PER CURIAM:
This case is before the Court upon a petition for writ of prohibition filed by the petitioner, The Affiliated Construction Trades Foundation, a division of the West Virginia Building and Construction Trades Council, AFL-CIO, and all those similarly situated, against the respondents, William F. Vieweg, Commissioner, Bureau of Employment Programs, and the Compensation Programs Performance Council. The petitioner seeks a writ prohibiting Commissioner Vieweg from dismissing civil actions instituted by the Workers’ Compensation Division against certain corporate entities under theories of imputed liability for delinquent workers’ compensation premiums, penalties and interest; prohibiting the Commissioner from having any further involvement in these actions; and directing the Commissioner and the Compensation Programs Performance Council to promulgate rules and regulations governing the conduct of litigation commenced by the Commissioner. We issued a rule to show cause and now deny the petitioner the relief which it seeks.
I.
FACTS
In the original proceeding before us, this Court has the pleadings, affidavits and exhibits of the parties as well as several briefs of [690]*690amicus curiae.1 From these we glean the following facts.
In 1996 and 1998, the Workers’ Compensation Division [“the Division”] instituted civil actions against several coal companies asserting theories of imputed liability for workers’ compensation premiums that had not been paid by entities with whom those companies had contracted.2 Because of concerns about the progress of these civil actions, the Commissioner recently sought advice from the Compensation Programs Performance Council (“the council”) concerning the continued prosecution of these actions.3
On March 12, 1999, the council adopted Resolution 30 recommending that the Commissioner “take such action as is deemed necessary to terminate, withdraw or otherwise dismiss any party or entity named as a defendant whose liability, if any, for payment of premium is not direct under the workers compensation laws ... and whose own account with the Division is deemed to be in good standing.”4 The council emphasized that the division “should continue to pursue collection from those parties or entities, including responsible officers, whose accounts remain in default and which parties, entities or officers have direct responsibility for and means of payment of premium, interest and/or penalty under the workers compensation statutes .., and applicable case law.”5 The council’s recommendation was unanimous. The council listed several reasons in support of the recommendation. These included:
WHEREAS, the Division has in fact initiated civil actions against certain parties, founded upon certain complex theories of law which are without precedence in the field of workers compensation law in West Virginia, and perhaps in other states, claiming liability of such parties for the defaulted premium obligations of other employers and further claiming such parties [691]*691to be related or affiliated in some manner to the defaulting employers; and
WHEREAS, it appears that the amount of defaulted premium due and owing approximates $95 million and the interest and penalties thereon also approximate $95 million and further accumulating at the rate of $3 million per month; and
WHEREAS, outside litigation expenses to date have totaled $3 million; and
WHEREAS, the Division may expect to incur ongoing outside litigation expenses of $30,000 per month in addition to the ongoing but undetermined administrative and managerial time and other resources committed in support of the litigation; and
WHEREAS, the representation agreement with outside counsel imposes on the Division certain contractual obligations for purchase of a data system at fair market value which may total $700,000; and
WHEREAS, the representation agreement provides for the outside counsel to be compensated on a contingent fee basis in accord with Ch. 21A-2-6(17)(B), which basis has been an obstacle to settlement of certain of the pending actions; and
WHEREAS, due to the nature of the complex theories of law upon which the claims against parties deemed only to be liable on a vicarious basis are founded,6 any estimate of recovery would be wholly speculative; however, it is anticipated with a high degree of certainty that a favorable trial decision to any of the parties will likely result in appeal by the party adversely affected; and
WHEREAS, claims may still be pursued against those defaulting employers and their responsible officers deemed directly liable for payment of premium, penalty and interest under traditional collection theories recognized under the workers compensation law; and
WHEREAS, current underground coal employers participating in the workers compensation system are paying through the premium rating mechanism all claims arising from the defaulted employers with direct liability for premium, while all employers in good standing in the workers compensation system are bearing the expenses associated with the litigation; and
WHEREAS, over a long period of time preceding the filing of this litigation, the Division failed to adequately enforce premium payments from those directly responsible therefor under the workers compensation law and due to enhanced data systems, increased staffing, and strengthened statutes, it is unlikely that- the environment which permitted such failures would be replicated; and
WHEREAS, it being the conclusion of the Council that further expenditure of Division funds in support of litigation founded upon the complex theories is not justified by the expectation of recovery or the need for precedent to discourage other parties from utilizing subcontractors as a means for workers compensation tax avoidance[.] (Footnote added).
