State, Dept. of Soc. Serv. v. Matthews
This text of 688 So. 2d 137 (State, Dept. of Soc. Serv. v. Matthews) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
STATE of Louisiana, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES and Annette Matthews
v.
Warren MATTHEWS.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fifth Circuit.
*138 Samuel W. Ethridge, Kenner, for Defendant/Appellant.
Jack M. Capella, District Attorney, Alison Wallis, Assistant District Attorney, Gretna, for Plaintiff/Appellee.
Before GAUDIN, DUFRESNE and DALEY, JJ.
DALEY, Judge.
In this appeal, Warren Matthews appeals the Juvenile Court's confirmation of a default judgment against him, finding that he is the father of the minor, Wynette Carey. On appeal, he argues that the trial court did not have personal jurisdiction over him, and that the appellees did not present a prima facie case of paternity. We affirm the paternity determination, vacate the support award, and remand for further proceedings.
Annette Matthews is the mother of Wynette Carey, conceived in December, 1977 and born on September 22, 1978. Annette and the defendant were married on December 7, 1978, approximately two and a half months after the child's birth, and were divorced *139 by a Kentucky divorce decree on August 29, 1983.[1]
The State of Louisiana through the Department of Social Services and Annette Matthews filed a Petition to Prove Paternity and Obtain Child Support on May 22, 1992, alleging that Annette and the defendant had had a sexual relationship in 1977, resulting in the conception of Wynette. The petition further alleged that the child was conceived in Louisiana, born in Orleans Parish, and has continued to reside in this State (now in Jefferson Parish). The petition alleged that Matthews had admitted the child was his own, and he had provided food, clothing, and financial support for the child, and had visited the child.
Defendant filed Exceptions of Lack of Personal Jurisdiction (he alleged he is domiciled in Florida), Res Judicata, No Cause of Action, and No Right of Action. On October 19, 1992, the juvenile court denied all exceptions except res judicata, finding that the Kentucky divorce decree stated that no children were born of the marriage. On the State's Motion for Appeal, this court reversed, finding that the record was unclear whether a Kentucky divorce proceeding between the mother and Matthews had litigated the issue of the minor child's paternity. The case was remanded for further proceedings[2]. Defendant did not appeal the trial court's ruling or this court's ruling. The record is clear that Wynette was born before the parties married; therefore, the Kentucky court's finding that no children were born of the marriage is clearly not dispositive of the child's paternity.
Following the remand, the Juvenile Court on April 26, 1993, issued a Rule to Show Cause why blood work should not be ordered. Evidently, service was returned. Numerous other rules to show cause were issued and service by certified mail attempted: September 24, 1993; December 3, 1993; March 22, 1994; April 29, 1994; and August 1, 1994. It is well established that a party may not defeat service by merely refusing to accept the letter containing the citation. Dean v. Waters, 95-2365 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/14/95), 667 So.2d 1137. In the case of the Long Arm Statute, employed here, the legislature has created a procedure for those cases (LSA-R.S.13:3205(a)), requiring the plaintiff to execute an affidavit of service and enter it into the record. Plaintiffs have complied with this requirement.
On January 11, 1996, the State moved for a Preliminary Default against defendant. The Confirmation of Default was heard and granted on April 10, 1996. On April 22, 1996, an IV-D Income Assignment was ordered of defendant's wages from payor, Metropolitan Dade County of Florida. A Judgment of Paternity and Order of Support was entered on June 3, 1996. Defendant filed a Motion for Devolutive Appeal on July 11, 1996.
Jurisdiction
On appeal, defendant first argues that the court did not have in personam jurisdiction over him. The record shows that the juvenile court overruled Matthews' Exception of Lack of Personal Jurisdiction in 1992, and that defendant did not appeal this ruling. We note that the instant default judgment was not rendered in a "new" proceeding, but in a continuation of the same suit in which defendant's exception was overruled. Only one Petition for Support has been filed, and in prior proceedings therein the trial court rejected defendant's Exception of Lack of Personal Jurisdiction. Defendant cannot now raise this issue again, having failed to appeal the denial of this exception in 1992.
However, this court finds that personal jurisdiction over defendant was proper under the Long Arm Statute, LSA-R.S. 13:3201 and LSA-Ch.C. art. 1302.1, which state in pertinent part:
§ 3201. Personal jurisdiction over nonresidents
A. A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action arising from any one of the *140 following activities performed by the nonresident:
* * * * * *
(7) Parentage and support of a child who was conceived by the nonresident while he resided in or was in this state.
Art. 1302.1. Basis for jurisdiction over nonresident
In a proceeding to establish, enforce, or modify a support order or to determine parentage, a court of this state may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident or his tutor in any of the following situations:
* * * * * *
(6) The nonresident engaged in sexual intercourse in this state that may have resulted in conception of the child.
* * * * * *
(8) There is any other basis consistent with the constitutions of this state and the United States for the exercise of personal jurisdiction.
The petition states that defendant and Annette began a sexual relationship Louisiana in 1977, resulting in the conception and birth of Wynette in New Orleans in 1977. Personal jurisdiction over defendant has been satisfied under both statutes.
Defendant also argues that service and citation were legally insufficient. Insufficiency of service is an objection which must be raised by declinatory exception and pleaded prior to answer or judgment by default. LSA-C.C.P. arts. 925 and 928. The question of sufficiency of service on a non-resident defendant may not be raised for the first time on appeal, but rather the issue should be raised in a suit to annul the judgment. State through La. Div. of Health and Human Resources v. Simmons, 542 So.2d 1150 (La.App. 2 Cir.1989). This issue is not properly before us on appeal.
Default Judgment
LSA-C.C.P. arts. 1701 and 1702 state the requirements for the entry of a default judgment against a defendant. In pertinent part, they state:
Art. 1701. Judgment by default
A. If a defendant in the principal or incidental demand fails to answer within the time prescribed by law, judgment by default may be entered against him. The judgment may be obtained by oral motion in open court or by written motion mailed to the court, either of which shall be entered in the minutes of the court, but the judgment shall consist merely of an entry in the minutes.
Art. 1702. Confirmation of default judgment
A. A judgment of default must be confirmed by proof of the demand sufficient to establish a prima facie case.
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688 So. 2d 137, 1997 WL 29314, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-dept-of-soc-serv-v-matthews-lactapp-1997.