AMENDED OPINION1
BENCH, Judge:
The Department of Social Services of the State of Utah (the State), on behalf of Cathy Parker, appeals the trial court’s application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel .to prevent Ms. Parker’s recovery of reimbursement for past child support from Harry Irizarry. We affirm.
FACTS
In June 1984, Ms. Parker and Mr. Irizarry met and began dating. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Parker became pregnant. After discovering she was pregnant, Ms. Parker temporarily moved from Utah to California. That August, Mr. Irizarry visited Ms. Parker in California and learned that she was pregnant. He then returned to Salt- Lake City.
Mr. Irizarry testified that in September he' sent a letter with some money to Ms. Parker, which she kept. He said that he followed up the letter with a telephone call. The trial court found that during this telephone call Ms. Parker stated that she did not want any money and would take care of herself. Mr. Irizarry testified that in November he sent another letter with approximately twenty dollars, and followed that letter with another telephone call. The trial court found that Ms. Parker again said she wanted nothing to do with him. Mr. Irizarry called again in January 1985. The trial court found that during this call she once again said she wanted nothing to do with him. In April 1985, Ms. Parker gave birth to twin girls. Ms. Parker left Mr. Irizarry’s name off the twins’ birth certificates.
In October 1985, Mr. Irizarry married his present wife and moved to Puerto Rico until September 1987, when they returned to Salt Lake City. He and his wife now have four-children. Ms. Parker became aware of Mr. Irizarry’s return to Salt Lake City in November 1988.
On May 30, 1989, the State filed a paternity action on Ms. Parker’s behalf to establish that Mr. Irizarry is the father of the twins and to fix a support obligation from the time of their birth. Mr. Irizarry acknowledged his paternity by stipulation shortly after the complaint was filed and a temporary support order was set. After a trial in February 1993, the trial court entered a judgment holding Mr. Irizarry responsible for ongoing child support and for back child support from the time this action was filed. However, the trial court found that Ms. Parker was equitably estopped from collecting past due child support from the date of the twins’ birth until the paternity action was filed. This determination was based on the statements Ms. Parker made to Mr. Irizarry before the twins’ birth to the effect that she did not want any money or involvement from Mr. Irizarry. The State now appeals the trial-court’s application of equitable estoppel.
ANALYSIS
The issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred by applying equitable estop-pel to bar Ms. Parker’s claim for reimbursement of back child support she has furnished.2 “[Ejquitable estoppel is ‘a highly fact-dependent question, one that we cannot profitably review de novo in every case because we cannot hope to work out a coherent statement of the law through a course of such decisions.’ ’-’ Trolley Square Assocs. v. Nielson, 886 P.2d 61, 65 (Utah App.1994) (quoting State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994)); accord Terry v. Price Mun. Corp., 784 P.2d 146, 148 (Utah 1989). We will not overturn the trial court’s application [1109]*1109of equitable estoppel absent an abuse of discretion. Trolley Square, 886 P.2d at 65.
In Baggs v. Anderson, 528 P.2d 141 (Utah 1974), the Utah Supreme Court discussed the distinction between reimbursement for past due support and future support:
it is appropriate to point out that support money can fall into two separate categories: First, the current and ongoing right of a child to receive support money from his father (parent); and second, the right to receive reimbursement for support of a - child after that has been done. As to the second, suppose a father (parent) fails over a period of time to furnish support of the child, and the mother, or someone else, furnishes it. That person then has the right to claim reimbursement from the parent, the same as any other past debt. The right of reimbursement belongs to whoever furnished the support; and it is subject to negotiation, settlement, satisfaction or discharge in the same manner as any other debt.
Id. at 143. While the court in Baggs ultimately refused to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel because the claims asserted were for current and future support, it held that the right to reimbursement for past support already furnished was a debt subject to legal and equitable doctrines. Id.; see also Borland v. Chandler, 733 P.2d 144, 146 (Utah 1987) (holding that equitable doctrines, such as estoppel, apply in statutory paternity actions); Wasescha v. Wasescha, 548 P.2d 895, 896 (Utah 1976) (holding that one who provided back child support may be estopped from seeking reimbursement for money expended).
In Burrow v. Vrontikis, 788 P.2d 1046 (Utah App.1990), on facts similar to the present case, this court applied equitable estoppel consistent with Borland, Wasescha, and Baggs to a claim for reimbursement for past support. In Burrow, the mother gave birth out of wedlock. Following the birth of the child, the mother told a Mend that she wanted nothing to do with the father. The Mend relayed this information to the father. Relying on this information, the father married and incurred additional financial obligations.
Seven years after the child’s birth, the mother brought a paternity action seeking reimbursement for back child support. The father argued that the mother should be barred from receiving back child support by the doctrines of laches and/or equitable es-toppel. The trial court concluded, based on Zito v. Butler, 584 P.2d 868 (Utah 1978) (per curiam), that equitable doctrines were not available in statutory paternity actions and awarded the mother four years back child support consistent with Utah Code Ann. § 78-45a-3. The father appealed.