On May 20,1999, the Commissioner publicly announced his decision to dismiss cases filed against those parties which were claimed to be liable for payment of premium taxes due and owing from their contractors and to continue to pursue recovery against workers’ compensation subscribers and their responsible officers under traditional legal theories.7 Thereafter, the petitioner filed the writ of prohibition which is the subject of this case.
[692]*692II.
DISCUSSION
The petitioners herein seek a writ of prohibition. According to W.Va.Code § 53-1-1 (1923), “[t]he writ of prohibition shall lie as a matter of right in all cases of usurpation and abuse of power, when the inferior court has not jurisdiction of the subject matter in controversy, or, having such jurisdiction, exceeds its legitimate powers.” This Court has said that “ ‘ “[a] writ of prohibition will not issue to prevent a simple abuse of discretion by a trial court. It will only issue where the trial court has no jurisdiction or having such jurisdiction exceeds its legitimate powers. W.VaCode, 53-1-1.” Syl. pt. 2, State ex rel. Peacher v. Sencindiver, 160 W.Va. 314, 233 S.E.2d 425 (1977).’ Syllabus point 3, State ex rel.
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PER CURIAM:
This case is before the Court upon a petition for writ of prohibition filed by the petitioner, The Affiliated Construction Trades Foundation, a division of the West Virginia Building and Construction Trades Council, AFL-CIO, and all those similarly situated, against the respondents, William F. Vieweg, Commissioner, Bureau of Employment Programs, and the Compensation Programs Performance Council. The petitioner seeks a writ prohibiting Commissioner Vieweg from dismissing civil actions instituted by the Workers’ Compensation Division against certain corporate entities under theories of imputed liability for delinquent workers’ compensation premiums, penalties and interest; prohibiting the Commissioner from having any further involvement in these actions; and directing the Commissioner and the Compensation Programs Performance Council to promulgate rules and regulations governing the conduct of litigation commenced by the Commissioner. We issued a rule to show cause and now deny the petitioner the relief which it seeks.
I.
FACTS
In the original proceeding before us, this Court has the pleadings, affidavits and exhibits of the parties as well as several briefs of [690]*690amicus curiae.1 From these we glean the following facts.
