e., that one department of the government cannot perform the functions of another department. That contention was made and rejected in State, ex rel., v. Kansas Turnpike Authority, 176 Kan. 683, 692-696, 273 P. 2d 198, in which it was held that members of the legislature, i. e., the chairman of the committees on roads and highways of the senate and the house of representatives, who were appointed by the act as members of the Authority and performed only administrative duties thereunder, did not constitute an encroachment on the executive in violation of Art. 2, §§ 1 and 3 of the constitution. In its brief and oral argument the plaintiff, conceding that the holding in the Turnpike case, supra, is contrary to the contention it makes here, asks that we review the holding and overrule it. We have carefully re-examined that holding and conclude no sound reason exists for overruling it.
The record in this case has been carefully considered and we are [668]*668of the opinion that the prayer of the petition should be denied and that judgment should be entered for the defendants. It is so ordered.
Hall, J., not participating.