During the course of the appeal, the supreme court overruled Zito and, as earlier expressed in Wasescha and Baggs, held that equitable defenses such as laches and equitable estoppel are available in paternity actions. See Borland, 733 P.2d at 146. Relying on Borland, this court reversed and remanded for a determination of whether lach-es and/or equitable estoppel barred the mother’s action. Burrow, 788 P.2d at 1047.
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AMENDED OPINION1
BENCH, Judge:
The Department of Social Services of the State of Utah (the State), on behalf of Cathy Parker, appeals the trial court’s application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel .to prevent Ms. Parker’s recovery of reimbursement for past child support from Harry Irizarry. We affirm.
FACTS
In June 1984, Ms. Parker and Mr. Irizarry met and began dating. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Parker became pregnant. After discovering she was pregnant, Ms. Parker temporarily moved from Utah to California. That August, Mr. Irizarry visited Ms. Parker in California and learned that she was pregnant. He then returned to Salt- Lake City.
Mr. Irizarry testified that in September he' sent a letter with some money to Ms. Parker, which she kept. He said that he followed up the letter with a telephone call. The trial court found that during this telephone call Ms. Parker stated that she did not want any money and would take care of herself. Mr. Irizarry testified that in November he sent another letter with approximately twenty dollars, and followed that letter with another telephone call. The trial court found that Ms. Parker again said she wanted nothing to do with him. Mr. Irizarry called again in January 1985. The trial court found that during this call she once again said she wanted nothing to do with him. In April 1985, Ms. Parker gave birth to twin girls. Ms. Parker left Mr. Irizarry’s name off the twins’ birth certificates.
In October 1985, Mr. Irizarry married his present wife and moved to Puerto Rico until September 1987, when they returned to Salt Lake City. He and his wife now have four-children. Ms. Parker became aware of Mr. Irizarry’s return to Salt Lake City in November 1988.
On May 30, 1989, the State filed a paternity action on Ms. Parker’s behalf to establish that Mr. Irizarry is the father of the twins and to fix a support obligation from the time of their birth. Mr. Irizarry acknowledged his paternity by stipulation shortly after the complaint was filed and a temporary support order was set. After a trial in February 1993, the trial court entered a judgment holding Mr. Irizarry responsible for ongoing child support and for back child support from the time this action was filed. However, the trial court found that Ms. Parker was equitably estopped from collecting past due child support from the date of the twins’ birth until the paternity action was filed. This determination was based on the statements Ms. Parker made to Mr. Irizarry before the twins’ birth to the effect that she did not want any money or involvement from Mr. Irizarry. The State now appeals the trial-court’s application of equitable estoppel.
ANALYSIS
The issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred by applying equitable estop-pel to bar Ms. Parker’s claim for reimbursement of back child support she has furnished.2 “[Ejquitable estoppel is ‘a highly fact-dependent question, one that we cannot profitably review de novo in every case because we cannot hope to work out a coherent statement of the law through a course of such decisions.’ ’-’ Trolley Square Assocs. v. Nielson, 886 P.2d 61, 65 (Utah App.1994) (quoting State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994)); accord Terry v. Price Mun. Corp., 784 P.2d 146, 148 (Utah 1989). We will not overturn the trial court’s application [1109]*1109of equitable estoppel absent an abuse of discretion. Trolley Square, 886 P.2d at 65.
In Baggs v. Anderson, 528 P.2d 141 (Utah 1974), the Utah Supreme Court discussed the distinction between reimbursement for past due support and future support:
it is appropriate to point out that support money can fall into two separate categories: First, the current and ongoing right of a child to receive support money from his father (parent); and second, the right to receive reimbursement for support of a - child after that has been done. As to the second, suppose a father (parent) fails over a period of time to furnish support of the child, and the mother, or someone else, furnishes it. That person then has the right to claim reimbursement from the parent, the same as any other past debt. The right of reimbursement belongs to whoever furnished the support; and it is subject to negotiation, settlement, satisfaction or discharge in the same manner as any other debt.
Id. at 143. While the court in Baggs ultimately refused to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel because the claims asserted were for current and future support, it held that the right to reimbursement for past support already furnished was a debt subject to legal and equitable doctrines. Id.; see also Borland v. Chandler, 733 P.2d 144, 146 (Utah 1987) (holding that equitable doctrines, such as estoppel, apply in statutory paternity actions); Wasescha v. Wasescha, 548 P.2d 895, 896 (Utah 1976) (holding that one who provided back child support may be estopped from seeking reimbursement for money expended).
In Burrow v. Vrontikis, 788 P.2d 1046 (Utah App.1990), on facts similar to the present case, this court applied equitable estoppel consistent with Borland, Wasescha, and Baggs to a claim for reimbursement for past support. In Burrow, the mother gave birth out of wedlock. Following the birth of the child, the mother told a Mend that she wanted nothing to do with the father. The Mend relayed this information to the father. Relying on this information, the father married and incurred additional financial obligations.