In 1996 and 1998, the Workers’ Compensation Division [“the Division”] instituted civil actions against several coal companies asserting theories of imputed liability for workers’ compensation premiums that had not been paid by entities with whom those companies had contracted.2 Because of concerns about the progress of these civil actions, the Commissioner recently sought advice from the Compensation Programs Performance Council (“the council”) concerning the continued prosecution of these actions.3
On March 12, 1999, the council adopted Resolution 30 recommending that the Commissioner “take such action as is deemed necessary to terminate, withdraw or otherwise dismiss any party or entity named as a defendant whose liability, if any, for payment of premium is not direct under the workers compensation laws ... and whose own account with the Division is deemed to be in good standing.”4 The council emphasized that the division “should continue to pursue collection from those parties or entities, including responsible officers, whose accounts remain in default and which parties, entities or officers have direct responsibility for and means of payment of premium, interest and/or penalty under the workers compensation statutes .., and applicable case law.”5 The council’s recommendation was unanimous. The council listed several reasons in support of the recommendation. These included:
WHEREAS, the Division has in fact initiated civil actions against certain parties, founded upon certain complex theories of law which are without precedence in the field of workers compensation law in West Virginia, and perhaps in other states, claiming liability of such parties for the defaulted premium obligations of other employers and further claiming such parties [691]*691to be related or affiliated in some manner to the defaulting employers; and
WHEREAS, it appears that the amount of defaulted premium due and owing approximates $95 million and the interest and penalties thereon also approximate $95 million and further accumulating at the rate of $3 million per month; and
WHEREAS, outside litigation expenses to date have totaled $3 million; and
WHEREAS, the Division may expect to incur ongoing outside litigation expenses of $30,000 per month in addition to the ongoing but undetermined administrative and managerial time and other resources committed in support of the litigation; and
WHEREAS, the representation agreement with outside counsel imposes on the Division certain contractual obligations for purchase of a data system at fair market value which may total $700,000; and
WHEREAS, the representation agreement provides for the outside counsel to be compensated on a contingent fee basis in accord with Ch. 21A-2-6(17)(B), which basis has been an obstacle to settlement of certain of the pending actions; and
WHEREAS, due to the nature of the complex theories of law upon which the claims against parties deemed only to be liable on a vicarious basis are founded,6 any estimate of recovery would be wholly speculative; however, it is anticipated with a high degree of certainty that a favorable trial decision to any of the parties will likely result in appeal by the party adversely affected; and
WHEREAS, claims may still be pursued against those defaulting employers and their responsible officers deemed directly liable for payment of premium, penalty and interest under traditional collection theories recognized under the workers compensation law; and
WHEREAS, current underground coal employers participating in the workers compensation system are paying through the premium rating mechanism all claims arising from the defaulted employers with direct liability for premium, while all employers in good standing in the workers compensation system are bearing the expenses associated with the litigation; and
WHEREAS, over a long period of time preceding the filing of this litigation, the Division failed to adequately enforce premium payments from those directly responsible therefor under the workers compensation law and due to enhanced data systems, increased staffing, and strengthened statutes, it is unlikely that- the environment which permitted such failures would be replicated; and
WHEREAS, it being the conclusion of the Council that further expenditure of Division funds in support of litigation founded upon the complex theories is not justified by the expectation of recovery or the need for precedent to discourage other parties from utilizing subcontractors as a means for workers compensation tax avoidance[.] (Footnote added).
On May 20,1999, the Commissioner publicly announced his decision to dismiss cases filed against those parties which were claimed to be liable for payment of premium taxes due and owing from their contractors and to continue to pursue recovery against workers’ compensation subscribers and their responsible officers under traditional legal theories.7 Thereafter, the petitioner filed the writ of prohibition which is the subject of this case.
[692]*692II.
DISCUSSION
The petitioners herein seek a writ of prohibition. According to W.Va.Code § 53-1-1 (1923), “[t]he writ of prohibition shall lie as a matter of right in all cases of usurpation and abuse of power, when the inferior court has not jurisdiction of the subject matter in controversy, or, having such jurisdiction, exceeds its legitimate powers.” This Court has said that “ ‘ “[a] writ of prohibition will not issue to prevent a simple abuse of discretion by a trial court. It will only issue where the trial court has no jurisdiction or having such jurisdiction exceeds its legitimate powers. W.VaCode, 53-1-1.” Syl. pt. 2, State ex rel. Peacher v. Sencindiver, 160 W.Va. 314, 233 S.E.2d 425 (1977).’ Syllabus point 3, State ex rel. McDowell County Sheriff’s Dept. v. Stephens, 192 W.Va. 341, 452 S.E.2d 432 (1994).” Syllabus Point 1, State ex rel. Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc. v. Kaufman, 197 W.Va. 282, 475 S.E.2d 374 (1996). See also Syllabus Point 1, Crawford v. Taylor, 138 W.Va. 207, 75 S.E.2d 370 (1953). We have stated- that “[prohibition lies only in case of the unlawful exercise of judicial functions. Acts of a mere ministerial, administrative, or executive character do not fall within its province.” Syllabus Point 4, Fleming v. Kanawha County Com’rs, 31 W.Va. 608, 8 S.E. 267 (1888). See also Syllabus Point 2, State ex rel. City of Huntington v. Lombardo, 149 W.Va. 671, 143 S.E.2d 535 (1965). This Court has determined that prohibition lies not only to judicial tribunals, but to inferior ministerial tribunals possessing incidentally judicial powers and known as quasi-judicial tribunals. See Wiseman v. Calvert, 134 W.Va. 303, 59 S.E.2d 445 (1950); Brazie v. Fayette County Com’rs, 25 W.Va. 213 (1884); State ex rel. City of Huntington v. Lombardo, supra. This includes administrative tribunals having quasi-judicial power when acting in a quasi-judicial capacity. See United States Steel Corp. v. Stokes, 138 W.Va. 506, 76 S.E.2d 474 (1953). Prohibition will not lie, however, to prevent administrative action. Wiseman, supra (prohibition does not lie against county courts in exercising power not judicial or quasi judicial); State ex rel. Noce v. Blankenship, 93 W.Va. 273, 116 S.E. 524 (1923) (prohibition does not lie against county sheriffs); State ex rel. City of Huntington, supra; Hartigan v. Board of Regents, 49 W.Va. 14, 38 S.E. 698 (1901) (prohibition does not lie against the Board of Regents in its removal of a professor); United States Steel Corp. supra.
In the instant case, a writ of prohibition is sought against the workers’ compensation Commissioner who is an administrative official within the executive branch of our state government. W.Va.Code § 23-l-l(a) (1999) provides that the Commissioner “has the sole responsibility for the administration of [the workers’ compensation system]. ... [and] shall exercise all the powers and duties described in this chapter and in ... [§ 21A-2-1, et seq.] ... of this code.” W.Va.Code § 21A-2-6 (1996) provides that the Commissioner has the power to, inter alia, supervise fiscal affairs and responsibilities of the Bureau of Employment Programs; invoke any legal or special remedy for the enforcement of orders; and exercise any other power necessary to the administration of bureau business. It is clear, and the petitioner does not dispute, that in dismissing the actions at issue the Commissioner was not performing a judicial or quasi-judicial function. Rather, the dismissal of the lawsuits constitutes a purely administrative function. As we noted above, the writ of prohibition never issues against administrative officials performing purely administrative acts. Accordingly, we hold that a remedy by prohibition does not lie in this proceeding and, for that reason, the writ of prohibition will not be issued.
We note that the petitioner sought only a writ of prohibition in its petition filed with this Court. During oral argument, however, it attempted to request relief by a writ of mandamus. This Court has, on occasion, treated a request for relief in prohibition as a petition for a writ of mandamus, or vice versa, if the facts so warranted. See State ex rel. Ranger Fuel Corp. v. Lilly, 165 W.Va. 98, 267 S.E.2d 435 (1980); Carr v. Lambert, 179 W.Va. 277, 367 S.E.2d 225 (1988). Accordingly, even though the petitioner did not originally plead in the alternative, we will now proceed to consider the petition as a request for mandamus relief.
[693]*693The petitioner essentially argues that the Commissioner has violated his fiduciary obligation to the workers’ compensation fund set forth in W.Va.Code § 23-2-4(a)(2) (1995).8 According to the petitioner, the fund currently has “an actuarial determined, discounted deficit of in excess of $1.9 billion.” Because the lawsuits at issue were originally instituted to collect approximately two hundred million dollars owed to the fund, the dismissal of the lawsuits will prove injurious to the solvency of the entire workers’ compensation system. Therefore, concludes the petitioner, this Court should compel the Commissioner to fulfill his fiduciary obligation to the fund by mandating that he prosecute the lawsuits for unpaid premiums.