Seven years after the child’s birth, the mother brought a paternity action seeking reimbursement for back child support. The father argued that the mother should be barred from receiving back child support by the doctrines of laches and/or equitable es-toppel. The trial court concluded, based on Zito v. Butler, 584 P.2d 868 (Utah 1978) (per curiam), that equitable doctrines were not available in statutory paternity actions and awarded the mother four years back child support consistent with Utah Code Ann. § 78-45a-3. The father appealed.
During the course of the appeal, the supreme court overruled Zito and, as earlier expressed in Wasescha and Baggs, held that equitable defenses such as laches and equitable estoppel are available in paternity actions. See Borland, 733 P.2d at 146. Relying on Borland, this court reversed and remanded for a determination of whether lach-es and/or equitable estoppel barred the mother’s action. Burrow, 788 P.2d at 1047.
On remand, the trial court applied equitable estoppel and found that: (1) the mother had unreasonably delayed the filing of her claim for past child support; (2) the mother’s delay amounted to more than mere silence because of her representations that she wanted nothing to do with the father; and (3) the father reasonably relied upon the mother’s representations.- Based on its findings, the trial court concluded that the mother’s claim for past child support was barred by the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Id. at 1048. The mother appealed.
In the second appeal, this court restated the doctrine of. equitable estoppel:
“Estoppel is an equitable doctrine which precludes parties from asserting their' rights where their actions render it inequitable to allow them to assert those rights. Estoppel requires proof of three elements:-(1) a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one party inconsistent with a later-asserted claim; (2) the other party’s reasonable action or inaction based upon the first party’s statement, admission, act, or failure to act; and (3) injury to the second party that would result from allowing the first party to contradict or repudi[1110]*1110ate its statement, admission, act, or failure to act.”
Id., at 1048 (quoting Brixen & Christopher, Architects v. Elton, 777 P.2d 1039, 1043-44 (Utah App.1989) (citations omitted)). This court upheld the trial court’s application of equitable estoppel and ruled that the mother’s claim for reimbursement of back child support was barred:
First, it is uncontroverted that appellant failed to make any request or to take any action to require respondent to pay back child support for seven years. This was an unreasonable delay. Further, with adequate evidentiary support, the trial court found that appellant made statements to a mutual friend inconsistent with requiring respondent to pay child support, which she knew or should have known would be communicated to respondent and, in fact, were. This behavior is inconsistent with her present claim that respondent owes her $7,200 for past child support.
Second, respondent failed to pay support for those seven years because he reasonably relied upon both appellant’s failure to take any overt action to require him to pay, and.upon her communication to the mutual friend that she did not want anything to do with him and that she would handle the rearing of the child herself. Thus, respondent’s.failure to pay child support was based upon more than mere silence ....
Third, as a result of this reliance, respondent assumed other obligations, both in his personal life and in-his business, that would have been tempered had he been aware of the need and obligation to support the child.
Id.
The trial court in the present ease made findings with respect to each element of equitable estoppel. First, the trial court found that Ms. Parker “made statements [and] took actions that led [Mr. Irizarry] to reasonably conclude that she wanted nothing to do with him and didn’t want his support.” Second, the trial court found that it was reasonable for Mr. Irizarry to rely on Ms. Parker’s statements and actions. Third, the trial court found that, in reliance on Ms. Parker’s statements and actions, Mr. Irizarry married and incurred additional expenses. The trial court’s findings are supported by the evidence. Based upon these findings, the trial court concluded that Ms. Parker was estopped from receiving reimbursement for child support furnished prior to the filing of this action.
Ms. Parker made at least three statements that she wanted nothing to do with Mr. Iri-zarry and that she would take care of herself. Unlike the father in Burrow, Mr. Irizarry was the one who initiated the contacts between the parties in order to determine whether Ms. Parker needed his assistance. Ms. Parker’s statements, in contrast to those of the mother in Burrow, were made directly to the father so that there was no question that he was aware of and understood Ms. Parker’s position. The substance of Ms. Parker’s statements, however, bear a striking resemblance to the mother’s statements in Burrow. If anything, Ms. Parker’s statements were clearer'and more concise than the statements made in Burrow. Ms. Parker’s decision to leave Mr. Irizarry off of the birth certificates also supports the trial court’s decision. Like the father in Burrow, Mr. Irizarry reasonably relied on Ms. Parker’s statements and married and incurred additional financial obligations. Under Burrow, the trial court in the present case was clearly acting within its discretion by ruling that Ms. Parker was estopped from receiving reimbursement for" back child support.
CONCLUSION
The trial court properly denied Ms. Parker’s request for reimbursement of past child support under the doctrine of equitable es-toppel. The trial court’s ruling is affirmed.