It is axiomatic in the law that,
A writ of mandamus will not issue unless three elements coexist — (1) a clear legal right in the petitioner to the relief sought; (2) a legal duty on the part of respondent to do the thing which the petitioner seeks to compel; and (3) the absence of another adequate remedy.
Syllabus Point 2, State ex rel. Kucera v. City of Wheeling, 153 W.Va. 538, 170 S.E.2d 367 (1969). We have characterized the purpose of the writ as the enforcement of an established right and the enforcement of a corresponding imperative duty created or imposed by law. See State ex rel. Bronaugh v. City of Parkersburg, 148 W.Va. 568, 136 S.E.2d 783 (1964). “Mandamus is a proper remedy to require the performance of a nondiscretion-ary duty by various governmental agencies or bodies.” Syllabus Point 1, State ex rel. Allstate Insurance Co. v. Union Public Service District, 151 W.Va. 207, 151 S.E.2d 102 (1966); See State ex rel. Board of Education v. Miller, 153 W.Va. 414, 168 S.E.2d 820 (1969); Delardas v. County Court of Monongalia County, 155 W.Va. 776, 186 S.E.2d 847 (1972); State ex rel Anderson v. Bd. of Ed. of Mingo Cty., 160 W.Va. 208, 233 S.E.2d 703 (1977). Finally, “[m]andamus lies to control the action of an administrative officer in the exercise of his discretion when such action is arbitrary or capricious.” Syllabus, Beverly Grill, Inc. v. Crow, 133 W.Va. 214, 57 S.E.2d 244 (1949); See also Syllabus Point 1, State ex rel. Payne v. Board of Education of Jefferson County, 135 W.Va. 349, 63 S.E.2d 579 (1951)(“Mandamus does not lie to control a board of education in the exercise of its discretion, in the absence of caprice, passion, partiality, fraud, arbitrary conduct, some ulterior motive, or misapprehension of law upon the part of such board.”); State ex rel. McLendon v. Morton, 162 W.Va. 431, 249 S.E.2d 919 (1978); State ex rel. Withers v. Board of Educ. of Mason County, 153 W.Va. 867, 172 S.E.2d 796 (1970); State ex rel. Board of Education v. Miller, supra; State ex rel. Waller Chems. v. McNutt, 152 W.Va. 186, 160 S.E.2d 170 (1968). We will now apply these principles to the facts before us.
This Court agrees with the petitioner that the Commissioner has a fiduciary obligation to maintain the workers’ compensation fund. We have not hesitated on prior occasions to recognize the fiduciary obligation of officers who oversee state funds set up for the benefit of designated classes of individuals. Also, we have exercised this Court’s mandamus power to compel executive and legislative officials to maintain the fiscal soundness of state funds in their capacities as fiduciaries. For example, in Dadisman v. Moore, 181. W.Va. 779, 384 S.E.2d 816 (1988), we compelled the Governor to include in his appropriation plan for fiscal year 1990-91 the aetuarially determined amounts of contributions earned by state employees to the Public Employees Retirement System (PERS) Fund. We further compelled the Senate President and Speaker of the House to introduce in their respective houses proposed budget bills to meet the PERS requirements. More recently, in State ex rel. Deputy Sheriffs’ Ass’n v. Sims, 204 W.Va. 442, 513 S.E.2d 669 (1998), we held in Syllabus Point 2:
[694]*694The fiduciary duty of the Consolidated Public Retirement Board ... with respect to the public employee pension funds and assets entrusted to the Board, includes the affirmative duty to monitor and evaluate the effect of legislative actions that may affect such funds and assets, and to take all necessary actions including initiating court proceedings if necessary to protect the fiscal and actuarial solvency of such funds and assets.
In Syllabus Point 3, however, we stated:
The speculative possibility that the transfer of funds and assets that is required ... from the [PERS] trust fund to the deputy sheriffs’ retirement fund ... may impair the fiscal solvency of the PERS trust fund does not bar the transfer of assets where legal mechanisms exist that can detect and correct any impaired solvency in a timely fashion.
Likewise, in the instant case, the possibility that the dismissal of the civil actions at issue will impair the workers’ compensation fund and render the fund unable to fulfill its purpose is nothing more than speculation.
The petitioner has not shown that the Commissioner violated his fiduciary duty to maintain the workers’ compensation fund. The Commissioner has represented to this Court that a program was implemented in 1997 to reduce the workers’ compensation deficit. The Commissioner has also stated in an affidavit that no eligible injured worker or dependent of a fatally injured worker has failed to receive any benefit payable under the worker’s compensation system due to any employer’s default of its premium obligations. In light of this, as well as the complete lack of evidence to the contrary, we find that the Commissioner has not breached his fiduciary duty to the workers’ compensation fund.9 Also, while this Court can mandate that the Commissioner fulfill his fiduciary duty, it is powerless to mandate the manner in which this duty is to be performed. “Mandamus is a proper remedy to compel tribunals and officers exercising discretionary and judicial powers to act, when they refuse so to do, in violation of their duty, but it is never employed to prescribe in what manner they shall act, or to correct errors they have made.” Syllabus Point 1, State ex rel. Buxton v. O’Brien and the County Court of Mason County, 97 W.Va. 343, 125 S.E. 154 (1924). The one area, above all, where a court should exercise caution is when it is deciding its own power. The power of this Court simply does not extend to sitting in judgment on every lawful discretionary act performed by an executive officer pursuant to the execution of his or her responsibilities, regardless of how politically unpopular that act may be. Accordingly, we find no merit to the petitioners’ argument concerning the Commissioner’s fiduciary obligation.
The petitioner’s more specific complaint is that the Commissioner has dismissed certain civil actions. However, we [695]*695have not been informed nor are we aware of any statute or regulation that requires the Commissioner to institute and prosecute the kinds of actions involved in this case. The Commissioner’s power to commence and discontinue litigation is clearly discretionary. Notably, the great cost of the litigation to date necessitates weighing the potential value of the civil actions against the expense of their continued prosecution. This involves a judgment call that by law must be made by the Commissioner. While this Court may or may not agree with the Commissioner’s course of action, it simply is not our decision to make. The discretionary nature of the decision at issue distinguishes this case from Dadisman where the duties of the executive and legislative officials mandated by this Court were specifically provided for by constitutional provision and statute. Also, as noted above, the petitioner fails to prove that the dismissal of the actions further impairs the solvency of the fund. Accordingly, we find that the Commissioner has not failed to perform a mandatory, nondiscretionary duty.
Further, we have before us the performance council’s and the Commissioner’s detailed rationale for dismissing the actions. After considering this rationale, we are unable to find that the Commissioner acted with caprice, passion, partiality, fraud, arbitrarily, with some ulterior motive or misapprehension of the law.
In addition, we note the petitioner raises the specter of conflict of interest in the dismissal of the civil actions. This charge, however, is wholly unsubstantiated and amounts to nothing more than speculation.10 Accordingly, we also reject the petitioner’s plea to remove the Commissioner from any further involvement in the civil actions.11
Finally, the petitioner also requests that we direct the Commissioner and performance council to promulgate rules governing the conduct of litigation commenced by the Commissioner. Again, we are aware of no legal requirement for the promulgation of rules and regulations governing the lawful exercise of an executive official’s discretionary judgment. Therefore, we decline to direct the promulgation of such rules.
In summary, we find that the dismissal of lawsuits such as those involved in this case lies within the discretion of the Commissioner. Further, we find that the Commissioner’s [696]*696dismissal of the civil actions was not arbitrary or capricious. Accordingly, because there is no clear legal duty on the part of the respondents to do the things which the petitioner seeks to compel, we deny the writ of mandamus.12
III.
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, we deny the writ of prohibition/mandamus.
Writ denied.